Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AguilarJimenez was charged with two counts of murder (Penal Code 187(a)), DUI, and driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more and causing injury. A magistrate concluded that Aguilar-Jimenez did not have the requisite state of mind for implied malice murder,.Two weeks later, the district attorney recharged the same two murder counts, stating that the magistrate had not made factual findings but reached legal conclusions to which the superior court owed no deference. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of implied malice and dismissed. The district attorney filed a felony complaint, charging AguilarJimenez with two counts of murderThe court dismissed the murder counts under the “two-dismissal rule” (Penal Code section 1387), which “bar[s] further prosecution of a felony if the action against the defendant has been twice previously terminated according to the provisions of that statute.” with exceptions, The court of appeal reversed. The exception under section 1387(c)(3) applies; there had only been one prior termination—when the superior court previously granted the section 995 motion. As the magistrate did not make factual findings that were “fatal to the allegation that the offense was committed,” the prosecutor was authorized to recharge the murder counts under section 739. When the prosecutor refiled the charges in case C1922671, the prosecutor commenced a second prosecution—not a third. View "Pwoplw v. Aguilar-Jimenez" on Justia Law

Appellant, a former police officer, was terminated from the Merced City Police Department (Department) based on allegations he conducted an illegal search, submitted a false police report, and committed perjury at a court hearing. Appellant appealed to the personnel board (Board), which found the City of Merced (City) failed to show Appellant had submitted a false police report or had conducted an illegal search. However, the Board found that Appellant was not truthful in explaining certain details concerning the search. Consequently, the Board rejected the majority of charges against Appellant, but sustained portions of charges relating to his untruthfulness. The Board recommended that Appellant not be terminated, but instead that he be demoted without backpay. The Merced City Manager reversed the decision and upheld Appellant’s termination. The trial court rejected Appellant’s challenges to the city manager’s decision.   The Fifth Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred in upholding several of the charges against Appellant. The court explained that while it upholds several other charges, it remanded for the trial court to determine whether the surviving charges are sufficient to support the consequence of termination. The court upheld the court’s apparent finding that Appellant intentionally opened the bag and that Appellant’s testimony that the bag opened inadvertently as a result of how he grabbed the straps was untruthful. The court wrote that it cannot affirm the judgment because the possibility remains that the trial court could conclude, in its independent judgment, that the surviving charges are insufficient to support Defendant’s termination (i.e., that the termination decision was an abuse of discretion). View "Cruz v. City of Merced" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants Jeff Jenkins, Jeff Jenkins Productions, LLC, and Bongo, LLC, for breach of contract and eight other causes of action. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged she conceived the idea for and worked to develop and coproduce a popular television program that came to be known as Bling Empire on Netflix. In the spring of 2018, Plaintiff presented the idea for the program to Defendant Jenkins during a series of discussions, and she gave Jenkins written development material concerning the program. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and other claims. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that adhering to the two-part test announced in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), that while the creation of a television show is an exercise of constitutionally protected expression, in this case, there is no “functional relationship” between the activity challenged in the complaint and the issue of public interest, as required by FilmOn.  Further, the court wrote that the conduct challenged, while it “implicates” a public issue, does not “contribute to public discussion of that issue” Consequently, Defendants’ activity excluding Plaintiff and failing to compensate her was not undertaken “in furtherance of free speech ‘in connection with’ an issue of public interest.” View "Li v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Jenkins left the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office to join the campaign to recall Boudin, the then-San Francisco District Attorney. After leaving the Office, Jenkins spoke to a reporter about a homicide case being prosecuted by the Office in which the victim was her husband’s cousin. Jenkins criticized the Office for its lax approach toward prosecuting the alleged killers, Mitchell and Pomar. Jenkins faulted the Office for dropping felony gang charges against the two and for failing to detain Pomar—which she claimed allowed Pomar to commit additional crimes, including attempted murder. After Boudin was recalled, Jenkins became the District Attorney. The Office instituted an “ethical wall” to prevent Jenkins from influencing its prosecutions of Mitchell and Pomar. Mitchell and Pomar moved to disqualify the entire Office from that case, Penal Code 1424.1 Pomar also moved to disqualify the Office from his separate prosecution for the additional crimes mentioned by Jenkins in the newspaper article.The court of appeal affirmed the disqualifications of the Office from both cases. The trial court reasonably concluded that Jenkins’s animosity toward Pomar extended to the other case; that, due to Jenkins’s public statements, the cases had become inextricably intertwined in the eyes of the ADAs, and the public; and that Jenkins’s belief that the prosecution of Pomar was doomed due to the lack of gang charges would likely influence ADAs “consciously or unconsciously” to be more aggressive in prosecuting Pomar. View "People v. Pomar" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dominick Martin and Rusty Rendon filed suit under the Unruh Civil Rights Act for disability discrimination, contending that one of Thi E-Commerce’s Web sites discriminated against the blind by being incompatible with screen reading software. Plaintiffs contended the court erred by concluding that a Web site was not a place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (incorporated into the Unruh Act). Although this was an issue that has split the federal courts (and California Courts of Appeal), the appellate court here concluded the ADA unambiguously applied only to physical places. Moreover, even if the Court found ambiguity and decided the issue on the basis of legislative history and public policy, it would still conclude that the ADA did not apply to Web sites. Plaintiffs alternatively contended they stated a cause of action against Thi E-Commerce on a theory of intentional discrimination. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the allegations of the complaint did not state a claim under that theory either and affirmed the judgment. View "Martin v. THI E-Commerce, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, Manzoor pleaded guilty to a felony violation of Penal Code sections 288.2 and 6641 for attempting to distribute harmful material to a minor. The prosecutor dismissed a count that alleged Manzoor attempted to commit a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, As a result of his conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender for life under former section 290(a)(2)(A). Almost 14 years later, the court granted his petition to reduce his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor, section 17(b).After section 290 was amended to provide for a tiered system of registration time periods, Manzoor sought relief from the registration requirements. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the petition, rejecting Manzoor’s argument that the section 290 amendments reflect a legislative intent to relieve a defendant whose section 288.2 felony conviction has been reduced to a misdemeanor from the lifetime obligation to register. Under both the current and pre-2021 versions of section 290, a felony conviction of section 288.2 requires lifetime registration and misdemeanor violations of section 288.2 are not mentioned; section 17(e) continues, both before and after the amendments, to prohibit a court from “reliev[ing] a defendant of the duty to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290” where the defendant is charged with an offense for which registration is required under Section 290, and for which the defendant was found guilty. View "People v. Manzoor" on Justia Law

