Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An online business, Interactive Life Forms, LLC, was sued by a customer, Brinan Weeks, who alleged that the company falsely advertised a product he purchased. In response, the company invoked an arbitration clause found in the terms of use on its website, claiming that these terms bound customers irrespective of whether they clicked on the link or provided any affirmative assent. The company argued that by using the website and making a purchase, Weeks had agreed to the terms of use, which included a provision mandating arbitration for any disputes.The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the company failed to show the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The court held that the link to the terms of use was insufficient to put a reasonable user on notice of the terms of use and the arbitration agreement.On appeal, the Appellate Court of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division One, affirmed the trial court’s decision. It held that the company failed to establish that a reasonably prudent user would be on notice of the terms of use. The court rejected the company's argument that it should depart from precedent, which generally considers browsewrap provisions unenforceable, and also dismissed the company's claim that Federal Arbitration Act preempts California law adverse to browsewrap provisions. The court concluded there were no grounds to deviate from this precedent, and that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt California law concerning browsewrap agreements. The court emphasized that the company had the onus to put users on notice of the terms to which it wished to bind consumers. View "Weeks v. Interactive Life Forms, LLC" on Justia Law

In the appeal case presented, the defendants, Brian Terrell Hill and Clifford Jenkins, sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 for their convictions of first-degree murder and attempted murder. The defendants were initially convicted based on their involvement in the 1990 kidnapping and subsequent murder of Randy Burge and attempted murder of Kevin Thomas.The defendants contended that their petitions for resentencing were denied based on a felony murder theory related to kidnapping, which they argued violated ex post facto principles. They stated that at the time of the offense, kidnapping was not an enumerated felony under section 189, subdivision (a) to which felony-murder liability could be attached. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that section 1172.6 does not apply new law retroactively to make formerly innocent conduct criminal, but looks to whether a defendant could be convicted under current law.The court found substantial evidence supporting the lower court's determination that Hill intended to kill Thomas and was therefore guilty of attempted murder. Similarly, the court found substantial evidence supporting the lower courts' findings that both Hill and Jenkins were guilty of felony murder as major participants in the kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human life.Given these findings, the court affirmed the denial of Hill's and Jenkins' petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

The case concerns Brooklyn Restaurants, Inc., a company that operates a local diner in California. The company filed a lawsuit against its insurer, Sentinel Insurance Company, Limited, after the insurer declined a claim under a commercial property insurance policy following a partial shutdown of the diner during the COVID-19 pandemic. The lower court granted Sentinel’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling there was no coverage under the policy for Brooklyn’s claimed business loss. However, Brooklyn appealed, asserting that its case was unique from other COVID-19 related insurance cases filed in the state, as it had alleged a direct physical loss which should trigger coverage under the policy.Brooklyn also pointed out that their insurance policy contained a unique provision specifically covering losses attributable to a virus. Therefore, they argued, physical loss should include the cleaning of an area infected by the coronavirus. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, agreed that the policy was reasonably susceptible to that interpretation. They also determined that Brooklyn had adequately alleged a direct physical loss or damage under the policy, which raised the possibility of coverage.However, the policy also included certain exclusions and conditions applicable to coverage for a loss or damage resulting from a virus. Brooklyn argued that these exclusions and conditions rendered the policy illusory. The court agreed that at the pleading stage, Brooklyn had done enough to raise the issue that its policy might be illusory, which in turn raised factual questions that required further discovery and evidence collection. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the lower court with instructions to enter an order denying Sentinel’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Brooklyn Restaurants, Inc. v. Sentinel Insurance Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, with the defendant, Richard Curtis Morris, Jr., appealing from the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Morris was previously convicted on charges of first-degree murder with associated special circumstances of rape, robbery, and murder for financial gain. He argues that for a nonkiller to be convicted of first-degree murder under the amended felony-murder statute when the nonkiller acts with intent to kill, the prosecution must prove the nonkiller assisted the actual killer in the killing itself. According to him, the jury found that he aided an actor in committing the underlying felonies, which he claims is insufficient basis for denying a resentencing evidentiary hearing.The appeals court disagreed with Morris, holding that a person who, with an intent to kill, directly commits or aids and abets an enumerated felony in which a death occurs commits the actus reus necessary for felony murder under the amended felony-murder statute by acting in furtherance of the common design of the felony. The jury instructions and verdicts in this case establish the jury necessarily concluded Morris possessed an intent to kill during the commission of the underlying felonies and aided and abetted the actual killer in committing those felonies. By this ruling, the court affirmed that the record of conviction establishes, as a matter of law, that Morris is not eligible for resentencing. Therefore, the trial court was correct in its summary denial of the petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "P. v. Morris" on Justia Law

