Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 186-acre Bollinger Valley, in rural Moraga near St. Mary’s College, is sloped; about half of the proposed project site has grades over 20 percent, and “significant portions” have grades over 35 percent. The property is used for cattle grazing and a summer equestrian day camp. Bruzzone purchased an interest in the property in 1967. Before Moraga was incorporated as a city in 1974, the property's Contra Costa County zoning designation “allowed residential development with a density of approximately three dwelling units per acre.”In 1979, Moraga adopted its first general plan. The property was denominated “Public Open Space – Study.” Permitted uses were “[a]griculture and accessory buildings thereto.” Although originally meant to be temporary, the Study designation has remained in place. For several reasons, including safety and environmental concerns, Moraga denied applications to develop housing on the property.The trial court directed Moraga to give the property a legally compliant land-use designation but otherwise rejected Bruzzones’ claims. The court of appeal affirmed. The Study designation is legally invalid under Government Code 65302, but the lack of a legally compliant land-use designation alone did not preclude Moraga from denying the project application for unrelated reasons, none of which the Bruzzones challenge. The court also upheld the rejection of claims of inverse condemnation and equal protection and due process violations. View "Lafayette Bollinger Development v. Town of Moraga" on Justia Law

Defendant acknowledged that in 1991 he “was convicted of provocative act murder.” He appeals a post-judgment order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly Section 1170.95) petition to vacate the first-degree murder conviction.1 Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437). Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). Appellant claimed the trial court erred in denying the second petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argued he made a prima facie case for relief based on S.B. 775’s amendment of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to add the following ground for relief: the petitioner’s murder conviction was pursuant to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Appellant maintains he was convicted of provocative act murder pursuant to such a theory of “imputed” malice because he did not personally commit a provocative act. The provocative acts allegedly were committed by his accomplices.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that because Appellant was convicted of provocative act murder, as a matter of law, he is not eligible for section 1172.6 relief. The court explained that a conviction of provocative act murder cannot be premised on “malice that is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” The court further explained that the law of provocative act murder requires that the defendant personally harbor malice. View "P. v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant MaeReichelle Villamor Marquez appealed a court order directing her to pay restitution to the victim of her crimes. Marquez and two others fraudulently used the identities of 60 prisoners to obtain unemployment benefits from the Employment Development Department (the Department). The State of California charged Marquez with 21 felonies, some arising out of her participation in the fraudulent scheme and others out of her possession of controlled substances. Marquez and the State agreed to an indicated prison sentence range of four to seven years, and Judge Link granted the State's motion to dismiss all other charges. Marquez agreed “[r]estitution to [the Department] [would] be joint and several with co-defendants.” Appealing the restitution order, Marquez claimed the trial court breached the implied agreement under California v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749 (1978) that the same judge who accepted her guilty plea and sentenced her to prison would also determine the amount of victim restitution to be awarded. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Marvin Sloan appealed an order finding he qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals. His sole argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use a privately retained expert to testify at trial. To support this position, Sloan cited Needham v. Superior Court, 82 Cal.App.5th 114 (2022), which held that the State had no right to privately retain an expert under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The California Supreme Court recently granted review in Needham and will decide whether Needham’s interpretation of the SVPA was correct. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal joined Needham in concluding that the State could not retain an expert to testify at an SVP trial. The order was therefore reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to issue an order excluding the testimony of the State's privately retained expert and to conduct a new trial. View "California v. Sloan" on Justia Law

After the truck defendant-appellant Joseph Gyorgy was driving was pulled over for making an unsafe lane change, a police officer used his narcotics detection dog to sniff the truck’s exterior. The police dog alerted, signaling it detected the odor of narcotics inside the truck’s cab. In a subsequent search of the truck, officers found methamphetamine, a pipe, a handgun, and ammunition. Gyorgy twice moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his truck, arguing the search occurred during an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied his motions, and he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. His sole argument on appeal was that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress. Based in its analysis of of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the Court of Appeal agreed the court erred. "What began as a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment’s shield against unreasonable seizures when the officers detoured from the traffic stop’s mission by conducting the dog sniff and inquiring into matters unrelated to the traffic violation." The Court also rejected the California Attorney General’s alternative argument the stop was lawfully prolonged based on reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. View "California v. Gyorgy" on Justia Law

