Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two, the appellant, Debra Abney, challenged the decision of the State Department of Health Care Services and the City and County of San Francisco to consider money garnished from her Social Security payments as income for the purposes of determining her eligibility for benefits under Medi-Cal.Abney's Social Security payments were being reduced by nearly $600 each month to satisfy a debt she owed to the IRS. The authorities considered this garnished money as income, which led to Abney being ineligible to receive Medi-Cal benefits without contributing a share of cost. Abney argued that the money being garnished was not income “actually available to meet her needs” under the regulations implementing the Medi-Cal program.The trial court rejected Abney's argument, and she appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeal held that the tax garnishment was "actually available" to meet Abney's needs because it benefitted her financially by helping to extinguish her debt to the IRS. Therefore, the garnished money was correctly considered as income for the purpose of calculating her eligibility for the Medi-Cal program. View "Abney v. State Dept. of Health Care Services" on Justia Law

In this case, Epochal Enterprises, Inc., also known as Divine Orchids, entered into a commercial lease agreement with LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation. The lease included a limitation of liability clause which stated that the defendants were not personally liable for any provisions of the lease or the premises, and the plaintiff waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business profits. After the plaintiff sued the defendants, a jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence.The jury awarded the plaintiff damages for lost profits and other past economic loss. However, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), reasoning that the lease agreement’s limitation of liability clause prevented the plaintiff from recovering the economic damages the jury awarded.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the order granting JNOV in the defendants' favor, finding that the limitation of liability clause did not bar plaintiff’s recovery of damages. The court reasoned that the jury's award of damages necessarily implied a finding of gross negligence on the part of the defendants, which would be outside the scope of the indemnification clause. Further, the court held that the limitation of liability clause was void to the extent that it sought to shield the defendants from liability for their violations of the Health and Safety Code, as it violated public policy under Civil Code section 1668.On the defendants' cross-appeal regarding the damages award, the court affirmed the denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV, finding that substantial evidence supported the damages award. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably interpret the term "other past economic loss" on the verdict form as a different form of lost profits, and that the evidence presented to the jury provided a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of the plaintiff's lost profits. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, the court analyzed a second appeal involving a defendant, Yacob Dain, who was found guilty of home invasion robbery, kidnapping, assault with a firearm, and other offenses. The trial court also found that he had two prior convictions for active gang participation that qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes law.Following a first appeal, the court remanded the matter for resentencing. The prosecution retried only one of the prior convictions, which was again found to be a strike and a serious felony conviction. The trial court then granted Dain's motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction. The People appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law.Dain argued that Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), which directs trial courts to consider specified mitigating circumstances when deciding whether to dismiss an “enhancement” in furtherance of justice, should apply to decisions about dismissing a prior strike conviction under the Three Strikes law. However, the appeal court disagreed with this argument, stating that section 1385(c) does not apply to the decision whether to dismiss a strike under the Three Strikes law.The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction because Dain cannot be deemed outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to dismiss the five-year enhancement under section 667(a) and imposing the middle term for the principal offense of home invasion robbery.The court reversed the order dismissing the prior strike conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to resentence Dain as a person who has suffered one prior strike conviction. View "People v. Dain" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three, the mother (B.S.) appealed the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over her child (R.M.) under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and (g), based on her and the father's incarceration.The parents were arrested on murder charges, and no prior arrangements had been made for the care of their minor child. The child was taken into protective custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. The court exercised jurisdiction over the child because it believed the parents had not made plans for the child's care prior to their arrest.However, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the court's exercise of jurisdiction was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the parents' incarceration alone was not sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court stressed that the law does not require parents to make an appropriate advance plan for the child's ongoing care and supervision to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal found that the Department didn't prove that there was something more than the mere fact of the parents' incarceration to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court found that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that jurisdiction was appropriate. Therefore, the court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders were reversed. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

The appellant C.B., the biological father of minor A.K., appealed from the January 2023 order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights. The appellant argued that the juvenile court and the Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) denied his due process rights to notice and an opportunity to participate in dependency proceedings to establish presumed father status. T.K., the minor’s mother (mother), joined in C.B.’s arguments. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District agreed, finding that the juvenile court and the Agency did not comply with duties to try to identify all of the minor’s alleged fathers, to give adequate notice to C.B. that his parental rights were at stake in the proceedings, or to give C.B. notice of specific important hearings. Thus, it reversed the order terminating parental rights. The facts of the case reveal that when the minor was born, the Agency received a report that the mother tested positive for methamphetamine, benzodiazepines, and sexually transmitted diseases. The mother did not inform C.B. about her pregnancy and initially identified D.C. as the alleged father of the minor. However, paternity testing later showed that D.C. was not the biological father, and C.B. was identified as the potential father. Despite this, C.B. was not given proper notice of the proceedings or properly informed about their importance, and his due process rights were violated. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

