Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted the petitioner of multiple serious offenses, including two counts of attempted first degree murder, three counts of attempted murder of police officers, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, and attempted arson. The trial court imposed a lengthy custodial sentence, including consecutive and concurrent life terms, as well as additional years for other offenses. The court also imposed an $8,000 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, ordered $1,700 in direct victim restitution, and assessed a court security fee.Following the conviction, the petitioner’s judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. Years later, the California Legislature amended the law to provide that restitution fines imposed under section 1202.4 become unenforceable and uncollectible after 10 years, and the portion of the judgment imposing such fines is vacated. The petitioner sought relief by filing a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory vacatur of the restitution fine required a full resentencing and that habeas was the proper vehicle to effectuate this change.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the statutory vacatur of the restitution fine under section 1465.9(d) does not trigger the full resentencing rule. The court reasoned that the statute only vacates the portion of the judgment imposing the fine, not the entire sentence, and does not affect the custodial components. The court further held that a postjudgment motion in the trial court, rather than a habeas petition, is the appropriate method to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the vacatur of the restitution fine. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was therefore denied. View "In re Mattison" on Justia Law

A company filed a lawsuit against another corporate entity, seeking damages for breach of a sublease. The plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant corporation by leaving the summons and complaint with an individual named Roberto Molina at the defendant’s business address, followed by mailing copies to the defendant’s chief executive officer. Molina was later identified as a bus washer employed by a related but separate company, not as an employee or officer of the defendant. The defendant did not initially respond to the lawsuit, resulting in the entry of default and a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.Subsequently, the defendant moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to quash service and vacate the default judgment, arguing that service of process was improper because Molina was not a person “apparently in charge” of the defendant’s office as required by California law. The plaintiff opposed, relying on the process server’s declaration and standard procedures. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding that substituted service was valid and refusing to vacate the default judgment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the matter de novo. The appellate court held that the substituted service was not valid because there was insufficient evidence that Molina was “apparently in charge” of the defendant’s business office, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20. The court found that the process server’s declaration lacked necessary facts to support such a conclusion, and the defendant’s evidence rebutted any presumption of proper service. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, vacated the entry of default and the default judgment, and remanded with directions to grant the defendant’s motion and allow time to respond to the complaint. View "Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc." on Justia Law

After purchasing a home with wooded acreage in Santa Cruz, the buyers discovered issues they believed the sellers had failed to disclose, including matters related to the septic system, property condition, and logging operations. The real estate transaction was governed by a standard form agreement that required the parties to attempt mediation before resorting to litigation or arbitration, and provided that the prevailing party in any dispute would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, except as limited by the mediation provision.Following the sale, the buyers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud. The sellers filed a cross-complaint. After a three-day bench trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, the court found in favor of the sellers on all claims and on their cross-complaint, determining that the sellers were the prevailing parties and entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in post-trial proceedings. The sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate the dispute, as required by the contract, barred them from recovering attorney fees, even though they later expressed willingness to mediate before the buyers filed suit. The court also denied the motion for costs without prejudice due to procedural deficiencies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court’s initial statement regarding entitlement to attorney fees was interlocutory and not a final judgment on the issue. The appellate court further held that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate did not automatically preclude them from recovering attorney fees if they later agreed to mediate before litigation commenced. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the sellers effectively retracted their refusal to mediate before the lawsuit was filed. The denial of costs was affirmed due to the sellers’ failure to file a proper costs memorandum. View "Evleshin v. Meyer" on Justia Law

A former professional football player, who played in the National Football League for 15 seasons, filed a workers’ compensation claim in California alleging cumulative injuries sustained throughout his career. He began his career with a California-based team, signing his initial contract in California, but spent the majority of his career with out-of-state teams, including the Atlanta Falcons, for whom he played his final seasons. During his employment with the Falcons, he played only a small number of games in California and spent the majority of his duty days outside the state.A workers’ compensation judge determined that both the player and the Falcons were exempt from California workers’ compensation law under specific statutory provisions, as the Falcons provided workers’ compensation coverage under another state’s laws and the player did not meet the statutory thresholds for California coverage. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), upon reconsideration, disagreed, finding that it had jurisdiction over the claim because the player had signed a contract in California during his career, and it rescinded the judge’s decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the Falcons are exempt from California workers’ compensation law under Labor Code sections 3600.5(c) and (d), because the player did not spend enough of his career working for California-based teams or in California, and he played more than seven seasons for non-California teams. The court annulled the WCAB’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, holding that the statutory exemptions for professional athletes applied and precluded the player’s claim against the Falcons under California law. The court awarded costs in connection with the writ proceeding to the Falcons. View "Atlanta Falcons v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

