Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jeffrey LaRoche deprived Antonio Davila a hunting trophy. Following a plea, LaRoche was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon, receiving a stolen vehicle, and second degree burglary. Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of two years eight months in state prison. LaRoche challenged the amount of restitution ordered to Davila for his loss. Davila claimed the loss of the ram’s head (the trophy)amounted to $7,500, which included the cost of the associated hunting trip, taken approximately 10 years prior. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred when it included the hunting trip as an economic loss because the experience was not property lost as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. "While the statutory framework for victim restitution is broad, we conclude it is not so broad as to include costs attendant to the acquisition of the stolen property." View "California v. LaRoche" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Paul Hupp was convicted by jury on four counts of violating Penal Code section 69 based on threatening statements he made to four judges. On appeal, Hupp raised an issue of first impression: Is a judge an “executive officer” within the meaning of section 69, which makes it a crime to attempt to deter, by means of any threat, an executive officer from the performance of a legal duty? The Court of Appeal concluded the answer was no: in this context, “executive officer” unambiguously refers to an officer of the executive branch, and judges are not part of the executive branch. The Court therefore agreed with Hupp that his convictions had to be reversed. View "California v. Hupp" on Justia Law

Weeks after Hampton left his employment at a restaurant, the restaurant was robbed. During Hampton's January 2022 trial, the judge dismissed two jurors for reasons related to COVID-19 and seated the two remaining alternate jurors. After jury deliberations began, the judge was called away by a personal emergency. Another judge took her place. A juror subsequently tested positive for COVID-19. Hampton claimed that the original judge had made an off-the-record ruling prohibiting remote deliberations. After consulting the original judge, the substitute judge denied a mistrial and permitted the COVID-positive juror to deliberate remotely for one day, after which the jury returned its verdicts. The foreperson disclosed that the jury agreed on the verdicts while all the jurors were present in person; during the remote deliberations, the jury discussed only the lesser weapon enhancements on which it hung. Hampton was convicted of felony counts of second-degree robbery and false imprisonment but acquitted of accompanying firearm enhancements, and placed on probation for three years.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the substitute judge improperly relied on ex parte communications with the original judge and that the jury deliberations in which one juror participated remotely were unauthorized and unconstitutional. The judges’ communications were ethical and did not deny Hampton a fair trial. Any error in permitting the jury to deliberate remotely for one day was harmless because that deliberation did not result in a finding of guilt. View "People v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Orange (the City) appealed an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion. The underlying lawsuit alleged a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act). Plaintiff Mary’s Kitchen provided homeless services in the City of Orange. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the city manager for the City terminated Mary’s Kitchen’s license, citing safety concerns. Subsequently, the city council held an executive (i.e., closed) session to discuss potential unspecified litigation. Afterward, the city attorney exited the meeting and declared that the council had “unanimously confirmed” the termination of Mary’s Kitchen’s license. The Brown Act required that any contemplated action or topic of discussion be posted in an agenda at least 72 hours prior to the meeting; the meeting agenda pertinent here did not mention anything about Mary’s Kitchen’s license. Plaintiffs Mary’s Kitchen and Gloria Suess (chief executive officer and president of Mary’s Kitchen) filed a verified complaint/petition for writ of mandate against the City. The City filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that because the agenda described the meeting as discussing legal matters, the complaint/petition arose out of protected activity. The City took the position that no action was taken at the meeting, and that the unanimous approval described in the minutes simply reflected inaction—i.e., that the city council chose to do nothing to override the city manager’s decision to terminate the license. The court denied the motion, concluding the complaint targeted the City’s failure to provide adequate notice of the confirmation of the license termination rather than anything that was said at the meeting. To this the Court of Appeal agreed with this assessment and further concluded that the “unanimous confirm[ation]” was evidence of an action: ratification. View "Mary's Kitchen v. City of Orange" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Das appealed a trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding the stated factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea refuted the allegations in his petition for resentencing, rendering him ineligible for relief. While the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s assessment that the stated factual basis, if true, demonstrated defendant stabbed the attempted murder victim with the intent to kill, defendant did not stipulate to the factual basis or otherwise admit the truth of the facts recited by the prosecutor. The Court agreed with defendant that the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding at the prima facie stage and reversed for that reason. View "California v. Das" on Justia Law

