Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

North River Insurance Company and its bail agent (collectively, North River) asked for its bail money back. The court said no: the prosecution had not decided whether to extradite the fugitive from Mexico. North River sought a continuance, to give the prosecution enough time to decide. The court refused that as well. Because prosecutors would not decide, and because prosecutors would not agree to a delay to allow themselves to decide, North River had to forfeit its bail money, said the trial court.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that where the bail company has complied with its obligations, government prosecutors should not be able to use their own indecision to allow the government to keep bail money. The bond is a contract between the bail company and the government. Section 1305 governs that contract. The bail company performed its end of the bargain. The trial court vitiated the bargain by allowing the government to escape all obligations simply by proclaiming irresolution. View "P. v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The principal issue in these cases is whether two corporations, wholly owned by the late entertainer Michael Jackson, had a legal duty to protect plaintiffs from sexual abuse Jackson is alleged to have inflicted on them for many years while they were children. The corporations say they had no duty to protect plaintiffs from Jackson because of their corporate structure, that is, “because they had no ability to control Jackson—their sole owner—or his interactions with [plaintiffs]. Parties cannot be liable for neglecting to exercise powers they simply do not have.” The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend in Safechuck’s case and granted summary judgment to Defendants in Robson’s case. Both Plaintiffs appealed, and Robson also appealed a discovery sanctions order against his counsel   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that following the guidance in Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204 (Brown), it concludes that a corporation that facilitates the sexual abuse of children by one of its employees is not excused from an affirmative duty to protect those children merely because it is solely owned by the perpetrator of the abuse. The court explained that while there is no comparable case law to recite it would be perverse to find no duty based on the corporate defendant having only one shareholder. Thus the court reversed the judgments entered for the corporations. One of the plaintiffs also appealed a sanctions order and discovery rulings granting protective orders to nonparty witnesses. The court found no abuse of discretion in those rulings. View "Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

The County of San Luis Obispo granted a permit to move an easement on a property in the coastal zone. However, the California Coastal Commission denied the permit. The trial court found in the Commission's favor.The County appealed under the California Coastal Act of 1976( Coastal Act). The CoastalAct establishes a “coastal zone,” defined by an official map and generally extending from the mean high tide line landward 1000 yards. Every city or county with jurisdiction over lands within the coastal zone is required to create a “local coastal program” to implement the provisions and policies of the Coastal Act.The Commission has de novo review authority over the County’s grant of the permit. Here, because the Commission denied the McCarthys’ permit on appeal, the development was not authorized pursuant to the Coastal Act. Thus the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order. View "Cave Landing, LLC v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

The Westin St. Francis, in Union Square, is San Francisco’s third largest hotel. In return for a base management fee and an incentive fee, the Company manages and maintains the hotel, handles personnel and employment matters, provides advertising and promotional services, and provides all computer services, including reservations. In addition to renting its rooms, the Westin receives income from guest cancellations, no-shows, and attrition. The hotel also profits from in-room movies and guest laundry services provided by third parties. In 2015, BRE purchased Strategic, the owner of the Westin St. Francis and other hotels, triggering a reassessment. The Assessor assessed the hotel’s value at approximately $785 million. Strategic sought a refund. The trial court upheld the Board’s determination.The court of appeal held that the method used by the city to exclude the value of nontaxable, intangible assets from the assessed value of the hotel—i.e., the deduction of fees or expenses associated with the asset from the hotel’s future income stream—is legally incorrect. As a result, the assessed value of the hotel improperly subsumed the value of the management agreement, in-room movies, and guest laundry services. However, the assessed value properly included the cancellation/no-show/attrition income because that asset is a taxable attribute of the property. The court remanded for a redetermination of the taxable value of the hotel. View "SHR St. Francis, LLC v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendants were identified as suspects of murder after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of his murder. After their motions to quash and suppress evidence were denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder; and co-Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress, arguing the geofence warrant violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and did not comply with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (CalECPA).   The Second Appellate District explained that although the geofence warrant satisfied the requirements of CalECPA, the court agrees it lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment and was impermissibly overbroad. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the convictions under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established by United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon). The court explained that given the dearth of authority directly on point and the novelty of the particular surveillance technique at issue, the officers were not objectively unreasonable in believing the warrant was valid, even if the issue, upon close legal examination, is not a particularly close one. View "P. v. Meza" on Justia Law

A woman sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her estranged husband. The trial court denied her petition while indicating that her allegations of a pattern of control and isolation by limiting her access to money, communication, and transportation did not fall within the statutory definition of domestic violence or abuse. The Court of Appeal found that under the law, attempts to control, regulate, and monitor a spouse’s finances, economic resources, movements, and access to communications are abuse. The Court therefore reversed the order denying the restraining order and remanded for a new hearing on whether a restraining order was appropriate. The trial court did not address the woman's request for spousal support, and the Court ordered that considered on remand as well. View "Hatley v. Southard" on Justia Law

Mark Kielar challenged a superior court’s decision to grant Hyundai Motor America’s (Hyundai) motion to compel arbitration of his causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and fraudulent inducement arising from alleged mechanical defects in the condition of his 2012 Hyundai Tucson. The superior court’s ruling followed Court of Appeal's earlier decision in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (2020) and concluded Hyundai, a nonsignatory manufacturer, could enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract between Kielar and his local car dealership under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court of Appeal joined recent decisions that have disagreed with Felisilda and concluded the court erred in ordering arbitration. Therefore, it issued a preemptory writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its June 16, 2022 order and enter a new order denying Hyundai’s motion. View "Kielar v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

In People v. Bartholomew (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 775, 778, the Second Appellate District Court’s majority opinion acknowledged, “‘No provision of section 17, subdivision (b), authorizes the superior court judge to [determine a wobbler to be a misdemeanor] prior to judgment or a grant of probation.’” But the majority opinion held that “the People have no authority to appeal” the superior court’s pretrial order reducing a felony wobbler to a misdemeanor. The majority rejected the People’s claim that section 1238, subdivision (a)(6) authorizes such an appeal. The People did not raise the issue of whether an appeal is authorized under section 1238, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(8).   The Second Appellate District disapproved of the holding in Bartholomew. Here, the People petitioned for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its post-preliminary hearing, pretrial order reducing a felony wobbler to a misdemeanor. The People also filed an appeal. Because the superior court’s order is both unauthorized and appealable, the court issued the requested writ. The court directed the Superior Court of Ventura County to vacate its order reducing the felony wobbler to a misdemeanor and to reinstate the felony charge. View "P. v. Super. Ct. (Mitchell)" on Justia Law

The County of Santa Barbara (County) appealed from the entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting its Road Commissioner from removing unpermitted encroachments placed in the public right of way along a portion of East Mountain Drive in Montecito. The County filed a cross-complaint alleging causes of action for public nuisance and trespass against respondents. The trial court issued a preemptory writ that suspends all efforts by County to enforce the right-of-way encroachments.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred because Respondents are not correct on the merits of their CEQA claim and will not be irreparably harmed by the removal of encroachments installed without permits in the public right of way of an existing road. The County Road Commissioner is authorized by statute and local ordinance to remove any encroachment on a public right of way. The court explained that Respondents will suffer no irreparable harm because a party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by being prohibited from violating the law. View "Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law