Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of plaintiffs, who are successors to a 1968 lease for 2,400 acres of undeveloped coastal land in San Luis Obispo County, challenged the lessor’s assertion that their lease was limited to 51 years under California Civil Code section 717, which restricts leases of land for “agricultural purposes” to a maximum of 51 years. The property, known as Wild Cherry Canyon, had historically been used for cattle grazing, but the plaintiffs argued that the primary purpose of the lease was not agricultural, but rather estate planning, development, and, in practice, minimal cattle grazing for wildfire prevention.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County conducted a bench trial and issued a detailed statement of decision. The court found that the lease was for agricultural purposes, specifically to continue the property’s existing use for cattle grazing, and that this use fell within the meaning of “agricultural purposes” under section 717. As a result, the court ruled that the lease expired after 51 years, in December 2019, and entered judgment in favor of the lessor, Eureka Energy Company, quieting title in its favor and rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief and to quiet title to their leasehold interest.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that while “agricultural purposes” in section 717 can include cattle grazing, the minimal grazing conducted here—primarily for wildfire suppression and not as a commercial agricultural activity—did not constitute an “agricultural purpose” within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, the 51-year lease limitation did not apply, and the plaintiffs’ lease was not subject to forfeiture on that basis. The appellate court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Pacho Limited Partnership v. Eureka Energy Co." on Justia Law

A plaintiff alleged that, between 1965 and 1969, while he was a young child attending an elementary school in a California school district, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by the school’s principal. The complaint stated that school staff and faculty were aware or suspected the abuse, and that similar abuse occurred to other students. The plaintiff claimed ongoing psychological and emotional harm as a result. He brought four negligence-based causes of action against the school district, asserting that he was not required to present a government tort claim before filing suit due to statutory changes exempting such claims.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the school district’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement was fatal to his case, and concluded that legislative changes extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 violated the California Constitution’s gift clause. The appellate court held that the retroactive waiver did not create a new liability or cause of action, but merely removed a procedural barrier to suit. The court further found that the legislative purpose of aiding victims of childhood sexual assault served a valid public purpose and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District" on Justia Law

Catherine Baker was employed by San Mateo County as a Social Worker III but went on medical leave in 2009 due to back pain. In 2015, she returned to work in a different position as a screener trainee, which involved different duties but was compensated at the same pay rate as her original position. Her last paycheck was issued in January 2016. In 2017, Baker applied for a service-connected disability retirement, and the San Mateo County Employees Retirement Association (SamCERA) determined that the effective date for her retirement benefits should be January 22, 2016, the day after her last receipt of “regular compensation.”After SamCERA’s Board approved her application and set the effective date, Baker sought administrative review, arguing that her compensation as a screener trainee did not qualify as “regular compensation” under Government Code section 31724 because she had not returned to her original job. An administrative law judge recommended denial of her request to change the effective date, and the Board adopted this recommendation. Baker then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Superior Court of San Mateo County, which denied the petition and confirmed the January 22, 2016 effective date.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether “regular compensation” under section 31724 included Baker’s pay as a screener trainee. Exercising independent judgment on statutory interpretation, the court held that “regular compensation” refers to regular salary or full wages, regardless of whether the position is the employee’s original job. Because Baker’s screener trainee pay matched her original position’s rate, it qualified as “regular compensation.” The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding the effective date set by SamCERA. View "Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2003 after pleading no contest to several counts of lewd and lascivious acts with minors and one count of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor. The plea agreement amended one charge from forcible to nonforcible oral copulation, and the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. In 2005, mental health professionals evaluated the petitioner and, relying in part on a probation report, certified him as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under California law, finding he had committed a qualifying offense involving force or violence. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed this certification, and the petitioner did not seek review in the superior court at that time. He has remained in state custody under annual recommitment orders since then.Years later, the petitioner challenged his original MDO certification in the Fresno County Superior Court through a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for MDO commitment because he did not admit to using force or violence, and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force, and concluded the petitioner’s offense qualified under the statutory “catchall” provision for nonenumerated crimes involving force or violence.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is an appropriate means to challenge an initial MDO certification based on the nature of the underlying offense, even many years after the initial commitment. The court further held that the evidentiary rule announced in People v. Stevens, which restricts the use of expert testimony to prove qualifying offenses, does not apply retroactively. The court found sufficient evidence supported the original certification under the law in effect at the time and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Steven Meads and Penny Lipking-Meads operated a business as a sole proprietorship before partnering with Jed Driggers in 2010 to expand the business. The parties formed Afterburner, LLC, with the Meadses and Driggers as members, and Driggers as manager. The Meadses contributed assets and goodwill, while Driggers provided capital and expertise. The LLC’s operating agreement included a provision stating that the LLC could only be dissolved by a vote of the members or bankruptcy/insolvency, and that members agreed not to take any other voluntary action to dissolve the LLC, effectively waiving the right to seek judicial dissolution under certain statutory circumstances.A decade later, the Meadses alleged Driggers had improperly diverted business funds and filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Siskiyou County seeking, among other relief, judicial dissolution of the LLC. Driggers and the LLC filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that the Meadses violated the operating agreement’s waiver provision by seeking dissolution. The Meadses responded with a motion to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, contending that the waiver provision was unenforceable as contrary to law and public policy. The Superior Court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Driggers could not show a probability of prevailing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, under the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act, an LLC operating agreement may not waive or vary a member’s statutory right to seek judicial dissolution in the circumstances specified by law. The court concluded that the waiver provision was void and unenforceable, and thus Driggers could not prevail on his cross-complaint. The order striking the cross-complaint was affirmed. View "Meads v. Driggers" on Justia Law

