Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Airbnb, Inc. and Airbnb Payments, Inc. (collectively Airbnb) is an online marketplace that connects owners of short-term rentals (STRs) with renters seeking accommodations for 30 days or less. Among Airbnb’s many rental listings are properties within California’s coastal zone. The Coastal Protection Alliance (CPA) brought an action against Airbnb for violations of the Coastal Act, alleging that STRs in the coastal zone are “developments” that require a coastal development permit (CDP) and that Airbnb was directly and vicariously liable for allowing STR owners to list and rent unpermitted STRs on its website. CPA appealed from a judgment following an order granting Airbnb’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, holding that t STRs are not per se developments under the Coastal Act. The court explained that a development does not occur merely because a residence is used as an STR. Whether using a residence as an STR is a “change in the density or intensity of the use of land,” and thus, a development under the Coastal Act depends on the permissible scope of the residence’s existing use. Here, CPA’s sweeping interpretation of development to include every STR would circumvent the specifically tailored zoning ordinances in the LCPs throughout the coastal zone. Interpreting the Coastal Act in this way is neither reasonable nor consistent with the Act’s acknowledged reliance on “local government and local land use planning procedures and enforcement” in carrying out the Act’s goals. View "Coastal Protection Alliance v. Airbnb" on Justia Law

Defendant-Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order denying her post-permanency Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition that asked the court to grant her reunification services with her thirteen-year-old son N.F. The juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over N.F. in January 2021 after appointing paternal uncle as his legal guardian. Mother does not contest the merits of the court’s denial of her section 388 petition. Rather, she argued the juvenile court’s legal guardianship order must be reversed because the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not comply with their initial inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California law.The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Mother had the right to appeal from the court’s legal guardianship order, including the court’s implicit finding it continued to have no reason to know N.F. was an Indian child and the Department had satisfied its duty of ICWA inquiry. However, the time to so do expired many months ago. The court explained that Mother cannot now use her appeal from her post-permanency section 388 petition to challenge the legal guardianship order and findings made at the section 366.26 hearing—including the finding that ICWA did not apply. Further, the court explained that as the juvenile court did not vacate its order terminating its dependency jurisdiction over N.F. when it heard Mother’s section 388 petition—and a section 300 petition was not being filed on N.F.’s behalf—the court’s and the Department’s continuing duty of inquiry under section 224.2 was not implicated. View "In re N.F." on Justia Law

The Law Firm of Fox and Fox (Law Firm) appealed from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase Bank, N.A. The Law Firm filed this action against Chase, alleging negligence in the disbursement of funds from a blocked account containing estate funds to the sole signatory on the account (as administrator of the estate), Jazzmen Brumfield (Brumfield). The trial court granted Chase’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Law Firm contends it raised triable issues of fact with respect to whether Chase owed a duty to the Law Firm, whether Chase breached any such duty, and whether Chase’s conduct in distributing the funds to Brumfield (who absconded with the funds) was the proximate cause of the Law Firm’s damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded Chase owed the Law Firm a duty of care based on the special relationship it had with the Law Firm as an intended beneficiary of the probate court’s order directing that the estate funds be deposited into a blocked account from which withdrawals could only be made “on court order” and Chase’s acceptance of that order by executing the “receipt and acknowledgment of order for the deposit of money into blocked account.” The court explained that although banks do not generally have a duty to police customer accounts for suspicious activity, Chase owed the Law Firm, as an intended beneficiary of the blocked account order and acknowledgment, a duty to act with reasonable care in limiting distributions from the blocked account to those authorized by court order. View "The Law Firm of Fox and Fox v. Chase Bank" on Justia Law

Lashon was convicted of one count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder, together with true findings of special circumstance allegations of multiple murders. She was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Lashon argued the judgment was the result of the trial judge’s implicit racial bias against her and her trial counsel in violation of the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), Penal Code section 745.1, effective on January 1, 2021. She claimed that certain portions of the trial and sentencing proceedings constitute a prima facie showing for relief.The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Lashon forfeited her section 745 claim on direct appeal by not filing a section 745 motion in the trial court before judgment was entered. The court did not address her argument that she has alleged a prima facie showing for relief under section 745. The CRJA was effective four months before Lashon’s trial began and sets forth the procedure for seeking relief during various stages of a criminal proceeding. View "People v. Lashon" on Justia Law

