Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between The Pep Boys — Manny, Moe & Jack and The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California LLC (collectively, Pep Boys) and their insurers, Old Republic Insurance Company (Old Republic); Executive Risk Indemnity Company, formerly known as American Excess Insurance Company (American Excess); and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (Fireman’s Fund). Pep Boys had been sued by hundreds of people claiming harm from exposure to asbestos in products sold by Pep Boys. Following these claims, Pep Boys sought coverage from their insurers who had sold them a "tower" of commercial general liability policies providing coverage between February 1, 1981, and July 1, 1982.The insurers claimed that their respective policies provided only a single aggregate annual limit, while Pep Boys filed a declaratory judgment action against them, arguing that each policy provided two aggregate annual limits, one for the first 12 months and one for the remaining period. The trial court ruled in favor of the insurers, holding that the policies each provided only a single aggregate limit.In the appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Old Republic's and Fireman’s Fund's policies, which were for terms longer than 12 months, contained two separate annual periods for the purposes of the annual aggregate limits of liability. However, it agreed with the trial court that the American Excess policy, which had different language, had only one period for purposes of that policy’s annual aggregate limits. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment in part. View "The Pep Boys v. Old Republic Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, ruled in favor of the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (VCERA) in a dispute over the calculation of retirement benefits for county employees. VCERA had adopted a resolution excluding compensation for accrued but unused annual leave hours exceeding a calendar year allowance from the calculation of retirement benefits, following a Supreme Court decision in a similar case (Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn.). VCERA sought a judicial declaration that its resolution was legal, which was granted by the trial court. The Criminal Justice Attorneys Association of Ventura and Ventura County Professional Peace Officers’ Association appealed this decision, arguing that the resolution was not mandated by the Supreme Court decision or the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that VCERA was required to comply with the Supreme Court decision and the relevant statutes, which were designed to prevent pension spiking by excluding income designed to artificially inflate a pension benefit. View "Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association v. Criminal Justice Attorneys Association of Ventura County" on Justia Law

In this case, Darlene Renee Fouse, who was convicted in 2006 for several crimes, including attempted murder of a peace officer, appealed a resentencing order under Penal Code section 1172.6. Fouse was originally convicted as a getaway driver in a series of violent home invasion robberies. After her petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, the court vacated her two convictions for attempted murder of a peace officer, as she was deemed not culpable under the amended law. Instead, the court redesignated the offenses as two counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer and added a conviction for felony evading a peace officer.Fouse argued that the court erred in redesignating the attempted murders as assaults with a firearm on a peace officer and in adding a conviction for evading a peace officer, as the jury had convicted her of the target offenses of robbery. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District agreed with Fouse, stating that since the target offenses (robbery) were charged and Fouse was convicted of them, the statute required the court to resentence Fouse on the remaining charges. It did not permit the court to redesignate the attempted murder convictions to other offenses. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Fouse" on Justia Law

In this personal injury case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, the plaintiff, Mark Olson, sued the defendant, Patrick Saville, for injuries sustained while both were surfing at Miramar Beach in Montecito. Olson claimed that Saville negligently caused his injuries by "dropping in" on his wave, failing to control his board, and not using a leash on his longboard. Saville moved for summary judgment, arguing that Olson's claim was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, which typically applies to sports and recreational activities involving inherent risks of injury.The court granted Saville's motion, holding that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred liability for injuries caused by a negligent surfer to a fellow surfer because those injuries were caused by risks inherent in the sport of surfing. The court found that the inherent risks of surfing included surfers "dropping in" on other surfers, not wearing leashes while riding longboards, and using surfboards with sharp fins.On appeal, Olson argued that there were triable issues of material fact as to whether Saville was protected by the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The appellate court disagreed, finding that no reasonable trier of fact could determine that Saville's conduct fell outside the protection of the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that imposing liability in these circumstances would likely chill vigorous participation in surfing. View "Olson v. Saville" on Justia Law

