Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lawrence Marino obtained an 18-month civil harassment restraining order against Mark Alon Rayant in a proceeding where Rayant was not present. Rayant later appeared, arguing he had not received notice of Marino’s restraining order request and that the request was without merit. The trial court terminated the restraining order. Rayant then moved to seal the entire record of the restraining order proceedings, citing concerns that the proceedings had negatively impacted his background checks for job applications and subjected him to increased scrutiny by airport authorities when returning from international travel. The trial court denied the sealing request because Rayant had not made the necessary showing for sealing under the California Rules of Court.Rayant appealed the trial court's decision. He contended that there is no federal constitutional right of public access to records of restraining order proceedings, and therefore the court rules for sealing records, which are based on federal constitutional requirements, are inapplicable. The trial court found that the sealing rules provide an independent, statutory right of public access to court records, creating a broad presumption of public access with only limited exceptions, none of which applied in this case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the sealing rules under California Rules of Court apply to the records Rayant sought to seal. The court found that Rayant did not meet the high bar for sealing imposed by those rules, as he did not demonstrate an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access, nor did he show a substantial probability that his interest would be prejudiced if the record was not sealed. The court affirmed the trial court's order denying the motion to seal. View "Marino v. Rayant" on Justia Law

Arthur Lee Henderson appealed the judgment entered after the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) concerning his attempted murder conviction. The court resentenced him on his remaining convictions for murder (with a felony-murder special-circumstance finding) and attempted robbery, imposing a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence. Henderson argued that the application of section 1385.1, which restricted the court's discretion to strike the felony-murder special circumstance, violated the ex post facto clauses of the California and United States Constitutions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially sentenced Henderson in 1988 to LWOP for first-degree murder, plus additional terms for attempted murder and attempted robbery. Henderson's petition for resentencing was partially granted, leading to the dismissal of his attempted murder conviction. However, the court maintained the LWOP sentence for the murder conviction, citing section 1385.1, which prohibits striking special circumstances in first-degree murder cases.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that the application of section 1385.1 at Henderson's 2023 resentencing did not violate ex post facto principles. The court reasoned that the resentencing under section 1172.6 was an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution, and Henderson's new sentence was no more severe than the punishment prescribed at the time of his crimes. The court also found that the law of the case doctrine barred reconsideration of Henderson's petition for resentencing as to his murder conviction, as the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Curiel did not constitute a significant change in the law regarding direct aider and abettor liability.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, directing the Superior Court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment accurately. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In 1991, Maurice Jackson was convicted of the first-degree murders of Johnny Castaneda, Timothy Treas, and Claudia Blackmon, along with multiple other charges including kidnapping, robbery, and burglary. The jury found true the special circumstance allegations for the murders of Castaneda and Treas but not for Blackmon. Jackson was sentenced to life without parole.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Jackson's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows for resentencing if a defendant could not be convicted of murder under current law. The court denied the petition at the prima facie stage for the murders of Castaneda and Treas, relying on the jury's special circumstance findings. For Blackmon's murder, the court issued an order to show cause but denied the petition without a hearing, finding Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders, as the jury's special circumstance findings did not necessarily establish all elements required under current law. The appellate court also found that the trial court's failure to hold a hearing for the Blackmon murder was prejudicial error, as Jackson was entitled to be present and potentially testify.The appellate court reversed the trial court's rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court must hold a hearing for the Blackmon murder and issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing for the Castaneda and Treas murders, applying the correct legal standards under current law. View "P. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Medtronic USA, Inc. (Medtronic) manufactures insertable cardiac monitors (RICMs) that are implanted in a patient's chest to monitor heart rhythms and detect cardiac arrhythmias. The California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (Tax Department) collected sales tax on these devices. Medtronic argued that the devices should be exempt from sales tax under Revenue and Taxation Code section 6369 and Regulation 1591, which define "medicines" exempt from tax. After exhausting administrative remedies, Medtronic filed a lawsuit seeking a refund of the collected taxes, totaling $3,329,195.79, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Tax Department.The trial court ruled that the RICMs did not qualify as "medicines" under the relevant tax exemption statutes and regulations. Medtronic appealed the decision, arguing that both the Tax Department and the trial court misinterpreted the law. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the RICMs are not exempt from sales tax. The court found that the devices are classified as "instruments, apparatus, contrivances, appliances, devices, or other mechanical, electronic, optical, or physical equipment," which are explicitly excluded from the definition of "medicines" under section 6369, subdivision (b)(2). Additionally, the court determined that the RICMs do not "assist the functioning of any natural organ" as required by subdivision (c)(2) for exemption, as their primary function is diagnostic rather than directly aiding organ function. The court emphasized that tax exemptions must be clearly mandated by statute and are strictly construed against the taxpayer. View "Medtronic USA v. Department of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law

