Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the plaintiff was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary after he drove accomplices to a location where a planned marijuana theft resulted in the victim’s death. The evidence showed he participated in planning and facilitating the crime, and the jury found him guilty under both aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories. The conviction and sentence of 26 years to life were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. Later, in an uncontested habeas proceeding, the murder conviction was reduced to second degree and the sentence reduced accordingly.Following legislative changes in 2018 that redefined murder under Senate Bill No. 1437 and created a process for retroactive relief, the trial court vacated the plaintiff’s murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6 and resentenced him on the remaining charges. Having served more time than the revised sentence required, he was released. The plaintiff then applied to the California Victim Compensation Board, seeking compensation under Penal Code section 4900 for time served beyond his new sentence, arguing he was “innocent” under the current definition of murder.The Board denied his application, finding he did not allege innocence under the law as it stood at the time of his conviction and that his claim did not state a cognizable basis for relief. The Board also relied on a regulation allowing dismissal of such claims without a hearing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied his writ petition challenging both the Board’s decision and the validity of the regulation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed. It held that compensation under section 4900 requires an “erroneous conviction,” and a conviction valid when rendered does not become erroneous due to subsequent legislative changes. The court also upheld the Board’s regulation as consistent with its statutory authority. View "Gardner v. Cal. Victim Comp. Bd." on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a contract in which a company specializing in vehicle emissions testing equipment agreed to supply and install its products in a facility being constructed by a general contractor for a state agency. After receiving substantial payments, the equipment supplier sought additional compensation through arbitration. The general contractor defended by arguing that the supplier was not properly licensed as required by California’s Contractors State Licensing Law (CSLL), and thus could not recover payment. The supplier then initiated a lawsuit seeking a judicial declaration that it was exempt from the CSLL’s licensing requirements because its equipment did not become a “fixed part of the structure,” referencing an exemption in the law.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The general contractor argued the exemption did not apply because the equipment became permanently affixed to the building, and the supplier had performed work before obtaining a license. The supplier contended its products were portable and not intended to be permanent fixtures, and that it acted as an equipment installer exempt under the law. The superior court granted summary judgment for the general contractor, finding that the evidence showed the equipment did become a fixed part of the structure and thus the supplier needed a contractor’s license.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found the lower court erred by deciding as a matter of law that the exemption did not apply. The appellate court held that whether the equipment became a fixed part of the structure is a factual question, not one suitable for summary judgment on the record before it. Because there was conflicting evidence—including expert declarations—on this issue, the trial court should have permitted the factual dispute to be resolved by a trier of fact. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AVL Test Systems v. Hensel Phelps Construction" on Justia Law

The case involves an attorney who, after being voluntarily dismissed as a defendant in a legal malpractice and fraud lawsuit brought by his former client, later sued that client for malicious prosecution. The client, who speaks and reads only Japanese, had previously alleged that the attorney’s actions led her to accept an unfavorable settlement in an estate dispute. After receiving a letter from the attorney’s counsel asserting that the malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations and warning of potential malicious prosecution liability, the client dismissed her lawsuit with prejudice.When the attorney sued for malicious prosecution, the client moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. In support, she submitted a declaration stating her main motivation for dismissal was concern about the statute of limitations, and her counsel offered a similar declaration. The attorney objected, arguing that the client’s declaration was incompetent because she could not read or write English, and no interpreter’s attestation was provided. The Superior Court overruled this objection, finding no such attestation was required for written declarations, and granted summary judgment for the client on the basis that the dismissal was procedural and thus not a favorable termination for malicious prosecution.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the client’s declaration as competent evidence. The appellate court held that, since the client could not read or speak English, her declaration required a proper foundation, including an interpreter’s attestation regarding the translation’s accuracy and the interpreter’s qualifications. Without this foundation, the declaration could not establish the client’s reasons for dismissal, and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. The appellate court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower court to deny the summary judgment motion. View "Detrick v. Shimada" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was injured in a collision with a vehicle driven by a physician employed by a medical group. The accident occurred on a Monday morning while the physician was driving her personal vehicle from home to her office at the medical center, stopping briefly at a dry cleaner for a personal errand. The physician’s employment permitted her to work from home part of the week, but on Mondays, she worked exclusively at the office. The injured bicyclist sued the physician and her employer, alleging the employer was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that the “going and coming rule” applied. This rule generally exempts employers from liability for torts committed by employees while commuting to and from work. The court found no evidence that the physician was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, and no exception to the rule applied. The court also overruled evidentiary objections raised by the plaintiff, including objections to call and text logs showing no work-related communications at the time of the accident.