Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A former employee of the County of San Diego pleaded guilty to a felony charge for violating a state conflict-of-interest law, which prohibits public employees from having a financial interest in contracts made in their official capacity. After the guilty plea, but before sentencing, the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association (SDCERA) notified him that a portion of his accrued pension benefits would be forfeited under Government Code section 7522.74, as he had been “convicted” of a job-related felony. At sentencing, the criminal court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3). The employee then requested reinstatement of his pension benefits, which SDCERA denied.The employee challenged SDCERA’s denial through administrative appeals, including to its chief executive officer and Board of Retirement, but both appeals were denied. He subsequently petitioned the Superior Court of San Diego County for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside SDCERA’s decision. The court denied the petition, finding that section 7522.74 precluded reinstatement of the forfeited pension benefits. The employee timely appealed the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that a public employee is “convicted” for purposes of Government Code section 7522.74 upon an adjudication of guilt—whether by plea or jury verdict—and not only upon entry of judgment. The reduction of the felony to a misdemeanor at sentencing under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3), did not retroactively affect the forfeiture. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the employee’s pension benefits remained forfeited, and SDCERA properly denied reinstatement. View "Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

The defendant is incarcerated for murder and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She has spent most of her sentence in an inpatient psychiatric treatment program and has been largely unresponsive to medications administered under an involuntary medication order. After other treatments failed, the acting warden petitioned for authorization to administer electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), as her condition persisted and she lacked the capacity to provide informed consent. Both parties stipulated to her incapacity to consent to ECT, and she conceded on appeal that ECT is medically necessary.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held an evidentiary hearing and granted the warden’s petition, authorizing ECT for six months, the maximum period allowed by statute. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the medical necessity of ECT but argued that the statutory requirement for “no less onerous alternatives” to ECT should include procedural alternatives, specifically the possibility of obtaining informed consent from a surrogate decisionmaker under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5326.7.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. It held that the “no less onerous alternatives” language in Penal Code section 2679 refers to medical alternatives to ECT, not alternative procedural methods such as surrogate consent. The court found that the statutory scheme intentionally excludes ECT from expedited surrogate decision-making provisions, requiring judicial authorization instead. The court rejected the argument that the warden must seek surrogate consent before judicial authorization and affirmed the trial court’s order authorizing ECT. View "P. v. T.B." on Justia Law

The case centers on the estate of Charles Frazier, who, after becoming very ill in late 2019, was cared for by Michael and Kelly Pagano. During this period, Frazier executed a new trust with the Paganos’ assistance, granting them a substantial portion of his assets. Shortly before his death in January 2020, Frazier expressed regret over this change to his nephews, Jeff and Theodore Haun, and executed another trust to revert his estate plan. After Frazier’s passing, the Paganos filed a civil complaint alleging Haun and Jeff had exerted undue influence over Frazier for personal benefit. Haun, as trustee of the January 2020 trust, then initiated a probate petition claiming financial elder abuse by the Paganos.The Superior Court of San Diego County consolidated the competing probate petitions for trial. After eight days of trial, the court found the Paganos had exerted undue influence over Frazier in the creation of the December 2019 trust and committed financial elder abuse. Haun and Jeff, however, were not found to have unduly influenced Frazier regarding the January 2020 trust. The court granted Haun’s petition, denied Kelly’s petition, awarded Haun compensatory and statutory damages, and entitled him to attorney’s fees. The court determined all attorney’s fees incurred by Haun were inextricably intertwined with his defense and prosecution of the elder abuse claims, making apportionment impractical.On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed whether Haun could recover attorney’s fees under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5(a), a unilateral fee-shifting provision, given the intertwined nature of his prosecution and defense. The court held that the statute does not bar recovery of fees for defense work that overlaps with prosecution of a successful financial elder abuse claim by a prevailing plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed, and costs of appeal were awarded to Haun. View "Haun v. Pagano" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when one attorney, after obtaining a $5 million default judgment against another attorney in California, sought to collect on that judgment by levying two Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) belonging to the judgment debtor. The debtor argued that because he had moved to Florida, Florida’s statutory exemptions should apply, shielding his IRAs from collection. He also claimed the IRAs were funded from a surrendered life insurance policy held in a private retirement plan, asserting exemptions under California law for both the policy and the retirement plan.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the claim of exemption. Initially, the court tentatively applied Florida law but later decided the law of the forum state—California—should govern exemption claims. Ultimately, the court found the debtor failed to prove that the IRAs qualified for any exemption under California law, including the private retirement plan exemption or that the funds were necessary for his support. The court denied the claim of exemption, permitting the creditor to levy the IRAs.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that California law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of the judgment debtor’s domicile. It further concluded that a surrendered life insurance policy is not necessarily exempt from collection and, once surrendered, is treated as matured, requiring proof that the proceeds are necessary for support. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings, applied a de novo review to legal questions, and affirmed the order denying the exemption. Thus, the IRAs were subject to collection, and the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Bagby v. Davis" on Justia Law

