Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Dana Hohenshelt, filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Golden State Foods Corp., alleging retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, failure to prevent retaliation, and violations of the California Labor Code. Golden State moved to compel arbitration in accordance with their arbitration agreement, and the trial court granted the motion, staying court proceedings. Arbitration began, but Golden State failed to pay the required arbitration fees within the 30-day deadline. Hohenshelt then sought to withdraw his claims from arbitration and proceed in court, citing Golden State's failure to pay as a material breach of the arbitration agreement under California's Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The trial court denied this motion, deeming Golden State's payment, which was made after the deadline but within a new due date set by the arbitrator, as timely.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's decision. It held that the trial court had ignored the clear language of section 1281.98, which states any extension of time for the due date must be agreed upon by all parties. Golden State's late payment constituted a material breach of the arbitration agreement, regardless of the new due date set by the arbitrator. The court also rejected Golden State's argument that section 1281.98 is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, following precedent from other courts that held these state laws are not preempted because they further the objectives of the Federal Arbitration Act. Therefore, the court granted Hohenshelt's petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to lift the stay of litigation. View "Hohenshelt v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two, a woman, T.B., was found to be gravely disabled and was appointed a conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. T.B. appealed, arguing that her trial did not commence within 10 days of her demanding one, violating section 5350, subdivision (d)(2) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and denying her due process. This statute was amended in January 1, 2023, to state that the failure to commence the trial within the time period is grounds for dismissal. The court concluded that the time limit for commencing trials is directory, not mandatory, and that dismissal for the failure to comply with the time limit is discretionary. The court found that the trial court did abuse its discretion in denying T.B.’s motions to dismiss the proceedings, but no reversal was required because T.B. did not demonstrate prejudice. The court also found that T.B. did not demonstrate a violation of her due process rights by the delay. Therefore, the court affirmed the conservatorship order. View "Conservatorship of T.B." on Justia Law