In 2001, petitioner Ronnie Harrell was charged with five felonies, including attempted murder, each with a firearm enhancement and a gang enhancement; a prior prison term enhancement and a strike prior were also alleged. He was allowed to enter into a plea bargain, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to robbery, with a firearm enhancement, and admitted a strike prior. He was sentenced to 28 years in prison — the term prescribed by the plea bargain. In 2023, Harrell filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Harrell was honorably discharged from the United States Army in 1981, and he claimed to suffer from several service-related disorders. The trial court denied the petition, relying on case law holding that a person serving a stipulated sentence was categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91. It rejected Harrell’s argument that recent amendments to section 1170.91 had abrogated that case law. To this, the Court of Appeal found was error: the amendments deleted language from section 1170.91 that courts had previously relied on in holding that persons serving a stipulated sentence were ineligible. They also added new language allowing a trial court to reduce a conviction or a sentence “regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea . . . .” View "California v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Westlands Water District (Westlands) appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered in a validation action filed pursuant to, inter alia, Code of Civil Procedure section 860 et seq. The subject matter was an anticipated contract between Westlands and the United States concerning the ongoing delivery of federal reclamation project water and repayment of certain financial obligations. The superior court declined to grant relief and ultimately dismissed Westlands’ validation action for multiple reasons. Most pertinently, the draft was found to be materially deficient in its failure to specify Westlands’ financial obligations under the anticipated contract.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court explained that the “Repayment Obligation” cannot be determined without knowing the “Existing Capital Obligation” and/or the contents of exhibit D. The “Existing Capital Obligation” cannot be determined without knowing the contents of exhibit D. In the absence of exhibit D, both terms are useless for purposes of determining Westlands’ financial obligations, i.e., “the scope of the duty and the limits of performance.” Moreover, as Westlands admitted during the motion proceedings, exhibit D was not merely omitted from the draft attached to the complaint. Despite being expressly incorporated into the contract by reference, exhibit D did not exist when the complaint and the December 2019 motion were filed. Even when the motion was heard, there was only meager parol evidence of estimates ranging from $200 million to $362 million. Given the circumstances, the court agreed the contract presented for validation was missing an essential term and, therefore uncertain, i.e., not sufficiently definite to be binding and enforceable. View "Westlands Water Dist. v. All Persons Interested" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Rhonda Jenkins appealed an order recommitting her as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. Jenkins contended substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that she represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others because of her severe mental disorder. After careful review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed: the mental health experts who evaluated Jenkins expressed concern that she was not ready to leave the hospital due to her mental illness and level of functioning, and that she had unrealistic expectations about the challenges she would face. "They nevertheless failed to identify any history of dangerous behavior beyond her commitment offense in 1999 or explain how their concerns translate into difficulty controlling her dangerous behavior." Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins then-represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the Court reversed the trial court’s order recommitting her for an additional year. View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and gang and firearm enhancements and sentenced to a total term of 22 years. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The trial court granted the petition, vacated Appellant’s conviction, and resentenced him to the midterm of three years on the target offense of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The court awarded Appellant the same number of custody credits he was awarded at his initial sentencing and reimposed the same fines, fees, and direct victim restitution. Appellant contends the court erred in several respects. He primarily argued that he should have received additional custody credits for the time he served on his original sentence. Respondent Attorney General concedes Appellant is correct.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order in part, specifically to the calculation of Appellant’s custody credits and their application to his restitution and parole revocation fines. The court explained that where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.” In the specific context of a resentencing under section 1172.6, a person resentenced “shall be given credit for time served.” The court held that the trial court did not fulfill this obligation, rendering Appellant’s sentence unauthorized. View "P. v. Rojas" on Justia Law

Barrera and Varguez sued Apple, a nationwide restaurant chain, to recover civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Labor Code 2698) for Labor Code violations suffered by them and by other employees. Apple unsuccessfully moved to compel arbitration.The court of appeal reversed in part, first rejecting a claim that Apple waived the right to arbitrate by “litigating this case for over a year” before moving to compel arbitration. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision, "Viking River Cruises," and the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1), the court concluded that the parties’ agreements require arbitration of the PAGA claims that seek to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations committed against the plaintiffs. The PAGA claims seeking civil penalties for Labor Code violations committed against other employees may be pursued by the plaintiffs in the trial court. In defining the scope of arbitrable claims, the Agreements permissibly provide that only individual PAGA claims can be arbitrated. The plaintiffs’ individual claims can be arbitrated—unless the Agreements are unenforceable on some other ground; the plaintiffs did not meet their burden in establishing the Agreements are unconscionable. The court remanded for determination of whether a stay of the non-individual PAGA claims would be appropriate. View "Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC" on Justia Law

San Francisco Officer Gunn testified that he observed a Buick parked in a “known high-crime area” and ran a license plate check, which came back as belonging to an Acura. Finley, who is Black, stepped out of the vehicle with his wife. Finley stated that they had recently purchased the vehicle and provided title and registration information, establishing the car was not stolen. After obtaining Finley’s driver’s license, Gunn learned that Finley was on federal probation with a search clause. Gunn searched the vehicle and retrieved a backpack, containing a loaded handgun without a serial number.Finley alleged a violation of the Racial Justice Act (Penal Code 745(a)(1)). The prosecution noted that the Supreme Court has stated that an area’s reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in determining the reasonableness of investigative detention and that it is “common practice” for an officer to run a query of a person’s name. The trial court concluded that Finley did not establish a prima facie violation of the Racial Justice Act under the totality of the circumstances, noting that the officer was courteous.The court of appeal ordered a rehearing. The trial court’s review of Finley’s motion went beyond the confines of determining whether it stated a prima facie case. The focus at this stage of the proceedings should be on Finley’s allegations and supporting evidence, not evidence supporting the prosecution’s argument. View "Finley v. Superior Court" on Justia Law