In the matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the defendant, W.K., appealed the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting his wife, N.M., and their daughter. The court was asked to consider whether a party who had already responded to a petition for a DVRO was entitled to a continuance of the hearing "as a matter of course" under Family Code, Section 245, subdivision (a).The court ruled that the trial court did not have a mandatory duty to grant a continuance under these circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the hearing. The court found that W.K., having already responded to the petition, was not entitled to a continuance to allow him to respond to the petition. The court also concluded that denial of a continuance did not deprive the defendant of a fair hearing, as he had declared himself prepared to proceed at an earlier hearing and was aware at least four days before the DVRO hearing that the text message exchanges between himself and his wife would be at issue.N.M. had alleged several incidents of domestic abuse. The court found her testimony credible and W.K.'s explanations not credible, concluding that the text messages alone, which W.K. acknowledged he wrote, provided sufficient basis for the DVRO. The trial court issued a restraining order for three years, with N.M. retaining custody of their child and W.K. granted supervised visitation twice a week. The court rejected W.K.'s remaining challenges to the DVRO, denied N.M.'s request to dismiss the appeal, and denied both parties' requests for sanctions. View "N.M. v. W.K." on Justia Law

In this case, the court dealt with the suspension and subsequent resignation of a licensed obstetrician and gynecologist, Plaintiff Dr. Vardui Asiryan, from the defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center and its Medical Staff. The Medical Staff suspended Asiryan’s privileges at the hospital without holding a hearing or giving her prior notice. Asiryan sued both entities, alleging they failed to comply with statutory and common law procedural requirements in connection with suspending her privileges at the hospital. She further claimed that the Medical Staff lied to her regarding their obligations to report her suspension and resignation to the state licensing board.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court correctly concluded that the Business and Professions Code is the sole source of procedural protections in connection with hospital peer review, and that the common law doctrine of fair procedure does not supplement those protections with additional guarantees. Therefore, the court correctly granted the nonsuit on Asiryan’s common law peer review claims and correctly rejected her proposed jury instructions regarding peer review.As for the court's order awarding attorney fees, the Court of Appeal held that given the court’s rulings denying certain portions of defendants’ summary judgment and nonsuit motions, a hypothetical reasonable attorney could have deemed Asiryan’s peer review claims against the Medical Staff tenable and reasonably decided to take them to trial. This same logic does not apply to the fees awarded to GAMC, because the court disposed of the claims against GAMC on summary judgment. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the court’s fee order to the extent it awards fees to the Medical Staff, but affirmed the order as it applies to GAMC. View "Asiryan v. Medical Staff of Glendale Adventist Medical Center" on Justia Law

