Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves Stewart Johnston who was the defendant, cross-complainant, and appellant, against BTHHM Berkeley, LLC, PNG Berkeley, LLC, Michail Family 2004 Living Trust, Bianca Blesching, Scot Hawkins (collectively, BTHHM), and Holda Novelo and Landmark Real Estate Management, Inc. (collectively, Landmark). Johnston owned a property which he was to lease to BTHHM for a cannabis dispensary once permits were granted by the City of Berkeley. However, after the city approved the permit, Johnston refused to deliver possession of the property to BTHHM, leading to a lawsuit by BTHHM against Johnston.Following mediation, a two-page term sheet titled “Settlement Term Sheet Agreement” was signed by all parties. Johnston later wished to withdraw from the agreement. BTHHM and Landmark moved to enforce the term sheet pursuant to section 664.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the court granted. Johnston failed to make the payments required by the enforcement orders. The court granted BTHHM's motion for entry of judgment, awarded prejudgment interest to BTHHM, entered judgment against Johnston, and dismissed his cross-complaint with prejudice.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four reversed the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest but otherwise affirmed the decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the term sheet’s language evinces the parties’ mutual agreement to settle the case according to its terms. However, the court concluded that the award of prejudgment interest was unauthorized as it differed materially from the terms of the parties’ agreement. View "BTHHM Berkeley, LLC v. Johnston" on Justia Law

A mother appealed from juvenile court orders denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The mother argued that the proceedings violated her substantive due process rights because the juvenile court was not required to consider her potential for further brain development, or her capacity to change, given her status as a teenager.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the juvenile court orders. The court rejected the mother's arguments, concluding that sections 366.26 and 388 did not violate her due process rights. The court found that the focus of the proceedings shifted to permanence and stability for the child once reunification efforts failed. This shift did not violate the mother’s rights, even though she was a teenage parent. The court reasoned that the mother’s youth did not change or lessen the child’s need for permanence and stability.The court also dismissed the mother's reliance on cases concerning juvenile offenders in the criminal context, stating that the objectives and interests of the criminal justice system are vastly different from those of the juvenile dependency system. The court noted that the legislative choices to shift focus from reunification to permanency, require a parent to demonstrate changed circumstances, and prefer adoption as a permanent plan, were not intended to punish the parent, but to focus on the child's rights in proceedings where expediency is critical to the protection of their interests. View "In re S.G." on Justia Law

In this case, the People of the State of California filed a lawsuit against Holiday Liquor (owned by Abdul Jamal Sheriff and operated under Freetown Holdings Company) for public nuisance. The People claimed that the store had become a hub for illegal drug transactions, with customers and dealers using the store as a meeting point. The store was accused of tolerating loitering and drug dealing, lacking security, operating until 2 a.m., and selling alcohol in cheap single-serving containers.The trial court granted summary judgment for the People, ordering the store to hire guards, stop selling single-serving containers of alcohol, and take other measures to address the issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision.The court held that Holiday Liquor had indeed facilitated a public nuisance by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent the sale of illegal drugs on its property. The court ruled that the proprietor was aware of the illegal activities as he had been informed multiple times by the police. Despite this knowledge, he failed to implement recommended measures to mitigate the issue, such as hiring security guards, limiting operating hours, and ceasing the sale of single-serving alcohol containers. The ruling was based on the violation of sections 11570 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code (the drug house law), sections 3479 et seq. of the Civil Code (the public nuisance law), and sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (the unfair competition law). View "P. v. Freetown Holdings Co." on Justia Law

