Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns two children whose parents were subject to dependency proceedings after allegations of domestic violence and failure to protect were brought by a county child welfare agency. The children were ultimately removed from their parents' custody and placed with extended family members. Over the course of the proceedings, the social services department conducted multiple inquiries with both parents and a number of extended family members about possible Native American heritage, as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law. Each person asked denied any such heritage.After the initial dependency petition, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the allegations, ordered reunification services, and later returned the children to their parents. Following further incidents of domestic violence, the children were again removed, and supplemental petitions were sustained. The agency continued its ICWA inquiry, interviewing additional family members but did not specifically question the paternal grandfather, though he was interviewed on other subjects. The Superior Court terminated parental rights after finding the children adoptable and determined there was no reason to know the children were Indian children under ICWA.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether the agency’s failure to inquire specifically of the paternal grandfather required reversal of the order terminating parental rights. The court held that, under the standard articulated in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, a finding that the initial ICWA inquiry was adequate is supported by substantial evidence where the agency interviewed the parents and several extended family members, even if not every possible relative was asked. The court found the agency’s efforts sufficient and affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re Bella L." on Justia Law

An investor brought a derivative action against the managers of a limited liability company, alleging unauthorized transactions conducted under their management. After a bench trial, the investor lost both at trial and on appeal. The investor’s claims were rejected, and the court awarded costs to the prevailing manager. Although both managers were originally involved in the case, only one remained relevant for the cost award proceedings at this stage.Following the trial and appellate losses, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County awarded costs to the prevailing manager under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.891, which together provide that a prevailing party is generally entitled to recover costs. The plaintiff had previously defeated the manager’s motion for a security bond under Corporations Code section 17709.02, a statute intended to deter frivolous derivative suits. The plaintiff argued that this earlier success on the bond motion should bar any subsequent award of costs, claiming that section 17709.02 overrides the ordinary cost rules.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed this argument. The appellate court held that Corporations Code section 17709.02 does not preclude an award of ordinary litigation costs to a prevailing defendant in a derivative action where the bond motion was denied. The court found no statutory language supporting the plaintiff’s position and noted that case law, including Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., confirms that the bond statute is special-purpose and does not displace general cost-recovery rules. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, awarding costs to the prevailing defendant. The court also found that the plaintiff had forfeited several additional arguments by failing to support them with adequate briefing or legal authority. View "Barrios v. Chraghchian" on Justia Law

A father and mother, previously married and sharing a child, were involved in an ongoing custody arrangement. After initial divorce proceedings, the mother was permitted unmonitored visitation with the child. In late 2023 and early 2024, the father alleged that the mother’s behavior had become increasingly erratic, including stalking, repeated unwanted visits to his home, entering his residence and car without permission, incessant calls and texts, following him and the child in her car, and making threats related to his employment and family. The father stated these actions caused fear for both himself and their child, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and restored monitored visitation for the mother. The mother denied the allegations, attributing her actions to concern for the child’s safety and referencing her mental health history.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard testimony from both parties and considered evidence including text messages, videos, and the mother’s admissions. The court acknowledged that the mother’s conduct was obsessive and alarming but found that the behavior stemmed from her mental health condition rather than malicious intent. The court concluded that the father had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother’s actions constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), specifically focusing on whether her conduct was intentionally threatening or intimidating. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professionally monitored visitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, found that the trial court misapplied the standard for abuse under the DVPA by requiring proof of intent to threaten or intimidate, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances and the effect of the conduct. The appellate court held that the uncontradicted evidence established abuse as defined by the DVPA and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding with directions to enter the requested DVRO. View "R.R. v. C.R." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff purchased a new Hyundai vehicle that experienced repeated mechanical issues, leading to seven repair attempts over 19 months. After the buyer or his wife requested Hyundai repurchase the vehicle, it was involved in a collision and declared a total loss. The wife’s insurer paid her for the vehicle’s loss. The plaintiffs—comprised of the buyer and his wife—then sued Hyundai under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging breach of express warranty, among other claims. After some claims were dismissed, only the express warranty claim proceeded to trial.