Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff purchased a vehicle in 2017 and later alleged it was defective, suing the manufacturer in 2021. The parties eventually settled, with the plaintiff surrendering the vehicle and dismissing the suit, and the manufacturer agreeing to pay $100,000. The settlement specified the plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, and the manufacturer would pay the amount determined by the trial court upon noticed motion. After the settlement was reported to the Superior Court of San Diego County, the court ordered dismissal within 45 days. When no dismissal was filed, the clerk issued notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a party showed good cause otherwise. No such cause was shown, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees.The motion for attorney fees was opposed by the manufacturer, arguing it was untimely under California Rules of Court, as it was not served within 180 days of the dismissal date. The plaintiff countered that the 180-day deadline did not apply, claiming the case had not been formally dismissed and no judgment had been entered. The Superior Court of San Diego County disagreed, finding the case had been dismissed on August 15, 2023, per the clerk’s notice and court rules, and denied the motion as untimely. The plaintiff appealed the denial, and a signed minute order dismissing the complaint was later entered, but the court maintained that the earlier date controlled.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter de novo. It held that a voluntary dismissal, even if not appealable, starts the clock for filing a motion for attorney fees when it concludes the litigation. The court found the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, and the plaintiff failed to timely serve the fee motion. The order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

After an adult son sent text messages threatening a mass shooting at a local high school and referenced access to thousands of rounds of ammunition, the city police investigated the home he shared with his father. The father owned multiple firearms and large quantities of ammunition. Evidence showed the son had a history of mental health crises, including involuntary holds, and was subject to a lifetime ban from possessing firearms. Despite this prohibition, the son had access to firearms through his father, participated in shooting competitions, and had knowledge of how to access gun safes in the home. The father failed to turn in all firearms and ammunition as required by a temporary restraining order, and some safes were not adequately secured.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing, where both the father and a police investigator testified. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s failure to adequately secure his firearms and ammunition, combined with his son’s mental health history and credible threat of mass violence, posed a significant danger to others. The court concluded the father’s conduct enabled his son’s access to firearms and found no adequate, less restrictive alternatives to a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO). A three-year GVRO was issued against the father.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings and that the GVRO statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court concluded the trial court reasonably interpreted statutory causation and properly considered alternatives. The father’s Second Amendment and hearsay objections were deemed forfeited for not being raised below. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the GVRO. View "Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

Edward and Linda Diaz purchased a motorhome from a California dealer, receiving warranties from the manufacturer that included a clause requiring any legal disputes related to the warranties to be litigated exclusively in Indiana, where the motorhome was manufactured. The warranties also contained a choice-of-law provision favoring Indiana law and a waiver of jury trial. After experiencing issues with the vehicle that were not remedied under warranty, the Diazes sued the manufacturer, dealer, and lender in California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging failure to repair defects and refusal to replace or refund the vehicle.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants’ motion to stay the California action, enforcing the forum selection clause. The manufacturer had offered to stipulate that it would not oppose application of California’s Song-Beverly Act or a jury trial if the Diazes pursued their claims in Indiana. The court ordered the manufacturer to sign such a stipulation, holding that the Diazes could seek to lift the stay if Indiana courts declined to apply California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, concluded that the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The court held that the warranty’s terms, including the forum selection and choice-of-law provisions, violated California public policy by purporting to waive unwaivable statutory rights under the Song-Beverly Act. The court determined that the manufacturer’s post hoc offer to stipulate to California law did not cure the unconscionability present at contract formation and that severance of the unlawful terms would not further the interests of justice. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order staying the California action and directed entry of a new order denying the stay. View "Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded no contest in 2009 to second degree murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and participating in a criminal street gang, following an amended indictment stemming from a 2006 shooting. The plea was supported by a stipulation that police reports and grand jury testimony provided a factual basis for the charges. The defendant was sentenced to a total of 25 years to life. After a direct appeal resulted in a minor modification to presentence custody credits, the conviction stood.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Kern County Superior Court initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced, and the court admitted, transcripts from the grand jury proceedings, police reports, witness statements, and related law enforcement documents, over the defendant’s objections. The trial court denied the resentencing petition, finding the defendant was a major participant in the murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life, relying on the challenged evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury transcript and police reports at the evidentiary hearing, as these did not fall within the exceptions for admissible evidence under section 1172.6(d)(3). The appellate court held that neither the stipulation to the factual basis for the plea nor any other exception permitted their admission. The court vacated the denial of the resentencing petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, explicitly directing that only admissible evidence consistent with section 1172.6 may be considered. The holding does not bar the prosecution from presenting admissible evidence on remand. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

