Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A trial court denied defendant Monica Njoku’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. Defendant owned a house in Sacramento of which she rented rooms to short term tenants, primarily single mothers with children. She also rented a room to Edward W., the victim and a single father with a two-year-old son. Other tenants in the house during the relevant period included Jasmine M., a single mother with an eleven-month-old daughter, and Amanda F., a single mother with a five-or six-year-old son. At the time of the events detailed below, Edward had been living in the house for two weeks, Jasmine for three weeks, and Amanda for three months. Defendant and Jasmine had a disagreement several days before the murder. On November 14, 2014, defendant appeared at the house unannounced and learned Jasmine had violated house rules by allowing her sister to spend the night. Defendant came back to the house two days later, confronting Jasmine again, and demanding she leave. Edward, standing nearby, interjected. This disagreement between Defendant and her tenants would end with Defendant calling her brother and his wife for help evicting her tenants, tempers flaring, all three tenants making multiple calls to 911, and Edward ultimately being stabbed and stomped where he later died an hour after he placed his last call to 911 from loss of blood from his wounds. On appeal, defendant argued insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding she aided and abetted implied malice murder. Defendant also argued any factual disputes should have been resolved in her favor because the prosecution did not introduce live testimony at the evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes as it was required to do pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Njoku" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Karl Doron appealed after his guilty plea to nine counts of robbery, two counts of attempted robbery, and allegations he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the robberies. Before entering into his plea, Doron unsuccessfully requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The court sentenced Doron to a prison sentence of 10 years four months in accordance with his plea. In his initial appellate briefing, Doron contended the trial court abused its discretion by ruling he had not made a prima facie showing he was entitled to mental health diversion. After the State filed its respondent’s brief, the Legislature amended section 1001.36 to revise the eligibility test for pretrial diversion (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023), and the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the issue. Doron then contended under the amended statute, which applied retroactively to his case, the trial court was required to find his mental disorder was a substantial factor in the commission of his crimes absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. He maintained there was no substantial evidence to rebut this presumption, and thus he was both eligible and suitable for pretrial mental health diversion. Doron alternatively asked the Court of Appeal remand his matter for an evidentiary hearing governed by section 1001.36’s new principles. The State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that amended section 1001.36 applied retroactively to Doron’s nonfinal judgment. The State argued, however, the proper remedy was not for the Court to engage in factfinding so as to decide whether Doron met the criteria for diversion, but to remand the matter for a new prima facie evidentiary hearing consistent with section 1001.36’s amendments. To this the Court concurred, and remanded the case with directions that the trial court consider Doron’s request for mental health diversion under amended section 1001.36. View "California v. Doron" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a residence and obtained a $1 million loan, memorialized by a note secured by a deed of trust. Years later, the property was sold through a nonjudicial foreclosure. Plaintiffs, after two prior federal suits were dismissed without prejudice, filed this state lawsuit for wrongful foreclosure, against the Buyers, and Lenders. Lenders successfully argued the action was barred by res judicata (claim preclusion), based on those dismissals; under Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B), the “two dismissal rule,” the dismissal of the second federal suit was “an adjudication on the merits.”The court of appeal concluded the voluntary dismissal of the second federal lawsuit was not a final “adjudication on the merits” that barred the filing of this case in state court. The two-dismissal rule of Rule 41(a)(1)(B) applies when there is a voluntary dismissal in state or federal court, a second voluntary dismissal in federal court, and the subsequent filing of an action in the same federal court where the second suit was dismissed. Under California law, a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a prior action is not a final judgment on the merits that bars a subsequent suit. California does not prohibit a plaintiff from filing dismissals without prejudice in successive actions. The rule is inapplicable to this state court lawsuit alleging only state-law claims. The court nonetheless affirmed, concluding that the challenges to the foreclosure lack merit. View "Gray v. La Salle Bank" on Justia Law

Castaneda-Prado was convicted of five counts of committing a lewd act on a child under age 14, with allegations that the charges involved multiple victims and substantial sexual conduct. Castaneda-Prado was sentenced to 125 years to life; five consecutive prison terms of 25 years to life. Castaneda-Prado argued the court erred by excluding evidence that one of the children believed that, by accusing Castaneda-Prado of sexual molestation, she was helping her mother obtain a “U visa,” which can provide legal status for victims of certain crimes who assist in the investigation of those crimes.The court of appeal reversed his convictions. The exclusion of this evidence violated Castaneda-Prado’s right to confront a witness against him under the federal and state constitutions. On the record cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury’s guilty verdicts turned almost entirely on the credibility of the girls. There was no physical evidence of the alleged sexual offenses. The court noted that it was irrelevant whether a U visa was possible or whether the mother actually sought a visa; what mattered was the girl’s belief. In addition, the prosecutor highlighted the absence of any proven basis to question the motives of either witness. View "People v. Castaneda-Prado" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Ceja was convicted by jury of being a felon in possession of ammunition and other charges. On appeal, Ceja’s sole claim was that the felon in possession of ammunition statute facially violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Another Court of Appeal recently held that California’s laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition did not violate the Constitution because “only law-abiding citizens are included among ‘the people’ whose right to bear arms is protected by the Second Amendment.” To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Ceja" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Phil Hagey appealed a judgment of dismissal entered following the sustaining of a demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff owned a home with a solar energy system (the system). At the time he purchased the home, the prior homeowner was party to a contract with a company, Kilowatt Systems, LLC (Kilowatt), which owned the system (the solar agreement). Among other terms, the solar agreement required the prior homeowner to purchase the energy produced by the system through monthly payments to Kilowatt. In the event of a sale of the house, the solar agreement afforded the prior homeowner three options. The prior homeowner and plaintiff agreed to an option which allowed prepayment of all remaining monthly payments and a transfer of all solar agreement rights and obligations to plaintiff, except for the monthly payment responsibility. In conjunction with the sale of the house, prepayment occurred and the parties entered into the requisite transfer agreement. At some later point in time, defendant Solar Service Experts, LLC began sending plaintiff monthly bills on Kilowatt’s behalf, demanding payments pursuant to the solar agreement. After receiving a bill, plaintiff spoke to a representative of defendant who told him he should not have received the bill and the issue would be resolved. Plaintiff received additional bills and at least one late payment notice which identified defendant as a debt collector. Plaintiff communicated with defendant’s representatives about the errors by phone and email, all to no avail. Plaintiff thereafter filed a class action lawsuit against defendant. The trial court concluded plaintiff did not, and could not, allege facts sufficient to constitute a consumer credit transaction, as statutorily defined. Plaintiff argued the court erroneously focused on the undisputed fact he did not owe the debt which defendant sought to collect and, in doing so, failed to recognize the Rosenthal Act applied to debt alleged to be due or owing by reason of a consumer credit transaction. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "Hagey v. Solar Service Experts" on Justia Law

