Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Renteria was sentenced to 34 years in prison on 18 drug- and gang-related offenses. Changes in sentencing laws took effect while an appeal was pending. Senate Bill 136 amended Penal Code section 667.51 to limit prior prison term enhancements to terms for sexually violent offenses; Senate Bill 1393 amended section 1385 to give trial courts discretion to strike enhancements in the furtherance of justice. The trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing.The Attorney General conceded that under newly enacted Senate Bill 483, the trial court should have conducted a full resentencing. The court of appeal remanded. The trial court did not consider the applicability of the newly amended section 1170, addressing the choice between sentencing a defendant to lower, middle, or upper terms, and whether any of the seven consecutive sentences totaling 26 years imposed on Renteria should be reduced. Renteria is entitled to application of Assembly Bill 518, amending section 654, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same acts or omissions. The trial court must either vacate the sentence for gang participation, which was one year and four months, or the sentences for accessory after the fact and offering to sell cocaine, which total four years. The trial court was not required to strike the prior serious felony enhancement. View "People v. Renteria" on Justia Law

The parties married in 2001 and separated in 2011. Before the marriage, the husband operated a nursery as a sole proprietorship. After the marriage, the husband formed a corporation to operate the business. In 2003, the nursery business was “sold” to the corporation for $1 In the dissolution action, the court rejected the husband’s contention that the corporation was a continuation of the pre-existing business and that the business was presumptively community property.On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeal affirmed that the husband did not have a claim for reimbursement under Family Code section 2640 for contributions of separate property to a community asset. The $1 sale price is not determinative. A spouse who decides to sell property to the community is electing not to contribute the property “freely and without reservation” “to benefit the community.” It also is not a “general expectation” (ibid.) of most spouses that if they sell separate property to the community, they will nevertheless receive additional reimbursement for the transferred property, over and above the sale price, if the community dissolves. View "Marriage of Motiska & Ford" on Justia Law

A defendant in a criminal proceeding (“Defendant”) was arrested based on a co-defendant’s statement. The petitioning Newspaper sought an interview with the then-unindicted co-defendant (“Co-defendant”). Subsequently, Defendant filed a subpoena seeking all material relevant to Newspaper’s interview with co-defendant.The trial court denied Newspaper’s request to quash the subpoena, finding that newsperson’s immunity must yield to a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court ultimately held Newspaper in contempt.The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of a Newspaper’s motion to quash a subpoena but vacated the trial court’s finding of contempt. View "Bakersfield Californian v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner Juan Boitez moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his mother’s car. After the trial court denied his motion, Boitez petitioned for writ of mandate or prohibition The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether Boitez gave voluntary consent for the police to search his mother’s car after he was pulled over for a traffic violation. As a material part of obtaining Boitez's consent, the police officer falsely, but apparently with subjective belief that it was true, stated that he had the authority to tow the car, but would not do so if Boitez consented to the search. Specifically, the Court considered whether, but for the police officer’s false promise of leniency as to the towing of the mother’s car, the prosecution met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Boitez's consent was uncoerced. To this, the Court concluded the prosecution did not meet its burden: the false promise of leniency not to tow the car was a material and inextricable part of the agreement inducing defendant’s consent to the search, and thus, under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner's consent was not voluntarily given. As part of its analysis, the Court adopted the reasoning of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that the question of voluntary consent "cannot be based on the subjective good faith of a police officer in making the false statement that induced the defendant’s consent to search." The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress and to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Boitez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Stronghold and the city entered into a 2015 contract to renovate the Monterey Conference Center. Before filing a lawsuit asserting a claim for money or damages against a public entity, the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code 810) requires that a claim be presented to the entity. Without first presenting a claim to the city, Stronghold filed suit seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the contract, and asserting that the Act was inapplicable.Stronghold presented three claims to the city in 2017-2019, based on its refusal to approve change orders necessitated by purportedly excusable delays. Stronghold filed a fourth amended complaint, alleging breach of contract. The court granted the city summary judgment, reasoning that the declaratory relief cause of action in the initial complaint was, in essence, a claim for money or damages and that all claims in the operative complaint “lack merit” because Stronghold failed to timely present a claim to the city before filing suit.The court of appeal reversed. The notice requirement does not apply to an action seeking purely declaratory relief. A declaratory relief action seeking interpretation of a contract is not a claim for money or damages, even if the judicial interpretation sought may later be the basis for a separate claim for money or damages which would trigger the claim presentation requirement. View "Stronghold Engineering, Inc. v. City of Monterey" on Justia Law

