Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The LLC, managed by Kountze, owns the four-unit building. Kountze lives in one unit. When the LLC acquired the property in 2017, the tenants lived in unit 3. In 2020, the LLC served them with a “Notice of Termination of Tenancy” (NOT), stating that the landlord was withdrawing the property from the residential rental market under the Ellis Act and the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance. The landlord also filed with the Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board a “Notice of Intent to Withdraw Residential Units from the Rental Market.” Counsel for the landlord testified that she sent the NOT to the tenants’ address with checks for $3,492.62 relocation payments. The postal service returned them due to the overflow of mail in the tenants’ mailboxes. The landlord and tenants had been engaged in protracted litigation, so counsel sent the NOT and checks to their counsel, who responded that he was “not authorized to accept” the payments.The landlord filed this unlawful detainer action. The tenants asserted affirmative defenses relating to the landlord’s lack of intent to withdraw the unit from the market and non-compliance with the Ellis Act. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment against the tenants, sustaining relevance objections to the tenants’ evidence. The tenants failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to compliance with the Ellis Act and Rent Ordinance. View "640 Octavia LLC v. Pieper" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles (the City) approved a project at 1719-1731 North Whitley Avenue in Hollywood (the Project) that would replace 40 apartments subject to the City’s rent stabilization ordinance (RSO) with a hotel. The City determined the Project was exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to CEQA Guidelines relating to certain development projects. The relevant guideline addresses what is often referred to as the “infill” exemption or the “Class 32” exemption. Respondent United Neighborhoods for Los Angeles (United Neighborhoods) sought a writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court, arguing, among other things, that the in-fill exemption does not apply because the Project is not consistent with a General Plan policy concerning the preservation of affordable housing. The trial court granted the writ, effectively halting the Project until the City was to find the Project is consistent with that policy or 148-159 undertakes CEQA review. The City and real parties in interest appeal.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order granting the petition for writ of mandate. The court explained that the City’s suggestion that the Project’s consistency with the Framework Element implies consistency “with the entirety of the General Plan” because of the Framework Element’s foundational role assumes, contrary to authority, the Framework Element stands in perfect harmony with the General Plan. However, the court explained that although it affirms the trial court, it does not suggest that the City was necessarily required to make formal findings that Housing Element policies are outweighed by competing policies favoring the Project. View "United Neighborhoods for L.A. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Here, a police officer received information via a radio broadcast from another officer that a juvenile on probation with a firearm restriction likely placed a firearm under the front passenger seat in defendant Hilario Leal, Jr.’s car before defendant got into his car and drove away. Defendant’s car was under constant surveillance from the time of the alleged firearm placement until the searching officer conducted the search. When a search of the passenger compartment of defendant’s car yielded no firearm, the searching officer decided to search the trunk, where he discovered a firearm. Defendant was charged with several offenses and filed a motion to suppress the firearm; the trial court denied the motion. Defendant ultimately pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The question presented was whether the search of defendant’s trunk was justified under the automobile exception. The Court of Appeal concluded it was not. "[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the passenger compartment of a vehicle (as compared to having probable cause to believe it will be found somewhere in the vehicle), and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk, an officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress, enter an order granting the motion, and allow defendant to move to withdraw his plea. View "California v. Leal" on Justia Law

After obtaining a judgment against Defendants in a prior case, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants, their attorney, and others for fraudulent transfer, quiet title, and declaratory relief. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the entire complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. At issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity and the claims for relief supported by them. Further, the issue is whether the trial court’s earlier order granting the Defendants’ attorney’s anti-SLAPP motion compels the same outcome here.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. The court explained that where a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from protected activity. Here, Defendants not only failed to identify specific claims for relief arising from protected activity, they expressly asked the court to perform the type of gravamen analysis disapproved in Bonni. At no point did the Defendants “identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” And there are obviously claims in the complaint that do not arise from anti-SLAPP protected activity. View "Park v. Nazari" on Justia Law

In 2001, G.A. was charged with lewd acts with a child, sexual battery by restraint, and false imprisonment. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court committed G.A. to the Redwood Regional Center. G.A. never regained competency but was released and received services through the Center until 2008. In 2010, G.A. was charged with kidnapping with the intent to sexually assault, rape, annoy, or molest a child under the age of 10 and sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10. Finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the court again committed him.A 2021 petition to extend G.A.’s commitment alleged that G.A. suffers from developmental disabilities and that he represents a danger to himself or to others. A psychologist, who evaluated G.A. several times, calculated G.A.’s I.Q. at 42 and testified that G.A. poses a danger to himself and to others, particularly children. The court continued the commitment.The court of appeal dismissed an appeal because the commitment order has expired. The court found that Welfare and Institutions Code 6500 does not violate due process by dispensing with the need for proof of a recent overt act of dangerousness but that substantial evidence did not support the finding of G.A.’s danger to others--it was based on the testimony of an expert witness who relied on unsupported assumptions of fact about G.A.’s offenses. The court noted significant ambiguity as to the meaning of “danger to self.” View "People v. G.A." on Justia Law