The case pertains to an appeal by the City of Los Angeles and real parties in interest, TTLC Los Angeles – El Sereno, LLC and The True Life Companies, LLC against a petition filed by Delia Guerrero and Coyotl + Macehualli Citizens (Objectors). The Objectors alleged that the city's approval of a real estate development project violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The city and the developers had argued that the petition was untimely, but the trial court granted the Objectors’ petition, directing the city to vacate project approvals and prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) evaluating the project's environmental impacts. On appeal by the city and developers, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Objectors’ petition was untimely, as it was filed more than a year after the city's notice of determination, which triggered the statute of limitations for challenges under the CEQA. The court concluded that the city's initial approval of the project represented its earliest firm commitment to approving the project, and hence constituted project approval under CEQA. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the city and the developers and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Objectors' petition. View "Guerrero v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In a case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two, the plaintiff, a minor identified as J.R., filed a putative class action against Electronic Arts Inc. (EA), alleging causes of action for unlawful and unfair business practices, violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and unjust enrichment. J.R. claimed that EA deceptively induced players, particularly minors, to purchase in-game currency for its game, Apex Legends. EA sought to compel arbitration under the terms of its user agreement, which J.R. had accepted to play Apex Legends. The lower court denied EA's motion to compel on the grounds that J.R. had exercised his power under Family Code section 6710 to disaffirm all of his contracts with EA, including the arbitration agreement. EA appealed, arguing that an arbitrator, not the court, should decide issues of arbitrability due to a delegation provision within the agreement. The appellate court rejected EA's arguments, affirming the lower court's decision. The court held that J.R.'s disaffirmance of "any... contract or agreement" accepted through his EA account was sufficient to challenge the validity of the delegation provision specifically, thereby authorizing the court to assess the validity of J.R.'s disaffirmance. View "J.R. v. Electronic Arts" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an arbitration agreement between an employee and her employer. The employee, Aljarice Hasty, was employed by the American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah (Association). After her employment ended, Hasty sued the Association for race discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, harassment, wrongful discharge, and retaliation. The Association sought to compel arbitration per an agreement in Hasty's employment contract, but the trial court found the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and declined to sever the unconscionable terms. The Association appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability was found due to the adhesive nature of the agreement, the lack of negotiation, and the hidden nature of the unconscionable provision within the complex document. Substantive unconscionability was found due to the agreement's one-sided nature, the overly broad confidentiality provision, and the waiver of the employee's right to bring representative actions under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the unconscionable terms, as the arbitration agreement was permeated with unconscionability. View "Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. of Northern Cal., Nev. & Utah" on Justia Law

In a domestic violence dispute that led to dueling restraining orders, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees to Peter Henri Dragones III, the prevailing party. Both Dragones and his opponent, Kerry Calkins, had sought restraining orders against each other in 2022. The trial court granted Dragones's request and denied Calkins's. Subsequently, Dragones moved for attorney's fees under Family Code section 6344. While the case was pending, the legislature repealed the prior version of section 6344 and enacted a new one, which made it easier for a prevailing petitioner to obtain fees. Both parties contended that the prior version of section 6344 should apply. However, the appellate court held that the current version of section 6344 applies retroactively to all cases pending on its effective date, including this case. This decision was based on California's general rule of retroactivity for amendments to the Family Code and the established principle that newly enacted attorney fee statutes apply to cases pending on their effective date. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under the new statute. View "Dragones v. Calkins" on Justia Law

In early 2022, a three-year-old child, L.C., was taken from his mother, D.C., after she was arrested for transporting fentanyl pills with L.C. in the car. After the juvenile court removed L.C. from his mother's care, D.C. returned to Mexico on the advice of her criminal defense attorney. Despite being in Mexico, D.C. maintained a relationship with L.C. through weekly video calls and completed necessary programs as part of her case plan, including a drug treatment program, individual counseling, and parenting classes. However, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services expressed concerns about the validity of her drug tests performed by Mexico's child protection agency. At a 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court terminated D.C.'s reunification services, citing her failure to return to California for drug testing and other services, speculation about L.C.'s developmental services in Mexico, and D.C.'s refusal to surrender herself in response to an arrest warrant.L.C. sought relief, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that returning him to his mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety or well-being. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven agreed with L.C. and found that the mother had complied with her case plan, maintained a bond with L.C., and that Mexico's child protection agency could provide services to the mother and L.C. Therefore, the court granted the petition, vacated the juvenile court's termination of reunification services, and ordered a new review hearing to consider any developments since the last hearing. View "L.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reviewed a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to adopt a new net energy metering (NEM) tariff. The PUC was required by the Legislature to create a successor tariff to the existing NEM scheme, which utilities argued overcompensated owners of renewable energy systems for their exported energy, raising electricity costs for customers without such systems.The petitioners, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., Environmental Working Group, and The Protect our Communities Foundation, contended that the successor tariff did not comply with various requirements of section 2827.1 of the Public Utilities Code. The petitioners argued that the tariff failed to consider the social benefits of customer-generated power, improperly favored the interests of utility customers who did not own renewable systems, failed to promote sustainable growth of renewable energy, and neglected alternatives to promote the growth of renewable systems among customers in disadvantaged communities.The court affirmed the PUC's decision. It held that the PUC had appropriately balanced the various objectives set out by the Legislature in section 2827.1. The court found that the successor tariff was designed to reduce the financial advantage previously given to owners of renewable energy systems under the NEM tariff, which the court said was consistent with the Legislature's aim of balancing costs and benefits to all customers. The court also noted that the PUC had adopted programs to make renewable energy systems more accessible to low-income customers, satisfying the requirement to ensure growth among residential customers in disadvantaged communities.Lastly, the court concluded that the PUC's decision to apply the same tariff to both residential and nonresidential customers was justified, as the nonresidential NEM 2.0 tariff, while cost-effective for the electrical system as a whole, did not balance costs and benefits among all customers. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law