Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 penalizes human trafficking of a minor. It targets a person who preys upon, and forces, a minor to engage in commercial sex acts for the person’s financial benefit. The penalty for this crime is fifteen years to life imprisonment. That was the sentence imposed here. Defendant appealed the judgment after a jury convicted him of human trafficking of a minor (“Doe”) for a commercial sex act and found true the allegation that the offense involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury. Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle, (2) he has standing to challenge the search of Doe’s cell phone, (3) the evidence is insufficient that he used force or fear to induce Doe to engage in commercial sex, (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during argument, (5) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted pandering, and (6) the cumulative impact of the “errors” requires reversal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. First, the court found that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant used force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury as set forth in section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2). Further, the court explained here there is no substantial evidence that Defendant was guilty of the lesser offense of attempted pandering but not the greater offense of trafficking of a minor. View "P. v. Banks" on Justia Law

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant-appellant Ryan Christianson as an inmate potentially eligible for relief under California Penal Code section 1172.75, but the trial court corrected the original sentence by administratively striking section 667.5(b) enhancements that had been stayed by the original sentencing court, and thus concluded resentencing was unnecessary. On appeal, the parties asked the Court of Appeal to decide whether section 1172.75 applied in cases like this, where the abstract of judgment on which an inmate was currently serving time included one or more section 667.5(b) enhancements that were previously imposed but stayed. To this, the Court concluded that it did and that therefore resentencing was required. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying Christianson’s request for resentencing. View "California v. Christianson" on Justia Law

According to H.B., Hall “mentally and physically” abused H.B. “every day [she] was under his control for over [three and a half years].” Hall made H.B. “work for him,” providing “sexual services to customers” and charging “from $80 to $1,000 per customer.” She “earned approximately $300 daily” but Hall “took all of this money.” After Hall pleaded no contest to human trafficking and pimping, H.B. sought restitution of $340,500: $31,336 for stolen Social Security payments and damage to her credit score, $340,500 for money she received for acts of prostitution, and accrued interest.In declining to make the award as to the prostitution earnings under Penal Code 1202.4(p), which does not expressly authorize restitution for a victim’s labor where that labor is itself proscribed by law, the court stated: “public policy arguments favor H.B.’s position, but … public policy decisions are for the legislature.” The court of appeal vacated, citing the statutory language: “Upon conviction for a violation of [s]ection 236.1, the court shall … order the defendant to pay restitution to the victim in a case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct.” The court also noted that the law contemplates measuring restitution by the defendant's profit. View "H.B. v. Superior Court of Solano County" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to a charge of second-degree murder. Appellant admitted as true an enhancement allegation regarding the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Appellant to prison for 15 years to life. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing in the trial court, claiming he could not be convicted of murder based on the 2019 changes to the law. After giving the parties a chance to brief this issue, the court denied the petition, concluding Appellant was ineligible for resentencing because his conviction had occurred after Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s petition. The court explained that Appellant is ineligible for resentencing for two reasons. First, in order to be resentenced, the charging document filed against Appellant must have allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid. This requirement is not met here. The prosecution filed the information against Appellant in 2020. Thus, when this criminal proceeding was initiated, the prosecution was precluded from proving the murder charge under a theory of imputed malice. This deficiency amply demonstrates that the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s petition for resentencing. Further, when Appellant entered his change of plea, the now invalid theories of murder liability had already been eliminated. Consequently, Appellant has already received the benefits of Senate Bill No. 1437. View "P. v. Reyes" on Justia Law

In 2012, Escamilla, a fugitive recovery agent, searched the plaintiffs' residence, looking for their relative, who had skipped bail. In 2014, the plaintiffs sued Escamilla based on the incident, asserting negligence, false imprisonment, assault, and battery. Attorney Vannucci represented the plaintiffs. In 2017, Escamilla filed a cross-complaint asserting abuse of process against the plaintiffs for instituting civil harassment proceedings resulting in a temporary restraining order. In 2019, the jury ruled in favor of Escamilla.Approximately 23 months later, Escamilla filed a malicious prosecution complaint against the plaintiffs and Vannucci. Vannucci filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc. 425.18)) motion, claiming the malicious prosecution claim arose out of his representation of the plaintiffs, a protected activity. and that Escamilla would not be able to prove a probability of prevailing because his malicious prosecution claim was barred by the one-year limitations period, Civil Code 340.6(a). Escamilla argued that his malicious prosecution claim was governed by section 335.1's two-year statute of limitations. The court of appeal affirmed, in favor of Vannucci. Section 340.6(a) governs “[a]n action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services.” It applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys who performed professional services in the underlying litigation. The tolling provision is inapplicable. View "Escamilla v. Vannucci" on Justia Law

