Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder, attempted murder of two counts of robbery, and one count of receiving stolen goods and found firearm enhancements true. This is Defendant’s second petition; the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of his first one. Subsequently, the Legislature amended former section 1170.95, expanding it to provide relief to defendants convicted under any theory in which malice was imputed to them based solely on their participation in a crime. The Legislature also amended the statute to encompass defendants convicted of attempted murder and manslaughter. Defendant filed his second petition under the amended statute, seeking resentencing for his murder and attempted murder convictions.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that although recent case law has held that a conviction for provocative act murder requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice, this was not the case when Defendant was convicted in 1994. Under the then-applicable Supreme Court authority, a defendant could be convicted for a killing by a third party provoked by an accomplice’s actions with malice aforethought, regardless of the defendant’s personal mental state. Defendant’s jury was so instructed. The court therefore concluded Defendant may have been convicted under a theory of imputed malice, and thus, he is not barred as a matter of law from relief under section 1172.6. The court rejected Defendant’s contention, however, that he is entitled to relief for his attempted murder conviction, which did not implicate the provocative act doctrine nor any theory of imputed malice. View "P. v. Lee" on Justia Law

Bodely entered a supermarket, grabbed $75 out of a cash register, and ran to his car. Andre ran to Bodely’s driver’s side window and put his arm inside the car. Bodely drove away, knocking Andre onto the hood. Andre fell and struck his head on the pavement, resulting in his death. While the taking of the $75 was charged as burglary, the prosecution argued that it could be characterized as robbery. The jury was instructed that Bodely could be found guilty of murder if the “killing was done with malice aforethought or occurred during the commission or attempted commission of burglary or robbery,” and that the “unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime or as a direct causal result of burglary or robbery is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime.” The court of appeal affirmed Bodely's convictions for first-degree felony murder, burglary, and an unrelated robbery.Senate Bill 1437 took effect in 2019, allowing a person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek resentencing. Bodely filed a petition, asserting that he could not presently be convicted of murder because of amendments to Penal Code 188 and 189. The prosecution cited section 189(e)(1): A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of (robbery or burglary) in which a death occurs is liable for murder if “[t]he person was the actual killer.” The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief. Bodely’s conviction could not have been based on an impermissible accomplice liability theory; there is no evidence in the record or the jury instructions of another participant. View "People v. Bodely" on Justia Law

Fitness International, LLC was operating an indoor gym and fitness center when it entered into an amended lease with KB Salt Lake III, LLC, that required Fitness International to renovate the premises. However, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted government orders that closed indoor gyms but allowed commercial construction to continue. Fitness International nevertheless stopped construction at the Chatsworth site, remained in possession of the premises, and stopped paying rent. KB Salt Lake filed an unlawful detainer action, and the trial court granted KB Salt Lake’s motion for summary judgment. Fitness International appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court explained that Fitness International argued that the lease is a “monthly installment contract” and that each month it could not operate the premises as a fitness facility, frustrated the purpose of the contract. The court wrote that neither the pandemic nor the COVID-19 closure orders, however, prevented Fitness International from reopening the gym. Thus, even if California law recognized temporary frustration of purpose, and even if the lease was an “installment contract,” Fitness International still had to make rent payments under the lease. Moreover, the court explained that Fitness International argues the purpose of section 1511 “is to excuse performance under circumstances like these,” but Fitness International cites no authority describing the purpose of section 1511, nor does Fitness International explain how the trial court’s ruling was contrary to any such purpose. View "Fitness International v. KB Salt Lake III" on Justia Law

In 2020, Lafayette City Councilmember and former Mayor, Burks, and his wife, Ackley, hosted an open house in their home in support of a school bond measure. The invitation stated Burks was “hosting this event as an individual resident of Lafayette and a father of school-aged children.” Peterson attended and had an “odd” and “stilted” conversation with Ackley in which Peterson referred to Ackley's birthday. Peterson later reposted on his Facebook page a family photo from Ackley’s public Facebook page. In the comments, Peterson wondered where they hid the girls during the open house. He mused, “They live near Burton Valley School … Burks, has a different name than his wife, I wonder what their daughters’ last name is?” Burks felt Peterson “could be a threat” to his wife and daughters. Later, Ackley received a “confusing” letter and check in the mail from Peterson, again mentioning the daughters. The rambling letter was a screed against local politics.Peterson was convicted of stalking and sentenced to two years of probation, with one year of home confinement. The court of appeal reversed. Peterson’s speech acts were constitutionally protected activities. A reasonable listener would not have found Peterson’s speech or speech-related acts a true threat of violence. View "People v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Bingham was charged with infliction of corporal injury on a romantic partner (Pen. Code 273.5(a)). The victim did not testify at trial, but her 911 call was admitted into evidence. Bingham argued that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding the victim’s prior convictions and inconsistent statements made after her 911 call, which Bingham offered for impeachment. He also argued that his case should be remanded for resentencing based on recent changes in the law.The court of appeal affirmed and remanded. While the trial court erred in excluding the impeachment evidence, the error was harmless. Under Evidence Code section 1202, when a hearsay statement by a declarant who is not a witness is admitted into evidence by the prosecution, an inconsistent hearsay statement by the same person offered by the defense is admissible to attack the declarant’s credibility. However, even if the victim’s statements recanting what she said in the 911 call and her prior convictions were admitted, it is not reasonably probable that Bingham would have obtained a more favorable outcome, considering all the evidence. The court remanded for resentencing under amended Penal Code section 1170(b), which limits the court’s ability to impose an upper-term sentence; the amended law applies retroactively to Bingham’s case. View "People v. Bingham" on Justia Law

