Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gregory D. is the father of X.D., a child born in 2014. In 2015, Gregory D. kidnapped X.D. and her mother, assaulted the mother, and endangered X.D., leading to a prior dependency proceeding in which the mother was granted full custody and the father was allowed monitored visits, though he rarely exercised them. In December 2023, X.D.’s mother was killed during a violent incident, leaving X.D. without a parent to care for her. At that time, Gregory D. was incarcerated and had not been in contact with X.D. for years. X.D. was placed with her maternal grandmother.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County seeking dependency jurisdiction over X.D. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), citing the absence of a parent able to provide care. After Gregory D.’s whereabouts were discovered, he suggested his mother and brother as possible caregivers. The Department investigated and found the paternal grandmother’s home unsuitable due to her health and living conditions, and the paternal uncle was unresponsive and already caring for two young children. X.D. expressed fear of her father and no interest in living with his relatives.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g), is appropriate when an incarcerated parent cannot arrange for suitable, reliable, or appropriate care for the child, even if the parent suggests relatives who are unwilling or unable to provide such care. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order exerting dependency jurisdiction over X.D. and ordering reunification services for Gregory D. View "In re X.D." on Justia Law

Daniel Orozco was involved in a drive-by shooting in Los Angeles, where he and three other members or associates of the Varrio Norwalk gang entered rival Chivas gang territory. During two separate incidents about twenty minutes apart, a shooter in Orozco’s car used Orozco’s gun to wound one man and kill another, who was not a gang member. Police quickly connected the car to Orozco, found the group at his home, and recovered the weapon and other evidence. Orozco was arrested along with the others. At trial, Orozco’s defense centered on his alleged intoxication, arguing he was too drunk to form criminal intent.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate suppressed a confession by the shooter, Martinez Garibo, due to a Miranda violation. Despite this, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold Orozco to answer for murder and attempted murder, but not for conspiracy to commit murder, as there was no evidence of an agreement to kill. On the day of trial, the prosecution moved to add a conspiracy charge, which the trial court allowed over Orozco’s objection. The jury convicted Orozco of all three charges, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder, with a stayed sentence for conspiracy.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the conspiracy conviction must be reversed because the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support that charge, and Orozco was not given proper notice. The court affirmed the convictions for murder and attempted murder, finding no merit in Orozco’s other arguments, including ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged prosecutorial error. The court also held that Orozco forfeited his challenge to the attempted murder sentence by failing to object and having adequate notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law

A maintenance worker was employed by a yacht club and, as part of his expanded duties, assisted with the club’s fleet of boats, including tasks that required boarding vessels in navigable waters. While returning a club-owned boat to the water after maintenance, the worker slipped and fell on the boat’s deck, sustaining injuries. He initially filed a claim under California’s workers’ compensation law and later brought suit in superior court, alleging general maritime negligence and unseaworthiness against the yacht club.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the club’s demurrer without leave to amend, holding that admiralty jurisdiction did not apply because the injury occurred on a noncommercial boat docked at a private yacht club. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, but on different grounds, concluding that the California Workers’ Compensation Act provided the worker’s exclusive remedy. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act nor California’s workers’ compensation law barred the worker’s general maritime claims, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to address federal jurisdiction and the viability of the tort claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, held that admiralty jurisdiction applies to the worker’s claims because the incident occurred on navigable waters and involved activities substantially related to traditional maritime activity. The court further held that the worker, not covered by the Longshore Act, may assert claims for both unseaworthiness and negligence against his vessel-owning employer. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