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed the wife to join as a plaintiff, even after finding she was not the buyer, based on the belief that prior precedent allowed her to proceed. The jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs, awarding damages and prejudgment interest, but the court reduced the damages by the amount of the insurance payment and adjusted the interest calculation. Both sides filed post-trial motions regarding prejudgment interest and costs, and both appealed aspects of the judgment and cost rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that only a “buyer” as defined by the Act has standing to pursue claims under it; since the wife was not a buyer, she lacked standing and should not have been a party. The court also ruled that insurance payouts received after a vehicle is totaled cannot reduce the statutory restitution owed by the manufacturer under the Act. Additionally, the court found that prejudgment interest is available under Civil Code section 3288. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest and reconsideration of costs. View "Towns v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

On a rainy night in March 2020, the plaintiff was catastrophically injured while sleeping in a truck driven by his co-worker, both of whom were transporting plasticware from New Jersey to California. The truck, owned and operated by Alliance, a federally licensed motor carrier, crashed on a highway near Oklahoma City. The transportation had been arranged by XPO Logistics, LLC, a federally licensed property broker, which was hired by Sabert Corporation to facilitate shipping but did not own trucks or employ drivers. XPO contracted with Alliance to perform the transport, and Alliance assigned the plaintiff and his co-worker to drive the shipment.After the accident, the plaintiff sued XPO in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging negligence based on claims that XPO exercised control over the transport and owed a nondelegable duty to maintain a safe workplace. XPO moved for summary judgment, arguing it was solely a broker and not responsible for the carrier’s employee safety. The trial court granted summary judgment for XPO, finding the evidence undisputed that XPO acted as a broker, not a carrier, and did not control Alliance’s transport operations. The trial court also excluded plaintiff’s expert declaration, which had applied the wrong legal standard.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the judgment. The court held that under California law, a broker who hires an independent contractor carrier generally owes no duty of care to the carrier’s employees for workplace injuries, unless the broker has a nondelegable duty or retains and exercises control over the work. The court found no triable issues of fact supporting either exception, and further clarified that the federal Essex Insurance Company v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc. test for broker liability for cargo damage is irrelevant to personal injury claims under California law. The judgment for XPO was affirmed. View "Hu v. XPO Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

Daevieon Towns purchased a new Hyundai Elantra in 2016, and over the next 19 months, the car required multiple repairs for alleged electrical and engine defects. In March 2018, either Towns or his wife, Lashona Johnson, requested that Hyundai buy back the defective vehicle. Before Hyundai acted, the car was involved in a collision, declared a total loss, and Johnson’s insurance paid her $14,710.91.Towns initially sued Hyundai Motor America in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. As trial approached, Towns amended his complaint to add Johnson as a plaintiff, arguing she was the primary driver and responsible for the vehicle. The trial court allowed the amendment, finding Johnson was not a buyer but permitted her to proceed based on its interpretation of Patel v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. At trial, the jury found for Towns and Johnson, awarding damages and civil penalties. However, the court reduced the damages by the insurance payout and adjusted the prejudgment interest accordingly. Both parties challenged the judgment and costs in post-trial motions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that only a buyer has standing under the Act, so Johnson could not be a plaintiff. The court also held that third-party insurance payments do not reduce statutory damages under the Act, following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC. Furthermore, prejudgment interest is available under Civil Code section 3288 because Hyundai’s statutory obligations do not arise from contract. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to enter a modified judgment and reconsider costs. View "Towns v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested on October 2, 2021, for misdemeanor driving under the influence and was released after signing a citation promising to appear in court on December 14, 2021. The Riverside County District Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint on November 17, 2021. The defendant failed to appear on the scheduled date, resulting in a bench warrant for her arrest. After a subsequent stop and another citation, she failed to appear again, leading to another bench warrant. In March 2024, the defendant voluntarily contacted the court, had her matters calendared, and pled not guilty. She later filed a motion to dismiss, arguing her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated due to delays.The Riverside County Superior Court denied the motion, finding the defendant’s own failures to appear contributed to the delay. The defendant then sought review by petitioning the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The Appellate Division, in a divided opinion, held that the prosecution’s failure to file a formal complaint within 25 days as required by Penal Code section 853.6 deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction and automatically relieved the defendant of any obligation to appear. Based on this, it ordered the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider the motion to dismiss.