Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved the complicated relationship between a mother, Teri A., and her son, Zachary H. During a tense period in their relationship, Zachary H. moved out of Teri A.’s home and informed her that he did not want to have further contact. Over Zachary H.’s repeated objections, Teri A. continued to reach out to him by mail, text message, e-mail, and by showing up to his home unannounced. Zachary H. claimed that after he moved out, Teri A. nearly ran him over with her car as he walked along the sidewalk near his residence. Following this incident, Teri A. sent Zachary H. a series of e-mails that caused him significant emotional distress. Immediately after receiving Teri A.’s e-mail referencing firearms, Zachary H. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). During the DVRO hearing, the trial court found Zachary H.’s testimony to be credible, and evidence established Zachary H. was in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily harm and issued a DVRO for a period of one year, including a related firearms prohibition. Teri A. appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the DVRO because it was not supported by substantial evidence and because the DVRO resulted from evidentiary errors by the trial court. She also contended the firearms prohibition violated her constitutional rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of discretion, and that the firearms restriction issued in conjunction with the DVRO was constitutional. View "Zachary H. v. Teri A." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances finding, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury found true allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had been armed with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a firearm enhancement. Defendant filed his first section 1172.6 petition. After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). Defendant again appealed an order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court’s holding is the law of the case and conclusively established at the prima facie stage that Defendant is not entitled to resentencing based on his second 1172.6 petition. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that, by applying the law of the case doctrine, the court would be shutting our eyes to a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice. View "P. v. Medrano" on Justia Law

This case arose out of disputes over the propriety and enforceability of amendments to Thomas Tedesco’s living trust, which was conceived of as part of a family estate plan Tedesco created with his late wife, Wanda. The trust came into being following Wanda Tedesco’s death in 2002, and it was later restated. The primary beneficiaries of the restated trust were the cotrustees. For their part, the cotrustees petitioned the court to validate a 2013 amendment, and thus to establish the invalidity of a purported 2020 amendment to the restated trust. The appeal before the Court of Appeal challenged a discovery sanction for $6,000. Counsel attempted to use the sanctions order as a basis for challenging the merits of the trial court’s nonappealable order quashing appellant Debra Wear's document subpoena, and then to further use the trial court’s analysis underlying that discovery ruling into a basis for reviewing a separate order the Court of Appeal already ruled could not be appealed. The Court concluded all of this seemed to be in furtherance of counsel’s broader quest: to again collaterally attack the validity of a conservatorship over the Tedesco estate, which had been rejected by the probate and appellate courts in earlier proceedings. The Court determined its jurisdiction arose here on the limited issue of sanctions, and found Wear failed to challenge the probate court's pertinent determinations, "let alone demonstrate why the court abused its discretion in making them. We find no error in the court’s ruling." The Court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Tedesco v. White" on Justia Law

The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 (the Act) is among the measures that the California Legislature has adopted to address the state’s housing shortage. Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 66300 prohibits affected cities from (1) enacting any policy that changes the zoning of parcels to “a less intensive use” or (2) “reducing the intensity of land use” within a zoning district to below what was allowed under zoning ordinances in effect on January 1, 2018. Defendants the City of Culver City and the City Council of the City of Culver City (City Council) (collectively, the City) adopted Ordinance No. 2020-010, changing development standards in its single-family residential, or R-1, zone. The Ordinance reduced the allowable floor area ratio (FAR) for primary residences from .60 to .45, decreasing the square footage of a house that could be built on a lot. Plaintiffs Yes In My Back Yard (collectively, YIMBY) filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order declaring the Ordinance void. The trial court determined the Ordinance violated section 66300 because the FAR reduction impermissibly reduced the intensity of land use.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that there is no published authority addressing the proper interpretation of section 66300, and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the novelty of the questions presented. In calculating the lodestar amount, the court accepted the hourly rates of YIMBY’s counsel, noting that “[the City] ma[d]e no argument to the contrary.” There is no showing that the trial court applied the multiplier to punish the City. View "Yes In My Back Yard v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

Defendant resides in Arcadia, California, and holds a Chinese resident identification card. In 2019, Defendant made several trips to Macau, which is an autonomous region on the south coast of China. Gambling is legal in Macau. While in Macau, Defendant entered into seven loan agreements with Tak Chun Gaming Promotion Company Limited (Tak Chun). Tak Chun sued Long in a California state court seeking HK$74,331,320 (that is, US$9,904,787) under causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum meruit, and (3) common counts. Following the entry of judgment for Defendant, Tak Chun appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the common law rule barring resort to the California courts to collect gambling debts rests on a rationale with continued vitality—namely, a policy of discouraging the creation of those debts and the financially ruinous consequences that often flow from them, regardless of whether those debts were lawfully incurred. The court explained that where, as in this case, the lender knows that the money will be used for gambling (as Tak Chun knew because it tendered Defendant casino tokens), the common law rule applies. Lastly, California courts will entertain a lawsuit seeking an accounting following a transaction to sell a casino, but such a lawsuit does not directly involve any gamblers and hence does not hasten any gambler’s financial ruin; while such a lawsuit involves the gambling industry in general, it does not implicate the rationale underlying the common law rule. View "Tak Chun Gaming Promotion Company Limited v. Long" on Justia Law

