Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

G.D. (Father) appealed the judgment approving the dissolution of his marriage to C.D. (Mother), granting her full custody of their minor daughters and barring all visitation. Father contends the custody and visitation orders attached to the judgment should be vacated. Father contends the custody and visitation orders should be vacated because there was insufficient evidence that he sexually abused F.D. and S.D. To him, only an evaluation conducted pursuant to section 3118 could provide the evidentiary basis necessary to permit the trial court to find that he abused his daughters.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that There are several problems with Father’s contentions. First, the trial court’s decision not to order a section 3118 evaluation was made, at least in part, at Father’s behest. Second, even if Father had not invited any error, he could not show prejudice. Third, no section 3118 evaluation was required here. If a trial court appoints a child custody evaluator and “determines that there is a serious allegation of child sexual abuse,” it must order a section 3118 evaluation. The court explained that the trial court below did not determine there had been a serious allegation of child sexual abuse. It was thus not required to order a section 3118 evaluation. Fourth, Section 3118 requires a trial court to order an evaluation when it appoints a child custody evaluator and determines there has been a serious allegation of child sexual abuse. But section 3118 also grants a court the discretion to order an evaluation when abuse allegations arise in other contexts. View "Marriage of C.D. & G.D." on Justia Law

When Frank died, Leslie, his daughter, was appointed as executor and personal representative of the estate, Independent Administration of Estates Act (Prob. Code, 10400). In his will, Frank confirmed his surviving spouse’s (Caroline’s) interest in their community and quasi-community property, and bequeathed all of his separate property, plus his one-half interest in their community and quasi-community property, to his three children, explicitly disinheriting Caroline, who is not their mother. Leslie, on behalf of Frank’s estate, filed in propria persona in the probate action a complaint for partition by sale of real property, claiming that Caroline improperly withdrew proceeds from a reverse mortgage and other allegedly fraudulent conduct. Caroline argued Leslie, as the personal representative of Frank’s estate, could not appear in propria persona in that representative capacity.The probate court granted the motions to strike with leave to amend to give Leslie the opportunity to retain counsel. The court determined that Leslie’s complaint “primarily consists of civil claims typically raised in a civil action. [Leslie], a non-attorney, cannot properly prosecute those claims in propria persona in any venue.” The court of appeal affirmed. Leslie’s complaint is a claim against third parties for the benefit of the estate’s beneficiaries, such that it could not be prosecuted by Leslie in propria persona; her conduct in filing briefs and other pleadings as representative of the estate constituted the unlicensed practice of law. View "Estate of Sanchez" on Justia Law

Doe sued her former employer Na Hoku,and former manager Montoya, asserting multiple claims arising from Montoya’s alleged sexual harassment and assault of Doe. The defendants successfully compelled the case to arbitration. September 1, 2022 was the “due date” for the defendants to pay certain arbitration fees and costs to the arbitrator. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98(a)(1), these fees and costs had to be “paid within 30 days after the due date” (October 3) to avoid breaching the arbitration agreement. The arbitrator received the payment on October 5, because the defendants mailed a check on Friday, September 30 although payment could be submitted by credit card, electronic check, or wire transfer.Doe moved to vacate the order compelling arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal granted Doe’s mandamus petition, strictly enforcing the section 1281.98(a)(1) 30-day grace period. The court declined to “find that the proverbial check in the mail constitutes payment.“ The defendants’ payment, received more than 30 days after the due date established by the arbitrator, was untimely. View "Doe v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sabrina Aranda was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility. During jury selection, the State exercised a challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted she would hold police officers to a higher standard of credibility than other witnesses. Aranda objected to the challenge, but the trial court overruled her objection. The jury convicted Aranda. On appeal, Aranda argued the State's challenge for cause during jury selection was based on the juror’s general distrust of police officers, that this was a presumptively invalid reason to challenge a juror under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, and the trial court prejudicially erred when it overruled her objection to the challenge. The Court of Appeal determined that argument failed because section 231.7 applied only to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause. View "California v. Aranda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Anthony Narro molested two of his stepdaughters and one of his stepdaughter’s friends for a period of over 10 years. He was convicted of numerous sexual offenses and sentenced to 195 years to life. On appeal he argued: (1) the judgment should have been reversed because CALCRIM No. 1191B violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution by allowing jurors to rely on currently charged crimes to find he had the propensity to commit other currently charged crimes; and (2) the trial court erred by awarding restitution in the amount of $9,461.34 as noneconomic damages pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) in order for a victim’s mother to replace the furniture where the molestations had occurred because the furniture invoked painful memories. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment. View "California v. Narro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC (Tsakopoulos) sought mandamus and declaratory relief against defendants the County of Sacramento (County) and the Sacramento County Office of Economic Development and Marketing, challenging the County’s approval of a project known as the Mather South Community Master Plan (the project) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Tsakopoulos appealed, arguing the Court of Appeal should reverse the judgment because the final environmental impact report (final report) was deficient because: (1) the climate change analysis was based on a methodology that the California Supreme Court in Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife, 62 Cal.4th 204 (2015) and the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego, 27 Cal.App.5th 892 (2018) previously rejected as unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the County “failed to assess the impacts from construction-related greenhouse gas emissions” in its climate change analysis; and (3) the County “failed to analyze the human health impacts associated with the” project’s emissions from criteria pollutants. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal explained why the County’s climate change analysis was not previously rejected by the Supreme Court or the Fourth District Court of Appeal for lack of substantial evidence. In the unpublished portion of opinion, the Court found Tsakopoulos presented no meritorious contentions to challenge the County’s construction-related and human health impacts analyses. View "Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento" on Justia Law

