Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Marilyn Joy Zemek was convicted by jury of first degree murder (count 1); elder abuse (count 2); two counts of grand theft (counts 3 and 5); identity theft (count 4); and perjury (count 6). Regarding count 2, the jury found true that Zemek caused the death of the victim who was then over 65 years and under 70 years of age within the meaning of Penal Code section 368 (b)(3)(A). Also, concerning counts 3 and 5, the jury found true that Zemek committed two or more related felonies involving fraud with the taking of more than $100,000 within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.11 (a)(1). The court sentenced Zemek to prison for an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 1, plus a total determinate term of five years, comprised of eight-month terms (one-third the middle term) on each of counts 3, 4, and 5, and the middle term of three years on count 6. Zemek appealed, contending: (1) she was denied her right to a public trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sufficiently investigate and then dismiss a juror for misconduct; (3) insufficient evidence supports her murder conviction; (4) the trial court erred in denying her request for a pinpoint jury instruction; and (5) the trial court erred in permitting evidence of her prior thefts. The Court of Appeal concluded none of these arguments has merit, and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Zemek" on Justia Law

In 2010, the California Supreme Court upheld a superior court's dismissal of a felony case under Penal Code section 1382 because there was no available judge or courtroom to hear the case. The Supreme Court held, without qualification, that “the state’s failure, over a considerable period of time, to provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside County’s rapidly growing population and caseload” did not provide good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. More recently, Courts of Appeal in other parts of California have held that delay and docket congestion caused by the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. In October 2022, about two years and seven months after the pandemic began, the Superior Court granted Jose Tapia’s motion to dismiss his felony case because there was no available judge or courtroom to try the case by the time the section 1382 deadline expired. In doing so, the Superior Court found that there was no good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. The Riverside District Attorney sought writ review of that decision. Finding that the superior court did not err, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "California v. Superior Ct. (Tapia)" on Justia Law

The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal was brought by Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Corrales, on behalf of himself, against the California Gambling Control Commission (the Commission) and the two competing factions of the California Valley Miwok Tribe (the Tribe), including his former client, the "Burley faction." In the Court of Appeals' preceding opinion, CVMT 2020, the Court affirmed, on res judicata grounds, the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by attorney Corrales against the Commission on behalf of the Burley faction. Through this lawsuit, Corrales sought to ensure that he received payment from the Tribe for the attorney fees that he claims he was due under a fee agreement he entered into with the Burley faction in 2007. Specifically, even though the Tribe’s leadership dispute was still not resolved, Corrales sought either (1) an order requiring the Commission to make immediate payment to him from the Tribe’s RSTF money, or (2) an order that when the Commission eventually decides to release the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) money to the Tribe, his attorney fees had to be paid directly to him by the Commission before the remainder of the funds were released to the Tribe. The trial court dismissed Corrales’s lawsuit because the question of whether Burley represented the Tribe in 2007 for the purpose of entering into a binding fee agreement with Corrales on behalf of the Tribe required the resolution of an internal tribal leadership and membership dispute, over which the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After judgment was entered, Corrales brought a motion for a new trial and a motion for relief from default. Among other things, Corrales argued that the trial court should have stayed his lawsuit rather than dismissing it. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's dismissal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Corrales v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Olen Properties Corp. owned commercial property in the City of Newport Beach (the City) within an area known as the Koll Center. The Koll Center was a mixed-use development area, near the John Wayne Airport, San Joaquin Freshwater Marsh Reserve, and the University of California, Irvine. It was located within the “Airport Area,” a portion of the City adjacent to John Wayne Airport, governed by the City’s Airport Business Area Integrated Conceptual Development Plan. In 2020 and 2021, the City considered and approved the request of Real Party in Interest TPG (KCN) Acquisition, LLC (TPG) to develop a five-story, 312-unit residential housing project (the Project) on an existing surface parking lot serving the Koll Center’s existing commercial tenants. In an effort to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the City obtained an addendum (the Addendum) to an existing environmental impact report prepared in 2006 (the 2006 EIR) as part of its general plan update. The Addendum considered a wide range of possible environmental impacts but concluded the Project’s impacts “would either be the same or not substantially greater than those described by the [2006 EIR].” Plaintiff opposed approval of the Project before the City. Among other things, plaintiff argued the City could not rely upon an addendum to the 2006 EIR and was legally required to obtain a subsequent EIR. After the City’s approval of the Project, plaintiff filed suit, seeking a writ of mandate compelling the City to void its approval for violation of CEQA, and for injunctive relief, barring construction at the site. The trial court explained its denial in an extensive written ruling, addressing and rejecting each of plaintiff's arguments. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's judgment and affirmed. View "Olen Properties Corp. v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