Venson, her fiancé Mitchell, and her 11-year-old daughter were at a house party when a car pulled up. Ponder, an 18-year-old high school senior, got out and started shooting. Ponder admitted killing Venson, claiming he was reacting to a man pulling a gun on him. Ponder was convicted of second-degree murder, assault with a firearm, and shooting at an inhabited building. Ponder moved to strike firearm enhancements in the furtherance of justice (Penal Code 1385). The trial court made extensive findings regarding Ponder’s neurodevelopmental disorders, immaturity, and history of trauma and struck the enhancement for the assault offense, but declined to strike the 25-year-to-life enhancement (section 12022.53(d)) associated with the murder conviction.In 2021, the court of appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion. On remand, the trial court struck that murder enhancement and imposed the lesser included enhancement. Ponder was resentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court failed to follow recent amendments to the sentencing laws, The record unmistakably shows the trial court would not sentence Ponder differently if it believed A.B. 518, amending section 654 and giving the trial court discretion, applied. Section 1385(c)(2), amended by Senate Bill 81 does not require dismissal of an enhancement when a mitigating circumstance is present unless the sentencing court finds dismissal would endanger public safety. View "Peoplew v. Ponder" on Justia Law

Snowball West Investments, LP applied to build a housing project consisting of 215 homes in the Sunland/Tujunga area of the City of Los Angeles. The current zoning for the site is RA and A1; the project must be rezoned to RD5 and R1 for the project to move forward. The City denied Snowball’s zone change request, stating that more information was needed before building homes in a high wildfire hazard area. Snowball petitioned for a writ of mandate, which was denied. Snowball appealed. Snowball argues that under the rezoning exemption in the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (j)(4)1 (section 65589.5(j)(4)), its project is exempt from the need for a zone change.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the superior court’s denial of Snowball’s writ petition. The court explained that the current RA and A1 zoning is consistent with the community plan through the language of that plan. Because the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) only applies when “the zoning for the project site is inconsistent” with the applicable plan, the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) does not apply here, and Snowball’s project was not exempt from zone change requirements.  Further, the court wrote that the HAA does not apply, and the City’s findings were sufficient under the LAMC and supported by substantial evidence. View "Snowball West Investments v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The court awarded Plaintiff fees after he prevailed on one of his six causes of action against his former employer ExakTime Innovations, Inc., on his complaint for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and related causes of action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $130,088 in damages on his claim ExakTime failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with him. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him $686,795.62 in attorney fees after the court applied a .4 negative multiplier to its $1,144,659.36 adjusted lodestar calculation “to account for [p]laintiff’s counsel’s . . . lack of civility throughout the entire course of this litigation.” Plaintiff contends the $457,863 reduction in attorney fees based on his counsel’s incivility must be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that it may consider an attorney’s pervasive incivility in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees. A court may apply, in its discretion, a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation—a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours—to account for various factors, including attorney skill. The court explained that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel was repeatedly, and apparently intentionally, uncivil to defense counsel—and to the court— throughout the litigation. View "Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations" on Justia Law

The Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a civil liability complaint against SLR and, after a hearing, imposed more than $6,000,000 in penalties for SLR’s pollution of protected waterways during its construction of a Healdsburg residential resort. SLR unsuccessfully asked the State Water Resources Control Board to review the decision. SLR sought administrative mandamus against both Boards, missing the 30-day filing deadline by three weeks. On that ground, the trial courts dismissed, also noting that the State Board’s declination to review the Regional decision is not subject to judicial review.SLR claimed the Regional Board “divested itself” of jurisdiction by conducting the hearing by videoconference over SLR’s objection, as authorized by Executive Order during the pandemic. SLR argued that the Order violated the separation of powers; the Regional Board unlawfully extended it to “non-emergency” hearings; the hearing was “quasi-criminal” so that the Order denied SLR’s Due Process and Sixth Amendment rights; the Board “committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion” by applying the Order rather than the Judicial Council’s Emergency Rule; and the Order did not apply without evidence that the Board satisfied the ADA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.The court of appeal upheld the dismissals, rejecting an argument that a plaintiff challenging an agency’s adjudicative decision may avoid the statute of limitations if the plaintiff contends that the agency acted without subject matter jurisdiction. Water Code section 133301 prohibits all judicial review of the decision except in accordance with the statute. View "Sonoma Luxury Resort v. California Regional Water Quality Control Board North Coast Region" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a wrongful death action for the death of the Appellants’ son against the City of Inglewood (the City). Appellants alleged the City was negligent and created a “dangerous condition” in a public park by failing to install security cameras in an area with ongoing criminal activity, which caused an unknown third party to fatally shoot their son. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend. Appellants filed a first amended complaint, which the trial court sustained, this time without leave to amend. The trial court then entered a judgment of dismissal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellants’ dangerous and negligence claims failed and the trial court did not err in declining to grant leave to amend. The court explained that here Appellants’ proposed allegations about “additional problematic criminal activity in Darby Park” and “crime in the areas of Inglewood immediately surrounding Darby Park” are vague and not specific. Appellants in no way explain how these proposed amendments would change the legal effect of the allegations in their FAC and merely state in a conclusory fashion that they “could have created a dangerous condition and a duty to warn.” Furthermore, the court wrote that Appellants failed to propose any new facts addressing the main issue of the FAC. View "Summerfield v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law