In 1995, Armondo Lopez was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder for his role in an incident where his co-defendant, intending to kill a rival, accidentally shot and killed an unintended victim. Lopez had assisted his co-defendant, knowing that the co-defendant intended to kill the rival. Although Lopez was not the shooter, he was deemed liable for the unintended victim's death under the doctrine of transferred intent. This doctrine holds that if a person intends to harm one individual but unintentionally harms another instead, the intent to harm is transferred to the actual victim, making the person liable for that harm.In 2021, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that changes in the law under Senate Bill 1437 meant he could no longer be convicted of murder. Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, amended California's murder law to limit murder liability for accomplices who did not act with intent to kill and were not major participants in the crime. Lopez argued that the doctrine of transferred intent, which had been used to establish his liability for murder, was a form of imputed liability and therefore incompatible with the revised law.The Court of Appeal of the State of California disagreed, holding that Senate Bill 1437 did not abrogate the doctrine of transferred intent. The court reasoned that the bill's language did not suggest any intent to abolish this long-established doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the doctrine of transferred intent requires an intent to kill, which Lopez had demonstrated through his actions and admissions. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Lopez's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the taxation of cell phones sold in California as part of a "bundled transaction," in which a consumer purchases the phone at a reduced price from a wireless service provider in exchange for signing a contract for future wireless service. The plaintiffs challenged a state regulation that calculates sales tax on the full, unbundled price of the phone, rather than the discounted price paid by the consumer. They argued that this regulation violated the Revenue and Taxation Code and was not properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, rejected these arguments. It concluded that the Department of Tax and Fee Administration could allocate a portion of the contract price in a bundled transaction to the cell phone and tax it accordingly. It also found that the regulation was properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act.The court noted that, while services are not taxable under California law, the sale of a cell phone as part of a bundled transaction is not a true discount because the wireless service provider recoups the cost of the phone through the service contract. Therefore, the Department could reasonably allocate a portion of the contract price to the phone and tax it accordingly. The court also concluded that the regulation had been properly adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act, rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the Department had failed to properly assess the regulation's economic impact and provide adequate notice to the public.As a result, the court reversed the portion of the lower court judgment that invalidated the regulation and prohibited the Department from applying it to bundled transactions. It remanded the case with instructions to deny the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Bekkerman v. California Department Of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff Jacob Ayers purchased a new Jeep Grand Cherokee manufactured by the defendant, FCA US, LLC (FCA). After experiencing numerous problems with the vehicle, he asked FCA to repurchase it, but FCA refused. Ayers then sued FCA under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, also known as the lemon law. During the course of litigation, FCA made multiple offers to settle the case. However, Ayers rejected these offers and continued to litigate. Later, Ayers traded in the Jeep for a new vehicle, receiving a credit of $13,000.In 2020, a court decision (Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC) held that the Song-Beverly restitution remedy does not include amounts a plaintiff has already recovered by trading in the vehicle at issue. This decision effectively reduced Ayers' maximum potential recovery by three times the amount of the trade-in. In January 2021, Ayers served FCA with a section 998 offer for $125,000 plus costs, expenses, and attorney fees, which FCA accepted.The dispute then centered on how much FCA should pay Ayers in attorney fees and costs. FCA argued that its earlier offer to settle the case (made under section 998 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) cut off Ayers' right to attorney fees incurred after the date of that offer. The trial court rejected this argument, and FCA appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that section 998 does apply to a case that is resolved by a pretrial settlement. It also held that an intervening change in law that reduced the maximum amount a plaintiff could recover at trial does not exempt the plaintiff from the consequences of section 998. The court concluded that FCA's earlier settlement offer was valid and that it cut off Ayers' right to attorney fees incurred after the date of that offer.The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter a new judgment excluding any costs incurred by Ayers after the date of FCA's earlier offer. FCA was also awarded costs on appeal. View "Ayers v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from a postconviction order for restitution in the amount of $6,700. The defendant, Joshua Jereco Pittman, was ordered to pay this amount for jewelry stolen from the home of victims Michael F. and Betty F. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's restitution order. The court noted that a victim's estimate of the value of stolen items is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of loss, subject to rebuttal by the defendant. In this case, the victims' estimates were contained in a police report and in restitution forms, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on these estimates. The appellate court also found that evidence of replacement value for the stolen property was sufficient to support the restitution order. View "People v. Pittman" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California decided on a matter concerning an automobile insurance policy. The plaintiffs, Silvia Escarcega and Alberto Molinar, who are the parents of Tania Molinar, filed a lawsuit against 21st Century Insurance Company (defendant) for refusal to defend or indemnify their daughter in a lawsuit brought against her following a car accident she caused. The insurer denied coverage on the grounds that the policy had been cancelled due to nonpayment of premiums prior to the accident. The plaintiffs argued that the insurer had a duty to give advance notice of cancellation not only to them as policyholders but also to their adult daughter who was named as an insured driver on their policy and whose vehicle was also insured under the policy.The court held that under Insurance Code section 662, subdivision (a), the insurer was required to give advance notice of cancellation to the adult daughter. Because the insurer did not give notice to the adult daughter, the policy was still legally in effect when she got into the accident driving her covered vehicle without knowledge of the purported cancellation. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the insurer on claims arising out of its refusal to defend or indemnify the daughter. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Molinar v. 21st Century Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, the defendant, Devin Gaillard, appealed from a lower court decision denying his petition for resentencing on a 2014 voluntary manslaughter conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). Gaillard argued that he had established a prima facie case because the record of conviction did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief. The People, represented by the Attorney General, conceded this error and agreed that the order must be reversed.Gaillard had initially pled guilty to counts of voluntary manslaughter and transportation of marijuana, admitting that he "aided [and] abetted the voluntary manslaughter of Dillon Davis [and] transported marijuana." The trial court sentenced him to a 25-year prison term.In 2022, Gaillard filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. However, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that Gaillard was a direct aider and abettor and therefore ineligible for relief under the law. Gaillard then filed a timely appeal.The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in its decision. It found that Gaillard’s guilty plea did not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6. The court ruled that Gaillard’s admission that he aided and abetted in the crime did not definitively establish that he could still be convicted of murder under current law, which requires the defendant to personally harbor malice aforethought. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition. View "People v. Gaillard" on Justia Law

In the case of Maryann Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC and GoodLeap, LLC, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision not to compel arbitration. The case concerned a business relationship involving the installation of home solar panels. The appellants, Solgen Construction and GoodLeap, had appealed the trial court's denial of their separate motions to compel arbitration, arguing that the court had erred in several ways, including by concluding that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed.Jones, the respondent, had filed a lawsuit alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, negligence, and violations of various consumer protection laws. She contended that she had been misled into believing she was signing up for a free government program to lower her energy costs, not entering into a 25-year loan agreement for solar panels. The appellants argued that Jones had signed contracts containing arbitration clauses, but the court found that the appellants had failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. The court also held that the contract was unenforceable due to being unconscionable.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting the appellants' arguments that an evidentiary hearing should have been held and that the court had erred in its interpretation of the evidence and the law. It found that the trial court had not abused its discretion and that its finding that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proof was not erroneous as a matter of law. View "Jones v. Solgen Construction" on Justia Law

The California Fifth Appellate District Court examined a case where the defendant, Brandon Michael Patterson, petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Patterson was initially convicted for first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. He later petitioned for resentencing, claiming that he did not meet the criteria for murder under changes made to sections 188 and 189. The lower court agreed and redesignated his murder conviction as attempted robbery and first-degree residential burglary.However, the appellate court found that the murder conviction could not be redesignated as a first-degree residential burglary because it was not the "underlying felony" of Patterson's felony-murder conviction. Based on the instructions given to the jury during the original trial, the only "underlying felony" was attempted robbery. The court ruled that the term "underlying felony" refers to the specific crime that underlies a felony-murder conviction, which, in this case, was attempted robbery. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's decision to redesignate the murder conviction as a first-degree residential burglary, and remanded the case for Patterson to be sentenced on the redesignated attempted robbery conviction. View "People v. Patterson" on Justia Law