Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves 11 public charter schools (the Schools) seeking to overturn a decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB found that the Schools violated section 3550 of the Prohibition on Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union Membership by sending e-mails that tended to influence employees' decisions regarding union representation by United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA). The Schools argued that PERB's interpretation of section 3550 was erroneous and that the statute was unconstitutional as it violated free speech protections.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially dismissed the allegations, finding that the e-mails did not contain threats or promises and thus did not violate the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). However, PERB, applying its new interpretation from Regents I and Regents II decisions, found that the e-mails violated section 3550 because they tended to influence employee choice regarding union membership. PERB rejected the Schools' defenses, including claims of business necessity and constitutional free speech rights.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court upheld PERB's interpretation of section 3550, finding it not clearly erroneous. The court also rejected the Schools' constitutional claims, determining that section 3550 regulates only government speech, which is not protected by the First Amendment or the California Constitution. The court found that the Schools, as public employers, and their administrators and Alliance CMO, as agents, were engaged in government speech when communicating about union matters.The court concluded that substantial evidence supported PERB's findings that the Schools could be held responsible for the e-mails sent by Alliance CMO and the School administrators under theories of actual and apparent authority. The court affirmed PERB's decision and order. View "Alliance Marce & Eva Stern Math & Sci. High Sch. v. PERB" on Justia Law

A Black man, known for his career in the NFL, was accused by an intellectually disabled woman of raping her at gunpoint during a babysitting job interview at his home. The jury found him guilty of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and false imprisonment, with firearm use in the first two offenses. He was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The prosecution argued that the police did not search his house due to his fame and race, suggesting a search would have caused controversy.The trial began in March 2020 but was paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resuming three months later. The jury acquitted him on two counts related to the victim's incapacity to consent. The trial court sentenced him in October 2020. The defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecution's statements violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 by appealing to racial bias.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the prosecution violated the Racial Justice Act by explicitly asserting that the defendant's race influenced the police's decision not to search his house, implying he gained an undeserved advantage at trial because he was Black. The court concluded that the prosecution's statements constituted racially discriminatory language under Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)(2). The court held that Penal Code section 745, subdivision (e)(2)(A) precludes harmless error analysis and mandates vacating the conviction and sentence. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded for new proceedings consistent with the Racial Justice Act. View "P. v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law

Fredy Cordero Gudiel, a member of the West Side Locos gang, was convicted of second-degree murder for his involvement in the 2004 killing of William Maldonado, a member of the rival Toonerville gang. Gudiel, along with fellow gang members William Torres and Pedro Pena, attacked Maldonado after confronting him in Toonerville territory. During the attack, Pena and Torres struck Maldonado with bats, and Gudiel punched, kicked, and threw a bicycle at him. Maldonado sustained severe head injuries and died four days later from blunt head trauma.In 2007, a jury convicted Gudiel of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. Gudiel's conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 2022, Gudiel filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder under the amended laws. The trial court appointed counsel, and after a series of hearings, the court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2023.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's denial of Gudiel's petition for resentencing. The court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Gudiel aided and abetted an implied malice murder. The court determined that Gudiel knew his co-defendants intended to commit a life-endangering act, intended to aid them, and acted with conscious disregard for human life. The court rejected Gudiel's argument that the trial court should have applied the "reckless indifference to human life" standard, noting that it is distinct from the "conscious disregard for human life" standard required for implied malice second-degree murder. View "P. v. Gudiel" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Luis Mendez was charged with two misdemeanors in one case and several felonies and a misdemeanor in a separate case. The trial court found him mentally incompetent and suspended criminal proceedings in both cases. After determining that Mendez's mental competency was restored, the court reinstated all charges and denied Mendez's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case under Penal Code section 1370.01.The Superior Court of Orange County initially suspended criminal proceedings in both cases and committed Mendez to the State Department of State Hospitals. Mendez's counsel moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charges, arguing that section 1370.01 applied, which does not provide for restoring competency in misdemeanor cases. The trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1370 applied because Mendez was charged with felonies, and reinstated criminal proceedings after finding Mendez competent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1370 applies to a person charged with a felony, even if misdemeanors are charged in a separate document. The court interpreted section 1367(b) to mean that section 1370.01 applies only when a defendant is charged with misdemeanors and no felonies. Since Mendez was charged with felonies, section 1370 applied to all charges. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying section 1370, reinstating criminal proceedings, or denying the motion to dismiss. The petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition was denied. View "Mendez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Lori Ann Wiley, who, along with Charles Wallace Hanson, engaged in a verbal altercation at a Kern High School District (KHSD) high school. The incident began when a school employee blocked a handicap parking spot they intended to use. Wiley later submitted a written complaint about the incident to the school. Subsequently, KHSD police officer Michael Whiting recommended various misdemeanor charges against Wiley, leading to her being cited and a prosecutor filing a criminal complaint with three misdemeanor charges. After a mistrial, the court dismissed Wiley’s charges in the interest of justice.Wiley sued KHSD police officers Edward Komin, Michael Whiting, Luis Peña, and Steven Alvidrez, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. She brought causes of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Bane Act, and common law torts for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to Wiley’s causes of action in the second amended complaint on multiple grounds without leave to amend and granted a motion to strike Wiley’s punitive damages allegations without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The appellate court held that Wiley failed to adequately plead her claims under section 1983 for malicious/retaliatory prosecution and abuse of process, as well as her claims under the Bane Act. The court also found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that Wiley did not sufficiently allege facts to support her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. However, the court granted Wiley leave to amend her section 1983 claim but denied leave to amend her other causes of action. The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the motion to strike without leave to amend. View "Wiley v. Kern High School District" on Justia Law

Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

The appellant, Shawn Lee Perrot, was convicted in 2004 of multiple sexual offenses involving minors, including forcible rape, lewd acts on a child, and distribution of lewd material to a minor. After serving over 16 years of a 21-year sentence, he was paroled with specific conditions. Perrot violated three parole conditions: accessing and using computer devices, associating with known sex offenders, and possessing sexually stimulating devices. He challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.Upon his release, Perrot refused to sign parole conditions, leading to civil commitment proceedings, which were later dismissed. He was evaluated as high risk for reoffending. Perrot signed parole conditions, including prohibitions on computer access, associating with sex offenders, and possessing sexually stimulating devices. He filed grievances and a habeas corpus petition challenging these conditions, which were largely denied, though he was temporarily allowed limited computer use for legal research.The Department of Adult Parole Operations filed a petition for parole revocation, alleging Perrot violated the conditions. Evidence showed he possessed multiple unauthorized devices, operated a business assisting sex offenders, and had sexually stimulating devices. The court found probable cause and revoked his parole, sentencing him to a 60-day jail term, followed by reinstatement to parole.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected Perrot's claims, holding that the parole conditions were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court found the conditions were sufficiently precise and narrowly tailored to address the state's compelling interest in preventing Perrot from reoffending. The order revoking Perrot's parole was affirmed. View "P. v. Perrot" on Justia Law

Lucy Mancini Newell was designated as the trustee and sole beneficiary of her parents' trust. After her father, Arthur Mancini, passed away, Newell discovered that he had amended the trust to name his caregiver, Neneth Rollins, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. Newell challenged the validity of these amendments and, upon learning that Rollins used trust assets to purchase real property, recorded a lis pendens against the property and sought to impose a constructive trust on it.The probate court granted Rollins' motion to expunge the lis pendens, ruling that Newell's petition did not contain a "real property claim" as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.4. The court concluded that Newell's petition sought to invalidate the trust amendments and change the trustee, but did not directly affect the title or possession of the real property.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Newell's petition did indeed contain a real property claim because it would affect the title to the property if successful. The court noted that the trustee holds legal title to the trust's property, and a change in trustee would change the name on the title. Therefore, the petition would affect the title to the Van Nuys property.The Court of Appeal granted Newell's petition for writ of mandate, directing the probate court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens and to enter a new order denying Rollins' motion to expunge. The court also awarded Newell her costs in the proceeding. View "Newell v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2015, the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by the defendant, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. The plaintiff sought medical treatment for his injuries, which included multiple surgeries and ongoing pain management. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant and KLS, and a jury awarded him $3,299,455 in damages for past and future economic and noneconomic losses.The Superior Court of Sacramento County entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. The defendants filed motions for a new trial, partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to tax costs, all of which were denied by the trial court. The court entered an updated judgment, including costs and prejudgment interest, totaling $1,645,685.88. The defendants appealed the judgment and the updated judgment.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and the proper measure of past medical damages. The appellate court concluded that the HLA only applies to emergency services and ongoing services provided while the patient remains in the hospital or an affiliated facility. The court vacated the award for past medical expenses and remanded for a new trial on this issue. The court also found that the award for future medical expenses was not supported by substantial evidence and remanded for a new trial on this issue as well.The appellate court affirmed the judgment in all other respects but vacated the award for costs and prejudgment interest. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law