The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) awarded a contract to OC 405 Partners Joint Venture (OC 405) for improvements to Interstate 405. OC 405 then awarded subcontracting work to Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB). However, the parties disagreed on the scope of the subcontract work and did not execute a written subcontract. OC 405 subsequently contracted with another subcontractor, leading GSB to file a lawsuit seeking benefit of the bargain damages, claiming OC 405 did not comply with Public Contract Code section 4107’s substitution procedures.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of OC 405 and other defendants, holding that GSB was not entitled to the protections of section 4107 because it did not meet the requirements of section 4100 et seq. Specifically, GSB was not a "listed subcontractor" in the original bid, and its proposed work did not exceed one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor’s total bid, a threshold requirement under section 4104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that section 4107’s substitution procedures did not apply to OC 405’s substitution of GSB. The court emphasized that the protections of section 4100 et seq. only apply to subcontractors whose proposed work exceeds the one-half of 1 percent threshold of the prime contractor’s total bid. Since GSB’s bid did not meet this threshold, it was not entitled to the protections under section 4107. The court also noted that the contractual provisions in the prime contract did not alter this statutory requirement. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction" on Justia Law

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law

Carlos and Ana Carachure filed a lawsuit against the City of Azusa, claiming the City violated article XIII D of the California Constitution by charging sewer and trash franchise fees that exceeded the cost of providing those services and using the fees to fund general city services. The City argued that the Carachures failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because they did not follow the statutory procedures for a refund, which require paying the fees under protest and filing a claim for a refund. The trial court agreed with the City and entered judgment in its favor.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that the Carachures were required to file a claim for a refund with the City before seeking judicial relief, as they claimed the fees were illegally collected or assessed. The court denied the Carachures' petition for a writ of mandate and entered judgment for the City. The Carachures filed a motion for a new trial and to vacate the judgment, arguing the trial court relied on inapplicable property tax cases and the current version of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The trial court denied the motion.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Carachures' constitutional challenge to the City's collection and use of franchise fees seeks relief outside the scope of the statutory claims procedure for refunds. The court concluded that the Carachures did not have to file a claim for a refund before bringing this action, as their challenge was not an action for a refund governed by section 5472 and Article 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The judgment was reversed, allowing the Carachures to proceed with their constitutional claims. View "Carachure v. City of Azusa" on Justia Law

Fell Holdings LLC and Stanyan Holdings LLC, misdescribed as California limited liability companies instead of Delaware limited liability companies, filed unlawful detainer proceedings against Fell Street Automotive Clinic, Stanyan Street Automotive Clinic, and Laurence Nasey. Nasey had lost ownership of two properties in San Francisco during a nonjudicial foreclosure but continued operating his businesses through a leaseback arrangement with the new owners, memorialized in a settlement agreement. The agreement allowed Nasey to repurchase the properties, with stipulated judgments against him if he failed to do so.The trial court entered judgments in favor of Fell Holdings and Stanyan Holdings, which were later enforced. Appellants moved to vacate these judgments, arguing that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status deprived the court of jurisdiction, rendering all judicial actions void. The trial court denied the vacatur motions.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the misdescription of the plaintiffs' corporate status did not automatically void the judgments. Instead, the issue was whether the discrepancy could be cured by amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). The court reversed the trial court's orders denying the vacatur motions and remanded the case, directing the trial court to vacate the judgments and enforcement orders without prejudice. The trial court was instructed to consider any motions by the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to correct the misdescription and to address appellants' arguments regarding the release of Nasey's $202,500 earnest money deposit. The parties were to bear their own costs on appeal. View "1215 Fell SF Owner LLC v. Fell Street Automotive Clinic" on Justia Law

In 1997, Kenneth Griggs was convicted by a jury of forcible rape, forcible penetration with a foreign object, and false imprisonment. He admitted to having three prior convictions that were both strikes and serious felonies. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 35 years to life, including a determinate term of 10 years for two of the priors.The Sacramento County Superior Court, on its own motion, recalled Griggs' sentence under section 1172.1, which had been amended by Assembly Bill No. 600 to allow courts to resentence defendants if applicable sentencing laws change. The presiding judge noted that courts now have discretion to strike five-year priors, which was not the case when Griggs was originally sentenced. The matter was assigned for a resentencing hearing, and the District Attorney appealed the recall order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the recall order was not appealable under section 1238, subdivision (a)(5), because it did not affect the substantial rights of the People at this stage. The court noted that the recall order merely permitted a resentencing hearing and did not determine whether Griggs' sentence would change. The court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the prosecution's right to appeal in a criminal case is strictly limited by statute and that the recall order did not yet impact the enforcement of the judgment or the prosecution's substantial rights. View "P. v. Griggs" on Justia Law

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law