In 2014, plaintiffs Medallion Film LLC and Pelican Point Capital Partners entered into a consulting fee agreement with Clarius Capital Group, managed by William Sadleir. The agreement stipulated that Medallion Film and Pelican Point would assist Clarius in obtaining funding for film projects, and Clarius would pay them a portion of any funding obtained. However, it is alleged that Sadleir dissolved Clarius and its affiliate and subsidiary entities in 2015 and formed a new set of corporate entities under the name Aviron with the assistance of the law firm Loeb & Loeb.The plaintiffs allege that Sadleir controlled both the Clarius and Aviron entities and transferred Clarius’s assets to the Aviron entities. Aviron later obtained a loan for its film projects from BlackRock, which Medallion Film and Pelican Point claim they were entitled to a portion of under their agreement with Clarius. However, Sadleir denied any affiliation between Aviron and Clarius and said he was solely an employee of Aviron.The plaintiffs sued Loeb & Loeb in December 2021, alleging causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit by concealment, negligent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting fraud, and violating California Business and Professions Code section 17200. Loeb & Loeb filed a special motion to strike the first amended complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under section 425.16. The trial court granted the special motion to strike.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight vacated the judgment, reversed the order granting the special motion to strike, and remanded with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP" on Justia Law

In a shootout following a high-speed car chase, the defendant, Mario Guadalupe Serrano, was convicted of 13 criminal counts, including two counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer. After the trial court dismissed five of six firearm enhancements, it sentenced Serrano to a total determinate term of 35 years 8 months and a total indeterminate term of 30 years to life. On appeal, Serrano argued that there was insufficient evidence supporting the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation, the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to consider striking the premeditation and deliberation findings, and the trial court erroneously attached the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement to his determinate term rather than his indeterminate term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five affirmed the judgment, with the exception of the last argument. It held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Serrano had committed premeditated attempted murder of two peace officers beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that the trial court did not err in failing to exercise its discretion to dismiss the jury’s findings of premeditation and deliberation because these findings constitute alternative penalties for the offenses rather than enhancements. However, the court agreed with Serrano's assertion that the trial court erred in orally pronouncing that the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement was attached to his determinate term. Therefore, the court remanded the case for the limited purpose of correcting the record to reflect that the 20-year sentence for the firearm enhancement was attached to Serrano's indeterminate term. View "P. v. Serrano" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Dr. R. Michael Williams, a board-certified oncologist, and several defendants, including Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (DMCM) and various associated individuals. After a deterioration in their professional relationship, Williams alleged that the defendants acted to limit his medical practice and restrict his hospital privileges, affecting his ability to treat patients. Williams filed multiple lawsuits against the defendants, the second of which is the subject of this appeal.The trial court granted two anti-SLAPP motions in favor of the defendants, finding that Williams' claims arose from their protected activity and that Williams failed to establish a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court also awarded the defendants their attorney fees. Williams appealed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the awards of attorney fees.The court of appeal reversed both the granting of the anti-SLAPP motions and the award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court erred in its application of the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished between the factual allegations that form the basis of Williams' claims and the defendants' protected activities, concluding that not all of the claims in the complaint arose from protected activity. As such, not all of Williams' claims were subject to the anti-SLAPP statute and the defendants were not entitled to attorney fees. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto" on Justia Law

In the case considered by the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, Ropati Afatia Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) for nine claims in his habeas corpus petition. The petition was filed after the superior court dismissed his previously filed petition in a capital case. The court determined that it could issue a COA for one of the claims but declined to do so for the remaining eight.Seumanu had been convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping to commit robbery, and first-degree robbery, with special circumstances that led to a death penalty sentence. His appeal and subsequent habeas corpus petition were both unsuccessful. In 2022, Seumanu filed a new petition presenting nine claims not previously raised. The superior court dismissed the new petition as 'successive' under a specific provision of the Penal Code, meaning the claims were not new or different but rather repeated or supplemented those in the original petition.The appellate court found that the court orders regarding the habeas petition did not materially impair a fair adjudication of the case. The court determined that the ten-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests in the Court of Appeal was directory rather than mandatory. The court also agreed to appoint specific attorneys to represent Seumanu in his appeal.In terms of the specific claims, Seumanu argued that he was denied a fair penalty phase trial, that the trial court allowed the prosecution and defense to stipulate to the removal of potential jurors, and that the process of 'death qualifying' juries violated the rights of prospective jurors. The court found that the claims did not meet the requirements for relief or substantiality and upheld the superior court's dismissal.The court did grant a COA for a part of one claim which argued that a potential juror was improperly excused for cause which could result in a penalty retrial. However, for the remaining claims, the court found that Seumanu had not met the burden of demonstrating a substantial claim for relief or a substantial claim that the requirements of the relevant subdivision of the Penal Code had been met. As such, the court denied Seumanu's request for a COA for these claims. View "In re Seumanu" on Justia Law