In 2017, Plaintiffs-appellants Loreto and Mercedes Lagrisola applied for and obtained a loan from North American Financial Corporation (NAFC), secured by a mortgage on their residence. In 2021, the Lagrisolas sued NAFC, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, alleging NAFC was not licensed to engage in lending in the state of California between 2014 and 2018 and asserted violations of California Business and Professions Code section 17200 and Financial Code sections 22100 and 22751. The trial court sustained NAFC’s demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend, concluding that the allegations in the FAC were insufficient to establish an actual economic injury, necessary for standing under Business and Professions Code section 17200, and that there was no private right of action under Financial Code sections 22100 and 22751. The Lagrisolas appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its judgment. On de novo review, the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusions as the trial court, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Lagrisola v. North American Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Edgar Flores appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing on his second degree murder conviction. The superior court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on the ground Flores was ineligible for resentencing because he had been convicted of provocative act murder. Flores contended the superior court erred by denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie review stage. He argued the instructions given at his trial allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder based on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice, namely, that he aided and abetted co-defendant Anthony Paez’s provocative act without himself acting with malice. Flores also argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to amend the petition after legislation made relief available to persons convicted of murder on any theory that imputed malice based solely on participation in a crime and by failing to make the instructional argument he urged here. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

Lai, an engineer, had access to Applied’s trade secrets and participated in highly confidential meetings. Mattson, Applied's direct competitor, recruited 17 Applied employees. Lai accepted a job with Mattson. Before his last day at Applied, Lai accessed proprietary information from Applied’s cloud-based storage system and sent e-mails attaching highly confidential Applied documents—many clearly marked as such—to his personal email accounts. He signed a separation certificate stating he had not retained any Applied information and confirmed this in two exit interviews. After starting his new job, Lai logged into his personal email accounts on his Mattson computer. Lai claims never disclosed any Applied information to Mattson. Mattson denies any knowledge of Lai’s actions.Applied sued Mattson and Lai, citing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Civ. Code 3426) and breach of Lai’s employment agreement. Lai then deleted the emails he had sent to one account, and, after communicating with Mattson’s lawyers, downloaded a confidential Applied document to his Mattson laptop, deleting it a moment later. Mattson put Lai on leave. cut off his access to his personal email accounts. and sequestered his iPhone and computers. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in the Applied-Lai employment contract. The court of appeal affirmed a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from accessing or using Applied’s confidential information and an order compelling arbitration as to Lai. Mattson, a non-party, is not entitled to arbitration. The litigation should be stayed pending arbitration. View "Mattson Technology, Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the complicated relationship between a mother, Teri A., and her son, Zachary H. During a tense period in their relationship, Zachary H. moved out of Teri A.’s home and informed her that he did not want to have further contact. Over Zachary H.’s repeated objections, Teri A. continued to reach out to him by mail, text message, e-mail, and by showing up to his home unannounced. Zachary H. claimed that after he moved out, Teri A. nearly ran him over with her car as he walked along the sidewalk near his residence. Following this incident, Teri A. sent Zachary H. a series of e-mails that caused him significant emotional distress. Immediately after receiving Teri A.’s e-mail referencing firearms, Zachary H. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). During the DVRO hearing, the trial court found Zachary H.’s testimony to be credible, and evidence established Zachary H. was in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily harm and issued a DVRO for a period of one year, including a related firearms prohibition. Teri A. appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the DVRO because it was not supported by substantial evidence and because the DVRO resulted from evidentiary errors by the trial court. She also contended the firearms prohibition violated her constitutional rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the firearms restriction issued in conjunction with the DVRO was constitutional. View "Zachary H. v. Teri A." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances finding, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury found true allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had been armed with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a firearm enhancement. Defendant filed his first section 1172.6 petition. After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). Defendant again appealed an order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court’s holding is the law of the case and conclusively established at the prima facie stage that Defendant is not entitled to resentencing based on his second 1172.6 petition. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that, by applying the law of the case doctrine, the court would be shutting our eyes to a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice. View "P. v. Medrano" on Justia Law