Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed from a post-judgment order awarding Respondent attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.4.1 Appellant argued that the trial court erred by not reducing the fee award in accordance with the percentage of Respondent’s comparative fault, that the court abused its discretion by awarding fees that were not supported by sufficient documentation, that the hourly rate awarded for a first-year attorney was unreasonable, and that the court applied an excessive multiplier to the lodestar amount.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court was not required to reduce Respondent’s attorney fee award in accordance with his comparative fault. Further, the court held that Appellant failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. The court explained that the record indicates the trial court considered Respondent’s comparative fault. Further, the fee award was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the court wrote that the use of a blended $450 hourly rate for Respondent’s counsel was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court noted that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a 2.0 multiplier. View "Isom v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

JRK Property Holdings, Inc. appealed from the order of dismissal entered after the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by primary insurer Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company (Ironshore) and excess insurers RSUI Indemnity Company (RSUI), Evanston Insurance Company (Evanston), and others (collectively, Insurers). JRK sued Insurers for breach of contract and declaratory judgment after Insurers denied coverage for JRK’s lost business income that resulted from the  COVID-19 pandemic and associated government orders. The trial court entered an order of dismissal in favor of Insurers. JRK appealed.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal except as to RSUI and Evanston. The court remanded for the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings and to enter a new order granting the motion without leave to amend as to RSUI and Evanston and denying the motion as to all other defendants. The court explained that under MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2003), the historical background of the pollution exclusion shows its inclusion in insurance policies was intended to address only traditional sources of environmental pollution. The court rejected Insurers’ argument that inclusion of the term “virus” in the definition of a contaminant transforms an exclusion that applies to “pollution” into one that encompasses the spread of a virus due to the normal human activities of breathing and touching surfaces. The court further concluded that the RSUI pathogen exclusion applies because it bars coverage for “losses or damage” caused by the discharge or dispersal of “pathogenic” material. The Evanston pathogen exclusion specifically bars loss or damage caused by the spread of an organic pathogen, defined to include a virus. View "JRK Property Holdings, Inc. v. Colony Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tina and David Glynn, parents of decedent Nicholas Glynn (Nicholas), appealed the grant of summary judgment against them and in favor of defendants Orange Circle Lounge Inc., Lounge Group, Inc., and Mario Marovic, owners and operators of the District Lounge, a bar. Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the physical and temporal distance between defendants’ bar (at which a fight took place between Nicholas and some assailants) and the subsequent fight a block away and nearly an hour later that resulted in Nicholas’s death. "In the absence of ongoing or imminent criminal conduct, we cannot find defendants owed a duty to Nicholas to protect him from the assailants during the final altercation. Once Nicholas, J.D., and the assailants left defendants’ bar peaceably and in separate directions, the bar’s duty ended." The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. View "Glynn v. Orange Circle Lounge Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Sandoval was convicted of second-degree murder (Pen. Code 187) with a finding that Sandoval committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang and, as a principal, personally used a firearm. He was sentenced to 40 years to life. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought habeas relief. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition. On remand, the case was assigned to the same judge who had previously denied Sandoval’s petition.Sandoval filed an unsuccessful peremptory challenge seeking to disqualify the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6(a)(2), which authorizes a motion to disqualify “following reversal on appeal of a trial court’s decision ... if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is assigned to conduct a new trial on the matter.” In a petition for mandamus relief, Sandoval argued that the remand for reconsideration of the resentencing petition constituted a “new trial.” The court of appeal rejected that argument. Although the remand did not foreclose the introduction of new evidence it contemplated that the trial court could consider evidence that had already been admitted at the Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. View "Sandoval v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

The People filed suit alleging Uber and Lyft violated the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 (UCL)) by misclassifying California rideshare and delivery drivers as independent contractors, depriving them of wages and benefits associated with employee status, thereby harming workers, competitors, and the public. The suit sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitution under the UCL and injunctive relief under Assembly Bill 5, Labor Code 2786. The court of appeal affirmed a preliminary injunction under Assembly Bill 5. Proposition 22 subsequently altered the standards for determining whether app-based drivers are independent contractors. The parties stipulated to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The Labor Commissioner filed separate actions against Uber and Lyft, pursuant to her Labor Code enforcement authority, alleging misclassification of drivers.The two direct enforcement actions were coordinated. Uber and Lyft moved to compel arbitration of those actions to the extent they seek “driver-specific” or “ ‘individualized’ ” relief, such as restitution under the UCL and unpaid wages under the Labor Code. The motions did not seek arbitration of the requests for civil penalties and injunctive relief; they relied on arbitration agreements the defendants entered into with drivers. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motions. The People and the Labor Commissioner are not parties to those arbitration agreements. View "In re Uber Technologies Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

