Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Anterion Suggs appeals a judgment following entry of a plea of no contest to misdemeanor possession of a concealed firearm after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence of the firearm and methamphetamine found in his vehicle. On appeal, Defendant contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the detention was unlawfully prolonged. Specifically, defendant claimed that once the arresting officer noticed the proper documentation attached to his vehicle’s rear window and thus learned that the reason he had stopped defendant was invalid, any further detention was unlawful. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal concurred: the detention became unlawful when: (1) the purpose of the stop completely dissipated (when the officer saw the documents in the window and thus realized that defendant had not committed the Vehicle Code violation that was the purpose of the stop); and (2) the officer then made inquiries aimed at finding evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. The judgment was reversed, the conviction was vacated, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to enter a new order granting that motion. View "California v. Suggs" on Justia Law

Vilches, the father and guardian of Doe (age 7), took her to Leao for treatment. Vilches later sued Leao to compel the release of Doe’s therapy records. Under Health and Safety Code 123110, the personal representative of a minor is entitled to access the minor’s patient records unless “[t]he health care provider determines that access to the patient records ... would have a detrimental effect on the provider’s professional relationship with the minor patient or the minor's physical safety or psychological well-being. The decision of the health care provider ... shall not attach any liability to the provider unless the decision is found to be in bad faith. Leao indicated she had determined that it would have a detrimental impact on Doe’s ability to trust in general, and would negatively impact the patient-counselor relationship. She was also concerned that Vilches would use the records to coach his daughter's responses in a court evaluation in an upcoming custody proceeding.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Leao, rejecting an argument that the absence of bad faith does not immunize a therapist’s determination from judicial review and that section 123110 creates a presumption of entitlement to disclosure. The statute does not require separate determinations for each type of patient record. When the provider makes the detriment determination, a plaintiff must show bad faith to compel disclosure. View "Vilches v. Leao" on Justia Law

Kelsey Carpenter gave birth to a baby girl at home, alone, after deciding that she would not risk having her child removed from her custody as had happened with her two older children when they tested positive for drugs after being delivered at the hospital. She again used drugs during her pregnancy. After Carpenter’s daughter was born, the baby struggled to breathe, and Carpenter attempted to provide her with CPR. Carpenter also cut the baby’s umbilical cord but did not clamp it, and the umbilical stump continued to bleed. Carpenter bathed, diapered, clothed, and attempted to breastfeed the baby before seemingly passing out. When she woke up, her newborn daughter was dead. Before Health & Saf. Code, § 123467(a) was effective, the State charged Carpenter with implied malice murder and felony child endangerment, contending that Carpenter intentionally chose an unattended at-home delivery, despite being warned of the dangers, in an effort to evade child welfare services and at the risk of her daughter’s life. According to the State, Carpenter’s acts and omissions, including her failure to seek medical assistance after realizing her baby was in distress, caused the baby to bleed to death. Carpenter challenged the superior court’s order denying her motion to set aside the information for lack of probable cause under Penal Code section 995. She contended she was immune from prosecution based on the new law, which went into effect after the preliminary hearing, but before the superior court ruled on her section 995 motion. While the Court of Appeal agreed that Carpenter could not be prosecuted for her decision to have an unattended home birth or any effect that her alleged drug use or lack of prenatal care during pregnancy may have had on her baby, the law did not preclude the State's prosecution for her acts and omissions after her daughter was born alive. The Court therefore denied Carpenter's petition. View "Carpenter v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Valle appealed restitution order regarding an undamaged cell phone. Valle and his girlfriend M. got into an argument at defendant’s home. The argument turned physical when defendant headbutted M. in the face, causing bleeding and a nasal fracture. M. was able to quickly get out, but she left her purse and new phone behind. Later that month, defendant pled no contest to battery in a dating relationship. On April 19, 2022, defendant returned the phone to M. at his sentencing hearing. A few weeks later at the victim restitution hearing, M. sought $629.99 for her phone. She testified she had intended to get a refund for the phone in that amount, but the refund period had lapsed by the time defendant returned the phone to her. The court awarded her the purchase price of the phone and allowed her to keep the phone. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion because it overcompensated the victim, and reversed and remanded with one of two options: (1) if the victim has not sold the phone, the court shall hold a hearing on the difference in value of the phone between the day the victim purchased the phone and the day the defendant gave it back to her; or (2) if the victim has sold the phone, the court shall hold a hearing on the difference between the purchase price and the amount for which she sold it. The defendant shall then be ordered to pay that difference. View "California v. Valle" on Justia Law