In the early hours of New Year's Day in 1987, O'Neal Underwood and an accomplice mugged a pedestrian in Richmond, California. During the mugging, Underwood's accomplice stabbed the victim, who subsequently died from his wounds. Underwood was convicted of first degree murder and robbery and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Years later, the Legislature amended the murder statutes to limit felony murder liability for persons who were not the actual killers. Underwood petitioned for resentencing under the new law. The trial court denied the petition, finding Underwood ineligible for relief because he aided and abetted murder with intent to kill and was a major participant in the underlying robbery, acting with reckless indifference to human life. Underwood appealed, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof, the prosecution's evidence does not prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law, and his attendance at the evidentiary hearing by speakerphone and without a means of confidentially communicating with his counsel violated his constitutional and statutory rights. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, agreed with Underwood that the prosecution failed to prove he is guilty of first degree murder under current law because no substantial evidence supports a finding that he intended to kill or acted with reckless indifference for human life. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and instructed it to vacate the murder conviction and resentence Underwood in accordance with the appropriate section of the Penal Code. View "People v. Underwood" on Justia Law

The case arises from an appeal by a minor, K.B., from the juvenile court's order denying his request to dismiss a juvenile justice petition and seal records pertaining to his commission of several criminal offenses, for which he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation. K.B. argued that he had met the requirements for "satisfactory completion" of probation and therefore, the petition should be dismissed and records sealed despite his subsequent admission for possessing marijuana for sale, an infraction.The central legal issue in this case was the interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, subdivision (c)(1), which provides that a subsequent wardship adjudication during probation does not preclude satisfactory completion unless it stems from "a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District disagreed with the juvenile court's interpretation of the statute that any juvenile adjudication, even an infraction, precludes satisfactory completion of probation.The appellate court held that the language of the statute, when considered in light of its purpose and to avoid absurd results, meant that the limiting phrase "for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude" applies equally to juvenile wardship adjudications and adult convictions. Hence, K.B.'s infraction did not preclude satisfactory completion of probation. The court reversed the juvenile court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition and seal all records pertaining to the dismissed petition. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

The case involves Adrian Lamont Brooks, who was found guilty of inflicting corporal injury on his domestic partner, R.J., and committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. On appeal, Brooks argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that R.J. had invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because she was never called and sworn. He also asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to replace a juror who was allegedly biased. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The appellate court found that R.J. had validly asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege through her counsel and that the juror's potential bias did not warrant removal. The court also held that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury regarding R.J.'s refusal to testify. View "People v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In February 2022, Gracia Bovis, an elder woman, signed documents transferring the title of her house to her daughter, Marina Casey. According to Bovis, Casey had misled her into signing the documents to protect her from rising property taxes. However, the documents transferred the property into Casey's name. Casey argued that the transfer was meant to protect the property from tax reassessment under Proposition 19. Bovis sought an Elder Abuse Restraining Order (EARO) against Casey, alleging financial abuse. The trial court granted the EARO and subsequently declared the deed transferring the property void ab initio (invalid from the outset). Casey appealed these decisions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, affirmed the issuance of the restraining orders, finding sufficient evidence of financial abuse, but reversed the order declaring the deed void. The appellate court concluded that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03 in declaring the deed void. The statute allows for the issuance of restraining orders to protect elders from further abuse, but does not provide the court with the authority to declare a deed void. The court noted that other permanent remedies, such as the return of property, can be pursued through a civil action under other provisions of the Elder Abuse Act. View "Newman v. Casey" on Justia Law

In 2003, Anh The Duong was sentenced to death by a jury, after being found guilty of multiple murders. In 2015, Duong filed a habeas corpus appeal, and in 2020, his conviction and sentence were upheld by the California Supreme Court. However, his habeas corpus petition was transferred to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Following an agreement with the district attorney, his death sentence was vacated, and he was a resentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Despite this, Duong sought to appeal the denial of the remaining claims in his habeas corpus petition, arguing that he was entitled to do so under the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (Proposition 66).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, dismissed Duong's appeal. The court interpreted Proposition 66, which expedites the appellate process in death penalty cases, as being applicable only to individuals who are under a death sentence at the time of their appeal. Since Duong's death sentence had been vacated and he was serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole when he filed his appeal, the court found that he was not entitled to the benefits of Proposition 66. View "In re Duong" on Justia Law