Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the district attorneys of Los Angeles and San Francisco (the People) filing a complaint against the law firm Potter Handy, LLP and several of its attorneys (collectively, Potter) for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The People allege that Potter Handy has filed numerous ADA complaints containing false standing allegations as part of a scheme to extract settlements from small business owners in California. The People claim that this conduct constitutes an “unlawful” business practice under California's unfair competition law (UCL).Potter Handy demurred on the ground that the litigation privilege, which generally protects communications made as part of a judicial proceeding, immunizes their alleged conduct. The People argued that the litigation privilege does not bar their UCL claim as it is predicated on violations of a regulatory statute or rule that is itself exempt from the privilege. The trial court sustained Potter’s demurrer without leave to amend, and the People appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the litigation privilege does apply to the People's UCL claim. The court concluded that carving out an exception to the litigation privilege for the People’s UCL claim would not be proper because the Legislature’s prescribed remedies—prosecution directly under section 6128(a) and State Bar disciplinary proceedings—remain viable. View "People v. Potter Handy, LLP" on Justia Law

In the state of California, Robert Otto Carter Jr. appealed the denial of his request for a full resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Carter was originally sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and the trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing under the new law. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in California agreed that section 1172.75 required the trial court to conduct a full resentencing, and that the People (prosecution) are not entitled to withdraw their assent to the plea bargain if the trial court further reduces Carter’s sentence on resentencing. The court concluded that section 1172.75 applies to all sentences, including those imposed as part of a plea bargain, and that the prosecution may not withdraw from the plea agreement if the court imposes a lower sentence on resentencing. The court thus reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a full resentencing. View "People v. Carter" on Justia Law

In California, Edgardo Ortiz Guevara was sentenced to 28 years to life under the "Three Strikes" law, due to his third strike being a nonserious, nonviolent felony. He also had prior prison term enhancements. When the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36) (Reform Act) was enacted, Guevara petitioned for relief from his life sentence, but the trial court denied his petition due to concerns of public safety. Later, Guevara moved to have his prior prison term enhancements struck under Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that he was entitled to have his three strikes life term reduced to eight years, double the term for his current offense, irrespective of the denial of his section 1170.126 petition. The trial court agreed and reduced his life term to eight years.The People petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six for a writ of mandate or prohibition seeking to direct the trial court to recall its sentence and reinstate Guevara’s 25-years-to-life sentence. The appellate court granted the writ, finding that Guevara's interpretation of section 1172.75 would result in a repeal of section 1170.126 for inmates serving an indeterminate term with a prior prison enhancement, which would be unconstitutional. It also stated that Guevara’s prior prison term enhancements were struck, but not his 25-years-to-life term mandated by the Reform Act, which remains in effect as Guevara was found to be a danger to the public. Therefore, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its order recalling Guevara’s sentence and imposing a second strike sentence, and to reinstate Guevara’s three strikes sentence of 25 years to life in prison. View "People v. Super. Ct. (Guevara)" on Justia Law

Salvatore Baglione, insured under Health Net of California Inc. through his employer, the County of Santa Clara, brought a lawsuit against Health Net alleging breach of contract and bad faith. This followed Health Net's inconsistent authorization of a medication prescribed for Baglione's chronic condition. Health Net moved to compel arbitration of Baglione's claims based on an arbitration provision in the enrollment form Baglione had signed. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Health Net's motion, finding that the agreement between Health Net and the County did not satisfy the disclosure requirements of Health and Safety Code section 1363.1, and therefore, the arbitration provision was unenforceable. Health Net appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court ruled that the enrollment form did not comply with the requirements of section 1363.1. It found that the form was not clear in its disclosure of which disputes were subject to arbitration, particularly with references to additional documents and laws that did not pertain to the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the form did not place the arbitration provision immediately before the signature line, as required by the statute. The court also agreed with the lower court that the agreement between Health Net and the County was non-compliant. It ruled that an arbitration agreement, which is part of a health plan, is not enforceable unless both the enrollment form and the County agreement are compliant. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying Health Net's motion to compel arbitration. View "Baglione v. Health Net of Cal." on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Ryan Berry-Vierwinden, was convicted of first-degree murder under the theory that he aided and abetted the crime. The murder was deemed first degree because it was committed by means of lying in wait. The defendant appealed the decision, arguing that he is eligible for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 because the jury instructions at trial allowed for his conviction based on the malice of his accomplice, which was imputed to him solely based on his participation in the crime. He based his argument on previous court decisions, particularly People v. Maldonado.However, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, disagreed with the defendant's argument. The court referenced their prior decisions in People v. Burns and People v. Flores, concluding that the defendant's claim of instructional error does not establish that he "could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189," as required by Penal Code section 1172.6.The court noted that the law already required an aider and abettor to personally harbor malice for a conviction at the time of the defendant's trial. Therefore, the defendant failed to demonstrate that he could not presently be convicted of murder due to changes made by Senate Bill No. 1437. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. View "P. v. Berry-Vierwinden" on Justia Law