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment. The appellate court held that the employer met its burden on summary judgment by providing uncontradicted evidence that the physician was commuting to work and not performing job duties at the time of the accident. The plaintiff failed to offer admissible evidence creating a triable issue of fact. The court also rejected the argument that the physician’s ability to sometimes work remotely converted her home into a second worksite for all purposes. Thus, the going and coming rule barred employer liability, and summary judgment was properly granted. View "Chang v. So. Cal. Permanente Medical Group" on Justia Law

A bail bond surety posted a $180,000 bond to secure the release of a criminal defendant. When the defendant failed to appear in court, the Superior Court of San Diego County ordered the bond forfeited and notified the surety. The surety later located the defendant in custody in Texas and informed the district attorney, who chose to extradite the defendant back to San Diego County. The defendant was returned to local custody, and the district attorney sought to recover the costs of extradition from the surety as a condition of exonerating the bond.After the defendant was returned to San Diego, his counsel appeared on his behalf in court pursuant to Penal Code section 977, which allows for appearance by counsel under certain circumstances. The court conditionally exonerated the bond, stating that exoneration was subject to payment of the extradition costs. Subsequent hearings addressed the proper amount of costs and competing motions by the surety to vacate the forfeiture and by the People to recover costs. The Superior Court ultimately denied the surety’s motion and granted the district attorney’s motion, ordering the surety to pay the extradition costs.On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the defendant’s appearance through counsel was sufficient under Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (c)(1), to require exoneration of the bond. The court further held that conditioning exoneration on payment of actual extradition costs was proper under Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (b), and rejected arguments that the court lacked jurisdiction to order those costs or that the bond was exonerated by operation of law. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s order, including the award of costs to the People. View "P. v. The North River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A local air quality management district initiated legal action against an engineering company, its chief executive officer, and a related business, alleging they committed statutory and regulatory violations connected to their agricultural service operations. The district claimed that the defendants failed to correct their conduct after being issued several notices of violation for operating equipment without proper permits and failing to comply with emission controls. The defendants, in response, asserted that the notices were based on an internal district policy that had not been properly adopted through the required public rulemaking procedures.The defendants filed a cross-complaint in the Superior Court of Yolo County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that the district relied on a “secret” policy (Policy 24) not properly promulgated under statutory procedures, which unfairly deprived them of certain agricultural exemptions. The district responded with an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion under section 425.16, asserting that the cross-complaint targeted protected regulatory and legal activities, including the investigation, issuance of notices, and initiation of litigation. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the cross-complaint was a challenge to the validity of the underlying policy, not to the enforcement actions themselves.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the cross-complaint arose from activities protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the causes of action in the cross-complaint were directed at the validity of the district’s internal policy rather than at the district’s protected enforcement activities. Therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded costs on appeal to the defendants. View "People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist." on Justia Law

A senior director was employed by a space exploration company from 2020 until his termination in 2022. Upon hiring, he signed an employee agreement containing a broad arbitration provision requiring most disputes with the company and its affiliates to be resolved by arbitration, with some exceptions. After his termination, the employee filed a lawsuit alleging, among other claims, sexual/gender discrimination, sexual/gender harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The company moved to compel arbitration under the agreement, while the employee argued that the arbitration provision was both unconscionable and unenforceable under federal law.