Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jennifer and Alan Simonis were married for 27 years and separated in September 2015. While married the parties ran a farm where they grew crops, and they raised cattle. Jennifer bore some recordkeeping responsibility for the farm operations during the parties’ initial period of separation, and Alan maintained Jennifer was in control of accounting for marital assets for at least a month after the parties separated. But other than that early period of control over accounting records, between the date of separation and the date of trial on reserved issues to divide the community estate approximately five years later, Alan retained control of the three main non-real estate assets that belonged to the community: cash on hand, crop income from 2015 crops, and a herd of cattle ("TCB Herd"). In the time during which Alan controlled the assets, he commingled the cattle, cash, and income with his separate property. Alan also made payments on various community debts using commingled funds. At trial in 2020, the trial court looked to long-established precedent regarding the tracing of commingled assets during marriage, found that Alan had failed to meet his burden to trace his separate property interest in the cattle or his use of separate property to pay down community debts, and divided the bulk of the community estate accordingly. The court made no specific order regarding the value of the cash on hand or the 2015 crop income, but it noted the court’s continuing jurisdiction over unadjudicated assets and liabilities under Family Code section 2556 when ruling on posttrial motions. Alan appealed the trial court's judgment, arguing the trial court incorrectly interpreted and applied case law regarding how to characterize the separate and community interests in commingled assets and payments on community debts. Additionally, Alan argued the trial court ought to have determined the value of the non-real estate community assets at the date of separation. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Marriage of Simonis" on Justia Law

In 2019, two Oakland journalists filed requests with the Oakland Police Department under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (previously Gov. Code 6250, now 7921.000), including for information regarding the “Celeste Guap” scandal, which involved several Oakland police officers who had sex with Guap while she was underage. The trial court ordered Oakland to produce documents responsive to those requests. Oakland produced a redacted version of the internal affairs investigation report.The court of appeal agreed that some of the challenged redactions were not permitted under the statute. In 2018 Senate Bill 1421 amended Penal Code section 832.7 to require public access to certain records of police misconduct and use of force. The trial court improperly permitted Oakland to redact certain information under section 832.7(b)(4) and (b)(5), including the Guap report’s training and policy recommendations; witness statements containing general information about Guap and her social-media use (without any information about allegations of misconduct against any officer); screenshots of Guap’s Facebook profile; and large portions of her statements to investigators. Redaction of witness-officer’s names or other identifying information from the interview summaries is not appropriate under section 832.7(b)(6)(B) in order to “preserve the anonymity of . . . witnesses.” View "Bondgraham v. Superior Court of Alameda County" on Justia Law

Defendant Wesley Panighetti and Jill Doe met in 2000 and began dating. According to the Court, the couple practiced bondage, discipline, sadism, and masochism (BDSM) together. When defendant went beyond the scope of Jill’s consent, his conduct became criminal. A jury rejected the argument that, by virtue of a written agreement to consent to BDSM at all times, Jill had irrevocably agreed to allow defendant to dominate all aspects of her life. The jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses, attempting to dissuade a witness, and residential burglary. He challenged those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his multiple requests for new counsel pursuant to California v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970); (2) instructing the jury it could consider prior uncharged offenses involving Jill Doe; (3) inflicting cruel and unusual punishment in imposing a 280 year-to-life sentence; and (4) failing to calculate and award presentence custody credit. After review, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to award presentence custody credit but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Panighetti" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in count 1, second-degree murder in count 2, and attempted murder in count 3. He admitted the truth of the personal firearm use enhancements in each count. Counts 4 and 5 and the special circumstance allegations were dismissed pursuant to the plea. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 25 years to life in count 1, plus two years for the firearm enhancement. On February 1, 2021, Defendant executed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court summarily denied Defendant’s petition in a written memorandum of decision. Defendant appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. However, the court modified the trial court’s memorandum of decision and minute order to reflect that Defendant, and not D.M., is the petitioner in this matter. The court explained that there is no merit to Defendant’s argument that the trial court engaged in premature fact-finding. The trial court reviewed and relied upon the plea colloquy, which is part of the record of conviction. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that he only admitted that he was guilty of murder and attempted murder, which did not require that he harbor malice at that time. The court wrote that regardless of whether Defendant was required to admit to being the actual killer/attempted murderer, or could stipulate to particular facts without admitting them, the only reasonable view of the record here is that Defendant did admit that he was the actual killer/attempted murderer. View "P. v. Fisher" on Justia Law

In August 2010, after the California v. Samaniego, 174 Cal.App.4th 1148 (2009) and California v. Nero, 181 Cal.App.4th 504 (2010) were decided, defendant Brandon Burns was convicted on one count of first degree murder arising out of his participation with a codefendant in a gang-related shooting. The jury was instructed using the now-disapproved version of CALCRIM No. 400, but his counsel did not argue he was guilty of a lesser crime than the codefendant. Neither did the attorney argue the instruction was given in error. In 2022 however, Burns petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, claiming he “could not presently be convicted of murder…because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” He argued that based on the error in former CALCRIM No. 400, the jury might have convicted him based on some “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” This possibility, he argued, required he be granted an evidentiary hearing. Even accepting Burns’ argument regarding the flaw in the earlier version of CALCRIM No. 400, the Court of Appeal found the alleged error he identified had nothing to do with the 2018 and 2021 legislative changes that gave rise to section 1172.6’s petition process. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Burns failed to establish a prima facile case for relief under section 1172.6. View "California v. Burns" on Justia Law