Several general law cities in California challenged the constitutionality of a state law, Senate Bill No. 9 (SB 9), which requires local agencies to ministerially approve two-unit housing projects and urban lot splits in single-family residential zones. The cities argued that SB 9 usurps their authority over local land use and zoning, imposes a uniform approach that disregards local needs and conditions, and is not reasonably related to its stated goal of ensuring access to affordable housing, as it does not mandate affordability for new units.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the cities’ complaint and the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and demurrer. The trial court concluded that, as general law cities, the plaintiffs could not invoke the municipal affairs doctrine under article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution, which provides certain protections only to charter cities. The court also found that the cities failed to identify any constitutional provision that SB 9 violated and determined there was no reasonable likelihood that the complaint could be amended to state a viable cause of action. Judgment was entered in favor of the state, and the cities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that general law cities are not protected by the municipal affairs doctrine and must yield to conflicting state law. The court further found that the cities did not identify a constitutional right that SB 9 violated and failed to show that the statute was unconstitutional on its face or as applied. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint, as no viable claim could be stated. View "City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State" on Justia Law

Ricardo Sarabia was involved in a shooting incident on December 23, 2016, where he shot three people: brothers German and Ramon Servin, and Domenica Romero. The altercation began over Sarabia’s missing phone, car keys, and gun. After a heated exchange, Sarabia shot Ramon through a bathroom door, then shot German multiple times, and finally shot Romero as she hid in a closet. German died at the scene, Ramon survived after medical intervention, and Romero also survived. Both Ramon and Romero identified Sarabia, known as “Clover,” as the shooter. Sarabia was later arrested in Arizona, where police recovered evidence from his phone and residence.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over Sarabia’s trial. During the proceedings, the court excluded gang evidence and instructed witnesses to avoid related terminology. Sarabia’s motions for mistrial, based on a witness’s use of the word “moniker,” and to exclude certain evidence, were denied. The court also denied his midtrial requests to substitute counsel and to represent himself, finding them untimely and not knowing. The court admitted prior testimony from Ramon, who asserted his Fifth Amendment right, and allowed impeachment of Romero with her prior inconsistent statements. The jury convicted Sarabia of first degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, dissuading a witness, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, with firearm enhancements. He was sentenced to 90 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, denial of mistrial, refusal to give a heat of passion instruction, or in denying Sarabia’s Marsden and Faretta motions. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the convictions and enhancements. The case was remanded solely to correct the abstract of judgment regarding the sentence and custody credits. View "People v. Sarabia" on Justia Law

In 2018, the plaintiff was placed on an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric hold, resulting in the creation of a confidential record by the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. In 2021, during a legal dispute over their father’s estate, the plaintiff discovered that his sister’s attorney had obtained this confidential record and used it to threaten him in an attempt to force dismissal of his elder abuse lawsuit against his sister. The record had been released by an office specialist at the Sheriff’s Department, who admitted knowing the sister was not entitled to the record but disclosed it anyway, believing she was concerned for the plaintiff’s well-being.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County found that the office specialist willfully and knowingly disclosed the confidential record, awarding the plaintiff $29,000 in economic damages and $40,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury also found the plaintiff’s sister and her attorney responsible for 25 percent of the damages. However, the trial court granted a motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding there was insufficient evidence of willfulness, declined to treble the damages, and apportioned both economic and noneconomic damages, entering judgment for 75 percent of the total damages against the office specialist and the County.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that “willfully and knowingly” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5330 means intentionally releasing confidential records to someone known to be unauthorized, regardless of intent to harm. The court found substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of willfulness, requiring trebling of damages. The court also held that while noneconomic damages could be apportioned to other tortfeasors, economic damages could not. The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for $177,000 against the County and the office specialist, jointly and severally. View "Doe v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

A defendant was stopped by police in the early morning hours after being observed swerving and speeding. The officer detected signs of alcohol intoxication, and the defendant refused a chemical test, leading to a blood draw pursuant to a warrant. The defendant was charged with four misdemeanor offenses related to driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, with additional allegations of a high blood alcohol content and refusal to submit to testing. The defendant, a military veteran, moved for pretrial military diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.80, submitting evidence of his military service and documentation of alcohol use disorder and other mental health conditions allegedly resulting from his service.The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion for military diversion, reasoning that there was no nexus between the defendant’s alcohol abuse and his military service, and that his alcohol use predated his service. The court appeared to require the defendant to show a relationship between his qualifying condition and the commission of the charged offenses. The defendant then sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that for misdemeanor charges, Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a defendant to show a nexus between the qualifying condition (such as substance abuse) and the commission of the offense. The court further clarified that the burden of proof for eligibility is a “reasonable possibility” standard: the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that he is suffering from a qualifying condition as a result of military service. The court granted the writ, directed the trial court to vacate its denial, and ordered a new hearing applying the correct legal standards. View "Segura v. Superior Court" on Justia Law