Malinowski filed for dissolution of her marriage to Martin. While that case was pending, Malinowski filed an ex parte request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, 6200), seeking to protect herself and the parties’ children. Pending a hearing on the merits, the trial court issued a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against Martin with “no-contact” and “stay-away” provisions. Subsequently, the court modified the DVTRO to allow Martin brief contact with the children consistent with a visitation order. Malinowski contends the trial court erred by modifying the DVTRO without adhering to Code of Civil Procedure section 533, which requires notice and a showing of changed circumstances for modification or dissolution of an injunction or a temporary restraining order.The court of appeal concluded that section 533 does not provide the exclusive means by which a trial court in a DVPA action may modify a DVTRO; a trial court is not necessarily obligated to proceed under section 533 before modifying a DVTRO to allow for exceptions consistent with child visitation ordered in a parallel dissolution case. In an appropriate case, the requirements of due process may require the court to consider evidence presented at a noticed hearing consistent with section 533 in order to resolve disputed factual matters. View "Malinowski v. Martin" on Justia Law

Under the 1976 Migrant Education Act (Ed. Code 54442)., the State Board of Education must adopt a master plan for services to migrant children, requiring “[t]he active involvement of parents, teachers, and community representatives in the local implementation of migrant education.” The Superintendent of Public Instruction implements the plan and must establish regional parent advisory councils (RPACs) to consult with local agencies in the planning, operation, and evaluation of migrant education programs. In 2019, the Superintendent adopted regulations concerning the formation and governance of RPACs.The trial court rejected arguments that the Superintendent acted outside his statutory authority, as section 54444.2 provides migrant parents the “sole authority” to “decide on the composition of the council,” that the regulations conflict with the statute by placing impermissible restrictions on migrant parents’ authority to elect RPAC members, that the necessity of the regulations to effectuate the Act’s purpose was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the adoption violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The court of appeal concluded that the Superintendent acted within his authority in adopting the challenged regulations but violated the APA’s notice requirements when he adopted a regulation prohibiting RPAC members’ use of alternates without adequate notice to the public. The necessity of the regulations is supported by substantial evidence. The regulations are valid except for the prohibition on alternates and portions of the regulations the trial court invalidated. View "Wendz v. Department of Education" on Justia Law

Defendant Alki David Productions, Inc. (ADP) appealed from the judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff after a jury found ADP liable for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 232.5, which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee who discloses information about the employer’s working conditions, and section 1102.5, subdivisions (b) and (c), which prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who refuses to participate in an activity that would violate the law or who discloses information the employee reasonably believes would disclose a violation of the law. The jury awarded Plaintiff $7,068,717 in damages (consisting of $368,717 in economic damages, $700,000 in non-economic damages, and $6 million in punitive damages). The jury further found that ADP terminated Plaintiff’s employment with malice, oppression, or fraud. The trial court denied ADP’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record contains substantial evidence of multiple other municipal code violations in the correction notice issued by a city inspector on September 25, 2017. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Plaintiff’s continued work at the theater would have violated the law, and the trial court’s finding in this regard was not legally erroneous. Further, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Plaintiff’s disclosure was a substantial motivating reason for his termination. View "Zirpel v. Alki David Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Shauna Willis appealed an order granting her request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-husband, Respondent Ricky Willis. She contended the family court erred under Family Code section 3044(a) because the court maintained joint physical custody by keeping in place a visitation order which had granted each approximately equal custody time with their child, T.W. The issue presented by this appeal was whether the rebuttable presumption of section 3044(a) arose in a proceeding for issuance of a DVRO when neither party was seeking custody or a modification of a custody or visitation order. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise in that situation. "Our conclusion is based on the plain language of section 3044(a), which by its terms applies only when a party is seeking custody of the child and is reinforced by other statutory provisions." Because the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise, the family court erred by awarding Appellant sole legal and physical custody of T.W. Although Respondent did not appeal, the Court reversed that part of the order in the interest of justice. View "Marriage of Willis v. Costa-Willis" on Justia Law

In November 2008, a California trial court sentenced defendant Kelly Kimble to 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement. In October 2022, defendant appeared for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified as Penal Code section 1172.75). At the hearing, the trial court struck defendant’s prior prison term enhancement, but otherwise left his sentence intact. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in resentencing him under Senate Bill 483 without applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)). To this the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the sentence. View "California v. Kimble" on Justia Law