In December 2023, a man was arrested after setting a fire in a rural area near the Ortega Mountains in Riverside County, California. Witnesses saw him near the scene, and firefighters and investigators concluded the fire was intentionally and maliciously set. At the time, there was a prolonged state of emergency in California, initially declared in 2015 due to widespread tree mortality from bark beetle infestations, which increased wildfire risks in certain regions.A jury in the Superior Court of Riverside County convicted the defendant of felony arson of forest land and found true a sentencing enhancement for committing arson “during and within an area” proclaimed by the Governor to be in a state of emergency. The court imposed a lengthy prison sentence, including additional time for prior convictions and the state of emergency enhancement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to decide the legal scope of the Governor’s state of emergency proclamation. The appellate court conducted an independent legal review and determined that the 2015 proclamation did not declare a statewide emergency but limited the emergency to specific high-risk zones to be identified by state agencies. The prosecution failed to provide evidence that the fire occurred within such a designated area, making the evidence insufficient to support the enhancement.The appellate court reversed the true finding on the state of emergency enhancement, ordered a full resentencing, and affirmed the underlying arson conviction. The court also directed that, upon the defendant’s request, the trial court hold a hearing on his ability to pay fines and costs, consistent with the standards set in People v. Kopp. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The plaintiff purchased a vehicle in 2017 and later alleged it was defective, suing the manufacturer in 2021. The parties eventually settled, with the plaintiff surrendering the vehicle and dismissing the suit, and the manufacturer agreeing to pay $100,000. The settlement specified the plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, and the manufacturer would pay the amount determined by the trial court upon noticed motion. After the settlement was reported to the Superior Court of San Diego County, the court ordered dismissal within 45 days. When no dismissal was filed, the clerk issued notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a party showed good cause otherwise. No such cause was shown, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees.The motion for attorney fees was opposed by the manufacturer, arguing it was untimely under California Rules of Court, as it was not served within 180 days of the dismissal date. The plaintiff countered that the 180-day deadline did not apply, claiming the case had not been formally dismissed and no judgment had been entered. The Superior Court of San Diego County disagreed, finding the case had been dismissed on August 15, 2023, per the clerk’s notice and court rules, and denied the motion as untimely. The plaintiff appealed the denial, and a signed minute order dismissing the complaint was later entered, but the court maintained that the earlier date controlled.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter de novo. It held that a voluntary dismissal, even if not appealable, starts the clock for filing a motion for attorney fees when it concludes the litigation. The court found the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, and the plaintiff failed to timely serve the fee motion. The order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

After an adult son sent text messages threatening a mass shooting at a local high school and referenced access to thousands of rounds of ammunition, the city police investigated the home he shared with his father. The father owned multiple firearms and large quantities of ammunition. Evidence showed the son had a history of mental health crises, including involuntary holds, and was subject to a lifetime ban from possessing firearms. Despite this prohibition, the son had access to firearms through his father, participated in shooting competitions, and had knowledge of how to access gun safes in the home. The father failed to turn in all firearms and ammunition as required by a temporary restraining order, and some safes were not adequately secured.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing, where both the father and a police investigator testified. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s failure to adequately secure his firearms and ammunition, combined with his son’s mental health history and credible threat of mass violence, posed a significant danger to others. The court concluded the father’s conduct enabled his son’s access to firearms and found no adequate, less restrictive alternatives to a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO). A three-year GVRO was issued against the father.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings and that the GVRO statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court concluded the trial court reasonably interpreted statutory causation and properly considered alternatives. The father’s Second Amendment and hearsay objections were deemed forfeited for not being raised below. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the GVRO. View "Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

