Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Court of Appeal reversed the summary denial of her request for resentencing, Petitioner Elvira Torres sought on remand to peremptorily challenge the judge who had originally denied her request for resentencing, when he was again assigned to hear the request. Petitioner’s challenge was essentially denied as untimely, and she asked the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate or prohibition. The Court found remand for further resentencing proceedings held pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 did not constitute remand for a “new trial” as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6(a)(2); thus, petitioner’s challenge to the trial judge pursuant to that section was properly denied as untimely. View "Torres v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company and several of its affiliates (collectively, Allstate) brought qui tam actions on behalf of the State of California alleging insurance fraud under the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA) (and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against three medical corporations, a medical management company and its parent company, four physicians, and Sattar Mir, an individual. The trial court found the complaints failed to state causes of action under the IFPA and the UCL because they were not pled with requisite specificity, the business models alleged were lawful, and one of the actions was time-barred.   The Second Appellate District reversed the orders sustaining the demurrers and judgments of dismissal. The court explained that the trial court found the complaints failed to state causes of action under the IFPA and the UCL because they were not pled with requisite specificity, the business models alleged were lawful, and one of the actions was time-barred. The court concluded that the operative complaints adequately plead causes of action under both statutes. View "P. ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology etc." on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Grant Park Neighborhood Association Advocates and four individuals (together, Grant Park) challenged Department of Public Health's (the Department) approval of an entity’s application to operate a needle and syringe distribution program in Santa Cruz County. Grant Park argued the Department’s approval was flawed for four reasons: (1) Department failed to consult with local law enforcement before approving the application; (2) the Department failed to notify three of the affected local law enforcement agencies about the comment period; (3) the Department provided only 45 days for public comment even though its regulations at the time required 90 days; and (4) the Department failed to conduct the environmental review required under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). After Grant Park filed suit, the California Legislature amended Health & Safety Code section 121349 to exempt approvals under the statute from CEQA; Grant Park contended this amendment did not apply retroactively. On Grant Park’s appeal of the trial court’s decision in the Department’s favor, the Court of Appeal found the Department failed to engage in the required consultation, failed to provide the required notice to three local police departments about the comment period, and failed to provide the required 90 days for comment. The Court also found these failures to comply with section 121349 prejudicial. But the Court found it unnecessary to consider Grant Park’s final claim premised on CEQA, because the only relief it sought under CEQA was relief the Court already agreed was appropriate because of the Department’s failures to comply with section 121349. The Court therefore directed the trial court to grant Grant Park’s petition. View "Grant Park Neighborhood Assn. Advocates v. Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