In California, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) found that the Kern County Hospital Authority violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), a law that governs labor relations in the public sector. The violation occurred when the Authority unilaterally decided it could reject collective grievances filed by the Service Employees International Union, Local 521 (SEIU), without giving the Union the opportunity to negotiate this policy change.The dispute centered on the interpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Authority and SEIU. The Authority argued that the MOU only allowed individual employees to file grievances and did not explicitly permit collective grievances. Therefore, the Authority believed it had the right to reject any collective grievances.However, PERB ruled that the MOU was ambiguous on this point. PERB noted that while the MOU did not directly address collective grievances, it did contain a provision allowing for the consolidation of grievances. Furthermore, the MOU's language did not clearly and unambiguously exclude collective grievances. PERB found that the Authority's assertion that it could categorically reject collective grievances represented a new policy or a new interpretation of an existing policy, which amounted to a unilateral change in violation of the MMBA.Additionally, PERB rejected the Authority's argument that the Union had waived its right to bargain over this matter. PERB found that the Authority had not demonstrated that the Union knowingly and voluntarily relinquished its interest in collective grievances.As a result, PERB affirmed its earlier decision and denied the Authority's petition for writ of extraordinary relief. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed PERB's decision. View "Kern County Hospital Authority v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The appellant, Samantha Wood, sought to legally change her name to Candi Bimbo Doll, an identity she had pursued for over a decade. Despite no opposition to her request, the trial judge of the San Francisco County Superior Court denied Wood's petition based on the judge's interpretation of the term "bimbo" as inherently offensive. The judge derived this interpretation from various sources, including the Oxford English Dictionary, a law review article, and trends on the social media platform, TikTok.Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by denying Wood's petition for a name change. The court established that the trial court had incorrectly applied the principle that a name change may be denied only upon a "substantial reason".The appellate court determined that the term "bimbo" was not universally offensive or vulgar. They found that the term was being reclaimed and used as a means of empowerment in certain contexts, including on TikTok. The court also highlighted that the term did not appear to cause any confusion, as evidenced by its use in various business names and personalized license plates.Consequently, the court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by not adhering to the applicable legal principles that favor granting a name change, and by failing to identify substantial and principled reasons for denying the name change. The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant Wood's petition for a name change. View "Wood v. S.F. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, F.K. (the Mother) filed a petition challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate her reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing regarding her daughter, A.R. The Mother contended that the Santa Barbara County Department of Child Welfare Services (the department) did not adequately consider her grief over the death of A.R.'s twin sister and did not provide reasonable reunification services. She also claimed that six months of services were insufficient.The Mother had a history of untreated alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and criminal convictions related to these issues. The juvenile court ordered her to receive reunification services after finding the dependency petition true and removing A.R. from her custody. The services aimed at addressing her substance abuse and its impact on her ability to safely parent A.R.The juvenile court decided to terminate the reunification services at the six-month review hearing after concluding that the Mother failed to make substantial progress in the court-ordered treatment plan. The court reasoned that it did not have discretion to extend services unless the Mother showed substantial compliance with the case plan. The court also found that the department had made reasonable efforts to return A.R. to the Mother's custody by providing reasonable services.The Court of Appeal agreed with the Mother's contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating the reunification services. The court noted that, at the six-month review, the juvenile court had the discretion to continue the case and forego setting a hearing to terminate parental rights even if it did not find a substantial probability of the child returning to the parent. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not exercise its discretion because it incorrectly believed it was bound to terminate services due to the Mother's lack of substantial progress. The Court of Appeal ordered the juvenile court to conduct a new section 366.21 hearing. View "F.K. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, Steve Wozniak and 17 individuals who fell victim to a cryptocurrency scam, sued YouTube and Google. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knowingly hosted, promoted, and profited from a scam that falsely claimed Wozniak was hosting a live event, during which anyone who sent cryptocurrency to a specified account would receive double the amount in return. The defendants argued that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 provided immunity because the plaintiffs were trying to treat them as publishers of third-party content. However, the plaintiffs contended that they were not treating the defendants as publishers but were instead seeking to hold them liable for engaging in actions they knew would further criminal activity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District held that most of the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act as they sought to treat the defendants as publishers of third-party content. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' claim that defendants created their own content and materially contributed to the scam's illegality by providing verification badges to hijacked YouTube channels potentially fell outside the scope of immunity. The court concluded that the trial court erred in not granting leave to amend the claims related to verification badges. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC" on Justia Law