Liapes filed a class action against Facebook, alleging it does not provide women and older people equal access to insurance ads. The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits businesses from discriminating against people with protected characteristics (Civ. Code 51, 51.5, 52(a)). Liapes alleged Facebook requires all advertisers to choose the age and gender of users who will receive ads; companies offering insurance products routinely tell it to not send their ads to women or older people. She further alleged Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithm discriminates against women and older people.The trial court dismissed, finding Facebook’s tools neutral on their face and concluding that Facebook was immune under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The court of appeal reversed. Liapes has stated an Unruh Act claim. Facebook, a business establishment, does not dispute women and older people were categorically excluded from receiving various insurance ads. Facebook, not the advertisers, classifies users based on their age and gender via the algorithm. The complaint also stated a claim under an aiding and abetting theory of liability An interactive computer service provider only has immunity if it is not also the content provider. That advertisers are the content providers does not preclude Facebook from also being a content provider by helping develop at least part of the information at issue. View "Liapes v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

EpicentRx, Inc. and several of its officers, employees, and affiliates (collectively, the defendants) challenged a trial court order denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff-shareholder EpiRx, L.P.’s (EpiRx) lawsuit on forum non conveniens grounds. The defendants sought dismissal of the case based on mandatory forum selection clauses in EpicentRx’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws, which designated the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum to resolve shareholder disputes like the present case. The trial court declined to enforce the forum selection clauses after finding that litigants did not have a right to a civil jury trial in the Delaware Court of Chancery and, therefore, enforcement of the clauses would deprive EpiRx of its inviolate right to a jury trial in violation of California public policy. The California Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that enforcement of the forum selection clauses in EpicentRx’s corporate documents would operate as an implied waiver of EpiRx’s right to a jury trial, thus the Court concluded the trial court properly declined to enforce the forum selection clauses at issue, and denied the defendants’ request for writ relief. View "EpicentRx, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Endeavor Operating Company, LLC (Endeavor) is a “holding company” that owns “various subsidiaries in the entertainment, sports, and fashion business sectors.” Endeavor sued the insurers for (1) declaratory relief and (2) breach of contract related to COVID-19 closures. The insurers demurred to the complaint. The trial court issued a ruling (1) sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and (2) denying Endeavor’s motion for a new trial. The court modified its initial ruling to find that the “actual” or “threatened presence” of COVID-19 or the SARS-CoV-2 virus “does not constitute a physical loss or damage required to trigger coverage for property insurance coverage” but reaffirmed its initial ruling that the contamination/pollution exclusion applied, which in the court’s view obviated its need to address the argument Endeavor raised for the first time in its new trial motion. Endeavor appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the insurance policy unambiguously requires “direct physical loss or damage to property” before Endeavor may recover under the business interruption clauses. The court held that Endeavor failed as a matter of law to plead “direct physical loss or damage to property.” The court explained that California courts are in accord that the phrase “direct physical loss or damage to property” means a “‘distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration’” of the insured property. This is the default definition to be applied where a policy does not provide a different definition of “direct physical loss or damage.” The policy here provides no different definition. View "Endeavor Operating Co., LLC v. HDI Global Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) sought extraordinary writ relief for the second time arising out of the parties’ ongoing efforts to clarify the standard of proof to be applied at trial on South San Joaquin Irrigation District’s (the District) right to take part of PG&E’s electric distribution system under the Eminent Domain Law. PG&E emphasized that it did not challenge the validity of the resolution of necessity adopted by the District. PG&E did challenge the District’s right to take its property on grounds that conflicted with various findings the District made in its resolution. Because these challenges were authorized by statute, PG&E could succeed at trial by essentially disproving one of these findings by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the Court of Appeal agreed with PG&E that the superior court’s September 6, 2017 and November 28, 2022 orders erred in concluding that PG&E also needed to demonstrate the District abused its discretion in adopting its resolution of necessity. Therefore, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its September 6, 2017 and November 28, 2022 orders, and enter a new order. View "Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Appellant, a former employee of the City of La Habra Heights (City), pled no contest to a felony that arose out of the performance of her official duties. Under the terms of Appellant’s plea agreement, the conviction was later reduced to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17 and then dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. After Respondent California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that Appellant forfeited a portion of her retirement benefits as a result of her felony conviction, she filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied her petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded the trial court did not err in denying the petition because, consistent with the language and purpose of section 7522.72, Appellant’s retirement benefits were subject to forfeiture upon her no-contest plea to a job-related felony, notwithstanding the subsequent reduction to a misdemeanor and dismissal of the charge. Further, the court explained that Appellant asserts that section 7522.72 is unconstitutional, but she fails to present any cognizable argument or legal authority to support her claim. View "Estrada v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law