Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who participated in a home invasion robbery during which he and several accomplices entered a residence, brandished firearms, assaulted the inhabitants, and stole valuables. During their escape, a gun battle erupted between the intruders and a neighbor, resulting in the death of one of the defendant’s accomplices. The identity of the shooter who killed the accomplice was never determined. The defendant was later identified by a victim and arrested after driving the wounded accomplice to the hospital.Following a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold the defendant to answer for murder under a provocative act theory, as well as for other related charges. The defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison. In 2022, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law rendered him ineligible for a murder conviction under the theory applied in his case. The superior court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately denying the petition after finding the defendant was convicted under a still-valid provocative act murder theory.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the defendant made a prima facie case for resentencing relief. The court held that because the defendant was convicted after the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Concha, which requires a personal finding of malice for provocative act murder, and because this theory remains valid under current law, the defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s denial of the resentencing petition. View "People v. Venancio" on Justia Law

After the birth of A.M., the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services became involved due to concerns about the mother’s substance abuse and the father’s alleged failure to protect A.M. from the mother. The juvenile court initially placed A.M. with her father, who lived with his sister Martha and other family members, and later awarded him sole physical custody. Years later, the father was incarcerated after police found a gun and pills in his car. Before going to prison, he arranged for Martha to care for A.M., providing her with necessary documents and a notarized letter for temporary custody. However, when the mother learned of the father’s incarceration, she refused to return A.M. to Martha after a visit. The mother’s care was found to be inadequate, with evidence of substance abuse, neglect, and unsafe living conditions, leading to A.M. being placed back with Martha.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained A.M. from both parents, citing concerns about the father’s criminal history and the mother’s conduct. The court found that the father’s incarceration and criminal actions impaired his ability to parent and protect A.M., and removed A.M. from both parents under various provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Both A.M.’s counsel and the father’s counsel argued that the father had made an appropriate care plan, but the court disagreed and ordered removal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that a juvenile court may not remove a child from an incarcerated parent solely due to incarceration if the parent has made a suitable plan for the child’s care. The court found no substantial evidence that the father’s plan posed a risk to A.M. and reversed the portion of the order removing A.M. from her father, remanding for further proceedings as appropriate. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

A woman diagnosed with fibromyalgia sued her former employer, a state agency, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, failure to engage in an interactive process, disability discrimination, and failure to prevent discrimination. The agency resisted early settlement and engaged in extensive, contentious litigation, including opposing amendments to the complaint, filing demurrers and summary adjudication motions, and engaging in protracted discovery. The case proceeded to a six-week jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on all counts and awarded her over $3.3 million in damages, significantly exceeding her earlier settlement offer.Following the verdict, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the agency’s post-trial motions and awarded the plaintiff statutory attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. The plaintiff’s counsel sought fees based on a lodestar calculation, supported by detailed timesheets and expert declarations regarding prevailing market rates. The court accepted most of the plaintiff’s evidence, applied a 1.75 multiplier to pre-verdict fees and a 1.25 multiplier to post-verdict fees, and awarded a total of $4,889,786.03. The court found the agency’s challenges to the number of hours and hourly rates unpersuasive, noting the agency had not meaningfully disputed the hours or provided its own billing records.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the agency’s appeal. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining reasonable hourly rates, accepting the number of hours billed, or applying multipliers to account for contingency risk and preclusion of other employment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Bronshteyn v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence in Riverside County, California, and sought pretrial military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. He had served five months of active duty in the United States Marine Corps and several years in the reserves. The trial court denied his request, finding him ineligible because he had not completed at least one year of active service or one day of combat, relying on a local Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and its interpretation of legislative intent.The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The People conceded that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a minimum of one year of service. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that the statute contains no such time requirement and remanded for the trial court to reconsider eligibility. The Appellate Division also clarified that, even if eligible, a defendant is not automatically entitled to diversion; the trial court retains discretion to assess suitability for diversion, guided by the statute’s rehabilitative purpose.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, then transferred the case for review. The court held that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not impose a minimum service duration for eligibility for military diversion, and the MOU’s one-year requirement does not apply to diversion under this statute. The court further held that trial courts must first determine eligibility under the statute and then exercise discretion to assess suitability for diversion, considering factors consistent with the statute’s rehabilitative goals. The court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Angulo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After the owners of a residential property in a common interest development defaulted on their homeowners association (HOA) assessments, the HOA, through its agent Delphi Law Group, LLP, initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Bird Rock Home Mortgage, LLC was the highest bidder at the initial auction and paid the bid amount. However, Delphi did not immediately transfer the deed, instead extending the bidding period under Civil Code section 2924m. During this extended period, Breaking Ground, LP submitted a higher bid and ultimately received the trustee’s deed to the property.The Superior Court of San Diego County presided over the dispute that followed. Bird Rock sued Breaking Ground, Microcredit Loan Fund, Inc., and Delphi, seeking declaratory relief and to quiet title, arguing that section 2924m did not apply to nonjudicial foreclosure sales enforcing liens for unpaid HOA assessments. Delphi filed a cross-complaint in interpleader regarding the rights to the property and sale proceeds. The case proceeded to a bench trial based on stipulated facts and briefs, with the central issue being whether section 2924m’s extended bidding period applied to this type of foreclosure sale.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s judgment de novo. The appellate court held that section 2924m does apply to nonjudicial foreclosure sales enforcing liens for unpaid HOA assessments when the governing declaration creates a contractual lien with a power of sale, qualifying as a “mortgage” under the relevant statutory scheme. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding the validity of the sale and deed to Breaking Ground, denying Bird Rock’s claims, and ordering distribution of the sale proceeds. The judgment was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the respondents. View "Bird Rock Home Mortgage v. Breaking Ground" on Justia Law

