Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Center for Scientific Integrity (CSI) was an organization that reported on academic retractions and accountability. CSI wrote an article about plaintiff-respondent Constance Iloh, a professor at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), after several academic journals retracted articles Iloh had written due to concerns about possible plagiarism or inaccurate citation references. In a follow-up to that article, CSI sent UCI a records request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) requesting Iloh’s postpublication communications with the journals and UCI. Iloh petitioned for a writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief against UCI to prevent disclosure of her communications, and later added CSI as a real party in interest. She then filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent disclosure. Meanwhile, CSI filed a motion to strike Iloh’s petition under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this case concerned Iloh’s motion for preliminary injunction. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that Iloh had not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and the Court affirmed that order. In this case, the Court considered CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that although protected activity may have led to the petition, it was not the “basis” for the petition. To this, the Court disagreed: in issuing the CPRA request, CSI was engaging in newsgathering so it could report on matters of public interest, such as how a public university funded largely by taxpayer dollars resolved quality or integrity problems in its professors’ publications. CSI was therefore engaged in protected activity when it issued the CPRA request. Iloh filed her petition for mandamus relief to prevent UCI from complying with the CPRA request. “This is the type of lawsuit the anti-SLAPP statute is designed to address, and it should be stricken if Iloh cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her petition.” The Court of Appeal found the trial court had not performed the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Therefore, the Court reversed the order denying CSI’s anti-SLAPP motion and remanded this case with directions that the trial court consider prong two of the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Iloh v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Sacramento County District Attorney charged defendant Stephanie Miller with carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle under her control. Penal Code section 25400(a)(1) did not apply to individuals, unlike Miller, who were licensed to carry concealed firearms under California law. Later that year, Miller filed a demurrer asserting her concealed firearm charge was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) which held the “proper cause” requirement in New York’s public carry licensing regime violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court sustained Miller’s demurrer and dismissed the charge against her. On appeal, the State argued Miller lacked standing to raise her constitutional challenge because she never attempted to apply for a license and could not show she would satisfy any valid conditions California places on receiving one. The State argued Bruen only invalidated the “good cause” requirement in California’s firearm licensing statutes and they remained otherwise constitutional pursuant to the severability doctrine. The State further argued the trial court’s interpretation of Bruen was overly broad and the criminal charge of having a concealed firearm under section 25400 remained valid post-Bruen. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, to the extent Miller had standing, her assertions were ultimately unavailing because section 25400 did not violate the Second Amendment regardless of the constitutionality of California’s firearm licensing statutes. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s order sustaining Miller’s demurrer and dismissing the charge against her. View "California v. Miller" on Justia Law

A.R. (Father) appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional order adjudging his son a dependent of the court and removing the child from his custody. The court also ordered reunification services for Father. Father’s one-year-old son, Andres R., came to DPSS’s attention in May 2022, when D.P. (Mother) called law enforcement to report domestic violence. Months later, the child was deemed a dependent of the court based on a social worker's findings of the child's living environment and interviews with his siblings and his mother. On appeal, Father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional finding and the removal order. He also argued that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with state law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) . Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Andres R." on Justia Law

