Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A company that provides employee management services hired an employee in California in September 2021. At the start of her employment, she completed onboarding documents that did not mention arbitration. About five months later, she was asked to sign additional documents, including an arbitration agreement, a voluntary dispute resolution policy, and a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement (CND). The arbitration agreement required most employment-related disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration, with certain exceptions for claims related to confidential information. The CND allowed the company to bring certain claims in court and permitted the company to seek injunctive relief without posting a bond or proving actual damages. The employee later filed a lawsuit alleging various employment law violations.The Solano County Superior Court reviewed the company’s motion to compel arbitration. The company argued that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and, if any provision was found unenforceable, it should be severed. The employee opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable due to the manner in which it was presented and its one-sided terms. The trial court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, particularly because it forced the employee’s claims into arbitration while allowing the company’s likely claims to proceed in court, and because of a confidentiality provision that restricted informal discovery. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration and declined to sever the offending provisions, finding the agreement permeated by unconscionability.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement and the CND, read together, were unconscionable due to lack of mutuality and an overly broad confidentiality provision. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to sever the unconscionable terms and concluded that any error in denying a statement of decision was harmless. View "Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

A young man named Marques stole a car from his grandmother’s auto body shop after she briefly left him unattended inside the locked premises. The car, a rental vehicle managed through a partnership with Hertz, was taken without permission. Several days later, Marques crashed the car while driving with a passenger, Jalen, who suffered a traumatic brain injury. Over two years later, Jalen died from a fentanyl overdose. His parents filed wrongful death lawsuits, alleging that the brain injury led to Jalen’s death and seeking to hold Marques’s grandmother and her business liable for both vicarious and direct negligence.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of fact. The court determined that Marques was not an employee or agent of the auto body shop at the time of the incident, based on the grandmother’s declaration and deposition testimony. The court also found that the defendants owed no duty to protect Jalen from the theft and subsequent accident, as there were no “special circumstances” that would create such a duty under California law. The court excluded certain hearsay evidence offered by the plaintiffs, ruling it inadmissible.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court properly excluded the hearsay evidence and that there was no triable issue regarding employment or agency. It further held that, absent special circumstances, the owner of a vehicle has no duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by a thief’s use of a stolen vehicle, and no such circumstances were present here. The court also found no basis for direct negligence liability. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Murphy v. Pina" on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law

A Black man was charged with multiple offenses, including felony false imprisonment, after a domestic violence incident in which his girlfriend alleged he struck her and prevented her from leaving his car. Witnesses observed the girlfriend attempting to exit the moving vehicle and heard shouting. The girlfriend initially told police that the defendant hit her and threatened her if she tried to leave, but later recanted, claiming she fabricated the story out of anger. The prosecution introduced both her initial statements and her recantation at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of felony false imprisonment and other related charges, but acquitted him of attempted robbery. He admitted a prior conviction, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of nine years and four months, including time for an unrelated prior case.During trial, the defendant’s counsel raised concerns under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) regarding the racial composition of the jury venire and the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of a Black prospective juror. The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied these motions, finding no evidence of bias or violation of the RJA. At sentencing, the court made comments referencing the defendant’s race and background, but defense counsel did not object to these statements under the RJA.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant forfeited his RJA claims on appeal by failing to object to the trial court’s statements at the appropriate time. The court also found no merit in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was a conceivable tactical reason for not objecting. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment, as there was no substantial evidence to support that lesser offense. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. View "People v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

In this case, a group consisting of an alumni association and several descendants of Serranus Clinton Hastings challenged the enactment of Assembly Bill 1936, which changed the name of “Hastings College of the Law” to “College of the Law, San Francisco” and eliminated a statutory requirement that a seat on the College’s board of directors be reserved for an heir or representative of S.C. Hastings. The plaintiffs argued that the original 1878 Act establishing the College constituted a binding contract between the State and S.C. Hastings and his descendants, and that the new legislation violated constitutional protections, including the Contract Clauses, the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and the California Constitution’s provision regarding collegiate freedom.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the 1878 Act was a contract rather than an exercise of legislative power. The court also determined that Assembly Bill 1936 did not constitute a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, and that the changes to the College’s name and governance did not violate the California Constitution, particularly since the College’s board had requested the name change.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State could not contract away its sovereign authority to manage a public institution, including the power to change the College’s name or governance structure. The court further concluded that Assembly Bill 1936 was not punitive and did not violate constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. The court also found no violation of the California Constitution’s collegiate freedom provision, as the changes were initiated by the College’s board. The judgment in favor of the State and College defendants was affirmed. View "Hastings College Conservation Committee v. State" on Justia Law

In October 2017, a family in Santa Rosa was the victim of a violent home invasion robbery involving multiple armed intruders. The defendant was apprehended shortly after the incident with stolen property and marijuana linked to the victims. He was charged and convicted by a jury of home invasion robbery, kidnapping, assault with a firearm, and several counts of false imprisonment. The trial court also found true allegations that he had two prior convictions for active gang participation, qualifying as strikes under California’s Three Strikes law and as serious felonies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence that both prior convictions qualified as strikes and serious felonies, vacated the sentence, and remanded for retrial of the prior conviction allegations and resentencing. On remand, the prosecution retried only one prior conviction, which was again found to be a strike and a serious felony. The trial court then granted the defendant’s Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction, citing changes in sentencing law and the remoteness of the prior offense, and imposed a reduced sentence. The People appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike and the five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667(a).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, held that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction, as remoteness alone cannot justify dismissal under the Three Strikes law. However, following the California Supreme Court’s instructions, the proper remedy is to remand for the trial court to reconsider the Romero motion based on a correct understanding of the law. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the five-year enhancement or in imposing the middle term for the principal offense. The order striking the prior strike conviction was reversed and remanded. View "People v. Dain" on Justia Law