In 2017, the plaintiffs leased a Mercedes-Benz B250E from a dealer. In 2020, at the end of the lease, they signed a Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC) with the dealer to finance the purchase of the vehicle. Both the lease and the RISC contained arbitration agreements.The plaintiffs allege that Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), as the manufacturer or distributor of the vehicle, provided them with two express warranties and a separate implied warranty of merchantability and that the vehicle had undisclosed defects covered by the warranties, They took the vehicle to the dealer, which was authorized by MBUSA for repairs, but despite multiple attempts, the vehicle could not be fixed. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. MBUSA moved to compel arbitration, arguing that it had standing to compel arbitration as a third-party beneficiary of both the lease and the RISC, and equitable estoppel. While the trial court rejected MBUSA’s argument that it was a third-party beneficiary of the agreements, it agreed with MBUSA’s equitable estoppel argument. The court of appeal reversed. MBUSA is not a party to the agreements with the vehicle dealer and the claims against MBUSA are not intertwined with those agreements. View "Yeh v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

Defendant Fermin Perez-Robles, a massage therapist, was convicted by jury on 16 counts of sexual penetration and sexual battery involving six clients and sentenced to 15 years in prison. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on 10 counts, including those for sexual battery by restraint; (2) the jury was not properly instructed on lesser included offenses on four counts; (3) the jury was improperly instructed on using other charged sex offenses as propensity evidence; (4) the prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument; and (5) the imposition of the upper term sentence on one count had to be reversed and remanded based on recent changes to Penal Code section 1170. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the evidence was insufficient to support one count (count 4); although there was sufficient evidence of restraint, the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses on two counts (counts 14 & 20); and the imposition of the upper term sentence on count 11 had to be vacated and remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Perez-Robles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while stepping from a dock to a boat. He sued his employer—a yacht club in Long Beach—under federal admiralty law. The trial court sustained the club’s final demurrer to the second amended complaint. The court ruled there was no admiralty jurisdiction.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the court’s ruling without deciding about admiralty jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress in 1984 specified employees covered by state workers’ compensation law working at a “club” are covered by state workers’ compensation law and not federal law if they are eligible for state workers’ compensation. The court wrote that Plaintiff concedes the yacht club is a “club.” Federal law thus makes California state workers’ compensation law paramount, which means Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation. The court wrote that a core part of the state workers’ compensation bargain is that injured workers get speedy and predictable relief irrespective of fault. In return, workers are barred from suing their employers in tort. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s tort suit against his employer. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

In December 2019, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1) and (j)) regarding infant V.C., with allegations that his mother tested positive for methamphetamine at V.C.’s birth, resulting in V.C. experiencing withdrawal symptoms. A social worker had spoken with both parents, who each “denied any Native American ancestry.” Both parents completed and filed “Parental Notification of Indian Status” forms, checking the box: “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know,” under penalty of perjury.In March 2020, the juvenile court found the allegations true, declared the children dependents, removed them from parental custody, and ordered reunification services, concluding that each child “is not an Indian child and no further notice is required under” the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901). In February 2021, the court terminated reunification services, set a section 366.26 hearing, and again concluded that ICWA did not apply. On remand for a new hearing concerning the beneficial relationship exception, the juvenile court again terminated parental rights, found “ICWA does not apply,” and identified adoption as the children’s permanent plan.The court of appeal conditionally reversed. The agency failed to comply with ICWA by not asking available extended family members about possible Indian ancestry. View "In re V.C." on Justia Law