North Coast Village Condominium Association (the Association) filed a workplace violence restraining order in support of its board president, Neil Anderson, and 46 other employees and board members seeking to restrain resident, defendant-appellant Nancy Phillips. At the conclusion of a three-day hearing, the trial court denied the Association’s request. It then sua sponte and absent a request to amend the pleadings by either party, awarded Anderson a civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 against Phillips “in the interest of judicial efficiency and conforming pleadings to proof.” In so doing, it impliedly amended the pleadings to add Anderson as a party. Phillips appealed, requesting that the Court of Appeal reverse the order granting the civil harassment restraining order and enter judgment dismissing all restraining orders with prejudice. The Association filed a cross-appeal seeking reversal of the order denying the workplace violence restraining order. It also requested that the Court reverse and remand with instructions to enter a restraining order that included stay-away orders. The Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte amending the cause of action and petitioning party without adequate notice. Regarding the cross-appeal, the Court further concluded the trial court erred in interpreting and applying section 527.8. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "North Coast Village Condominium Assn. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Geringer Capital, Inc., Roger Geringer and Tricycle Entertainment, LLC (collectively Geringer parties) moved to preclude Jeffrey Konvitz, Blue Rider Finance, Inc.’s counsel of record, from testifying at trial in support of Blue Rider’s claim that the Geringer parties fraudulently induced Blue Rider to enter into a settlement agreement that did not accurately reflect the terms negotiated by the parties. The Geringer parties subsequently clarified that their motion should be considered, in the alternative, a motion to disqualify Konvitz. The court granted the motion and disqualified Konvitz, finding the integrity of the judicial process would be impaired if Konvitz served in dual roles. On appeal, Blue Rider contends the court should have denied the motion due to the Geringer parties’ excessive delay in raising the issue.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the general rule is that an attorney may serve as both advocate and witness, testifying at trial concerning disputed issues, if the client has provided its informed written consent. Disqualification of counsel, when consent has been given, must be based on a convincing showing of prejudice to the opposing party or the potential for palpable injury to the judicial process. Here, the court wrote that the record is devoid of the evidence necessary to support the disqualification of Blue Rider’s chosen counsel. Further, the court explained that disqualification is not justified absent a convincing demonstration by the moving party of a potential for injury to the integrity of the judicial process. The showing must be based on an adequate factual record, not overarching statements of policy or conclusory allegations by the party seeking disqualification. Accordingly, the court found that it was an error for the trial court not to resolve the Geringer parties’ motion in favor of allowing Blue Rider to be represented by Konvitz, its counsel of choice. View "Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff died after his pick-up truck collided with a tractor-trailer driven by Jose R. Inzunza (Inzunza) for CR GTS, Inc. (CRGTS), an interstate motor carrier. Plaintiff’s surviving spouse and their four adult children and two adult stepchildren (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this wrongful death action against Defendants Inzunza and CRGTS (collectively, Defendants). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs. CRGTS appealed the judgment.   The Second Appellate District agreed with CRGTS’s first contention and conclude the trial court prejudicially erred by precluding CRGTS from presenting evidence contesting liability and of comparative fault. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment against CRGTS and remanded the action for a new trial against CRGTS. The court set aside the judgment against Inzunza pending the outcome of the new trial. The court concluded that an agent’s deemed admissions do not bind the principal codefendant, even when the basis for the action against the principal codefendant is vicarious liability arising from the acts of the agent. The court wrote that to hold otherwise would directly contradict the plain language of section 2033.410. The trial court, therefore, erred by precluding CRGTS from introducing evidence of non-liability and comparative fault. The court found that this error clearly was prejudicial. View "Inzunza v. Naranjo" on Justia Law

Appellant M.F. and her husband, J.F., were the paternal grandparents (PGPs) of R.F. and B.F. In 2021, the juvenile court terminated parental rights to the children and selected adoption as the children’s permanent plans. In Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 reports for each child, respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) recommended that the court designate the PGPs as the children’s “prospective adoptive parents” (PAPs). But at a hearing for B.F., counsel raised a concern about J.F.’s alcohol abuse; J.F. later tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines. In March 2022, DPSS removed the children from the PGPs’ home on an emergency basis. DPSS then filed a Judicial Council form JV-324 for each child, stating that the removals were “due to methamphetamine used by [J.F].” Together with the notice forms (JV-324), DPSS filed a form JV-326 for each child, stating that M.F. was given notice of the removals “orally, in person” on March 11. The proofs of notice (forms JV-326) did not show that M.F. was given: (1) copies of the notices of emergency removal DPSS filed on March 11; (2) blank copies of forms JV-325 (objection to removal); or (3) blank copies of forms JV- 321 (request for prospective adoptive parent