Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The California Court of Appeal held that evidence from a TruNarc laser narcotics identification test was improperly admitted at trial because the prosecution failed to establish its reliability under the Kelly rule. The Kelly rule requires that expert testimony based on a new scientific technique must be shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, that the expert testifying about the technique is qualified, and that correct scientific procedures were used in the test. The court found that the TruNarc test, which uses a laser to identify substances, was a new scientific technique and that the prosecution did not demonstrate its general acceptance or reliability. Consequently, it was error to admit testimony about the TruNarc test at trial. However, the court also held that this error was not prejudicial in relation to the defendant's two methamphetamine convictions because there was other compelling evidence supporting those convictions. It concluded, though, that the error was prejudicial with respect to the defendant's conviction for simple possession of carisoprodol (a muscle relaxant), because the officer's identification of the pills as carisoprodol was less certain and partly based on an unverified public website. As a result, the court reversed the carisoprodol conviction but affirmed the methamphetamine convictions. View "People v. Rios" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, the defendant, Daniel Oliver Mares, had appealed from an order that denied his petition to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction and resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.6. Mares had pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter while facing a murder charge. The record of conviction includes the preliminary hearing transcript, where police recounted Mares’s admissions that he stabbed the victim and acted alone. Mares claimed in his petition that he could not be convicted today due to changes made to the murder laws in 2019 legislation. The court determined that Mares had failed to make a prima facie showing for relief, as he was the actual killer and acted alone in stabbing the victim. The court's decision was based on the record of conviction, which contained uncontradicted facts that refuted Mares’s assertion. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny Mares's petition. View "People v. Mares" on Justia Law

In the case presented, Wesley McDowell Jr. was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and other offenses, leading to a sentence of 23 years to life in prison. McDowell appealed this sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his elevated sentence of 15 years to life under section 236.1(c)(2) of the Penal Code, which pertains to human trafficking of a minor with aggravating circumstances. He cited Senate Bill 81, claiming it compelled the sentencing courts to dismiss enhancements under certain circumstances, applicable to his elevated sentence.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three held that Senate Bill 81 applies only to enhancements--additional terms of imprisonment added to the base term. As McDowell conceded, section 236.1(c)(2) provides an alternative punishment for the underlying offense and is therefore not an enhancement. Thus, Senate Bill 81 did not apply to McDowell’s elevated sentence under section 236.1(c)(2). The court affirmed the original sentence. View "People v. McDowell" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Ali Shalghoun, was the administrator of a residential facility, Hargis Home, where a client of the North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. (the Regional Center), a man identified as J.C. with developmental disabilities and a history of violent outbursts, was housed. In May 2018, Hargis Home notified the Regional Center that it could no longer meet J.C.'s needs and requested help in finding alternative placement for him. While the Regional Center was searching for a new facility, J.C. attacked Shalghoun in July 2018, causing him serious injuries. Shalghoun sued the Regional Center for his injuries, arguing that it had a duty to protect him from harm.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District, however, disagreed. It held that the Regional Center had no legal duty of care towards Shalghoun. While the Regional Center has a responsibility to provide services and support to developmentally disabled persons, it does not have a duty to protect the employees of a residential facility. The court further noted that the Regional Center could not unilaterally relocate J.C. without the agreement of another facility to accept him. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Regional Center. View "Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc." on Justia Law

In a dispute between plaintiffs Jason Riddick, Elizabeth Riddick, and Renee Sperling, and the City of Malibu in the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The plaintiffs sought to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) attached to their existing single-family residence and applied for a permit. However, the City of Malibu denied the application, asserting that a coastal development permit (CDP) was required. The plaintiffs argued that their project was exempt from the CDP requirement under a local ordinance. The Superior Court agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the City to process the proposed ADU as exempt from the CDP requirements. The City appealed this decision.The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the local ordinance did indeed exempt improvements directly attached to existing single-family residences, including ADUs, from the CDP requirement. Moreover, the court decided that the City's interpretation of the ordinance was not entitled to deference and rejected the City's contention that the ordinance language was internally inconsistent or at odds with other provisions of the statutory scheme. In a cross-appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to a permit within 60 days of their completed application, but the court held that this issue was not properly before it on the cross-appeal because it arose from matters occurring after the final ruling. Their cross-appeal was therefore limited to the judgment, which the court affirmed in its entirety. View "Riddick v. City of Malibu" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, Arturo Franco, the defendant, committed two sexual offenses against his minor stepdaughter. After serving his sentence and completing his probation, Franco complied with the requirement to register as a sex offender for 37 years. In 2021, Franco petitioned to be removed from California's registry of sex offenders, arguing that he had lived a law-abiding life for over three decades since his conviction. However, the People opposed the petition, primarily arguing that one of Franco's crimes would render him ineligible for removal from the registry if prosecuted under a statute enacted 21 years after his conviction.The trial court denied Franco's petition, giving significant weight to the egregious nature of the underlying offenses and the age of the victim, despite Franco's 37 years of law-abiding behavior and no evidence suggesting a current risk of reoffending. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision, finding that it contravened the precedent set in People v. Thai, which held that mere focus on the nature of the initial crime without evidence of the defendant's current likelihood of reoffending was not sufficient to deny removal from the sex offender registry. The appellate court also rejected the People's argument that Franco "could have been convicted" of a crime that did not exist at the time of his offense, noting that the relevant legislation tied tier placement in the registry to the offense for which the defendant "was convicted". View "People v. Franco" on Justia Law

