Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a wildfire near their home, plaintiffs Hovik Gharibian and Caroline Minasian submitted a claim to their property insurer, Wawanesa General Insurance Company. Wawanesa paid the plaintiffs over $20,000 for professional cleaning services that were never used. Dissatisfied with the resolution, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Wawanesa for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Wawanesa’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs' insurance policy did not provide coverage for the claimed loss. The court determined that there was no evidence of "physical loss" as required by the policy. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a "direct physical loss to property" as required by their insurance policy. The court referenced the California Supreme Court's decision in Another Planet Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co., which clarified that "direct physical loss" requires a distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration to property. The court found that the wildfire debris did not cause such an alteration and could be easily cleaned or removed. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that Wawanesa did not breach the insurance policy since the plaintiffs' claim was not covered. All remaining arguments were deemed moot. View "Gharibian v. Wawanesa Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Caesar Elmi rejected a settlement offer from defendant Related Management Company, L.P. (Related) under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The case was resolved for less than the amount offered by Related, leading to a limitation on Elmi’s award of prejudgment costs and attorney fees to those incurred before the offer. Elmi later filed a motion seeking additional fees and costs incurred in enforcing the judgment, which the trial court denied, stating that Elmi was not entitled to any fees or costs after the date of the settlement offer.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Elmi’s motion for additional fees and costs, reasoning that section 998 precluded any fees or costs incurred after the settlement offer. Elmi appealed this decision, arguing that section 998 only applies to prejudgment costs and fees, not postjudgment costs incurred in enforcing the judgment.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Elmi, holding that postjudgment costs and fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not governed by section 998. The court noted that postjudgment costs and fees are distinct from prejudgment costs and fees and are governed by different laws, specifically section 685.040, which allows for the recovery of reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment, including attorney’s fees.The court reversed the trial court’s order denying Elmi’s motion for postjudgment fees and costs and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the motion on its merits. Elmi was also entitled to recover his costs on appeal. View "Elmi v. Related Management Co., L.P." on Justia Law

In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling the larger boy away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The case was tried in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. After a 15-day trial, the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times and concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The jury found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the trial court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, finding no error in the trial court’s decisions. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also found no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness and the refusal to give several special jury instructions requested by the plaintiff. The appellate court concluded that the standard instructions given were sufficient and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s rulings. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist. et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Dana Stubblefield, was convicted in 2020 of forcible rape and related offenses and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. On direct appeal, the conviction was found legally invalid due to a violation of the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). The appellate court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for new proceedings. Before the remittitur issued, Stubblefield filed a motion for release on his own recognizance or on bail, which the trial court denied, citing lack of jurisdiction.The trial court, upon receiving the jury's verdict in July 2020, remanded Stubblefield into custody, and he was sentenced in October 2020. Stubblefield appealed in November 2020, arguing that the prosecution violated the RJA. The appellate court agreed, reversed the conviction, and remanded the case. Stubblefield then sought release pending the final outcome of the appeal, but the trial court denied the motion, stating it lacked jurisdiction without the remittitur. Stubblefield petitioned the appellate court for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to rule on his motion.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on Stubblefield's motion for release pending appeal, despite the remittitur not yet issuing. The court held that the trial court's jurisdiction to hear a motion for release is supported by the Penal Code, which allows for bail after conviction and pending appeal. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its decision and rule on the merits of Stubblefield's motion for release. View "Stubblefield v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2011, the defendant was convicted by a jury of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and six counts of assault with a firearm. The jury found true the allegations that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The court sentenced the defendant to a total of 32 years to life in prison.The defendant later filed a petition for resentencing under Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code section 1172.1, arguing that he was a youth at the time of his conviction and had since participated in self-help groups and college courses while incarcerated. He requested the court to consider his youth and personal growth in resentencing. The Superior Court of Fresno County denied the petition, stating that under section 1172.1, a defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court.On appeal, the defendant's counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, asserting that there were no arguable issues on appeal. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, notified the defendant that he had 30 days to file a supplemental brief, but he did not do so. The court dismissed the appeal as abandoned, following the procedure outlined in People v. Delgadillo, which held that the Wende/Anders procedure does not apply to appeals from the denial of postconviction relief under section 1172.6. The court concluded that due process does not require independent review in this context and dismissed the appeal. View "P. v. Rosemond" on Justia Law