This appeal originates from a dispute between Alameda Health System (AHS) and Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Association (ACERA), concerning the method employed by ACERA to calculate the annual contributions that participating employers must make towards unfunded liabilities. This system was intended to ensure the ability to finance the pensions promised to employees. AHS is one of seven public entities that are part of ACERA's retirement system.Since 1948, ACERA has used the “Percentage of Payroll” method to calculate annual contributions for unfunded liabilities among its participating employers. This common approach pools actuarial risk to reduce volatility in contribution rates, simplify contribution calculations, and ensure timely funding for the retirement system. AHS raised concerns about this method in 2015, suggesting an alternative approach, the “Percentage of Liability” method, could result in AHS paying $12 million less in contributions each year.AHS requested that ACERA change its methodology and retrospectively reallocate contributions made of “approximately $65 million.” ACERA's Board unanimously voted to deny AHS's requests after consideration and consultation. AHS subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief challenging ACERA’s decisions. In 2022, the court granted ACERA's motion for summary judgment and AHS appealed. The appeals court affirmed the judgment, finding no abuse of discretion by ACERA or the lower court. View "Alameda Health System v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association" on Justia Law

In 1994, David D. McClelland pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in a California state prison. In 2019, he filed for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.951, which provides a mechanism for defendants who were not the principal in a murder but were charged due to imputed malice. The court scheduled and rescheduled an evidentiary hearing multiple times at the request of both parties.In 2022, the prosecution responded to the order to show cause, planning to rely on the grand jury transcript and McClelland’s statements in Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation records as evidence. McClelland’s counsel requested the court not to consider certain hearsay testimony and argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.During a hearing in September 2022, the prosecution presented additional evidence, and McClelland's counsel requested the court to take McClelland's age at the time of the offense into consideration. McClelland's counsel then agreed to the court issuing a written ruling, and the court took the matter under submission. In November, the court denied the petition, ruling that McClelland was ineligible for resentencing as the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted the actual killer.McClelland appealed, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not present at the evidentiary hearing. The court disagreed, stating that the September hearing, in which all parties were present and evidence was presented, was the evidentiary hearing as per section 1172.6(d)(3). The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. McClelland" on Justia Law

The appellant, Elinton Gramajo, was a pizza delivery driver for Joe's Pizza on Sunset, Inc. and other defendants, and sued them for Labor Code violations regarding unpaid minimum and overtime wages. After several years of litigation, a jury trial awarded Gramajo $7,659.93. Gramajo then requested attorney fees of $296,920 and costs of $26,932.84 under Labor Code section 1194(a), which allows prevailing employees to recover reasonable litigation costs, including attorney fees. The trial court, however, denied these requests, arguing that Gramajo’s counsel had excessively litigated the case, and that the requested fees and costs were disproportionately high compared to Gramajo’s limited trial success.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight disagreed with the trial court. The court held that employees who win actions for unpaid minimum and overtime wages are entitled to reasonable litigation costs under Labor Code section 1194(a), regardless of the amount recovered. The court stressed that Gramajo was entitled to his reasonable fees and costs, and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine a reasonable fee and cost award. The court did not express an opinion on the reasonableness of Gramajo’s requests for litigation costs. View "Gramajo v. Joe's Pizza on Sunset, Inc." on Justia Law