Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Cedrick Conway, is awaiting trial on a petition to commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In preparation for the trial, he requested a court order directing a Department of State Hospitals (DSH) evaluator to update a previous evaluation of Conway which was done several years earlier and concluded that he did not meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. The trial court denied the request, believing that the pertinent statute only allows the prosecution (the party seeking commitment) to request an updated evaluation—not the defense. Conway challenged this ruling, leading to the present case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five concluded that the trial court had misunderstood the statute. While the SVPA does allow the prosecution to request an updated evaluation from DSH, the court found nothing in the statute that would prohibit the defense from obtaining an updated evaluation if authorized by a court order. The court therefore held that the trial court erred in denying Conway’s request for an updated evaluation based on a mistaken understanding of the statute.The court also rejected the defense’s claim that the prosecution was not entitled to oppose the defense motion for an updated evaluation. The court determined that the trial court has discretion to decide whether to entertain opposition from the prosecution. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider Conway’s request for an updated evaluation, taking into account the court's discretion to authorize such an evaluation for the defense. View "Conway v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the filed rate doctrine and its applicability in instances where rates approved by a municipal board are questioned. The plaintiffs, a group of customers, sued Recology, a waste management company, alleging that the company violated the Unfair Competition Law and other laws by bribing a city official to facilitate the approval of Recology’s application for increased refuse collection rates. The trial court ruled in favor of Recology, holding that the claims were barred by the filed rate doctrine. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reversed the decision, stating that the California version of the filed rate doctrine does not bar this action because the purposes underlying the doctrine – “nondiscrimination” and “nonjusticiability” strands – are not implicated by plaintiffs’ claims. The court also concluded that the judgment in the prior law enforcement action does not pose a res judicata bar to this putative class action. The court remanded the case for the trial court’s consideration of Recology’s remaining challenges in the first instance. View "Villarroel v. Recology" on Justia Law

Buckner was convicted of arson of an inhabited structure and sentenced to three years in prison. He argued that: there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the house was inhabited because the evidence did not show that he intended to continue living in the house after the fire; the court erred by admitting statements he made during a police interview that he argues were taken in violation of his Miranda rights; and the trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution to his insurance company and the fire department.The court of appeal affirmed in part. The law does not require the prosecution to prove that Buckner intended to continue living in the house after the fire; since Buckner was living in the house at the time of the fire, substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that the house was inhabited. Buckner’s statements to the police were properly admitted at trial because, under the totality of the circumstances, the interview during which he made them was not custodial. The restitution order must be reversed because the insurance company and the fire department are not victims of Buckner’s crime for purposes of restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4. View "People v. Buckner" on Justia Law

Doe alleged that his ex-girlfriend and her friends, including Ledor, embarked upon a “vengeful smear campaign” to harass and defame him after his senior year of high school. In 2020, Ledor sent emails to Dartmouth College officials, stating essentially that Doe had committed voter fraud to win an election for student body president at Berkeley High School (BHS) and providing links to what she represented to be articles and a podcast about the incident. After receiving the emails, Dartmouth revoked Doe’s offer of admission. Ledor later sent Instagram messages to two of Doe's acquaintances, advising them to “avoid him” because “men like him grow up thinking it’s okay to disrespect women and be violent.”Doe sued for defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, civil harassment, civil stalking, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, with a claim for vicarious liability against Ledor’s parents. The Ledors filed a special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc. 425.16). The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Ledors did not meet their burden of showing that the statements in the Dartmouth emails involve protected activity under section 425.16(e)(2) or (4), View "Doe v. Ledor" on Justia Law