After defendant Christopher Esparza was pulled over for a Vehicle Code violation, a detective who specializes in gang enforcement recognized him and two of his passengers as members of a City Heights gang. The detective thought one of the passengers, Delfino Osnaya, was likely to be armed and told the other officers they needed to search him. After their patdown of Osnaya yielded a loaded gun, the officers searched Esparza as well and found another loaded weapon. Esparza contested the constitutional validity of his detention and search, arguing: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when they conducted his patdown; and (2) his detention was unreasonably prolonged because it lasted longer than necessary for the officers to issue him a citation for the Vehicle Code violation. The Court of Appeal found the detention lasted a mere seven minutes, during which the officers proceeded expeditiously consistent with reasonable concerns for officer safety. "The totality of the circumstances known to the initial investigating officer justified those concerns, which were only heightened as additional factors came to light during the course of the traffic stop." View "California v. Esparza" on Justia Law

At age 16, defendant Tory Bratton confessed to robbing a local market, with an accomplice, shooting the clerk dead, and taking $184. At his trial, his counsel argued that defendant’s confession was false and that he did not participate in the robbery at all. However, trial counsel did not argue that, even if defendant did participate, he was not the shooter. Defendant was convicted of (among other things) first degree murder, with a personal firearm use enhancement and felony-murder special circumstances. He appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. When defendant filed a petition to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, the trial court denied it; it ruled that the Court of Appeal's opinion in defendant’s direct appeal showed that he was the actual killer. The State conceded that this was error, but that the error was harmless because the record of conviction established defendant was the actual killer. Anticipating this response, defendant argued that, under standard principles of issue preclusion (a/k/a collateral estoppel), preclusion did not apply here because: (1) Whether defendant was the shooter was not actually litigated; (2) Trial counsel had an incentive not to contest whether defendant was the shooter; (3) The significance of whether defendant was the shooter was small at trial but, due to the then-unforeseeable enactment of section 1172.6, has since become great; (4) Section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law that warranted reexamination of whether defendant was the shooter. The Court of Appeal agreed that standard principles of issue preclusion applied here. However, the Court held that the issue of whether defendant was the shooter was actually litigated. Moreover, trial counsel did have an incentive to contest this issue; evidently, he simply made a tactical decision not to. Because trial counsel did have an incentive to contest the issue, it did not matter that it was unforeseeable that the issue would have additional future consequences. And finally, while section 1172.6 was a significant change in the law, the Legislature intended that it not constitute an exception ipso facto to issue preclusion. View "California v. Bratton" on Justia Law

Jennifer and Alan Simonis were married for 27 years and separated in September 2015. While married the parties ran a farm where they grew crops, and they raised cattle. Jennifer bore some recordkeeping responsibility for the farm operations during the parties’ initial period of separation, and Alan maintained Jennifer was in control of accounting for marital assets for at least a month after the parties separated. But other than that early period of control over accounting records, between the date of separation and the date of trial on reserved issues to divide the community estate approximately five years later, Alan retained control of the three main non-real estate assets that belonged to the community: cash on hand, crop income from 2015 crops, and a herd of cattle ("TCB Herd"). In the time during which Alan controlled the assets, he commingled the cattle, cash, and income with his separate property. Alan also made payments on various community debts using commingled funds. At trial in 2020, the trial court looked to long-established precedent regarding the tracing of commingled assets during marriage, found that Alan had failed to meet his burden to trace his separate property interest in the cattle or his use of separate property to pay down community debts, and divided the bulk of the community estate accordingly. The court made no specific order regarding the value of the cash on hand or the 2015 crop income, but it noted the court’s continuing jurisdiction over unadjudicated assets and liabilities under Family Code section 2556 when ruling on posttrial motions. Alan appealed the trial court's judgment, arguing the trial court incorrectly interpreted and applied case law regarding how to characterize the separate and community interests in commingled assets and payments on community debts. Additionally, Alan argued the trial court ought to have determined the value of the non-real estate community assets at the date of separation. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Marriage of Simonis" on Justia Law

In 2019, two Oakland journalists filed requests with the Oakland Police Department under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (previously Gov. Code 6250, now 7921.000), including for information regarding the “Celeste Guap” scandal, which involved several Oakland police officers who had sex with Guap while she was underage. The trial court ordered Oakland to produce documents responsive to those requests. Oakland produced a redacted version of the internal affairs investigation report.The court of appeal agreed that some of the challenged redactions were not permitted under the statute. In 2018 Senate Bill 1421 amended Penal Code section 832.7 to require public access to certain records of police misconduct and use of force. The trial court improperly permitted Oakland to redact certain information under section 832.7(b)(4) and (b)(5), including the Guap report’s training and policy recommendations; witness statements containing general information about Guap and her social-media use (without any information about allegations of misconduct against any officer); screenshots of Guap’s Facebook profile; and large portions of her statements to investigators. Redaction of witness-officer’s names or other identifying information from the interview summaries is not appropriate under section 832.7(b)(6)(B) in order to “preserve the anonymity of . . . witnesses.” View "Bondgraham v. Superior Court of Alameda County" on Justia Law

Defendant Wesley Panighetti and Jill Doe met in 2000 and began dating. According to the Court, the couple practiced bondage, discipline, sadism, and masochism (BDSM) together. When defendant went beyond the scope of Jill’s consent, his conduct became criminal. A jury rejected the argument that, by virtue of a written agreement to consent to BDSM at all times, Jill had irrevocably agreed to allow defendant to dominate all aspects of her life. The jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses, attempting to dissuade a witness, and residential burglary. He challenged those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his multiple requests for new counsel pursuant to California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (2) instructing the jury it could consider prior uncharged offenses involving Jill Doe; (3) inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in imposing a 280 year-to-life sentence; and (4) failing to calculate and award presentence custody credit. After review, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to award presentence custody credit but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Panighetti" on Justia Law