Lee’s contract with Cardiff segregated the $231,500 price between the construction of a pool and spa ($88,400) and the construction of a pavilion, an outdoor kitchen, an outdoor fireplace, pavers, and other landscaping items ($143,000). Disputes arose and Cardiff left the project. Lee sued. The court largely rejected Lee’s claims pertaining to the pool construction, agreed with some of her claims pertaining to the pavilion and other landscaping items, and agreed that Cardiff had violated state contracting laws by hiring workers who were not licensed contractors and treating them as independent contractors for purposes of worker’s compensation. Based on that claim, the court ordered disgorgement plus interest ($238,470). It awarded contract and tort damages of $236,634, allocating $35,000 to deficiencies with the pool.The contract did not have an attorney fees clause. The court declined to award discretionary fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1029.8, ruling Cardiff had not knowingly violated the state contractor licensing law and disgorgement was a sufficient penalty for that violation. The court ruled that because Lee was “unsuccessful on the vast majority of [her] swimming pool claims,” there was no prevailing party under Business and Professions Code 7168, which pertains to swimming pool construction contracts.The court of appeal affirmed with respect to section 7168. None of the non-swimming pool projects can reasonably be categorized as part of “a contract for swimming pool construction.” View "Lee v. Cardiff" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (the City) placed a citizen’s initiative, Measure C, on the ballot for the March 2020 general and special election. Ballot materials for the measure stated that it required a two-thirds majority to pass, but by March 2020, at least two trial courts in San Francisco concluded that citizens’ initiatives required only a simple majority. Measure C ultimately received 65.24% of the votes cast. The City thereafter adopted a resolution that stated the number of votes for and against measure C and identified that there was a split of authority about the voter threshold requirement for a citizens’ inintiative, but did not state whether Measure C passed. By April 2021, several appellate courts concluded citizens’ initiatives required a simple majority, and the City adopted a resolution that Measure C had passed. Various groups sued to challenge the adoption of Measure C, calling into question the voter threshold required for its passage. The Court of Appeal determined the application of a simple majority voting requirement did not violate due process or constitute “fraud on the voters,” even though ballot materials and the ordinance placing the measure on the ballot stated a two-thirds majority applied. View "Alliance San Diego, et al. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Genentech manufactures and sells Rituxan, a drug used to treat leukemia and lymphoma. Rituxan is sold in single-use vials. Williamson was diagnosed with follicular lymphoma and was treated with Rituxan. Williamson later sued Genentech, on behalf of himself and a putative class of similarly situated individuals. He claims that Genentech violates the unfair competition law by selling Rituxan (and three other medications) in excessively large single-use vials; because the appropriate dosage varies based on a patient’s body size, Genentech’s vial sizes are too large for most patients. He argues Genentech should be required to offer smaller vials to reduce the waste of expensive medicine. In addition to injunctive relief, Williamson seeks to recover the amount the class spent on wasted Rituxan (and three other medications). Williamson took only Rituxan, not the other three medications, and paid a $231.15 deductible– the rest of the payments were made by his health insurer.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of standing under California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200). Williamson suffered no economic injury caused by the alleged unfair practices and cannot establish standing by borrowing an economic injury from his insurer. The collateral source rule, under which a tortfeasor must fully compensate a victim and cannot subtract compensation the victim may have received from their insurer or another collateral source, does not apply. View "Williamson v. Genentech, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2019, the Coles entered a stipulation requiring Scott to pay Kikianne child support of $7,537 per month for their two minor children plus bonus child support in accordance with a bonus wages report table, capped by Scott’s gross employment earnings of $2 million per year. Scott stopped making payments in April 2020 without Kikianne’s stipulation or court order and requested an order modifying his 2020 child support obligations. As the sole shareholder and director of his law firm, Scott alleged that his firm encountered severe economic challenges due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that he had stopped taking a salary to keep his business afloat. Kikianne contended that Scott maintained assets, income, and access to funds in excess of $20 million and that he essentially failed to disclose all available income to pay child support.After a hearing, the court indicated it found Scott’s testimony “largely unbelievable” concerning his personal finances and transactions, denied Scott’s modification request, and ordered him to pay $90,444--the entire amount of child support due in 2020. The court also ordered Scott to pay Kikianne’s attorney fees ($123,909), finding that the awarded sum “does not impose an unreasonable burden.” The court of appeal affirmed. It was Scott’s burden to prove his circumstances had so changed that he lacked the ability and opportunity to meet his child support obligations. He did not do so. View "Marriage of Cole" on Justia Law

The Draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared (California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) Pub. Resources Code, 21000) for Santa Rita’s West Area Specific Plan did not discuss or analyze any potential off-site impacts flowing from an assumption that contemplated new schools would never be built. The school districts contended that they would never receive sufficient funding for the new facilities, and would have to accommodate new students from Specific Plan developments at existing school sites or by other means. The Project identified locations for new schools and the EIR addressed anticipated off-site impacts of development at those sites. The City imposed developer impact fees for the Project under Education Code 17620, deemed complete mitigation under CEQA. The City maintained that information relayed by the Districts amounted to no more than speculation, not requiring further review. After the City approved the Project, the Districts filed suit.The court of appeal concluded that the Final EIR complied with CEQA and properly assumed that the contemplated new schools would be built as part of the Specific Plan and Project. The City was not required to analyze any potentially significant off-site impacts of ill-defined, generalized, and speculative alternatives to new-school construction offered by the District The Districts’ expressed concerns about a perennial lack of sufficient funding without providing more detailed information or identifying a specific alternative plan to address this possibility—for which they, not the City, would be responsible—amounted to speculation. View "Santa Rita Union School District v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law

The Committee to Support the Recall of George Gascón (the Committee) filed a lawsuit against defendants Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Dean C. Logan and the Office of the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk (collectively “the Registrar”) to enforce the Committee’s rights under the Public Records Act (PRA) to examine a recall petition the Registrar certified as invalid for placement on the ballot. The trial court granted the ex parte application, ordered disclosure of various voter records, and ordered the parties to meet and confer on increased access. The court directed the disclosure of additional records. On appeal from the original injunction order and the subsequent order, the Registrar contends the trial court misinterpreted sections 7924.000 and 7924.110. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the PRA.   The Second Appellate District dismissed the portion of the appeal purporting the challenge the injunction order and partially granted the petition for extraordinary writ. The court concluded that the exclusive means of challenging an order granting or denying disclosure of records in connection with the examination of an unsuccessful recall petition under the PRA is through section 7923.500. Here, the Registrar did not meet the requirements for the injunction order. However, the court exercised its discretion to consider the Registrar’s challenges to new directives appearing in that order as a petition for extraordinary writ. The court concluded that the order improperly commanded the Registrar to (1) authorize the use of electronic voter lists outside its examination room and (2) disclose redacted affidavits of voter registration. View "Committee to Support the Recall, etc. v. Logan" on Justia Law