Edward and Linda Diaz purchased a motorhome from a California dealer, receiving warranties from the manufacturer that included a clause requiring any legal disputes related to the warranties to be litigated exclusively in Indiana, where the motorhome was manufactured. The warranties also contained a choice-of-law provision favoring Indiana law and a waiver of jury trial. After experiencing issues with the vehicle that were not remedied under warranty, the Diazes sued the manufacturer, dealer, and lender in California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging failure to repair defects and refusal to replace or refund the vehicle.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants’ motion to stay the California action, enforcing the forum selection clause. The manufacturer had offered to stipulate that it would not oppose application of California’s Song-Beverly Act or a jury trial if the Diazes pursued their claims in Indiana. The court ordered the manufacturer to sign such a stipulation, holding that the Diazes could seek to lift the stay if Indiana courts declined to apply California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, concluded that the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The court held that the warranty’s terms, including the forum selection and choice-of-law provisions, violated California public policy by purporting to waive unwaivable statutory rights under the Song-Beverly Act. The court determined that the manufacturer’s post hoc offer to stipulate to California law did not cure the unconscionability present at contract formation and that severance of the unlawful terms would not further the interests of justice. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order staying the California action and directed entry of a new order denying the stay. View "Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded no contest in 2009 to second degree murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and participating in a criminal street gang, following an amended indictment stemming from a 2006 shooting. The plea was supported by a stipulation that police reports and grand jury testimony provided a factual basis for the charges. The defendant was sentenced to a total of 25 years to life. After a direct appeal resulted in a minor modification to presentence custody credits, the conviction stood.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Kern County Superior Court initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced, and the court admitted, transcripts from the grand jury proceedings, police reports, witness statements, and related law enforcement documents, over the defendant’s objections. The trial court denied the resentencing petition, finding the defendant was a major participant in the murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life, relying on the challenged evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury transcript and police reports at the evidentiary hearing, as these did not fall within the exceptions for admissible evidence under section 1172.6(d)(3). The appellate court held that neither the stipulation to the factual basis for the plea nor any other exception permitted their admission. The court vacated the denial of the resentencing petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, explicitly directing that only admissible evidence consistent with section 1172.6 may be considered. The holding does not bar the prosecution from presenting admissible evidence on remand. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

After an undercover police operation responding to an online advertisement for fentanyl, law enforcement negotiated a drug purchase with the defendant using text messages and a Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone number. The defendant was identified and apprehended with nearly 1,000 fentanyl pills in his possession, and his cell phone was linked to the communications coordinating the sale. At the time, the defendant was already on probation for a similar drug offense. He ultimately entered a plea of no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale, admitting to an enhancement for a large quantity of contraband.The Alameda County Superior Court, following the plea agreement, placed the defendant on two years of formal probation with electronic monitoring. Over defense objection, the court imposed a “five-way” search condition, allowing warrantless searches of his person, property, vehicle, residence, and all electronic devices under his control, including the obligation to provide passwords. The search clause was justified by the court based on the defendant’s use of electronic devices to facilitate drug sales and obscure his identity. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the electronics search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the probation condition’s constitutionality and reasonableness de novo. The court found the electronics search clause was neither overbroad nor unreasonable, given the direct involvement of electronic devices in the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. The court also rejected proposals from both the Attorney General and the defense to modify or narrow the condition, concluding that the clause was sufficiently tailored to the facts of the case and necessary for rehabilitation and public safety. The judgment was affirmed, and the search condition was upheld without modification. View "P. v. Flores" on Justia Law