After consuming excessive amounts of alcohol, Christina Demirelli left a restaurant in the Fashion Island shopping center (Fashion Island) and walked through a nearby parking structure while engaging in “displays of nonsensical horseplay.” She found herself on an upper story of the parking structure where she seated herself on a 43-inch tall perimeter wall, lost her balance, and fell backward out of the structure to the ground several stories below. Demirelli sued The Irvine Company, which owned the parking structure, for premises liability, alleging the parking structure had a physical defect or dangerous condition. The Irvine Company filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. The Irvine Company filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause. The Court thereafter granted The Irvine Company’s petition. In her opposition, Demirelli conceded the parking structure did not have a physical defect or dangerous condition. In the stead of her original theory, Demirelli asserted a new theory of liability: The Irvine Company assumed a duty to her by hiring a security company charged with detecting and stopping horseplay according to the Fashion Island Code of Conduct. She argued The Irvine Company was liable for the security company’s negligence in enforcing that code. The Court of Appeal found The Irvine Company’s retention of security services did not increase any risk to Demirelli and she did not rely on that undertaking to her detriment. Therefore, The Irvine Company did not owe a duty to Demirelli and summary judgment should have been granted. View "The Irvine Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2008-2010, Shah engaged in fraudulent transactions involving three luxury condominiums owned by Hwang, ultimately using the property to obtain over $2 million in loans. Shah was convicted of multiple crimes. Enhancement allegations, including taking a property valued over $3.2 million and special findings, including a pattern of white-collar crime. were found true. A 2015 restitution order remains unpaid. Hwang filed a civil action against Shah and, in 2018, secured a civil judgment—over $3.8 million.In 2021, the trial court levied property under Penal Code 186.11, the “Freeze and Seize” law, which is intended to prevent a defendant from disposing of assets pending trial, and then use the assets to pay restitution after conviction. Shah argued that a trial court must seize any properties under section 186.11 no later than the sentencing hearing.The court of appeal affirmed. Shah sought to import time limitations into the statute and ignored the legislative purpose of section 186.11 and California’s over-arching statutory framework for restitution in criminal cases. California recognizes restitution for crime victims as a constitutional right. The court’s authority does not change even after the Courts of Appeal decide a criminal case. The lack of a disposition formally remanding Shah’s original appeal for further proceedings was no bar to the trial court’s levying order. View "People v. Shah" on Justia Law

Proposition 39 established a program to promote the creation of clean energy jobs. Under Proposition 39, a multistate business must apportion its tax based on a single factor—in-state sales. The proposition further provided for cable companies spending $250 million or more in California on certain expenditures to exclude half of their in-state sales when apportioning, thus lowering their tax burden under the single factor tax regime. Paintiff One Technologies, LLC, a Texas-based provider of credit score and credit reporting services, paid tax to California calculated under the single-factor method. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for refund against Defendant Franchise Tax Board (the Board). Plaintiff alleged Proposition 39 was invalid under the single-subject rule for ballot initiatives. The trial court disagreed and sustained the Board’s demurrer.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Proposition 39 did not violate the single-subject rule. The purpose of the proposition was to fund a clean energy job creation program by raising taxes on some multistate businesses. The provisions of the proposition were both reasonably germane and functionally related to that purpose because those provisions established a funding mechanism and the means of directing that funding to clean energy job creation. The special rules for cable companies reflect a determination by the proposition’s drafters that some businesses should bear the funding burden more than others, but that is still within the scope of the proposition’s purpose. View "One Technologies, LLC v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Gilroy Police Department (GPD) receives complaints about homeless encampments, including on the property of the Santa Clara Valley Water District. When requested by the Water District, GPD assists with the cleanup of homeless encampments (sweeps) on Water District property. The Water District is responsible for collecting belongings left at the site. GPD collects and stores some items, such as identification cards. GPD officers assisting with homeless encampment cleanups have body-worn cameras, which they activate during “criminal investigation or enforcement" actions. Bodycam video footage is retained for one year, then automatically deleted by a computer system unless flagged for preservation.After receiving complaints from homeless persons that their personal property was being destroyed during sweeps, Law Foundation made numerous public record requests and sought declaratory relief under the California Public Records Act (CPRA; Gov. Code, 7920.000).The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in granting declaratory relief on the basis that Gilroy’s past conduct in responding to Law Foundation’s public records requests violated the CPRA. The trial court did not err by denying Law Foundation’s request for a declaration that Gilroy violated the CPRA by failing to preserve responsive records it claimed were exempt while the records requests were pending. CPRA is not a records retention statute. View "City of Gilroy v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

Ortiz, born in 1960, was charged with 18 sex crimes committed against several minors in 2004-2018. In 2022, the jury found Ortiz guilty on multiple counts and found true the multiple-victim enhancement allegation. Ortiz was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 225 years to life.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by overruling Ortiz’s Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a Black prospective juror (S.H.). The record includes exchanges demonstrating S.H.’s inability to answer or understand questions, failure to answer questions, confusion, reluctance, timidity, and evasiveness. The trial court’s confirmation finding is supported by substantial evidence and the statutory explanation requirement was fulfilled. There was no violation of Ortiz’s constitutional rights. The court upheld the admission of testimony from a defense character witness about her daughter’s midtrial disclosure of molestation by Ortiz as probative of her opinion of Ortiz’s character and properly provided context for a change in her opinion. The CALCRIM 1193 jury instruction that expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any crimes, was proper. View "People v. Ortiz" on Justia Law