Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

One evening, a group of friends gathered at an apartment, where alcohol and marijuana were consumed. Among them was A.S., who became highly intoxicated and passed out on a couch. Later, Ruben Paramo Gallardo, who was also present, was observed by another friend, D.L., on top of A.S., appearing to penetrate her while she was unconscious. D.L. intervened and called the police. A.S. later underwent a medical exam that documented various injuries and found Gallardo’s DNA on her body. At trial, Gallardo testified that the sexual contact was consensual and that A.S. was awake, but this was contradicted by other evidence.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a jury found Gallardo guilty of two offenses: rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4), and assault with intent to commit rape under section 220, subdivision (a)(1). The court sentenced him to four years for the assault count and stayed a concurrent three-year term for the rape count pursuant to section 654. Gallardo appealed, arguing that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person, and therefore his conviction for assault should be reversed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. Applying the statutory elements test, the court determined that assault with intent to commit rape requires proof of intent to use force, which is not an element of rape of an unconscious person. Therefore, assault with intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Gallardo could properly be convicted of both offenses. View "People v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an experienced bus rider, was injured when she fell while standing on a public bus operated by a transit district. She had stood up and moved toward the rear door in anticipation of her stop, holding a bag in one hand and a phone in the other. Security camera footage showed she was not holding onto a railing at the time the bus made a routine turn, lost her balance, and fell. The driver was not alleged to have made any unusual maneuver, nor did other passengers appear affected. The plaintiff claimed the driver operated the bus negligently and failed to warn her to hold on or sit down.After the incident, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Kern County, asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence against both the driver and the transit district (the latter on a vicarious liability theory). The defendants moved for summary judgment, relying heavily on the bus’s video recording to argue that the bus’s movement was ordinary and that the plaintiff’s own actions were the proximate cause of her injury. The plaintiff argued that factual disputes remained, that the heightened duty of care for common carriers was not met, and that expert opinion and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created triable issues for the jury. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding there was no evidence of negligence by the driver and that the plaintiff’s own conduct was the sole proximate cause of her injury.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that, while common carriers owe a heightened duty of care, that duty does not make them insurers of passenger safety for ordinary vehicle movements. The court further held that evidence, including the video, established the driver did not breach the applicable duty, and the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injury. The court also ruled that neither comparative negligence nor res ipsa loquitur doctrines applied under these facts. Judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit Dist." on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

An agricultural company opposed a unionization effort initiated by the United Farm Workers of America, who sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's employees under a new statutory procedure. The union filed a Majority Support Petition with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, presenting evidence that a majority of employees supported union representation. The company responded by submitting objections and employee declarations alleging misconduct by the union during the signature collection process. The Board's regional director investigated and determined that the union had met the statutory criteria for certification, leading the Board to certify the union as the employees' representative.Following the certification, the company filed additional objections with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, including constitutional challenges to the underlying statute. The Board dismissed most objections and set others for a hearing, but stated it could not rule on constitutional questions. While administrative proceedings were ongoing, the company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Kern County seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding and to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Board and the union argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory limits on judicial review, but the superior court nonetheless issued a preliminary injunction halting the Board's proceedings. Appeals and writ petitions followed, consolidating the matter before the reviewing court.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge at this stage. The court reaffirmed that under California law, employers may not directly challenge union certification decisions in court except in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here. The proper procedure is for employers to wait until an unfair labor practice proceeding or mandatory mediation is completed and a final order is issued before seeking judicial review. The court reversed the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of the company’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wonderful Nurseries v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Geovanni Quijadas Silva, and North River Insurance Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for his release. Silva failed to appear at a required court hearing, leading the Superior Court of Santa Clara County to declare the bond forfeited and begin the statutory appearance period during which the bail company could either produce Silva or demonstrate why forfeiture should be set aside. North River requested and was granted two extensions of this period. On the final day, North River moved to vacate the forfeiture, claiming Silva was located and detained in Mexico, and requested either exoneration of the bond or a tolling/continuance to allow time for extradition. The prosecution did not timely decide whether to pursue extradition and opposed the motion, arguing that no obligation existed for it to decide within the appearance period.The Superior Court denied North River’s motion to vacate or continue, finding that the prosecution was not required to decide on extradition by the end of the appearance period and that the motion was untimely. Judgment was entered against North River, which appealed. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed, but later reversed and remanded, concluding that the lower court should have either required a prosecution decision on extradition or granted a continuance.The Supreme Court of California subsequently held that Penal Code section 1305 does not authorize trial courts to compel prosecutors to make extradition decisions or require a continuance solely for that purpose. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether courts may, for good cause, extend time for extradition decisions by continuing the hearing on the motion to vacate. On remand, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, adopted the concurring analysis that trial courts have discretion to grant limited continuances for good cause to allow extradition decisions. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise this discretion in accordance with that interpretation. View "People v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