V.S. and V.K., both born in India, met in 2009 in Illinois, where they both lived. In 2010, during a trip to India, they participated in the Phera Hindu marriage ceremony. In 2013, the couple had a civil marriage ceremony in Illinois. In 2019, V.S. petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage, identifying the date of marriage as December 2010. Although V.K. in his response, likewise indicated the date of marriage as December 2010. He later argued that the date of marriage was the date of the Chicago civil ceremony.The court of appeal affirmed that the 2010 Phera was not legally binding under the Hindu Marriage Act and that the parties were not married until their U.S. civil ceremony. An out-of-state marriage is “valid” in California if it “would be valid by laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted” (Family Code 308). The court upheld a determination that the Phera was not legally binding on V.K., who was not domiciled in India and did not voluntarily submit to be bound by the Act. The court properly did not treat V.K.’s initial admission that the parties were married in 2010 as a judicial admission of fact; the date of the parties’ marriage is a predominantly legal conclusion not susceptible of judicial admission as a disputed fact. Substantial evidence supports the determination that V.S. was not entitled to treatment as a putative spouse after the Phera. View "Marriage of V.S. & V.K." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Castaic Studios, LLC (Castaic) and Wonderland Studios, LLC (Wonderland) entered an agreement under which Castaic granted Wonderland the “exclusive right to use” certain areas of its commercial property. The agreement specified that it was a “license agreement,” as opposed to a lease, with Castaic “retaining legal possession and control” of the premises. The agreement was to be “governed by the contract laws and not by the landlord tenant laws.” When Wonderland defaulted, Castaic nonetheless filed an unlawful detainer action seeking possession of the property. The trial court sustained Wonderland’s demurrer without leave to amend, reasoning that Castaic had waived its right to pursue the remedy of unlawful detainer   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the trial court correctly sustained Wonderland’s demurrer without leave to amend. Whether an agreement constitutes a lease or a license is “a subtle pursuit.” Although Castaic argued at length that the agreement was in fact a lease despite its express designation to the contrary, we need not decide this issue to resolve the appeal. Even assuming the agreement contains some elements of a lease, its express terms show the parties’ intent to waive any rights afforded by the landlord-tenant laws, including a landlord’s remedy of unlawful detainer. View "Castaic Studios v. Wonderland Studios" on Justia Law

Gary Sepanossian, dba G.S. Construction (Sepanossian), individually and as class representative, filed a class action against National Ready Mix Concrete Co., Inc. (Ready Mix), alleging Ready Mix charged its customers an “energy” fee and an “environmental” fee “wholly untethered to any actual cost for ‘energy’ or ‘environmental’ issues” that Ready Mix instead “recognize[s] as profit.” The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) under the fraudulent and unfair business practices prongs; (2) breach of contract; and (3) “unjust enrichment.” After Ready Mix answered the complaint, Sepanossian filed a motion for class certification. The trial court granted class certification but expressed doubts about Sepanossian’s legal claims and invited the parties to present a motion for judgment on the pleadings to address the merits before class notice. The parties agreed to do so, and Ready Mix subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted on the UCL and unjust enrichment causes of action.   The Second Appellate District reversed because Sepanossian alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action under the UCL but affirmed dismissal of the unjust enrichment cause of action. The court explained that here, Ready Mix customers cannot buy concrete from it while avoiding being charged energy and environmental fees. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court wrote that it must accept as true Sepanossian’s allegation the fees were unavoidable for customers who wished to purchase concrete from Ready Mix. View "Sepanossian v. Nat. Ready Mix Co." on Justia Law

Villegas was charged with six counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (his tenants’ daughters), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (count seven), forcible rape of a minor over 14 (his daughter), sexual penetration by a foreign object on a minor over 14, and forcible oral copulation of a minor over 14. As to counts one through six, enhancements were alleged under the One Strike law, that the crimes were committed against children under the age of 14, and that Villegas was convicted of qualifying offenses against more than one victim. As to counts eight through ten, enhancements were alleged that the qualifying convictions committed by Villegas involved more than one victim. As to all counts, it was further alleged that upon conviction Villegas was ineligible for probation. Convicted, he was sentenced to 202 years to life in prison.The court of appeal affirmed in part, rejecting an argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek exclusion of a portion of a custodial interrogation based on Miranda violations. The court reduced the sentences on counts eight to ten; an must information afford a One Strike defendant fair notice of the qualifying statutory circumstance or circumstances that are being pled, proved, and invoked in support of One Strike sentencing. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the court reduced his sex offender fine to $4,300 but imposed $12,320 in additional mandatory assessments. View "People v. Villegas" on Justia Law

In June 2016, the plaintiffs sued their contractor and subcontractors for alleged construction defects. In February 2017, the trial court deemed the litigation complex and appointed a discovery special master. The plaintiffs failed to comply with multiple pretrial orders regarding discovery; the trial date was reset several times before the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, when the Sonoma County Superior Court civil courtrooms closed due to the pandemic, the action had been pending for almost four years. After the courts reopened, the court reset the trial date twice. The plaintiffs requested a continuance from July to December 2021, noting that the statutory deadline for commencing trial was December 28, 2021, and that certain defendants would not stipulate to an extension. The court set a January 28, 2022 trial date without addressing the statutory deadline. Plaintiffs’ counsel raised no objection. In December 2021, the plaintiffs moved to continue the January trial date due to incomplete discovery. The trial court re-set the trial to April 2022 (eighth trial date).In December 2021 and January 2022, several defendants moved for mandatory dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure 583.310. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal. The court reviewed all pandemic-related orders and concluded that the delay was the result of the plaintiffs not exercising reasonable diligence in prosecuting their action. View "Oswald v. Landmark Builders, Inc." on Justia Law