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision. It held the lower court had abused its discretion by misinterpreting Penal Code section 853.6. The Court of Appeal clarified that the failure to file charges within 25 days did not relieve a defendant of the obligation to appear or deprive the court of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court issued a writ directing the Appellate Division to vacate its opinion and reconsider the defendant’s writ petition consistent with this interpretation. View "People v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee of California State University, Chico, filed suit against her prior employer and other parties alleging employment discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, and wrongful termination. She initiated the lawsuit on April 19, 2019. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310, as extended by Judicial Council emergency rule 10 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, she was required to bring her case to trial by October 19, 2024. However, at a case management conference in March 2024, the trial court scheduled the trial for February 3, 2025, a date beyond the statutory deadline.After the trial date was set, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to bring it to trial within the statutory period. They argued that no exception to the deadline applied, specifically contesting the existence of any oral agreement to extend the deadline. The plaintiff opposed dismissal, asserting that both parties had verbally agreed in open court to the February 2025 trial date, and that this agreement was recorded in the minute order. However, the minute order only documented the setting of the trial and related conferences, and contained no indication of any oral stipulation or agreement. The Superior Court of Butte County found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a valid oral agreement to extend the deadline under section 583.330, subdivision (b), and granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard, and interpreted the statute de novo. The appellate court held that an oral agreement to extend the statutory trial deadline under section 583.330, subdivision (b), must be reflected in the court’s minutes or a transcript. Because the record did not include any such evidence, the exception did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal and awarded costs to the defendants. View "Randolph v. Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged the validity of the City of La Habra’s February 2023 revision to its housing element, arguing that the modifications were adopted by the City Manager rather than the City Council and without additional public hearings. The housing element, part of the city’s general plan, is subject to periodic revision and state review. In this instance, after several public meetings and hearings on earlier drafts, the City Council adopted the housing element in September 2022 and authorized the City Manager to make further technical or clerical changes necessary for state certification. The City Manager subsequently approved additional revisions in February 2023, which were submitted to and certified by the Department of Housing and Community Development.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the nonprofit filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking to prohibit the City from treating the February 2023 version as validly adopted. The court denied the petition, finding that the City had met public participation requirements through hearings on prior drafts and online posting of the revised element. The trial court also ruled that the City Council validly delegated authority to the City Manager for minor revisions and determined that any procedural errors were harmless, as required by Government Code section 65010, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the judgment. The court held that additional public hearings were not required for the February 2023 modifications since they constituted part of the ongoing revision and certification process, rather than a distinct amendment. It further held that the City Council’s delegation of authority to the City Manager was valid and consistent with local law. Finally, the court found no prejudicial error or substantial harm resulted from the process used, upholding the presumption of validity following state certification. The judgment was affirmed. View "Californians for Homeownership v. City of La Habra" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Berkeley violated the Ralph M. Brown Act during three city council meetings in late 2023 and early 2024. At each meeting, disruptions from attendees prevented the council from conducting business. The mayor determined that order could not be restored by removing disruptive individuals but did not order the meeting room cleared. Instead, the meetings were recessed and reconvened in a different, smaller room. The press was allowed to attend in person, while the public could join by video, but the new location could not accommodate all nondisruptive members of the public. No attempt was made to restore order by removing disruptive individuals, nor was the meeting room ordered cleared.The Alameda County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, holding that section 54957.9 of the Brown Act does not require the city council to first attempt to remove disruptive individuals before determining that order cannot be restored. The trial court further found that the city council complied with the statute by recessing and reconvening the meetings in a different room with press attendance. The case was dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that, under section 54957.9, a legislative body may order the meeting room cleared and continue in session, but the statute does not authorize relocating the meeting to another room. The court found that recessing and reconvening in a new location is not equivalent to ordering the original meeting room cleared. Plaintiffs stated a claim for relief by alleging that the city council failed to order the meeting room cleared and instead moved the meetings. The judgment was reversed. View "Berkeley People's Alliance v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law