Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Steve Ahn was a sales executive for a title insurer who claimed his sales figures were adversely affected when his employer barred him from using a particular sales pitch to solicit customers from a competitor who was also a proposed corporate merger partner. Ahn’s pitch told prospective clients that after the proposed merger was finalized, they would have no choice but to comply with his company’s higher-cost, less flexible underwriting standards. He attempted to use this pitch to convince these clients to abandon the competitor before the merger. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' consideration was whether Ahn had standing under the California antitrust statute, known as the Cartwright Act, to assert a cause of action. To this, the Court found that Ahn did not claim injury from the alleged anticompetitive aspects of the proposed merging entities' agreement, but rather from conduct that emphasized their competitive differences. "A complaint that he could not lure customers with a pitch about their restricted postmerger options does not constitute an antitrust injury, meaning Ahn lacks standing to sue under the Cartwright Act." The Court's conclusion that Ahn could not demonstrate an antitrust violation affected his derivative economic relations tort claims, both of which required independently wrongful conduct. Concluding the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment, the appellate court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Ahn v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co." on Justia Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant Ahmad Raheem Price petitioned for a writ of prohibition, directing the superior court to grant his motion to set aside the information charging him with the 2019 first degree, premeditated murder of Jovany R., and unlawfully possessing a firearm on the same day. The information further alleged Price personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the death in count 1, and that Price had two prior serious felony convictions and two prior strikes. At the preliminary hearing and as part of his section 995 motion to set aside the information, Price moved to quash, traverse, and suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to 11 search warrants for electronic information, including a geofence warrant to Google, LLC (Google). In the suppression motion, Price claimed that the geofence warrant and several of the other 10 warrants for electronic information: (1) failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements; (2) had to be traversed based on material factual omissions in their affidavits; and (3) violated the particularity and notice requirements of the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA). Price also moved to suppress evidence that the gun used in the shooting was found in Price’s vehicle during a January 2020 parole search. Price claimed that the gun evidence was fruit of Price’s unlawful detention for being lawfully parked on a private driveway. The suppression motion was denied in its entirety. In the writ petition to the Court of Appeal, Price renewed his arguments made to the magistrate court. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the geofence warrant satisfied the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and was not overbroad; the good faith exception to the warrant requirement precludes the suppression of the geofence warrant evidence and its fruits, even if the geofence warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment; and CalECPA did not require the suppression of the geofence warrant evidence despite the government’s violation of CalECPA’s notice provisions. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected Price’s claims concerning the other 10 warrants and the gun evidence. View "Price v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a partition action by Plaintiff against her former significant other, Defendant.  The trial court entered default and a default judgment against Defendant. Nearly two years later, Defendant moved to vacate the default and resulting judgment, alleging he was never effectively served with the summons and complaint. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the trial court should not have granted Defendant set aside relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). She argued her personal service of the summons and complaint on Defendant was proper, and section 473, subdivision (b) applies instead, rendering Defendant’s motion “untimely.” Plaintiff also argued the trial court abused its discretion in not considering the estoppel doctrine when making its ruling.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendant’s motion to set aside the default and default judgment. On the record, the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over Defendant due to improper service of the summons and complaint. Defendant was “under no duty to act upon a defectively served summons.” (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.) Because the court had no jurisdiction in light of defective service, the court did not address Plaintiff’s remaining argument regarding equitable estoppel. View "Braugh v. Dow" on Justia Law

After sustaining a knee injury during a mandatory eighth-grade physical education class’s touch football unit, Plaintiff sued, among others, defendants Burbank Unified School District (the District) and his physical education teacher. A jury returned verdicts in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendants, finding that the District breached a mandatory duty under the Education Code, the teacher was negligent, and Plaintiff suffered resulting harm. Defendants appealed from the judgment, contending: there was insufficient evidence that the District’s breach of a mandatory duty proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury; the special verdict form was fatally defective because it failed to specify whether the District’s breach of a mandatory duty or the teacher’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the primary assumption of risk doctrine; and the court erred by not allowing the jury to apportion fault to the student who ran into Plaintiff (the Student), thus precluding Defendants from reducing liability for noneconomic damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the District and to hold a new trial limited to the issue of apportionment of fault between the teacher and student. The court explained that the Student’s act of intentionally running into Plaintiff was a substantial causative factor in Plaintiff’s injury and the teacher, therefore, should have been entitled to seek allocation of fault pursuant to Civil Code section 1431.2.11 Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on comparative fault principles, the court remanded for retrial on the apportionment of fault. View "Nigel B. v. Burbank Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The trial court granted a motion by the Labor Commissioner to amend a judgment to add Plaintiff as an alter ego judgment debtor. Plaintiff appealed. He contends there was “virtually no evidence” he commingled his assets or operations with those of the judgment debtor; the original judgment was not renewed during the 10-year limitation period; the doctrine of laches bars the alter ego motion; and the denial of an earlier alter ego motion barred the current motion under res judicata principles.   The Second Appellate District affirmed finding no error in the court’s decision to add Plaintiff as an alter ego judgment debtor. The court reasoned that as the trial court observed, “no single factor is determinative, and instead, a Court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the [alter ego] doctrine.” The court cited Plaintiff’s complete control over Cahuenga, his control of the litigation, his sharing of attorneys, his transfer of the company, and his destruction of relevant records of assets. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff contended in the trial court that the motion to amend the judgment was barred by the doctrine of laches. The trial court implicitly concluded Plaintiff did not carry his burden of proof on that point when it granted the Commissioner’s motion. The evidence does not compel a finding in Plaintiff’s favor as a matter of law. View "Hacker v. Fabe" on Justia Law