The trial court entered a default judgment against Defendant Wanu Water Inc. on June 16, 2020, and on December 7, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to set aside its default and vacate the default judgment under the mandatory attorney-fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)). The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling.   The Second Appellate District vacated the default judgment. The court explained that the mandatory provision requires the court to vacate the default judgment if the application is filed “no more than six months after entry of judgment,” is “in proper form,” and is accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault unless the court finds the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Here, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling. The record shows the filing was timely and was accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault. Thus, the only bases for denying the motion to vacate the default judgment were that the application was not “in proper form” or that the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s neglect. View "Dollase v. Wanu Water Inc." on Justia Law

In 2019, several dozen plaintiffs sued Massage Envy (a franchisor) and Massage Envy franchisees alleging that as adults they were sexually assaulted by massage therapists at California Massage Envy locations from 2003-2014. The trial court dismissed 18 claims as untimely. Just as the appellate briefing was about to be completed, the Governor approved Assembly Bill 2777, which amended section 340.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revive certain claims that relate to sexual assault provided that the claims had not been litigated to finality or compromised by a written settlement agreement before January 1, 2023.The court of appeal reversed the dismissals. The new law revives some, if not all, of the claims but the operative complaints and motions were drafted before the revival statute was enacted. Remand to the trial court is necessary to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaints and to give the defendants the opportunity to make further arguments regarding the effect of the revival statute on each of the claims. View "Doe v. CFR Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District dismissed two Appellants’ appeals of the trial court’s post-judgment orders. One Appellant purported to appeal from the trial court’s post-judgment order denying his petition to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to former Penal Code 2 section 667.5, subdivision (b) (667.5(b)). In a separate proceeding, the other Appellant purported to appeal from a similar post-judgment order.   The Second Appellate District dismissed both appeals, holding that the orders appealed from are non-appealable because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitions. The court explained that Appellants’ prior prison terms had been served for offenses that were not sexually violent. After the imposition of the prior prison term enhancements, former section 667.5(b) was amended to limit its application to prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. Appellants contend the trial court erroneously denied their petitions to strike the now invalid prior prison term enhancements. But, the court explained that the Legislature has not authorized their appeals from the trial court’s order. “‘It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.’” View "P. v. Escobedo" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mother has seven children by several different fathers: the child at issue in this case—Jayden M. (born 2021). On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over Jayden on two grounds. On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. The court removed Jayden from Mother’s custody and also bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. More specifically, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under these provisions because (1) Mother’s reunification services or parental rights for Jayden’s older half-siblings had been terminated, and (2) Mother’s most recent four months of effort to address her drug addiction—did not eliminate the court’s “concerns” in light of her 20-year history of drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. On appeal, Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported by the record.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s finding is further supported by evidence that Mother has repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and relapse. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the effort underlying Mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of drug abuse is not “reasonable.” View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

In April 2022, Vinson sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former boyfriend, Kinsey, to protect herself, two children she shares with Kinsey (six and 10 years old), and her 19-year-old child from another relationship. Vinson sought orders for legal and physical custody of the younger children, with no visitation for Kinsey. Vinson’s request listed March 2022 as the date of the most recent abuse when Kinsey “began threatening to beat my face in” and “stated that he would kill me.” Vinson also described a June 2020 incident, when Kinsey took her phone out of her hand and “punched me in my face and pushed me on the floor,” leaving her with bruises. Vinson stated that Kinsey had abused her “verbally, mentally, and physically for many years,” “has threatened to kill me on numerous occasions”; and “shows up at my house unannounced any time he chooses”; and that she was “in fear of my life.”The trial court denied Vinson a DVRO and granted Kinsey unsupervised visitation. The court of appeal remanded for reconsideration. The trial court focused narrowly on the March incident, indicated that it did not believe Vinson took that threat seriously, and apparently did not consider evidence of additional threats and repeated verbal and physical abuse. View "Vinson v. Kinsey" on Justia Law