A limited liability partnership and one of its partners retained a lawyer but limited the scope of representation to having the lawyer represent the partnership in a specific, ongoing case. After the partnership lost the case, the partner sued the lawyer for malpractice. In an amended complaint, the partnership was added as a plaintiff. The partner’s complaint was filed before the statute of limitations ran; the amendment was filed after. The trial court issued its judgment of dismissal, the partner filed a motion for reconsideration along with a proposed second amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion as untimely and without merit because the proffered second amended complaint did not “present any new allegations which could support the claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded as a matter of law that the partner has suffered no damage as a result of the attorney’s alleged malpractice to the LLP during the Wells Fargo litigation and that the partner’s malpractice claims were properly dismissed. Further, the court held that given that all damages for any malpractice claims were suffered by and belong to the LLP, there is no “reasonable possibility” that the partner can amend the complaint to state a viable malpractice claim. View "Engel v. Pech" on Justia Law

This is an appeal from post-judgment findings and an order determining the amount of attorney fees and sanctions payable by Appellant to ex-wife. The family court ordered Appellant to pay a total of $70,000 ($22,000 and $48,000) in attorney fees and costs in the nature of sanctions. Appellant appealed. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay “excessive” attorney fees and “an egregious amount of sanctions as a result of ex-wife’s litigation.” He contends the trial court erred because he cooperated throughout the case, produced the accounting and documents requested, and “demonstrated willingness to settle.”   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record is replete with evidence demonstrating Deric’s steadfast, continued disregard of the court’s orders and the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and judgment. He delayed listing the Oklahoma property for sale. He delayed providing an accounting of rental income received, along with bank statements, receipts, and proof of expenditures. He delayed paying court-ordered attorney fees and costs to his ex-wife and her counsel. The court explained that this warranted an imposition of attorney fees and costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions. The court found that there is no unreasonable financial burden on Appellant, as he has approximately $26,928 as his one-half of rental income and $102,000 in sale proceeds in his possession, which can be used to pay the attorney fees and sanctions award. View "Marriage of Rangell" on Justia Law

Respondent Paramount Pictures Corporation (Paramount) sought a refund of taxes paid on its personal property for the 2011 tax year. Paramount first appealed to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (the Board). The property was assessed a final value of $137,397,278. Following a hearing, the Board agreed with the valuation proposed by the Assessor and found that Paramount failed to carry its burden of demonstrating additional obsolescence. Paramount appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court. The trial court found: (1) the Board committed a methodological error in excluding Paramount’s initial income approach valuation and (2) the Board issued inadequate findings regarding the significance of Paramount’s pre-lien and post-lien sales of personal property. In a separate ruling, the trial court awarded Paramount attorney fees under Revenue and Taxation Code Section 1611.6, which allows a taxpayer to recover fees for services necessary to obtain proper findings from a county board. The County timely appealed both orders.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding the Board committed neither methodological error nor issued findings that were less than adequate within the meaning of section 1611.5. First, Paramount did not challenge the validity of the cost approach relied upon by the Assessor and Board, and it did not otherwise identify any legal error in the Board’s rejection of its income approach valuation. Second, the hearing transcripts adequately disclose its rulings and findings on the pre-lien and post-sales data. The court remanded so the trial court may consider the question of whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Paramount failed to establish additional obsolescence. View "Paramount Pictures Corp. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Petitioner is serving a life term for the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Petitioner served 23 years and three months, the parole board granted him parole. The Governor reversed the parole board’s decision and denied Petitioner parole on the ground that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime. The superior court granted Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The People appealed from the court’s order granting the petition.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the Governor may rely on the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for his decision to deny parole, but the aggravated circumstances do not in themselves provide some evidence of current dangerousness. The failure to gain insight into the cause of the crime is a factor that shows a continuing threat to public safety.   The court wrote that here, there can be no dispute that the circumstances of the murder were aggravated. Petitioner and his companions brutally murdered a 15-year-old girl. The Governor found that Petitioner remains a current risk to the safety of society because he lacks insight to the cause of the crime. Petitioner explained that at the time he committed the murder, he was hurt and angry. He thought that violence against someone who could not hurt him was an appropriate response. Nothing Petitioner said explains the brutal murder of a 15-year-old girl. The Governor could reasonably conclude that Petitioner lacks insight into his crime View "In re Casey" on Justia Law

Hardiamon testified at a preliminary hearing that she had a child with Davenport. On January 4, 2007, Hardiamon left the child with Davenport and spent the day with West, Hardiamon’s cousin by marriage. Around 11:00 p.m., West drove Hardiamon home. They talked in the car for a few minutes before Hardiamon saw Davenport and said, “Oh, shit, my baby daddy.” Davenport opened the car door and pointed a gun at West. The gun went off without pauses between shots. West left. Hardiamon went inside and told her mother, her brother, and his girlfriend that Davenport had just shot someone. Davenport called Hardiamon and told her that he saw West crash and West was dead. A half-mile from Hardiamon’s residence, an officer found West slumped over dead in the driver’s seat.Davenport pleaded no contest to second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. In 2020, Davenport petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. On a third remand, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Davenport was West’s actual killer and was ineligible for resentencing. Davenport claims the court erroneously admitted into evidence the transcript of Hardiamon’s preliminary hearing testimony, which was hearsay, with no showing of witness unavailability. The court of appeal affirmed. The Legislature did not grant qualifying offenders under section 1172.6 a new trial but chose a procedure requiring trial judges to decide the critical factual questions based–at least in some cases—on a cold record. View "People v. Davenport" on Justia Law