Anthony drove the car in which four defendants fled after they shot and killed the brother of a rival gang member. Two bystanders were hit and killed during the ensuing vehicle chase, resulting in two second-degree murder convictions for each defendant. The trial court granted three defendants (not Anthony) relief from the second-degree murder convictions under Penal Code section 1172.6, which provides persons convicted of murder before the 2019 amendments to the murder statutes to seek relief from such convictions if they could not be convicted of murder under the current murder statutes. The defendants argued the court should also have granted them relief from their Vehicle Code section 2800.3 conviction arising out of the bystander killings and erred by failing to explicitly strike the multiple-murder special circumstance found true by the jury as to each of them. They also sought resentencing on the Vehicle Code convictions based on recent legislation constraining sentencing decisions about whether and when to impose upper, middle, and lower terms of imprisonment.The court of appeal remanded for the trial court to strike the multiple murder special circumstance as to the three defendants; affirmed the denial of relief for the Vehicle Code convictions; remanded for resentencing based on an amendment to section 1170(b); reversed the gang-murder special circumstance and the 25-years-to-life sentences resulting from the gang enhancement and the life without parole sentences resulting from the gang-murder special circumstance. View "People v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Wongs stored some embryos at a facility that kept them in a cryogenic tank that failed to maintain the temperature necessary to store the embryos. The Wongs’ fertility doctor told them they should consider the embryos “compromised” and “no longer viable, and lost.” The Wongs had a homeowners insurance policy with Stillwater, a specified perils policy providing that “We insure for direct physical loss to the property described in Coverage C caused by any of the following perils,” listing 16 specified perils. Stillwater denied their claim for property damage.The trial court granted Stillwater summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. The mere possibility that the embryos had suffered physical damage was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact to trigger coverage. The Wongs did not meet their burden of submitting evidence of actual physical alteration of the embryos. The insured also has “the threshold burden of proving the loss was caused by a specifically-enumerated peril.” The Wongs failed to prove their claim of “explosion.” View "Wong v. Stillwater Insurance Co." on Justia Law

D.P., C.A. and E.A. (the adoptive parents of D.P.’s two older brothers) appealed an order denying a petition made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 for placement of D.P. in the siblings’ adoptive parents’ home. The siblings’ adoptive parents and D.P. (Appellants) contended the court erred by failing to apply the “relative placement preference” articulated in section 361.3. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Appellants forfeited this claim by failing to raise the issue at the trial court. But even if it were to consider it, the Court determined the siblings’ adoptive parents did not qualify as relatives for consideration under section 361.3. The Court further concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition after finding it would be in D.P.’s best interest to remain with de facto parents A.G. and K.P. The Court, therefore, affirmed the order. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

After a joint trial, defendants and appellants Larry Fletcher and Eric Taylor, Jr. were convicted of several crimes stemming from a shooting outside of a convenience store. At trial, an expert opined that both Fletcher and Taylor were members of the Four Corner Hustler Crips gang. The jury found appellants guilty on all charges and enhancements. The trial court then found the allegations on the prior convictions to be true. Given their strike priors, Fletcher was sentenced to 56 years and four months to life, and Taylor 100 years to life. One of the issues presented on appeal was one of first impression: whether, and to what extent, appellants were entitled to relief under California Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Session), which narrowed the applicability of certain punishments for offenses involving a criminal street gang. Although the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill 333 required the Court to reverse the conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang (count 2) and the gang enhancements (counts 1, 5, and 6), the Court held that the new law did not apply to the findings on serious felony and strike priors. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected several of appellants’ other challenges to their convictions and sentences, reversed on various counts and findings based on other new laws, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "California v. Fletcher" on Justia Law