designation). M.F. went to the courthouse to ask whether she could “do anything,” and she was told she could file an objection to removal on form JV-325. On March 25, M.F. filed a form JV-325 for each child, requesting a hearing on the removals, and claiming the children would suffer harm the longer they were separated from M.F.’s family. The juvenile court never set a hearing on the removals. On September 1, 2022, M.F., through an attorney, filed a section 388 petition for each child, asking the court to return the children to her care and claiming she was never notified of her right to file objections to, and request a hearing on, the removals.The court denied the petitions, without a hearing, on grounds: (1) M.F. was provided with notice of the removals on March 11; (2) thus, M.F.’s objections were untimely filed; and (3) a hearing on the removals was discretionary, not mandatory, pursuant to section 366.26(n)(3). M.F. appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with orders to the juvenile court to hold a noticed hearing on the children’s March 11, 2022 removals. View "In re R.F." on Justia Law

Three former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (department) were discharged from their employment for alleged misconduct. The former deputies filed administrative appeals with the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (commission). While their appeals were pending, the former deputies executed settlement agreements with department personnel that purported to reinstate the former deputies to employment. The County of Los Angeles (county) thereafter refused to comply with these settlement agreements. The former deputies and a labor union for department personnel (collectively, Appellants) filed suit against the county, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (board of supervisors or board), the department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff (sheriff), the Los Angeles County Counsel (county counsel), and the Director of Personnel for the County of Los Angeles (director of personnel) (collectively, Respondents). Appellants sought enforcement of the settlements through mandamus, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims. The trial court sustained Respondents’ demurrers to Appellants’ pleading without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgments of dismissal. The court conclude that with the exception of the portion of Appellants’ declaratory relief cause of action that is premised on an alleged procedural due process violation, the trial court erred in denying Appellants leave to amend. Given that the trial court was reviewing Appellants’ first pleading and that Appellants could potentially discover the legal basis (if any) for the department’s alleged long-standing apparent belief that its personnel have the authority to settle commission appeals on their own. The court concluded that allowing appellants to file an amended pleading would not be an exercise in futility. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Appellant Tanner Altizer suffered serious injuries when he ran into a suspended cable fence while riding his off-road motorcycle on an unpaved area in an unoccupied area of the desert. The owner of the property, respondent Coachella Valley Conservation Commission (the Commission), placed the cable fence around its property to stop illegal dumping and off-road vehicles in order to protect the sensitive habitat. Altizer sued the Commission, alleging that the cable fence created a dangerous condition on public property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission, and Altizer appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Commission was entitled to hazardous recreational activity immunity under Government Code section 831.71 and affirmed. View "Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Com." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and appellant Rhonda S. is the conservator, appointed pursuant to section 5350 of the Lanterman-Petris Short Act (LPS), of her adult son David S. Plaintiff sued Defendants and respondents Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals for a declaration of their obligations, under LPS and the terms of David’s health plan, to transport and accept for “assessment and evaluation” (each as defined in LPS) conservatees like David upon their conservators’ demand. The trial court sustained Kaiser’s demurrer.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that it rejects Plaintiff’s implication that an LPS conservatee is per se suffering from an “Emergency Medical Condition” at all times following the judicial determination of grave disability. The purposes of LPS conservatorship include providing treatment to the conservatee. (Section 5350.1.) To assume a conservatee’s condition remains static following the conservatorship order is to assume treatment is always ineffectual. We are offered no basis for such an assumption. For a mental health condition to be an “Emergency Medical Condition” under the plan, “acute symptoms of sufficient severity” must result in an “immediate” specified danger or mental health disorder-induced disability. Second, even if conservatees were in a state of perpetual “Emergency Medical Condition” within the meaning of the plan, Plaintiff’s requested declaration would eliminate the coverage requirement that a “reasonable person would have believed that the medical condition was an Emergency Medical Condition which required ambulance services.” View "Rhonda S. v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan" on Justia Law