Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Shalome Kaushansky, retained Stonecroft Attorneys, APC, to represent her in a legal action against her landlord due to various issues during her tenancy, including water leaks, mold, electrical problems, and harassment. Stonecroft filed a complaint but failed to advance the case, conduct discovery, or respond to the landlord's discovery requests. Shortly before the trial, Stonecroft withdrew from the case, leading Kaushansky to settle for $2,500.Kaushansky then sued Stonecroft for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair competition. The Los Angeles County Superior Court found in favor of Kaushansky, awarding her $91,734.29 for professional negligence and $25,000 for breach of fiduciary duty, totaling $116,734.29. The court found Stonecroft failed to plead all applicable causes of action, conduct discovery, and protect Kaushansky from foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal. However, the court ruled in favor of Stonecroft on the unfair competition claim and declined to award punitive damages.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the $91,734.29 award for professional negligence, finding no substantial evidence that Kaushansky could have collected this amount from her landlord. The court noted that Kaushansky failed to prove the landlord's solvency or the collectibility of a hypothetical judgment. However, the court affirmed the $25,000 award for breach of fiduciary duty, finding substantial evidence that Stonecroft's withdrawal constituted intentional misconduct, justifying emotional distress damages. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with each party bearing its own costs on appeal. View "Kaushansky v. Stonecroft Attorneys, APC" on Justia Law

Carlos Faustinos appealed the trial court's order declining to act on his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1. Faustinos had pled guilty to forcible rape in 2019 and was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. In 2023, he petitioned for resentencing, citing recent ameliorative sentencing laws, but the trial court took no action, stating it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.The trial court's decision was based on the fact that under section 1172.1, a defendant is not entitled to seek relief, and the court is not required to respond to such a request. The trial court's order declining to act on the petition is not an appealable order. This is consistent with longstanding precedent that orders responding to unauthorized motions invoking section 1172.1’s predecessor are not appealable.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order is not appealable. The court explained that the right to appeal is determined by statute, and an order after a judgment in a criminal case is appealable only if it affects the substantial rights of the party. Since a defendant is not entitled to file a petition under section 1172.1, and the court is not required to respond, the trial court's order does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The court also noted that a recent statutory amendment allowing a trial court to act on its own motion under section 1172.1 does not change the non-appealability of an order on a defendant’s unauthorized petition. View "People v. Faustinos" on Justia Law

Volcano Telephone Company, a rural telephone service provider, receives subsidies from the California High-Cost Fund-A (A-Fund) administered by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Volcano Vision, Inc., an affiliate, uses Volcano Telephone’s broadband-capable facilities, subsidized by the A-Fund, to deliver broadband services without contributing to the underlying costs. The PUC considered Volcano Vision’s net revenues in setting Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and future rates. The PUC also required Volcano Telephone to submit broadband service quality metrics related to Volcano Vision’s services.The PUC issued Decision No. 23-02-008, calculating Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and approving rates for 2023. Volcano Telephone and Volcano Vision challenged this decision, arguing that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation constituted an unconstitutional taking and conflicted with federal law. They also contended that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was outside the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The PUC denied rehearing and modified the decision to clarify the reporting requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected the petitioners’ claims, affirming Decision Nos. 23-02-008 and 23-08-051. The court held that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking, as the A-Fund program is voluntary, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the rate of return was confiscatory. The court also found that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was within the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The court concluded that the PUC’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and did not violate any constitutional rights. View "Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

A.J. began experiencing auditory hallucinations around 2010, leading to multiple hospitalizations and incarcerations. Diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2023, he was found mentally incompetent to stand trial on various charges. The criminal court vacated the incompetency order and directed the Public Guardian to investigate an LPS conservatorship. The Public Guardian filed a petition, citing A.J.'s grave disability due to mental health and substance abuse disorders. A.J.'s psychiatrist and social worker testified about his lack of insight into his illness, unwillingness to take medication, and history of aggressive behavior.The trial court appointed a temporary conservator in 2024. During a jury trial, the social worker and psychiatrist testified about A.J.'s inability to maintain housing due to his mental illness and aggressive behavior. The jury found A.J. gravely disabled. The trial court then appointed the Public Guardian as his conservator, granting the power to place him in a psychiatric or other state-licensed facility.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. A.J. argued that the Public Guardian's closing argument improperly suggested he was unable to provide shelter due to past involuntary detentions and that the trial court improperly delegated the duty to designate the least restrictive placement. The court disagreed with A.J.'s first argument, finding no authority to support his claim and noting that the Public Guardian's argument was based on multiple factors. However, the court agreed that the trial court failed to designate the least restrictive placement, as required by law. The court remanded the case for the trial court to designate the least restrictive placement but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "In re Conservatorship of the Person of A.J." on Justia Law

Six4Three, LLC developed an app called "Pikinis" that allowed users to search for photos of people in bathing suits on Facebook. Six4Three sued Facebook, Inc. and six individuals, alleging a "bait-and-switch" scheme where Facebook initially provided developers with access to data but later restricted it. Six4Three claimed this restriction harmed their business.The case began in April 2015, with Six4Three filing against Facebook. Facebook responded with demurrers, leading to multiple amended complaints. The trial court allowed new causes of action but not new defendants. Six4Three filed a third amended complaint and sought to add individual defendants through a writ of mandate. The trial court sustained some demurrers and granted summary adjudication on certain damages. Six4Three's fourth amended complaint included eight causes of action against Facebook. Facebook filed an anti-SLAPP motion, and the trial court initially denied it as untimely but granted the individual defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. On appeal, the denial of Facebook's motion was affirmed, but the individual defendants' motion was remanded for reconsideration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Facebook's untimely anti-SLAPP motion after granting the individual defendants' motion. The court also held that Six4Three failed to demonstrate the commercial speech exception to the anti-SLAPP statute and did not show a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court affirmed the trial court's orders granting the anti-SLAPP motions and awarding $683,417.50 in attorney fees to the defendants. The court concluded that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred Six4Three's non-contract claims and that Six4Three did not show a probability of prevailing on its breach of contract claim. View "Six4Three v. Facebook" on Justia Law