The City of Norwalk sued the City of Cerritos, alleging that Cerritos' ordinance limiting commercial and heavy truck traffic to certain major arteries caused extra truck traffic to be diverted through Norwalk, constituting a public nuisance. The City of Cerritos demurred, arguing that it was immune from liability as the ordinance was enacted under the express authority of the Vehicle Code sections 35701 and 21101. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Norwalk appealed this decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the public nuisance alleged by Norwalk, namely, the diversion of heavy truck traffic and its adverse effects, necessarily and inescapably flowed from the enactment of the Cerritos ordinance, which was expressly authorized by the Vehicle Code. As such, Cerritos was immune from liability for public nuisance under Civil Code section 3482. In addition, the court found no merit in Norwalk's arguments that the ordinance was unreasonable and that Cerritos failed to obtain the state's permission to regulate certain streets. View "City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Lancaster, California, and the companies Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC. The City claimed that Netflix and Hulu were required under the Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act of 2006 to pay franchise fees to local governments for using public rights-of-way to provide video service in their jurisdictions. According to the City, the companies had been providing video service without paying these fees.However, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the City's claims, and the City appealed. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal, finding that the Act does not authorize local governments to seek franchise fees from non-franchise holders. The Act allows local governments to sue franchise holders over unpaid or underpaid franchise fees, but it does not extend this right of action to companies that do not hold a state franchise. The court further noted that the Act empowers the state's public utilities commission to enforce franchise-related issues, including the issuance of franchises and the collection of associated fees.The court also rejected the City's claim for declaratory relief, which sought a court order compelling Netflix and Hulu to obtain state franchises and pay franchise fees going forward. The court found that this claim was "wholly derivative" of the City's claim for damages under the Act and that the enforcement of franchise-related issues is a matter for the public utilities commission, not the courts.The court's ruling means that local governments in California cannot sue video service providers like Netflix and Hulu for failing to pay franchise fees unless those companies hold a state franchise. View "City of Lancaster v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

In the State of California, a criminal defendant diagnosed with a mental disorder can be placed on mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The provision allows such defendants to receive treatment for their mental illness and potentially avoid prosecution. However, the court may reinstate charges if the defendant's behavior while on diversion renders them unsuitable for the program. This case involved a defendant, Jasmen Lavar Hall, who was charged with carjacking and related offenses. After being placed on mental health diversion, Hall was expelled from his residential treatment program for threatening and assaulting other patients and destroying property. Following this behavior, Hall went missing for approximately six months before being apprehended. The trial court subsequently terminated Hall's diversion and reinstated the criminal proceedings. After a jury trial, Hall was convicted of the carjacking-related offenses and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of seven years eight months in prison. Hall argued that the court erred in reinstating the criminal proceedings because his actions did not meet the statutory criteria for having his diversion terminated. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One disagreed, ruling that Hall's violent conduct and failure to comply with his treatment obligations rendered him unsuitable for diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, subdivision (g)(3). The court therefore held that the trial court did not err in terminating Hall's diversion and reinstating the criminal proceedings, and it affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, the defendant, Ronald Gordon Ferenz, had pleaded no contest to charges of rape of an unconscious person, forcible rape, and dissuading a witness. He was sentenced to a 12-year term in state prison and was imposed a criminal justice administration fee. On appeal, Ferenz challenged the trial court's denial of his post-plea motion to substitute his counsel, the court's decision to not strike certain exhibits attached to the prosecutor’s statement of view, and the imposition of the criminal justice administration fee.The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ferenz’s motion to substitute his counsel as there was no showing of a breakdown in communication between Ferenz and his counsel, nor was there any evidence that the counsel's conduct fell below the standard of care. The court also held that the trial court did not err in declining to strike portions of the prosecutor’s statement of view as the material was not expressly precluded by section 1203.01 and the court had inherent authority to accept the material. However, the court agreed with Ferenz that the criminal justice administration fee must be stricken due to the effect of Assembly Bill No. 1869 which rendered such fees unenforceable and uncollectible after July 1, 2021.The court modified the judgment to vacate the $129.75 criminal justice administration fee, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "People v. Ferenz" on Justia Law