Defendant Oscar Lopez was convicted of multiple crimes including: first degree murder and willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. He was sentenced to 141 years to life. In his direct appeal, the Court of Appeal modified the sentence; the Court also reversed conditionally and remanded with directions to consider striking defendant’s prior serious felony conviction enhancement and firearm enhancements. On remand, in October 2022, the trial court struck the prior serious felony enhancement but refused to strike the firearm enhancements. It resentenced defendant to 101 years to life. Defendant appealed again, contending that at resentencing, the trial court erred under various amendments to the Penal Code, all of which went into effect on January 1, 2022. In the published portion of the Court's opinion, the Court addressed his contention that under section 186.22 — as amended by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) — there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement to count 5 (unlawful possession of a firearm). To this, the Court held that, because the judgment against defendant was not final, he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of A.B. 333. However, because the Court reversed solely with respect to the sentence and directed the trial court to resentence defendant, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider the gang enhancement. "A.B. 333 was simply irrelevant to anything the trial court had jurisdiction to do." In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court found no other error. View "California v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2016 Martin Mariano, an employee of plaintiff L & S Framing Inc., was working on a residential house under construction when he fell from the second floor onto the concrete ground floor below, sustaining serious injuries. Following an investigation, real party in interest California Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division) issued a citation, which eventually included a serious accident- related citation for violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 1626(b)(5). Plaintiff appealed the citation. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the Division’s mid-hearing request to amend the citation to allege a violation of section 1632(b)(1), denied the Division’s post-hearing motion to amend to allege violation of section 1626(a)(2), and concluded the Division failed to prove the alleged violation of section 1626(b)(5). The Division filed a petition for reconsideration with the defendant California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Appeals Board). The Appeals Board concluded the ALJ improperly denied the two requests to amend and upheld the citation based on violation of both section 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2). Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court: (1) erred in permitting the Appeals Board to amend the citation; (2) incorrectly concluded sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) applied; and (3) incorrectly concluded section 1716.2 did not apply and did not supersede the other regulations on the facts of this case. The Court of Appeal surmised that second and third of these contentions depended on the question whether the specific location from which Mariano fell qualified as a floor opening (§ 1632(b)(1)) and/or a stairwell (§ 1626(a)(2)), or instead an “unprotected side[] or edge[]” (§ 1716.2(f)). After review, the Court affirmed, finding the Appeals Board properly allowed the Division to amend the citation, the Appeals Board reasonably deemed the location at issue to fall within the scope of sections 1632(b)(1) and 1626(a)(2) and that determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the Appeals Board properly determined section 1716.2 did not apply. View "L & S Framing Inc. v. Cal. Occupational Saf. & Health Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Nicole Woodworth was a registered nurse at Loma Linda University Medical Center (the medical center) from December 2011 to June 2014. In June 2014, she filed this putative class action against the medical center, alleging a host of wage and hour claims on behalf of herself and other employees. She later amended her complaint to add a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After several years of litigation, only her individual claim for failure to provide rest periods remained. The trial court had granted four motions for summary judgment in favor of the medical center, denied Woodworth’s motion for class certification, and denied her motion to strike putative class members’ declarations. Woodworth appealed those orders, which disposed of the putative class members’ claims, the PAGA claims, and all of her individual claims (apart from her claim about rest periods). The medical center moved to dismiss most of Woodworth’s appeal, but the Court of Appeal denied the motion, affirming the orders in large part. Specifically, the Court reversed in part the order denying class certification: the court erred with respect to Woodworth’s proposed wage statement class, which consisted of employees who received allegedly inaccurate wage statements. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider certification of that class. View "Woodworth v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Center" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order summarily denying his petition to vacate his murder conviction and be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6.   The Second Appellate District agreed with the trial court that Defendant has not made a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. The court explained that although Defendant’s petition is facially sufficient and thus entitled him to the appointment of counsel, it is devoid of factual allegations concerning the killing of the victim. Defendant does not deny that he was the actual killer, nor does he assert that another person fired the shot that killed the victim or that he acted without the intent to kill. He merely states the legal conclusion that he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes made to the law of murder under Senate Bill No. 1437. Under these circumstances, where Defendant alleged no facts concerning the murder to which he pleaded guilty, the People introduce without objection uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript showing that the Defendant acted alone in killing the victim, and Defendant does not put forth, by way of briefing or oral argument, any factual or legal theory in support of his petition, Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Pickett" on Justia Law

Barber Group, Inc., doing business as Barber Honda (Barber)—a car dealer in Bakersfield, California—brought an establishment protest to the California New Motor Vehicle Board (Board), challenging a decision by American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) to open a new dealership about nine miles away. The Board overruled Barber’s protest, and the trial court denied Barber’s petition for administrative mandate challenging the Board’s decision. On appeal, Barber argued the Board prejudicially erred when it: (1) relied on Honda’s dealer performance standards at the protest hearing without first deciding whether those standards were reasonable; (2) permitted the proposed new dealership to exercise a peremptory challenge to an administrative law judge initially assigned to the protest hearing, contrary to notions of fairness and the Board’s own order in the matter; and (3) denied Barber’s request that it take official notice of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Barber Group, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd." on Justia Law