Piplack and Taylor are lead plaintiffs in Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Labor Code 2698) representative actions in Orange and Los Angeles Counties against In-N-Out. Upon learning of settlement negotiations in a subsequent, overlapping PAGA action brought by Accurso against In-N-Out in Sonoma County, Piplack and Taylor filed a proposed complaint in intervention in the Sonoma County action, and moved to intervene under Code of Civil Procedure section 387 and 2 for a stay. The trial court denied the motions.The court of appeal vacated. Non-party PAGA claimants who seek to intervene in overlapping PAGA cases must have a “significantly protectable interest” that meets the threshold requirements of section 387. A personal interest is not required. The court upheld the denial of mandatory intervention; although Piplack and Taylor have significantly protectable interests, they failed to prove inadequate representation or potential impairment of their protectable interests. The court remanded the issue of permissive intervention for a “discretionary weighing of whether Piplack and Taylor propose to add anything to this case, the importance of which outweighs any objections Accurso and In-N-Out may have to the court hearing it.” View "Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers" on Justia Law

LaCour, a former Marshalls employee, filed suit under the Labor Code’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) (Labor Code 2698) in January 2021. Marshalls argued that LaCour, having left Marshalls in May 2019, had only a year and 65 days to bring a claim and missed that deadline. Marshalls also argued that all allegations of violations pre-dating November 17, 2020, must be stricken because PAGA claims against Marshalls through that date were released in the settlement of an earlier class and PAGA action (Rodriguez).The court held that California Rules of Court emergency rule 9, put into effect during the pandemic, validly extended the limitations period by six months and that LaCour could pursue claims for violations occurring after the Rodriguez settlement's effective date. The court rejected LaCour’s argument that the Rodriguez plaintiff had no authority to settle claims encompassed by LaCour’s notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA); the Rodriguez LWDA notice letter listed several Labor Code provisions, including section 2802—which provided the legal basis for LaCour’s PAGA claims, even though, factually, the notices alleged different policies. The court then dismissed because LaCour was not a Marshalls's employee after November 17, 2019, and was not an “aggrieved employee” under PAGA and had no standing to sue.The court of appeal vacated. LaCour’s PAGA complaint was timely filed but the trial court erred in giving claim preclusive effect to a federal court judgment in a prior PAGA case. View "LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC" on Justia Law

When the Covid pandemic struck, the California State University (CSU) directed that instruction be provided remotely. To provide such instruction, Plaintiff, a biology professor at CSU-Los Angeles, incurred expenses that CSU refused to reimburse for a computer and other equipment. Plaintiff sued CSU’s board of trustees on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, alleging Labor Code section 2802 obligated CSU to reimburse employees for necessary work-related expenses. CSU demurred, arguing that as a department of the state, it enjoys broad exemption from Labor Code provisions that infringe on its sovereign powers. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that absent express words or positive indicia to the contrary, a governmental agency is not within the general words of a statute. The court further wrote that although this exemption is limited to cases where the application of the statute would impair the entity’s sovereignty, subjecting CSU to Labor Code section 2802, in this case, would do so because it would infringe on the broad discretion CSU enjoys under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies. Further, the court noted that because CSU did not violate section 2802, Plaintiff is not an aggrieved employee for purposes of PAGA. His PAGA claim therefore fails with his section 2802 claim. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian Carr appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Newport Beach (the City) an action arising from injuries plaintiff sustained after diving headfirst into shallow harbor waters. The court concluded the City was immune from liability pursuant to Government Code section 831.7, which concerned hazardous recreational activities. It also found no triable issue of fact as to plaintiff’s claim alleging a dangerous condition of public property. Plaintiff contended the decision was error because there are triable issues of fact regarding the City’s claimed immunities and his dangerous condition claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding record evidenced otherwise. "As a matter of law, the hazardous recreational activity immunity insulates the City from the alleged liability, so thus affirm the judgment." View "Carr v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law