Mike Dennis developed mycosis fungoides, a subtype of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, after regularly applying Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, for approximately 20 years. Dennis claimed his cancer resulted from exposure to Roundup, which he alleged was sold and marketed without adequate warnings about its carcinogenic risks, despite Monsanto’s knowledge of the potential danger. He brought claims for design defect, failure to warn (under both negligence and strict liability), and negligence. At trial, the jury found that Monsanto was liable for failing to warn about the cancer risk, determining Monsanto knew or should have known of the risk, failed to provide adequate warnings, and acted with malice or oppression. The jury awarded Dennis $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages.Following the verdict, Monsanto moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Monsanto’s requests to overturn the liability findings but reduced the punitive damages award from $325 million to $21 million, finding the original award disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Monsanto timely appealed, arguing that Dennis’s failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and that the punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA does not preempt state law failure to warn claims that parallel federal misbranding requirements, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent and California decisions. The court also found that the punitive damages award, as reduced by the trial court, did not violate due process, as it was based on highly reprehensible conduct directly related to Dennis’s harm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in full. View "Dennis v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

This case concerns the State Water Resources Control Board's intervention in the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin pursuant to California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). After local agencies in the subbasin submitted a groundwater sustainability plan that the Department of Water Resources twice determined to be inadequate, the State Board designated the basin as probationary in April 2024. This designation triggered state-imposed monitoring, reporting, and fee obligations on certain groundwater extractors. In response, the Kings County Farm Bureau and others filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint, asserting that the State Board exceeded its authority and challenging the validity of the designation and associated fees on several grounds.The Superior Court of Kings County addressed both a demurrer filed by the State Board and a request from the Farm Bureau for a preliminary injunction. The trial court dismissed the equal protection claim with leave to amend, but overruled the demurrer as to claims that (1) the State Board used improper “underground regulations” not adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), (2) the imposed extraction fee constituted an unlawful tax, and (3) general declaratory relief was appropriate. The trial court also granted a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the State Board’s enforcement activities.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer. The appellate court held that all actions by the State Board taken under sections 10735.2 and 10735.8 of the Act—including the designation of a probationary basin—are exempt from the APA unless the State Board voluntarily opts to adopt regulations using APA procedures. Therefore, the claim for improper “underground regulations” could not proceed. The court also held that a challenge to the extraction fee as an unlawful tax was barred by the constitutional “pay first” rule, as no exception applied. Lastly, the court determined that declaratory relief was unavailable because the Legislature provided for review of State Board actions exclusively by writ of mandate. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant the demurrer without leave to amend as to these three claims. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the State Water Resources Control Board’s designation of the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin as a probationary basin under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The Tulare subbasin is categorized as high-priority and critically overdrafted, requiring coordinated local management and submission of a sustainability plan. Local agencies formed a single groundwater sustainability plan, which the Department of Water Resources twice found inadequate, leading the State Board to designate the subbasin as probationary. Following this, the Board imposed monitoring and reporting requirements with associated fees, prompting farmers and landowners, including Kings County Farm Bureau, to challenge the Board’s actions as exceeding its authority and lacking proper notice.Before reaching the California Court of Appeal, the Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the matter. The trial court had issued a preliminary injunction against the State Board, barring it from enforcing requirements and fees related to the probationary designation. The trial court found the plaintiffs likely to succeed on several claims, including improper denial of “good actor” exclusions and failures in notice, and determined the balance of harms weighed in favor of plaintiffs. A nominal bond was set, and the trial court later denied objections to the bond amount.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an overly broad injunction affecting the entire Tulare subbasin, where only certain areas had plausible claims. The court clarified that the State Board must exclude any basin portion where a local agency demonstrates compliance with sustainability goals, but this exclusion does not require an independently approved plan for every area. The appellate court reversed the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to consider whether a narrower injunction may be appropriate. The petition for writ of supersedeas was denied as moot. View "Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence that included enhancements for firearm use and gang involvement, resulting in a total sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, and his sentence was reduced to 32 years to life. Years later, the defendant filed several petitions for resentencing, arguing that he was improperly sentenced due to changes in the law and because he was not the actual shooter. The trial court eventually acknowledged that the defendant was serving a longer sentence than he should have, as he was not eligible for the firearm enhancement once the gang enhancement was stricken, but believed it lacked the authority to correct the sentence absent a habeas corpus petition or a request from the district attorney or the Department of Corrections.The Los Angeles County Superior Court repeatedly denied the defendant’s requests for resentencing, finding either that he failed to make a prima facie case under the applicable statutes or that the court lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Although the trial court recognized a sentencing error, it maintained that procedural limitations prevented it from acting unless prompted by a specific type of petition or an external agency.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that the trial court did have the authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of procedural posture or the form of the defendant’s petition. The appellate court concluded that the unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the usual statutory restrictions and time limits, and it reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a prompt resentencing hearing and correct the sentence if it is found to be unauthorized. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law