After an undercover police operation responding to an online advertisement for fentanyl, law enforcement negotiated a drug purchase with the defendant using text messages and a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone number. The defendant was identified and apprehended with nearly 1,000 fentanyl pills in his possession, and his cell phone was linked to the communications coordinating the sale. At the time, the defendant was already on probation for a similar drug offense. He ultimately entered a plea of no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale, admitting to an enhancement for a large quantity of contraband.The Alameda County Superior Court, following the plea agreement, placed the defendant on two years of formal probation with electronic monitoring. Over defense objection, the court imposed a “five-way” search condition, allowing warrantless searches of his person, property, vehicle, residence, and all electronic devices under his control, including the obligation to provide passwords. The search clause was justified by the court based on the defendant’s use of electronic devices to facilitate drug sales and obscure his identity. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the electronics search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the probation condition’s constitutionality and reasonableness de novo. The court found the electronics search clause was neither overbroad nor unreasonable, given the direct involvement of electronic devices in the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. The court also rejected proposals from both the Attorney General and the defense to modify or narrow the condition, concluding that the clause was sufficiently tailored to the facts of the case and necessary for rehabilitation and public safety. The judgment was affirmed, and the search condition was upheld without modification. View "P. v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2000, a 16-year-old girl and her boyfriend developed a fascination with murder, exchanging letters expressing admiration for notorious killers and a desire to commit murder themselves. In the early morning hours of July 21, 2000, she let her boyfriend into her family’s home, and waited in the bathroom while he fatally stabbed her uncle, three cousins, and seriously wounded her aunt. Her fingerprints were found on weapons and duct tape at the scene. During the investigation, she admitted to planning a staged robbery to bring her family together, but maintained she did not intend for anyone to be killed.A jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted her of four counts of first degree murder under both direct aiding and abetting and felony murder theories. She was sentenced to four consecutive terms of 25 years to life. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed her attempted murder conviction and special circumstance findings but affirmed her murder convictions. Subsequent appeals and resentencing focused on mitigating factors such as her age and psychological condition, but her convictions and sentences were largely upheld.In 2020, she petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows certain defendants convicted under the felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek resentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found her ineligible for resentencing, concluding that she was a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill, and a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed, holding that resentencing relief is not available to a direct aider and abettor who acts with intent to kill, and found no error or ineffective assistance regarding the consideration of her youth. View "P. v. Diaz" on Justia Law

An employee working as a prep cook at a restaurant was injured during a physical altercation with a co-worker. The altercation arose out of a workplace argument that escalated, resulting in the co-worker striking the employee and causing significant injury. The injured employee filed a workers’ compensation claim, while the employer and its insurer denied liability, asserting the “initial physical aggressor” defense under California Labor Code section 3600(a)(7), arguing that the employee was the initial physical aggressor and thus barred from recovery.The matter was tried before a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge (WCJ), who heard testimony from all involved and found that the employee was the initial physical aggressor, based largely on the credibility of eyewitnesses. The WCJ denied the employee’s claim for compensation. The employee timely filed a petition for reconsideration with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Although the petition was filed and transmitted within the statutory 60-day period, the WCAB did not review it until after the deadline. The WCAB ultimately granted reconsideration, rescinded the WCJ’s denial, and found that the “initial physical aggressor” defense had not been proven, thus allowing the employee’s claim.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the WCAB’s order. The court held that under former section 5909 of the Labor Code, the WCAB lost jurisdiction to act on the petition for reconsideration after the 60-day statutory period elapsed, unless grounds for equitable tolling were present. The court concluded that equitable tolling was not warranted here because there was no evidence of reasonable diligence or special circumstances justifying such relief. Therefore, the court reversed the WCAB’s order and decision after reconsideration. View "Zenith Insurance Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