Catherine Kuo was killed while volunteering at a food distribution event organized by the Dublin Unified School District (DUSD). Her family and estate sued DUSD for negligence and premises liability, alleging failure to implement and communicate safety protocols. DUSD moved for summary judgment, arguing that Labor Code section 3364.5, which deems school volunteers as employees entitled to workers' compensation benefits, barred the plaintiffs' claims.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, granted DUSD’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that section 3364.5 applied, providing that workers' compensation was the sole remedy for any injury, including death, sustained by volunteers while performing their duties. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history supported this interpretation, and thus, it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the term "any injury" in section 3364.5 unambiguously includes fatal injuries. The court also determined that DUSD’s resolution, which declared volunteers entitled to workers' compensation benefits, satisfied the statutory requirement, even though it did not explicitly use the word "deemed." The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the statute did not apply because DUSD did not treat its volunteers as employees in practice, noting that the statute did not require such conduct.The appellate court concluded that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DUSD, affirming that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claims. View "Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

David Wayne Gray was convicted by a jury of second-degree burglary of a vehicle, attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle, conspiracy to commit theft, vandalism, and possession of burglar’s tools. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of five years and four months. Gray appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for second-degree burglary of a vehicle and attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle.The Superior Court of Placer County declared a mistrial on the grand theft charge but found Gray guilty on all other counts. The court also found true the allegations of a prior strike and that Gray had served a prior prison term. Gray's motion to dismiss the prior strike was denied, and he was sentenced accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Gray contended that cutting the locks on the exterior compartments of the trucks did not constitute entering the vehicles under Penal Code section 459. The court disagreed, referencing the legislative intent to treat entry into locked vehicles more harshly than simple theft. The court found that the locked compartments and bins on the trucks were analogous to a car trunk, which has been previously ruled as part of the vehicle's interior for burglary purposes. The court concluded that Gray's actions of cutting the locks to access the enclosed cargo areas and bins constituted entry into locked vehicles.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Gray's convictions for second-degree burglary of a vehicle and attempted second-degree burglary of a vehicle. View "People v. Gray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff K.C. alleged that she was sexually abused while in foster care under the custody of the County of Merced. The abuse occurred in two separate foster homes between 1971 and 1977. K.C. claimed that she reported the abuse to her social worker, but no corrective action was taken, resulting in continued abuse. She filed a complaint citing negligent acts and omissions by the County and its employees, which she argued proximately caused her injuries.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the County's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of K.C.'s complaint with prejudice. The court found that the County and its employees were protected by discretionary immunity under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2, which shield public employees and entities from liability for discretionary acts.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the social workers' decisions regarding the investigation of child abuse and the continuation of foster home placements were discretionary acts protected by immunity. The court emphasized that these decisions involved the exercise of judgment and policy considerations, which are shielded from liability to ensure that public employees can perform their duties without fear of civil suits. Consequently, the County was also immune from liability under the derivative immunity provided by Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b). View "K.C. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

The case involves defendant Prospero Guadalupe Serna, who was found guilty by a jury of two misdemeanors: knowingly resisting arrest and willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The incident occurred when a California Highway Patrol officer encountered Serna walking within traffic lanes. Despite the officer's attempts to guide Serna to safety, Serna resisted multiple times, leading to his eventual detention with the help of additional officers. Serna's defense argued that his mental health issues should have been considered to negate the knowledge requirement for the offenses.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case, where Serna claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his attorney failed to introduce his mental health records and did not request a jury instruction regarding mental defects affecting intent. The appellate division held that since the crimes were of general intent, evidence of mental disease was not admissible to show lack of specific intent. The court also noted a split in authority regarding whether the offense required actual knowledge that the person resisted was a peace officer.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case to resolve whether Penal Code section 148(a)(1) requires actual knowledge that the person being resisted is a peace officer. The court found the analysis in People v. Mackreth persuasive, which held that section 148(a)(1) does not require actual knowledge. Instead, it is sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the person was a police officer. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the statute does not necessitate the defendant's actual knowledge of the officer's status. View "People v. Serna" on Justia Law

Several skilled nursing facilities challenged the State Department of Health Care Services and its director, Michelle Baass, over the formula used to calculate Medi-Cal reimbursement overpayments. The plaintiffs argued that the Department's method, which was based on the amount Medicare paid for ancillary services rather than the amount Medi-Cal overpaid, violated a ministerial duty and constituted an underground regulation.The trial court sustained the Department's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim was not cognizable in a traditional writ of mandate proceeding. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the Department violated a ministerial duty or adopted an underground regulation. Additionally, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery of certain documents, deeming them privileged.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that some of the plaintiffs' claims were indeed cognizable in a traditional writ of mandate proceeding and that the petition stated a claim for relief regarding the Department's use of an underground regulation when calculating Medi-Cal reimbursement overpayments. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did not provide an adequate record to review whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery.The appellate court reversed the judgment of dismissal and affirmed the trial court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel. The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order sustaining the Department's demurrer without leave to amend and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "California Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center v. Baass" on Justia Law