In 2017, the defendant pleaded no contest to attempted second-degree robbery with firearm enhancements, resisting a peace officer, hit and run, and assault with a firearm. He also admitted to a prior strike conviction. The court sentenced him to a total of 27 years and 8 months in prison. In 2019, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the restitution fine, which was denied. In 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was also denied.The defendant then filed a "Request for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing" in March 2024, citing changes in the law under Assembly Bill 600 and section 1172.1. The Superior Court of Tulare County denied the petition, stating it lacked jurisdiction to resentence him. The defendant appealed this decision, arguing that the court had jurisdiction under the amended laws and should have exercised its discretion.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence the defendant under section 1172.1, as amended by Assembly Bill 600, which allows for resentencing when applicable sentencing laws have changed. The appellate court found that the trial court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction and that the order denying the petition was appealable because it affected the defendant's substantial rights.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to exercise its discretion in considering whether to recall and resentence the defendant under the amended laws. View "People v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with Technology Credit Union (TCU) before starting his job in 2020. The agreement required both parties to submit any employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. Vo was later terminated and sued TCU for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination. TCU moved to compel arbitration, but Vo opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable because it did not allow for prehearing third-party discovery.The Santa Clara County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable because it did not permit third-party discovery, relying on Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. The court denied TCU's motion to compel arbitration, leading TCU to appeal the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court found that while the agreement was procedurally unconscionable, it was not substantively unconscionable. The court noted that the JAMS Rules incorporated into the agreement allowed the arbitrator to order additional discovery, including third-party discovery, if necessary. The court emphasized that the agreement should be interpreted to allow adequate discovery to vindicate statutory claims, as clarified in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded with instructions to grant TCU's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and not unconscionable. View "Vo v. Technology Credit Union" on Justia Law

Steven Ellis was convicted of kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and making criminal threats. The incident involved Ellis accosting two victims, Yasmin and Blanca, on separate occasions. Ellis forcibly moved Yasmin from a sidewalk to the middle of the street, and later grabbed Blanca from behind, placing her in a chokehold and threatening to kill her and her friend, Jessica. Ellis was identified by the victims and arrested the following day.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Ellis guilty on multiple counts, including the kidnapping of Yasmin. The jury did not reach a verdict on an alternative attempted kidnapping charge, which was subsequently dismissed. Ellis was sentenced to a total of nine years and six months in state prison, with the upper term of eight years for the kidnapping count. Ellis appealed the conviction, arguing insufficient evidence for the kidnapping charge and improper sentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to support the asportation element required for the kidnapping conviction. The movement of Yasmin was deemed not substantial in character, as it did not appreciably change her environment or increase the risk of harm. Consequently, the court reversed Ellis’s kidnapping conviction and reduced it to felony false imprisonment. The case was remanded for a full resentencing.The court also noted that the trial court must reconsider whether the sentences for the criminal threats convictions should be stayed under section 654, as concurrent sentences were initially imposed without proper consideration of this statute. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant Benny Townes was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his biological daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Jane Doe 1, who was 16 years old, was raped and impregnated by the defendant. Jane Doe 2, who was 13 and 14 years old at the time, was raped, sodomized, and subjected to lewd acts by the defendant. The defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with Jane Doe 1 but argued that it was consensual and not against her will.The Superior Court of Riverside County found the defendant guilty on all counts, including forcible rape, incest, lewd acts with a minor, and sodomy. The court sentenced him to 150 years to life in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he raped Jane Doe 1 by means of force or duress, and therefore, his convictions on counts 1 and 2 should be reversed. He also argued that the multiple victim enhancement allegations should be reversed if counts 1 and 2 were overturned.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of duress, which can be purely psychological. The defendant had instilled in Jane Doe 1 the belief that he was the son of God and that disobeying him would result in divine retribution. This psychological coercion was sufficient to constitute duress under Penal Code section 261, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(1). The court concluded that the threat of divine retribution, as taught by the defendant, was enough to uphold the convictions for forcible rape. View "People v. Townes" on Justia Law