Adir International, LLC operates a chain of retail stores, Curacao, which primarily serves low-income, Spanish-speaking immigrants in California, Nevada, and Arizona. Curacao offers store credit to customers, with over 90 percent of sales made on store credit. Since at least 2012, Curacao has offered optional “account protection” services (AGP Basic and AGP Plus) to credit customers, with AGP Plus including a credit property insurance component. Curacao was licensed as a credit insurance agent, but its sales associates, who were not licensed or endorsed, received bonuses for selling these insurance products. The AGP program allowed customers to defer payments under certain circumstances, but the fees for AGP often exceeded finance charges, and the program was highly profitable for Curacao.The People of the State of California filed a civil enforcement action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging that Adir and its owner, Ron Azarkman, violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) through predicate violations of the Insurance Code and the Unruh Retail Installment Sales Act (Unruh Act). After a bench trial, the Superior Court found that Adir and Azarkman violated the Insurance Code by selling insurance through unlicensed employees, failing to use approved training materials, and providing required disclosures only after enrollment. The court held Azarkman personally liable due to his control and knowledge of the practices. However, the court ruled that the sale of account protection services did not violate the Unruh Act.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s findings regarding the Insurance Code violations and Azarkman’s personal liability, rejecting arguments about primary jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the Unruh Act, holding that the Act limits all permissible fees to those specifically authorized, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Adir Internat., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2020, an incident occurred in which Jacob Frederick Ball, while stopped at a traffic signal on a parkway, pointed a handgun in the direction of another driver after the driver had taken a picture of Ball’s license plate due to his reckless driving. Ball then sped away onto a freeway onramp. The driver called 9-1-1, and police later found Ball at his home, recovering a handgun and black gloves from his vehicle. Ball was charged with felony brandishing of a firearm at a person in a motor vehicle, along with two misdemeanors.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Orange County, the magistrate found probable cause to hold Ball to answer on all charges. Subsequently, the trial judge granted Ball’s motion to dismiss the felony brandishing count under Penal Code section 995, reasoning that there was no evidence the victim actually experienced subjective fear as a result of Ball’s actions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 417.3 does not require proof that the victim subjectively experienced fear; rather, the statute sets forth an objective standard, requiring only that the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to experience apprehension or fear of bodily harm. The court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the count based on the absence of evidence of subjective fear. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the felony brandishing count be reinstated. View "P. v. Ball" on Justia Law

A county public guardian sought to place an individual, A.H., under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, alleging that A.H. was gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. After the initial petition was filed in February 2023, the trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship. A.H. requested a trial, which by statute should have commenced within 10 days, but the trial was repeatedly continued due to court and counsel unavailability, ultimately beginning months later. As the first temporary conservatorship neared expiration, the public guardian filed a second petition and obtained a new temporary conservatorship, further extending A.H.’s involuntary confinement. A.H. objected to the continuances and sought dismissal of both petitions, arguing that the delays violated statutory deadlines and his due process rights.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County denied A.H.’s motions to dismiss, continued the trials multiple times, and ultimately dismissed the first petition at the public guardian’s request. The trial on the second petition began approximately ten weeks after the statutory deadline, and the court found A.H. gravely disabled, ordering a one-year conservatorship with various restrictions. The public guardian did not seek to renew the conservatorship after it expired.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the statutory deadline for commencing trial under the LPS Act is directory, not mandatory, and does not require automatic dismissal if missed. The court also found that, although the trial court abused its discretion by repeatedly granting continuances without good cause, this error was harmless as it did not affect the outcome of the conservatorship order. However, the appellate court concluded that the cumulative delay—over ten months of involuntary confinement before a final adjudication—violated A.H.’s due process rights, particularly since none of the delay was attributable to A.H. and he had never previously been found gravely disabled. The conservatorship order was therefore reversed. View "Conservatorship of A.H." on Justia Law

