Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a social worker’s duty to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a duty commonly referred to as the “initial inquiry.” At issue in this appeal was whether the initial inquiry encompassed available extended family members in every proceeding where a child is removed from home or in only those cases where the social worker takes temporary custody of the child without a warrant under exigent circumstances. Here, the child was initially taken into the custody of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) by protective custody warrant before being detained by the juvenile court and later removed at disposition. Reunification efforts failed, and the juvenile court ultimately terminated parental rights and freed the child for adoption. Relying on In re Robert F., 90 Cal.App.5th 492 (2023) the department argued that because the child wasn’t initially removed from home without a warrant, the duty to interview available to extended family members never arose. The Court of Appeal concluded there was only one duty of initial inquiry, and that duty encompasses available extended family members no matter how the child is initially removed from home. Applying a narrower initial inquiry to the subset of dependencies that begin with a temporary removal by warrant frustrates the purpose of the initial inquiry and “den[ies] tribes the benefit of the statutory promise” of Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Because the department in this case failed to ask the child’s available extended family members whether the child had any Native American ancestry, the Court conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded for the juvenile court to direct the department to complete its investigation. View "In re Delila D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a privately compensated temporary judge’s ruling that Plaintiff’s former husband, provided an accounting as to certain stock that was the subject of a marital settlement agreement (MSA). Among other things, Plaintiff contends Judge Johnson erred in issuing her ruling because she had withdrawn her request for an order for an accounting of her stock interest before the ruling.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiff’s notice withdrawing her accounting RFO was effective when made on June 26, 2020. Judge Johnson’s ruling granting Chris’s restoration RFO tacitly supports our holding. That is, if Plaintiff’s withdrawal of her accounting RFO had not been effective when made, Judge Johnson would not have later had to order that RFO restored. Plaintiff’s ex-husband does not cite any case that holds that a party needs a trial court’s approval to withdraw a motion. Because Plaintiff withdrew her accounting RFO, Judge Johnson did not have jurisdiction to rule on it. Her ex-husband’s restoration RFO did not restore her withdrawn accounting RFO and Judge Johnson’s jurisdiction because her ex-husband filed it after April 1, 2020, the date Judge Johnson’s appointment terminated under the parties’ stipulation. View "Marriage of DeWolfe" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s denial of her peremptory challenge. The Second Appellate District denied the petition for failure to demonstrate a prima facie case entitling her to extraordinary relief. After Petitioner filed a petition to review, our Supreme Court stayed all further proceedings pending its review. The court ultimately granted the petition and transferred the matter back to the court with directions to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate and issuing an order to show cause. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the peremptory challenge because the subsequent lower court proceeding, specifically the subject hearing, constitutes a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2).   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court explained that there is no indication, despite the constitutional and practical distinctions between a new trial and the subject hearing, that the Legislature intended such a hearing on remand be considered a new trial under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). To the contrary, the legislative history of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) “does not support the assertion that the Legislature intended to permit a [peremptory] challenge at any hearing on remand in a criminal case.” Thus, section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), was not intended “to counter every possible situation in which it might be speculated that a court could react negatively to a reversal on appeal.” The court concluded that the hearing conducted after a reversal and remand of a trial court’s order denying a petition for resentencing is not a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). View "Estrada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In a challenge to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency’s policy of towing safely and lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets, the Coalition argued that the warrantless tows are unreasonable seizures within the meaning of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied a motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief.The court of appeal reversed. The challenged warrantless tows are not permissible under the vehicular community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The defendants have not shown that legally parked cars with unpaid parking tickets that present no threat to “public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic” may be towed under that exception. The court rejected an argument that the governmental interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. The tows at issue may not be justified by analogy to warrantless property seizures in the forfeiture context. View "Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

This case was the second round of appeals arising from Dalia Rojas’s lawsuit against HSBC Card Services, Inc. and HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (together, HSBC) for violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act . Rojas received hundreds of personal calls from her daughter Alejandra, an employee at an HSBC call center, which were recorded by HSBC’s full-time recording system. Rojas alleged HSBC intentionally recorded confidential calls without her consent. She also alleged HSBC intentionally recorded calls to her cellular and cordless phones without her consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to HSBC, and Rojas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding HSBC had not met its initial burden to show there was no triable issue of material fact on intent. On remand, HSBC made a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, which Rojas did not accept. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where HSBC relied, in part, on workplace policies that purportedly barred call center agents from making personal calls at their desks to show it did not intend to record the calls. The trial court ultimately entered judgment for HSBC. Pertinent here, the court found Rojas did not prove HSBC’s intent to record. The court also found Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded, and did not prove lack of consent. Rojas appealed that judgment, contending the trial court made several errors in determining she did not prove her Privacy Act claims and that the evidence did not support its findings. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court applied correct legal standards in assessing lack of consent and substantial evidence supports its finding that Rojas impliedly consented to being recorded. Although the Court determined the record did not support the court’s finding that HSBC did not intend to record the calls between Rojas and her daughter, that determination did not require reversal. "What it underscores, however, is that a business’s full-time recording of calls without adequate notice creates conditions ripe for potential liability under the Privacy Act, and workplace policies prohibiting personal calls may not mitigate that risk." View "Rojas v. HSBC Card Services Inc." on Justia Law

Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law

Raul Camacho was installing glass panels when he fell out of a scissor lift manufactured by JLG Industries Inc. (JLG). Camacho failed to latch a chain that was designed to guard the lift’s entrance. Camacho sued JLG for strict products liability, failure to warn, and related claims. At a jury trial, Camacho alleged the scissor lift as designed with the chain invited human error, and the foreseeable risk of harm could have been avoided if JLG had marketed only its alternative design with a self-closing gate. Camacho also alleged there was a defective warning label on the lift. At the close of evidence, JLG moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion. The court ruled in order to show causation Camacho needed to prove if the chain been latched, “the accident would have happened anyway.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "Camacho only needed to make a prima facie showing that the alternative design with the self-closing gate would have prevented his fall. Under a risk-benefit test, it was then JLG’s burden to prove the benefits of the chain outweighed its risks." The Court found Camacho made a prima facie showing of causation, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that had a self-closing gate been in place, Camacho’s fall would have been prevented. The Court also found the jurors could have reasonably inferred JLG’s allegedly defective warning label was also a substantial factor in causing Camacho’s injuries. Thus, the Court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting JLG’s motion for a directed verdict. View "Camacho v. JLG Industries" on Justia Law

Defendant Keandre Session was convicted of five counts of residential burglary, street terrorism, and numerous enhancements. On appeal he argued: (1) the placement of a GPS surveillance device on his vehicle without a warrant was unconstitutional because the officer who did so did not offer specific testimony as to how he knew that defendant (who was, indeed, on parole) was on parole; and (2) due to changes in the law, he is entitled to a new trial where the gang counts are bifurcated from the other charges. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding: (1) the surveillance device argument had no merit because no case or statute has ever articulated such a requirement with respect to parolee searches; and (2) even if the change in the law should be retroactively applied, any error was not reasonably likely to change the outcome of the case. View "California v. Session" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in two consolidated lawsuits against San Diego Guns, LLC (San Diego Guns) seeking a peremptory writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its ruling that granted summary judgment to San Diego Guns on plaintiffs’ causes of action seeking to recover against San Diego Guns based on the doctrine of negligence per se. Plaintiffs’ theory of negligence per se was that San Diego Guns violated California law in selling the 19-year-old involved with the shooting at the Chabad of Poway synagogue, a rifle. According to plaintiffs, the shooter did not qualify for the then-existing exception that allowed a person under the age of 21 to be sold a rifle if that person possessed a “valid, unexpired hunting license.” The trial court granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that the shooter’s hunting license was valid and unexpired in April 2019 even though, on its face, the license stated that it was “Valid 07/01/2019 to 06/30/2020,” i.e., for a period beginning more than two months after San Diego Guns sold him the rifle. The trial court distinguished between the time period “when the license is ‘valid’ or effective for purposes of hunting,” which began on July 1, 2019, and the time period when “the license is valid for purposes of sale of the weapon,” which, according to the trial court, began when the license was issued in April 2019. The Court of Appeal found that the California Legislature's subsequent enactment of Penal Code section 16685, which clarified that “a valid and unexpired ‘hunting license’ means a hunting license . . . for which the time period authorized for the taking of birds or mammals has commenced but not expired,” the trial court erred in concluding that the shooter’s hunting license was valid for the purpose of purchasing a firearm. The Court accordingly granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate. View "Goldstein v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Esplanade Productions, Inc. sued The Walt Disney Company and affiliated entities (collectively Disney) for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence and unfair competition, alleging Disney had used the creative ideas of Esplanade’s principal, Gary Goldman, in Disney’s animated motion picture Zootopia without compensating Esplanade. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Disney regarding the individual elements of the works and the works as a whole, finding they were not substantially similar as a matter of law. The court overruled Disney’s demurrer as to the title “Zootopia.” The court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Disney, ruling there was no evidence the creators of Disney’s Zootopia had access to Goldman’s work and, even if there was evidence of access, any inference of copying was rebutted by the undisputed evidence a Disney employee had independently created the title “Zootopia.” On appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Disney, Esplanade challenged the trial court’s demurrer ruling and the grant of summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that there is simply no evidence that Disney producers would have had reason to discuss an animation project, nor is there evidence that they would have occasion to share that information with those working on Zootopia. Esplanade’s access argument relies solely on speculation and conjecture arising from the fact that some of the individuals involved occasionally provided feedback on one another’s work. That is insufficient as a matter of law to establish access. View "Esplanade Productions v. The Walt Disney Co." on Justia Law