Jose Velasquez, as a condition of probation, had entered a residential rehabilitation program sponsored by The Salvation Army and was injured while working in its warehouse. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) denied Velasquez's claim for workers’ compensation benefits, determining that Velasquez was not employed by either The Salvation Army or the County of Santa Barbara (the County). The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District held that The Salvation Army is statutorily excluded from being an employer for workers’ compensation purposes under section 3301 of the Labor Code, and affirmed the Board’s decision in that respect. However, the Court found that the record was inadequately developed during the administrative proceedings to determine whether the County was Velasquez’s employer. Therefore, the Court annulled the Board’s decision as to the County and remanded the matter for further consideration. View "Velasquez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight, the plaintiff, Eunices Argueta, appealed against the judgment in favor of her former employer, Worldwide Flight Services, Inc. Argueta had sued Worldwide for sexual harassment and retaliation, alleging that she was sexually harassed by a certain Mr. Nguyen, an employee of Worldwide, and that the company had failed to prevent the harassment.The case arose when several employees working under Argueta lodged complaints against her for bullying, harassment, and other misconduct. Subsequently, Argueta filed a complaint against Nguyen, accusing him of sexual harassment. The company investigated the allegations and issued a "Letter of Concern" to Nguyen, imposing certain conditions on his continued employment.Argueta eventually resigned, citing a hostile work environment. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Worldwide, and Argueta's motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied by the trial court. Argueta appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the substance of the complaints made against her by other employees.The appellate court agreed with Argueta, finding that the admission of the substance of the complaints was prejudicial. The court ruled that such evidence had little relevance to Argueta's claims of sexual harassment and was highly prejudicial to her case, potentially causing the jury to view her as a bad person. The court thus reversed the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial. The court did not find it necessary to consider her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three, the court evaluated the legality of three members of the City of Mission Viejo City Council holding office after their elected terms had expired. The three council members, Ed Sachs, Wendy Bucknum, and Greg Raths, were elected in November 2018 for two-year terms that expired in December 2020. These two-year terms, rather than the traditional four-year terms, were part of a stipulated judgment to remedy violations of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA). The judgment intended to implement a system of cumulative voting for the city council, with all five seats up for election in November 2020. However, cumulative voting could not be implemented in time for the 2020 election, and the three councilmembers did not stand for reelection but continued to hold office after their terms expired.Michael Schlesinger, the plaintiff, brought a quo warranto lawsuit, with the permission of the California Attorney General, to have the three councilmembers removed from office. The councilmembers argued that they were entitled to hold office until the next cumulative voting election in 2022. However, the court ruled that the councilmembers were elected for two-year terms, and the stipulated judgment did not extend their terms contingent on the implementation of cumulative voting. As a result, the court affirmed the quo warranto judgment that Sachs, Bucknum, and Raths were holding office unlawfully after their terms expired in December 2020. View "P. ex rel. Schlesinger v. Sachs" on Justia Law

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense. View "Conway v. Superior Court" on Justia Law