Yvette Renee Garcia was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and two counts related to driving under the influence of alcohol, following an incident in which she, while intoxicated, deliberately rammed her car into another vehicle during an argument. A breath test showed her blood-alcohol concentration was between .22 and .24. The charges stemmed from a single course of conduct.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Garcia’s request for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, finding her ineligible due to the DUI charges. Garcia then pleaded no contest to the assault and one DUI count, while the other DUI count was dismissed. The court imposed three years of formal probation for both the assault and DUI convictions, with additional conditions including community labor and jail time already served. Garcia appealed, and the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Vehicle Code section 23640 bars diversion in any case where a defendant is charged with a DUI offense, regardless of whether other non-DUI charges are included in the same case. The court rejected Garcia’s argument that she should be eligible for diversion on the assault charge, since all charges arose from a single incident and were prosecuted together. The court also found that the probation term for the assault charge exceeded the statutory maximum and modified it from three years to two years, while affirming the judgment as modified. The trial court was directed to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Carlos Mendoza was charged with second degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, along with related enhancements, following an incident in San Francisco. At his arraignment on the original felony complaint, Mendoza pled not guilty and waived his right to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days, but did not waive his right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days. Shortly before the expiration of the 60-day period, the prosecution moved to amend the complaint to add gang-related allegations and a new count for participation in a criminal street gang, based on recent discovery. Mendoza was arraigned and pled not guilty to the amended complaint, but did not waive the 60-day time limit.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco permitted the amendment and recalculated the statutory time limits, treating the arraignment on the amended complaint as restarting the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing. Mendoza’s counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing should occur within 60 days of the original arraignment. The trial court denied motions to dismiss based on violation of the 60-day limit, holding that material amendments to the complaint could restart the statutory period unless prompted by improper purpose. After the preliminary hearing, Mendoza was held to answer, and subsequent motions to dismiss were denied.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed Mendoza’s petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Although the underlying criminal case was dismissed as moot, the appellate court exercised its discretion to resolve the legal question. The court held that, absent a personal waiver by the defendant, an arraignment or plea on an amended complaint does not restart the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 859b. The statutory 60-day limit is absolute, and its purpose is to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy preliminary hearing. The petition was dismissed as moot. View "Mendoza v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

A charter city in California was required by state law to update its housing element—a component of its general plan addressing housing needs—by October 15, 2021. The city submitted a draft housing element to the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which found the draft would comply with state law if adopted. However, the city refused to adopt the revised housing element, citing concerns about environmental impacts and the number of affordable housing units required. The city also filed a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Housing Element Law, which was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing.The People of California, represented by the Attorney General and the HCD, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Orange County Superior Court, later transferred to the San Diego County Superior Court, seeking to compel the city to adopt a compliant housing element. The Kennedy Commission, an affordable housing advocacy group, intervened. The trial court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the city had a ministerial duty to adopt a compliant housing element, but the court’s order did not include a 120-day compliance deadline or provisional remedies limiting the city’s permitting and zoning authority, as requested by the State. The court also stayed further proceedings due to pending appeals and unresolved cross-petitions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Article 14 of Chapter 3 of Division 1 of Title 7 of the Government Code, which includes the 120-day compliance deadline and provisional remedies, applies to enforcement actions against charter cities. The court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and issue a new order including the required compliance deadline and provisional remedies, and to lift its stay and expeditiously resolve remaining issues. The court declined to order entry of final judgment while other pleadings remained unresolved. View "Kennedy Commission v. Superior. Ct." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury in 2000 of eight counts of first-degree special-circumstance murder and numerous other violent crimes, with firearm and gang enhancements found true. He received eight death sentences and a noncapital sentence exceeding 100 years to life, to be served consecutively. While his automatic appeal from the capital judgment was pending before the California Supreme Court, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified him as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which retroactively invalidates certain prior prison term enhancements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County set the matter for possible resentencing, appointed counsel, and held several hearings in the defendant’s absence. At the hearing, defense counsel requested the court strike the now-invalidated enhancement and conduct a holistic resentencing, including consideration of the Racial Justice Act and reassessment of the death sentences. The trial court declined to resentence, finding it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence while the direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, and denied the motion without prejudice to revisiting the issue after the Supreme Court’s decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that, under California law, the filing of a notice of appeal in a capital case vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the California Supreme Court over the entire judgment, including both capital and noncapital convictions and sentences. The court concluded that Penal Code section 1172.75 does not create an exception allowing trial courts to resentence defendants in capital cases while a direct appeal is pending. The appellate court also found no prejudicial error in holding the resentencing hearing in the defendant’s absence. The postjudgment order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Millsap" on Justia Law