Shawn Otis Hernandez was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree residential burglary and attempted first degree residential burglary, following an incident in which multiple individuals attempted to break into a home late at night. Evidence against Hernandez included cell phone records, home security video, DNA analysis, and a prior conviction for a similar crime. During jury selection, the prosecution exercised several peremptory challenges against jurors under the age of 25, prompting Hernandez to object on the basis that these challenges were discriminatory.The Ventura County Superior Court reviewed Hernandez’s objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which prohibits discrimination in jury selection based on certain protected categories. The trial court found that the prosecution’s reasons for excusing the young jurors were valid and supported by the record, and that age was not a substantial factor in the use of peremptory challenges. The court also noted that neither party raised objections based on ethnicity or gender during trial, and that the empaneled jury included several males and individuals with Spanish surnames.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the judgment. The court held that youth alone is not a cognizable group under section 231.7, and neither Batson v. Kentucky nor Wheeler prohibits excusing jurors solely based on youth. The court further held that objections to the dismissal of jurors based on protected class membership under section 231.7 must be made in the trial court, or the claim is forfeited on appeal. Hernandez’s claims regarding ethnicity and gender were deemed forfeited, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected due to lack of deficient performance and prejudice. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

A child, R.L., was injured in a car accident while his father was driving under the influence of alcohol and his mother was holding him on her lap without a car seat. Both parents were young, and neither had a prior criminal record or child welfare history. The accident resulted in R.L. suffering a nondisplaced skull fracture, but he was discharged from the hospital after a few days and appeared to be recovering well. Following the incident, the family was provided with a car seat, and both parents expressed remorse for their actions. The mother continued to care for R.L. in her parents’ home, and the father had no contact with the child after the accident due to his pending criminal case.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging that R.L. was at risk of harm due to parental neglect and the father’s alleged ongoing alcohol abuse. The juvenile court detained R.L. from his father but released him to his mother under supervision. After considering evidence and arguments, the juvenile court found that the incident was isolated, both parents were remorseful, and there was no evidence of ongoing substance abuse or risk of harm. The court dismissed the petition, declining to take jurisdiction over R.L.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the evidence compelled a finding of jurisdiction as a matter of law under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The appellate court held that a single episode of endangering conduct, without evidence of likely recurrence or ongoing risk, did not warrant jurisdiction. The order dismissing the dependency petition was affirmed. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

A group of dentists, who are both members of a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation and parties to provider agreements with that corporation, challenged the corporation’s decision to unilaterally amend its fee schedules and related rules. The provider agreements allowed the corporation to set the fees paid to dentists for services rendered to plan enrollees, and the agreements, as amended by a 2018 settlement, expressly permitted the corporation to make unilateral changes to the fee structure with 120 days’ notice, during which dentists could terminate their agreements if they did not accept the new terms. In 2022, the corporation announced further amendments that, according to the dentists, reduced fees and altered the fee determination process. The dentists alleged that these changes breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in their provider agreements and that certain directors breached fiduciary duties owed to them as members.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County sustained demurrers by all defendants without leave to amend. The court found that the corporation could not breach the implied covenant by exercising rights expressly granted in the agreements, and that the directors owed no fiduciary duty to the dentists in connection with the corporation’s exercise of its contractual rights to amend fee schedules.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to override or limit a party’s express contractual right to unilaterally amend fee schedules, provided the contract is supported by consideration and the changes are prospective, with adequate notice and an opportunity to terminate. The court also held that directors of a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, not to individual members in their capacity as contracting parties. View "California Dental Assn. v. Delta Dental of California" on Justia Law

A property owner and developer challenged a city’s adopted housing element, which is a required component of a local general plan in California that must identify how the city will accommodate its share of regional housing needs, including for lower-income households. The city, a charter city, used a “residential overlay” zoning approach, superimposing new residential development rights over existing commercial and industrial zones, to identify sites for affordable housing. Some of these sites were nonvacant, including parking lots serving shopping centers and a site leased to a grocery store with contractual restrictions. The developer argued that the city’s approach did not comply with state law because it did not ensure that the identified sites would realistically be developed for lower-income housing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the developer’s petition for writ of mandate and entered judgment for the city. The trial court found that the city’s housing element constituted a “major change in allowable land use” under the city charter, but held that state housing law preempted the charter’s voter approval requirement. The court also found the city’s use of overlay zoning and its identification of nonvacant sites to be permissible under the Housing Element Law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reversed. The appellate court held that the city’s use of a residential overlay did not comply with Government Code section 65583.2(h)(2) because the overlay allowed development of identified sites without requiring any residential component, thus failing to meet the mandatory minimum density and residential use requirements. The court also found that the city failed to provide substantial evidence that one of the nonvacant sites, occupied by a grocery store with restrictive lease terms, was realistically available for redevelopment. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate compelling the city to revise its housing element in compliance with state law. View "New Commune DTLA LLC v. City Redondo Beach" on Justia Law