A murder occurred in 2014 when the victim, Justin Triplett, was shot multiple times at his apartment. Jason Johnomar Zapata became a suspect after evidence connected him to the murder weapon and ammunition. Nearly a year later, while in custody on unrelated charges, Zapata was subjected to what is known as a Perkins operation: he was placed in a holding cell with two undercover agents posing as inmates. During the operation, a law enforcement officer conducted a fake lineup and falsely told Zapata that a witness had identified him as the killer. When asked if he wanted to discuss the murder, Zapata invoked his right to counsel. Nevertheless, the deputy returned Zapata to the cell, announced to the undercover agents that Zapata would be charged with murder, and the agents subsequently questioned Zapata, eliciting an incriminating confession.At trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Zapata moved to suppress his statements, arguing that his Miranda rights were violated because he had invoked his right to counsel before the confession and had not waived it. The trial court denied the motion, admitted the confession into evidence, and Zapata was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The jury did not reach a verdict on the personal firearm enhancement, but Zapata later admitted a lesser firearm use enhancement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel and a known law enforcement officer actively “stimulates” a Perkins operation in a manner that amounts to custodial interrogation, any resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible under Miranda and Edwards. The court found the admission of Zapata's statements prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Zapata" on Justia Law

The case concerns a father and mother with four minor children. Dependency jurisdiction was initially asserted over the children due to the father’s alcohol abuse and the mother’s failure to protect the children. After the parents entered into a stipulation, restrictions on the father’s visitation were removed, and joint custody was restored. However, a subsequent domestic violence incident involving the father led to a new dependency petition. The father was accused of slapping the mother while possibly intoxicated, which was witnessed by the eldest child. The investigation also revealed prior domestic violence calls. As a result, the children were detained from the father and released to the mother, with the father granted monitored visitation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained allegations against the father for domestic violence and alcohol abuse, declared the children dependents, and removed them from the father’s custody. The mother was given family preservation services, while the father received enhancement services and monitored visitation. At a six-month review hearing, it was reported that the father completed a substance abuse program but continued to engage in concerning behavior, including leaving threatening voicemails, appearing intoxicated, and being physically aggressive toward the mother. The mother obtained a restraining order, and the Department of Children and Family Services recommended terminating jurisdiction with sole custody to the mother and monitored visitation for the father.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the lower court erred in requiring the father to pay for a professional visitation monitor as a condition of visitation without considering his ability to pay or reasonable alternatives. The appellate court held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not inquiring into the father’s financial ability or considering alternatives such as an unpaid monitor. The order requiring the father to pay for a professional monitor was reversed and remanded for further proceedings; the custody order was otherwise affirmed. View "In re Reyna R." on Justia Law

Two students enrolled at a private university in California during early 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic prompted widespread campus closures. In accordance with local lockdown orders, the university transitioned from in-person to online instruction in March 2020. Prior to the Fall 2020 semester, the university communicated with students about its intention to return to in-person education but made clear that such plans depended on approval from local authorities. Ultimately, the university continued remote instruction. The students remained enrolled and later graduated.The students filed suit in the Superior Court of Orange County, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and unfair business practices. They argued that the university had made an enforceable promise to provide in-person education, citing various university publications, course listings, policies, and statements about on-campus experiences. They sought a partial tuition refund and raised alternative claims regarding unfair or unlawful representations. The university moved for summary judgment, asserting that it had not made any specific promise to provide in-person instruction and that its statements reflected only general expectations. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the university, relying on Berlanga v. University of San Francisco and finding no triable issue of material fact regarding any misrepresentation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the university’s statements and practices did not constitute sufficiently specific enforceable promises of in-person education under California law. The court found that only specific, explicit promises are enforceable in the student-university relationship, and none were present here. The court also rejected the students’ unjust enrichment and unfair business practices claims. The judgment in favor of the university was affirmed, and the university was awarded costs on appeal. View "Grant v. Chapman University" on Justia Law