Madrigal was among several men who got out of a van and beat a man, robbing him of $25-30. One attacker stabbed the victim with a knife. The victim died soon thereafter. A jury found Madrigal guilty of first-degree murder and second-degree robbery but acquitted him of participation in a criminal street gang. The court imposed an aggregate term of 100 years to life consecutive to 12 years in prison. Madrigal argued that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 1437, which added elements to the definition of felony murder, required the reversal of the first-degree murder conviction and that after defense counsel subpoenaed audio recordings of the van driver’s jailhouse phone calls, the court erred by refusing to review the calls or release them to the defense.The court of appeal vacated the first-degree murder conviction, conditionally reversed the robbery conviction, and remanded. A rational juror could have a reasonable doubt whether Madrigal was subjectively aware of a grave risk of death when he participated in the attack; it was not impossible for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdicts without also making the 39 findings that would support a valid theory of liability. The error was not harmless. Once Madrigal showed good cause to release the documents, the court erred by refusing to release them on the ground it could not review them quickly and easily; it is impossible to assess prejudice from the error. View "People v. Madrigal" on Justia Law

In January 2017, Jackson was convicted through a no-contest plea of felony second-degree burglary and was sentenced to five years of probation, including less than a year in jail. In July 2020, he was charged with having committed probation violations in July and October 2019. In August 2020, the court summarily revoked probation pending a formal hearing. In January 2021, Assembly Bill 1950 took effect, amending Penal Code sections 1203a and 1203.1 and decreasing the maximum period of felony probation (with certain exceptions) to no more than two years. Sections 1203.2 and 1203.3, relating to probation violations, were not amended. In August 2021, Jackson unsuccessfully moved to terminate probation. In February 2022, the trial court sustained two probation violations, one involving a robbery for which Jackson had been charged and convicted in Alameda County. While declining to impose additional jail time, the court revoked and terminated Jackson’s probation as unsuccessful.The court of appeal reversed. AB 1950 applies retroactively, in cases not yet final when the bill took effect, to prevent a court from finding a violation of probation based on misconduct that occurred more than two years after a defendant’s probationary term began, but before the bill’s effective date. The court noted that the California Supreme Court has accepted the issue for review. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant attempted to appeal the denial of his petition for resentencing based on Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 483). In 2012, Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 49 years to life. He claims his current sentence is invalid due to recent legislative changes involving sentencing enhancements.   The Second Appellate District dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides: “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in the law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” The court must appoint counsel for the defendant and hold a resentencing hearing unless a hearing is waived. Section 1172.75 contains no provision for an individual defendant to file the type of petition Defendant has filed. The court wrote that Section 1172.75 simply does not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or motion.” Defendant has not shown that the DCR did not comply with its statutory duty. View "P. v. Newell" on Justia Law

Defendants B.G. and D.R. were making a purchase at a convenience store where they exchanged words with a man who was accompanied by his girlfriend and her two young children. A short time after leaving the store, B.G. stopped his vehicle in the street near where the man, girlfriend, and children were walking on the sidewalk while D.R. exited the vehicle and shot at the individuals multiple times. Defendants were convicted of premeditated attempted murder and related charges and were sentenced to terms of seven years to life plus 10 years (as to B.G) and seven years to life plus 49 years and eight months (as to D.R). Defendants challenged their convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle and permitting someone to discharge a firearm from a vehicle because Ross was not in the vehicle when the shooting occurred. Defendants argued that recent amendments to the sentencing law require we remand their cases for resentencing.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing in accordance with section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill 567. The judgments are otherwise affirmed. The court explained that when a court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, “the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion. After reviewing the trial court’s comments and sentence in this case, the court was unable to conclude that the trial court would not exercise its discretion to impose different sentences. View "P. v. Gaines" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that at a 2020 neighborhood party, 17-year-old D.L. shot and killed a six-year-old boy and shot an adult twice. Video footage showed D.L. running down a hill seconds after the shooting, stumbling, and then running. Officers recovered a handgun in a dirt-filled hole where D.L. had stumbled. DNA swabbed from the handgun was a match with D.L.’s DNA. D.L. admitted to several felonies prior to the incident, including assault, robbery, and theft in 2018, and burglary in 2019. D.L. appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm in San Francisco. (Pen. Code 25850(a)), arguing that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” holding section 25850 must be facially unconstitutional based on its relationship to California’s laws for obtaining a concealed-carry license.The court of appeal affirmed. Before Bruen, California required an applicant for a concealed carry license to show “good cause,” usually by establishing a specific need to carry a gun for self-defense. D.L. argued that the requirement was substantially similar to the “proper cause” requirement for a New York unrestricted firearm license, struck down in Bruen. California’s “good cause” requirement did not survive Bruen but is severable from the other requirements for obtaining a concealed carry license, saving California’s regulatory framework for gun possession and preserving D.L.’s conviction. View "In re D.L." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Seth Hilburn was charged with first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, first degree robbery, and carjacking, with allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of all three offenses. Before trial, Hilburn entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the first degree robbery charge and the related firearm enhancement in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a maximum sentence of 13 years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the court considered aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed an eight year sentence, consisting of the middle term of four years for both the first degree robbery conviction and the admission of the firearm enhancement allegation. Hilburn appealed the sentence, asserting the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing the middle, and not low terms, on the charges. Hilburn argued recent changes to the sentencing laws required the court to impose the low terms for the crimes he pleaded guilty to because the aggravating factors relied on by the court were not stipulated or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Hilburn also argued the court abused its discretion by imposing the middle terms because the aggravating factors did not outweigh those in mitigation. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and sentence, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Hilburn" on Justia Law