A man was stopped by a California Highway Patrol officer for speeding on Interstate 680. He was the sole occupant of the vehicle and did not have a valid driver’s license, instead presenting a fake one. During an inventory search of the impounded car, the officer found a loaded handgun and a large sum of cash. The firearm was determined to be registered to several previous owners, but not to the man. He was charged with carrying a concealed, loaded firearm in a vehicle and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him.Before trial in the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, the defendant filed a demurrer arguing that the statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as interpreted by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The trial court denied the demurrer. The defendant then pled no contest to the charges and appealed, with the trial court granting a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that California’s licensing scheme for carrying concealed firearms, even as it existed prior to recent amendments, was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm is a reasonable means of screening for ineligible individuals, such as felons, and does not require a finding of dangerousness for each applicant. The court found that the statutes at issue are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and rejected the argument that the absence of a dangerousness finding rendered the statutes unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Roberts" on Justia Law

An employee at a substance abuse treatment provider alleged that a coworker subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, including sending explicit messages and images, visiting his home uninvited, and making lewd gestures. These actions occurred while the employee was on leave, and none took place at the workplace or during work hours. The employee reported the conduct to his employer’s acting program director and human resources representative. He was told that nothing could be done because the conduct occurred offsite. The HR representative also made a social media post and a sarcastic comment that the employee interpreted as mocking his complaint. The employee, distressed by the employer’s response and the prospect of further interaction with the coworker, resigned shortly after returning to work.The Superior Court of Kern County sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s second amended complaint, dismissing claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, among others. The court found that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and that the employer’s response did not constitute an adverse employment action or constructive discharge. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while the coworker’s conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be imputed to the employer under FEHA, the employer’s response to the employee’s complaint—specifically, its failure to act and the HR representative’s mocking conduct—could support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court also found that the claim for failure to prevent harassment was viable, as it depended on the underlying harassment claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of claims for discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, finding insufficient allegations of adverse employment action or employer knowledge of employee unfitness. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and assault with a firearm, with several enhancements found true, including prior convictions and use of a firearm. He was sentenced to a total prison term of 23 years and four months, later reduced to 21 years and four months after some enhancements were struck on remand. The sentencing court imposed various fines and fees, including a restitution fine, court operations assessment, criminal conviction assessment, and a booking fee. The defendant previously challenged the imposition of these fines and fees on due process grounds, but the California Court of Appeal found any error harmless, as he could pay from future wages.After his conviction became final, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate the fines and fees, arguing that statutory changes rendered some unenforceable and that others were unconstitutional without an ability-to-pay hearing. The trial court denied the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief through a freestanding postjudgment motion and suggested that a writ petition would be the proper procedural vehicle.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that neither the trial court nor the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s postjudgment motion because his conviction was final and he had begun serving his sentence. The court explained that, absent express statutory authorization, a defendant cannot challenge fines and fees through a standalone motion after judgment is final. The court also rejected arguments that recent statutory amendments or case law provided jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, two individuals who held automobile insurance policies with a major insurer in California alleged that the insurer’s rates became excessive due to a significant reduction in driving and traffic accidents. They claimed that the insurer was required by statute to refund a portion of the premiums collected during this period, even though the rates had previously been approved by the state’s insurance commissioner. The insurer did provide partial refunds in response to directives from the insurance commissioner, but the plaintiffs argued these refunds were insufficient and sought further restitution on behalf of a class of similarly situated policyholders.The Superior Court of Alameda County initially allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint after sustaining a demurrer. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs continued to assert claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law and for unjust enrichment, maintaining that the insurer’s failure to provide full refunds violated Insurance Code section 1861.05(a). The trial court, however, sustained the insurer’s subsequent demurrer without leave to amend, holding that the statutory scheme did not require insurers to retroactively refund premiums collected under previously approved rates, even if those rates later became excessive due to changed circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case on appeal. The court held that Insurance Code section 1861.05(a) does not impose an independent obligation on insurers to retroactively refund premiums collected under rates approved by the insurance commissioner, even if those rates later become excessive. The court reasoned that the statutory scheme provides for prospective rate adjustments through the commissioner’s review process, not retroactive modifications. The court also found that the insurer’s conduct was affirmatively permitted under the statutory “prior approval” system, and thus not actionable under the Unfair Competition Law. The judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed. View "Davis v. CSAA Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law