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the motion and found that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) applied, concluding that the employee’s allegations sufficiently stated discrimination based on gender. On this basis, the court denied the company’s motion to compel arbitration, without reaching the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The company filed a timely appeal from the denial of its motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the order de novo. The appellate court concluded that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability was established because the agreement was a contract of adhesion, presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no real opportunity for negotiation. Substantive unconscionability resulted from the agreement’s overbroad coverage, lack of mutuality, waiver of the right to a jury trial, and waiver of representative actions, including those under the Private Attorneys General Act. The court found that severance was not an appropriate remedy because the unconscionable provisions were pervasive and central to the agreement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with felony grand theft and, as part of a plea agreement, admitted to additional probation violations and a misdemeanor. He agreed to serve jail time contingent on possible release to a treatment program, subject to assessment. The trial court subsequently placed him on probation with several conditions, including one that permitted the probation department to transfer him to jail for up to 120 days—without court involvement—if he failed to successfully complete a treatment program. This condition further stated that he would not receive credit for time spent in treatment unless he completed the program.After the trial court imposed these conditions, including the challenged provision, the defendant’s probation was revoked due to his absconding from treatment, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was later apprehended and appealed the probation condition, arguing that it unlawfully delegated judicial authority to the probation department and was unconstitutionally vague regarding custody credits. Although the trial court later terminated his probation and credited him for all time spent in custody and treatment, the appeal continued based on the public interest and recurring nature of the legal questions presented.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court’s probation condition unconstitutionally delegated excessive judicial authority to the probation department by allowing it to determine and impose significant sanctions without court oversight. The court further concluded that, in the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver, the defendant could not be denied custody credits for time spent in residential treatment, even if he did not successfully complete the program. Because these issues are likely to recur, the appellate court reached the merits but ultimately dismissed the appeal as moot, since the defendant had already received the credits in question. View "P. v. Emrick" on Justia Law

An employee brought a lawsuit against her former employer and related entities, alleging wrongful termination, unfair business practices, and Labor Code violations stemming from her work as a massage therapist. The plaintiff later sought to amend her complaint to add several new defendants, including the national franchisor associated with her workplace, after obtaining new information through discovery and depositions. The franchisor, Massage Envy, was added after the plaintiff learned it may have influenced employment practices and the sale of the business. However, the initial amended complaint lacked specific factual allegations against Massage Envy.After the plaintiff conceded the factual deficiencies regarding Massage Envy, she sought leave to amend her complaint again. Massage Envy filed a demurrer, arguing not only that the complaint was deficient but also that there was no viable legal basis for liability. The parties disagreed over the adequacy of their meet-and-confer efforts. The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer but granted leave to amend, conditioning this leave on the plaintiff’s payment of $25,000 in attorney fees to Massage Envy, relying on section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter. It held that section 473 does not authorize a trial court to condition leave to amend a pleading on payment of attorney fees to the opposing party, absent a statutory provision or party agreement. The appellate court clarified that section 473 only allows for the shifting of costs, not attorney fees, and that attorney fee awards as sanctions require specific statutory authority and procedural compliance. The appellate court granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to strike the payment condition for attorney fees and awarded costs to the petitioner. View "Amezcua v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A man was convicted in 2008 after pleading no contest to rape and other forcible sex offenses committed against a woman at knifepoint. He was sentenced under California Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c), to an aggregate term of 50 years in prison, consisting of full, consecutive terms for each offense and a weapon enhancement, pursuant to a plea agreement. After serving 15 years, he received a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (b)(1), which allows such hearings for offenders who committed their crimes at age 25 or younger. The victim participated in the hearing to oppose parole, and parole was denied, but a new hearing was set.The victim and a crime victims’ advocacy organization filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking to block the parole hearing and to prevent enforcement of section 3051 for any prisoner sentenced under section 667.6, subdivisions (c) or (d). They argued that section 3051 was unconstitutional as applied to such offenders because it amended a voter initiative statute (Proposition 83) without the required two-thirds legislative approval or voter approval, in violation of the California Constitution. The superior court assumed the victim had standing but not the advocacy group, and denied the petition, finding that Proposition 83 did not substantively amend section 667.6, subdivision (c).The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. It held that Proposition 83 made only technical, not substantive, changes to section 667.6, subdivisions (c) and (d), and that the statutory scheme for consecutive sentencing of sex offenses was not integral to the initiative’s goals. Therefore, the enactment of Penal Code section 3051 was not an unconstitutional amendment. The appellate court affirmed the judgment denying the petition. View "Jessica M. v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation" on Justia Law