C.D. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s post-judgment order granting a request from G.D. (Father) that she enroll their minor daughters in public school. Mother contends the order must be vacated because, without a change in custody, Father has no decision-making authority regarding their daughters’ education.   The Second Appellate District agreed with Mother and vacated the order. The court explained that A parent with “sole legal custody” has “the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.” Here, Father requested a say in his daughters’ education by asking the trial court to order Mother to enroll them in public school. But because Mother has sole legal custody of the girls, Father has no right or responsibility concerning their education. To obtain those, Father had to secure joint legal custody by showing a significant change in circumstances. The court explained that the trial court erred when it granted Father’s request for an order directing Mother to send their daughters to public school. Prior to issuing such an order, the trial court was required to find that Father demonstrated a change in circumstances warranting modification of its initial custody order. Not making that finding was an abuse of discretion. View "Marriage of C.D. & G.D." on Justia Law

Appellant purports to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, co-Appellant purports to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.   The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals. The court held that the orders appealed were non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained, the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Escobedo" on Justia Law

A.R. (Father) and S.R. (Mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their parental rights to three of their children, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1. Father’s sole claim, joined by Mother, is that because Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) failed to conduct a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry into whether the children are or may be Indian children, the juvenile court erred when it found that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply.   The Fifth Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply. The court explained that Section 224.2, subdivision (b), imposes on the county welfare department a broad duty to inquire whether a child placed into the temporary custody of the county under section 306 is or may be an Indian child. The court explained that at issue is whether a child taken into protective custody by warrant under section 340, subdivision (a) or (b) falls within the ambit of section 306, subdivision (a)(1). The court explained that based on the plain language of the statutes, it agrees with Delila D. that the answer is yes and, therefore, the inquiry mandated under section 224.2, subdivision (b), applies. The court further concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding the agency conducted a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry and that the error is prejudicial, which necessitates a conditional reversal of the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and a limited remand so that an inquiry that comports with section 224.2, subdivision (b), may be conducted. View "In re Jerry R." on Justia Law

Defendant Curtis Slaton was convicted by jury of murder. The prosecution’s theory in the case was that defendant committed the murder because he affiliated with a gang that wore blue and the victim wore red—a color associated with a rival gang. The trial court allowed the prosecution to present limited gang evidence to advance this theory, including screenshots from a music video that, among other things, show defendant affiliating with a known gang member, displaying a symbol of the gang, and holding up a blue bandana. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court wrongly admitted these screenshots for three reasons: (1) this evidence was inadmissible to show his potential motive for the charged murder; (2) they were highly inflammatory and carried minimal relevance; and (3) a new statute governing the admission of music videos and other forms of creative expression—which became effective after the trial here— applied retroactively and requires reversal. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Slaton" on Justia Law