Mother gave birth to K.B. in August 2022. Both she and K.B. tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and marijuana at the hospital, triggering a referral to the Department, which placed K.B. in temporary protective custody. Law enforcement subsequently arrested both parents on out-of-county warrants, taking one-year-old K. into protective custody. The Department filed a dependency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300(b),(j)) and reported that the social worker had contacted the maternal grandmother as part of the Department’s inquiry into Minors’ Native American ancestry and that: “There are relatives to consider for placement at time of detention.” The Minors were placed in a non-relative foster home. A subsequent report stated that Mother “was unable to identify any relatives to be considered for placement”; the maternal grandmother and other relatives reside in Mississippi. Father stated that he has relatives in Arkansas that may be options in the future but he was unable to identify any relatives in California.” The paternal grandmother was also contacted.At the contested hearing, the parties did not raise the investigation regarding relative placement. The juvenile court declared Minors dependents, ordered that the Department offer reunification services, and found that the Department exercised due diligence to identify, locate, and contact relatives. The court of appeal reversed in part. There is no evidence that the Department exercised due diligence in identifying and investigating Minors’ adult relatives, or that any relatives received the required notice detailing options for participation. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Phillips. arrested for DUI, was taken to a lab facility. Ramos, a phlebotomist, took a needle from a sealed package supplied by the County Forensic Lab, cleaned Phillips’ arm, and drew two vials of blood. The county lab measured Phillips’ BAC at 0.110 percent, +/- 0.004 percent. The lab report certifies the "sample appears to be compliant with Title 17” of the California Code of Regulations. At a hearing, Phillips attempted to rebut the presumption, Evidence Code section 664, that the blood was properly collected. Phillips called one witness, Ribeiro, the president of Bay Area Phlebotomy and Laboratory Services, who testified that Ramos was a CPT, not a "qualified person" (licensed physician, RN, LVN, licensed clinical laboratory scientist, licensed clinical laboratory bioanalyst, certified paramedic, or licensed physician assistant). Phillips also established that a licensed physician had not approved the policies and procedures that Ramos followed; a qualified person had not verified Ramos’ competency to draw blood for alcohol testing before she was first allowed to do so without direct supervision; a qualified person had not reviewed Ramos’ work at least once a month; and no qualified individual was accessible for consultation within 30 minutes.The hearing officer rejected Phillips’ arguments and ordered the suspension of Phillips’ driving privilege. The court of appeal affirmed. While Phillips rebutted the presumption that the blood test was properly performed, the evidence established the reliability of the manner of collection of Phillips’ blood. View "Phillips v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Firefighters sued Favro, who crashed his car into a firetruck before receiving aid from the firefighters, alleging that Favro was negligent in failing to comply with their directions and thereby caused them to be harmed by another crashing vehicle.The Firefighter’s Rule negates liability "by one whose negligence causes or contributes to the fire which in turn causes the death or injury of the [firefighter].” with exceptions. Civil Code 1714.9(a)(1) provides: “any person is responsible not only for the results of that person’s willful acts causing injury to a" firefighter "also for any injury occasioned to [the firefighter] by the want of ordinary care or skill in the management of the person’s property or person," "Where the conduct causing the injury occurs after the person knows or should have known of the presence of the" firefighter. The court instructed the jury on: “Assumption of Risk/Exception/Occupation Involving Inherent Risk” The Special Verdict Form asked: Did Favro increase the risks to [the firefighers] through conduct occurring after he knew or should have known of the presence of the firefighters?” The presiding juror marked, “No.”The court of appeal ordered a new trial. Favro’s counsel committed misconduct by misrepresenting to the jury the law applicable to these unusual circumstances, stating that Favro could not be held liable unless he had increased the risk to the firefighters “beyond the risk that’s inherent to their job.”. A subsequent admonition failed to cure the error. View "Rattary v. Favro" on Justia Law

Wiley was charged with kidnapping and making a criminal threat. Wiley pled guilty to the criminal threat charge. The court imposed the upper term (three years) but suspended the execution of the sentence and placed Wiley on probation with a condition that Wiley obey all laws. Wiley was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a billy club, and possession of a stun gun by a felon. The information alleged Wiley had sustained a prior serious felony conviction, a strike, his criminal threat conviction. Wiley pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court dismissed the other counts and the prior conviction allegation and found that Wiley had violated his probation in the criminal threat case.The court imposed a three-year upper term for the criminal threat conviction and a consecutive eight months (one-third the midterm) for the firearm possession conviction. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court erred under federal and state law by selecting the upper term, relying in part on aggravating factors—the increasing seriousness of Wiley’s convictions and his poor performance on probation—that were not admitted by Wiley or found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts were proved by a certified record of Wiley’s convictions, and fall within the prior conviction exception to the heightened proof requirements. View "People v. Wiley" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Velasco, who was serving a sentence for attempted home invasion robbery, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon, was identified as eligible for resentencing pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified at Penal Code section 1172.75). At a September 2022 resentencing hearing, Velasco’s attorney made an oral motion to strike Velasco’s one year prison prior enhancement, which had been imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b) and did not involve a sexually violent offense. Velasco was not present at the hearing and, although the minute order reflected his presence was waived, the record did not contain a written waiver. The trial court granted the request, struck the enhancement, and resentenced Velasco to a total term of 26 years and four months. Neither counsel nor the court addressed whether other new sentencing laws might impact Velasco’s sentence or whether postconviction factors should influence the new sentence. Velasco argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting a full resentencing hearing as was required by section 1172.75. He further contended the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights by holding a resentencing hearing in his absence without a valid waiver. The State argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this resentencing hearing at all because Velasco’s case was already on appeal before the Court of Appeal in case No. D080603. However, should the appeals court determine that the trial court had jurisdiction, the State conceded remand was warranted because Velasco did not waive his presence at the resentencing hearing. The Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Velasco pursuant to section 1172.75 but reversed and remanded for a new hearing on the grounds that Velasco was not present at the sentencing hearing and did not validly waive his presence. View "California v. Velasco" on Justia Law