A man was charged with multiple sexual offenses, including forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, unlawful intercourse, and incest, all involving his 17-year-old immediate relative. The alleged incident occurred when the defendant stayed overnight at the victim’s home, entered her bedroom, and engaged in sexual acts without her consent. The victim testified about the charged incident and two prior uncharged incidents involving the defendant, one when she was eight years old and another a few weeks before the charged offenses. The defendant denied all wrongdoing and provided alternative explanations for his actions. The prosecution presented expert testimony on the psychology of child sexual assault victims and admitted evidence of the defendant’s statements during pretext phone calls.The Monterey County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 17 years in prison, with sentences for unlawful intercourse and incest stayed. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for some counts, improper jury instructions regarding the definition of force, erroneous admission of uncharged acts, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to certain evidence and testimony.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred by granting the prosecution’s request to modify the pattern jury instructions on the definition of force, which misled the jury regarding an essential element of the forcible rape and forcible oral copulation charges. This error was deemed prejudicial, requiring reversal and remand for possible retrial on those counts. The court found sufficient evidence supported the convictions for unlawful intercourse and incest, and that other asserted errors were either harmless or did not constitute ineffective assistance. The convictions for unlawful intercourse and incest were affirmed, while the convictions for forcible rape and forcible oral copulation were reversed and remanded. View "P. v. Melgoza" on Justia Law

Karen L. Willis, operating as Harlem West Entertainment and married to Victor Willis, the original lead singer of the Village People, alleged that the Walt Disney Company and related entities engaged in unfair competition and fraud. The dispute arose after Disney hired the reconstituted Village People, led by Victor Willis, for performances at Walt Disney World in 2018. Following these events, Willis claimed Disney instituted a secret ban on booking the Village People for future concerts and made misleading statements to the band’s agents about potential future engagements. Willis asserted that Disney’s actions, including evasive communications and refusal to consider booking proposals, constituted unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices.The Superior Court of San Diego County reviewed Disney’s special motion to strike the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16). The trial court denied Disney’s motion, finding that Disney failed to meet its initial burden of showing that the conduct alleged in Willis’s complaint was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision. The court concluded that, although the conduct implicated a public issue, it did not further or participate in a public conversation about that issue. As a result, the trial court did not address Disney’s evidentiary objections or whether Willis’s claims had minimal merit.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that Disney’s selection of musical acts for public concerts and its related communications with the Village People’s agents were protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Willis’s claims have minimal merit, as required by the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Willis v. The Walt Disney Company" on Justia Law

Raymundo Gomez was accused of committing lewd acts against three children at a public swimming pool. The key incidents involved Gomez allegedly bringing a 14-year-old boy’s hand into contact with his genitals and, separately, touching an eight-year-old girl, Katrina, on her buttocks and hip. The prosecution’s case against Gomez relied heavily on Katrina’s prior statements, including her preliminary hearing testimony and a forensic interview, as she did not testify at trial. Katrina’s mother objected to bringing her to court, citing concerns about the emotional impact on her daughter and her reluctance to have Katrina relive the experience in a courtroom setting.The Superior Court of San Diego County found Katrina unavailable to testify after hearing from her mother, who expressed that she did not want Katrina to participate further in the proceedings. The court allowed Katrina’s prior statements to be admitted at trial. The jury convicted Gomez of the offenses against Kane and Katrina but acquitted him of the offense against a third child. Gomez appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding Katrina unavailable and admitting her prior statements, thus violating his constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish Katrina’s unavailability as a witness because the record did not show that her mother’s refusal to bring her to court was unequivocal or that all reasonable efforts to secure her testimony had been exhausted. The court found this error prejudicial and concluded that the admission of Katrina’s prior statements violated Gomez’s confrontation rights. As a result, the court reversed the convictions on all three lewd act counts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Huntington Beach, a charter city in Orange County, amended its city charter through Measure A, which authorized the city to require voter identification for municipal elections beginning in 2026. This measure was passed by local voters. In response, the California Legislature enacted Elections Code section 10005, effective January 1, 2025, which prohibits any local government from requiring voter identification for voting unless mandated by state or federal law. The statute was specifically intended to address Huntington Beach’s Measure A.Following the passage of Measure A, the State of California, through the Attorney General and Secretary of State, filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Orange County, seeking to invalidate the voter identification provision in the city charter. The City of Huntington Beach demurred, arguing the issue was not ripe since the provision had not yet been implemented. The trial court sustained the demurrer, but after procedural developments and further hearings, ultimately denied the state’s petition, finding that the charter provision did not violate the right to vote or implicate the integrity of the electoral process. The state timely appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the four-part “home rule” test, the court held that Elections Code section 10005 addresses a matter of statewide concern—integrity of the electoral process—and is narrowly tailored to prevent discriminatory barriers to voting. The court concluded that section 10005 preempts the Huntington Beach charter provision. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate invalidating the charter provision, enter a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and declare it preempted by state law. View "P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law