Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

D’Andre Lampkin, a deputy at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), filed a complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation after he reported an interaction with Michael Reddy, a retired deputy sheriff. Lampkin claimed that Reddy’s friends at LASD retaliated against him, leading to his suspension, a search of his residence, and termination of medical benefits. Lampkin sought monetary damages and other relief. The case went to trial, and the jury found that while Lampkin engaged in protected whistleblowing activity and this was a factor in LASD’s actions against him, LASD would have made the same decisions for legitimate, independent reasons. Consequently, the jury awarded no damages.Lampkin moved to amend his complaint to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, but the trial court denied the motion. He then filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party and sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the same-decision defense should not preclude a fee award, as held in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA cases. The trial court agreed, declared Lampkin the prevailing party, and awarded him costs and attorney’s fees.The County of Los Angeles appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The appellate court held that Lampkin did not bring a “successful action” under Labor Code section 1102.5 because he obtained no relief due to the County’s successful same-decision defense. Therefore, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The court also found that the County was the prevailing party under section 1032, as neither party obtained any relief, and thus Lampkin was not entitled to costs. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and order awarding fees and costs to Lampkin and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the County. View "Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Brooklyn Broadway pled guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter and hit-and-run causing death, while Ana Villanueva was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon, willful cruelty to an elder, and robbery. Both defendants were referred to the San Diego County Behavioral Health Court (BHC) for admission screening over the objections of the People. The People filed peremptory challenges against the assigned BHC judge, Judge Cynthia Davis, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, which Judge Davis denied, concluding that BHC proceedings do not involve contested issues of fact or law.The People sought writs of mandate from the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, to direct the trial court to grant their peremptory challenges. The appellate court issued orders to show cause and consolidated the petitions for review.The Court of Appeal held that BHC proceedings do involve contested issues of fact or law, as the BHC judge makes the final decision on whether to admit a defendant into the program, which can be contested by the parties involved. The court concluded that the BHC judge's role in screening and acceptance decisions, as well as in probation violation hearings, constitutes hearings involving contested issues of fact or law. Therefore, the People’s peremptory challenges were timely and appropriate.The Court of Appeal issued writs of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders denying the People’s peremptory challenges and to enter new orders granting the challenges. View "P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In August 2020, Armani Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement and was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, Miller filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule effective January 1, 2019. Miller contended that subsequent cases recognizing youth as a factor in determining reckless indifference to human life should apply to his case.The Superior Court of Alameda County denied Miller's petition, finding that he failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The court reasoned that Miller's plea and conviction occurred after the changes to the felony-murder rule, and thus, he could not benefit from the amendments. The court also noted that Miller's argument based on subsequent case law was not sufficient to meet the statutory requirements for relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because the amended information filed against him in January 2020 did not allow the prosecution to proceed under the old, now-invalid theory of felony murder. The court emphasized that the charging document required Miller to be a major participant in the kidnapping and to act with reckless indifference to human life, aligning with the amended felony-murder rule. Therefore, Miller could not establish a prima facie case for relief as he was not charged under a theory that imputed malice solely based on his participation in the crime. The court affirmed the denial of Miller's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law

Kheloud Allos filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Poway Unified School District (PUSD), alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code. Allos claimed that PUSD's refusal to allow her to work exclusively from home during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged that PUSD failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and retaliated against her in violation of the Labor Code.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted PUSD's motion for summary judgment, finding that Allos's claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, which provides immunity to public entities for decisions related to preventing disease or controlling its spread. The court also found that Allos failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding her disability, the essential functions of her job, and whether she experienced an adverse employment action. The court noted that PUSD had engaged in multiple interactive meetings with Allos and provided various accommodations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that section 855.4 provided immunity to PUSD for its decisions related to COVID-19 safety measures. The court also found that Allos failed to present evidence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, as her alleged vaccine allergy and other health conditions did not constitute a disability. Additionally, the court held that PUSD's interactive process and accommodations were reasonable and that Allos did not suffer an adverse employment action, as she voluntarily retired. The court concluded that Allos's claims for associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code violations were without merit. View "Allos v. Poway Unified School District" on Justia Law

In March 2021, the district attorneys of Riverside, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara counties filed a civil enforcement action against Credit One Bank, N.A. (Credit One) on behalf of the People of the State of California. The lawsuit alleged that Credit One engaged in debt collection practices that violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law. The People sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution, and other equitable relief. Credit One responded with written discovery requests and later noticed the deposition of the People’s person most qualified (PMQ) to testify on 25 topics, including two document requests.The trial court denied the People’s motion to quash the deposition notice but instructed them to refile it as a motion for a protective order. The court granted the protective order in part, limiting the deposition topics and document requests but requiring the People to designate a PMQ. The People challenged this order, arguing that they should not be subject to deposition under the Code of Civil Procedure and that the deposition would be tantamount to deposing opposing counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the People, represented by government agencies, are subject to deposition under section 2025.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the court agreed that deposing the People in this context is effectively deposing opposing counsel. Therefore, the court applied the standard from Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court, requiring Credit One to demonstrate “extremely” good cause for the deposition. The trial court had not applied this standard, so the appellate court granted the petition and ordered the trial court to reconsider the People’s motion for a protective order using the correct standard. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Credit One Bank)" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights to her daughter, C.R., born in December 2020. The father was not a party to the appeal. Mother did not challenge the merits of the court’s rulings but argued that the order terminating her parental rights should be conditionally reversed due to deficiencies in the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California statutes.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Juvenile Court Referee Juan M. Valles, had previously reviewed the case. The court detained C.R. from her parents in January 2021, sustained a section 300 petition, declared C.R. a dependent, and removed her from her parents’ custody. Mother was granted reunification services, which were later terminated in September 2023. The court denied mother’s section 388 petition in September 2024 and terminated her parental rights. Mother filed separate notices of appeal, which were consolidated for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that both the Department and the court had previously inquired about the family’s potential Indian ancestry during mother’s dependency case, and maternal grandmother had denied any Indian ancestry. The court concluded that the Department’s inquiry was adequate and that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that ICWA did not apply. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

Kenya Taylor hired Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) employee Tyler Martin-Brand to babysit her six-year-old son, Dayvon, during the winter break in 2019. Tragically, Martin-Brand killed Dayvon. Taylor sued LAUSD, alleging negligent hiring and supervision of Martin-Brand. A jury found in favor of Taylor, awarding her $30 million in damages. LAUSD appealed the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and the judgment itself.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied LAUSD's motions for JNOV and a new trial, asserting that LAUSD was immune from liability under Education Code section 44808. The jury had found LAUSD negligent in hiring and supervising Martin-Brand, attributing 90% of the fault to LAUSD and 10% to Taylor.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that LAUSD was immune from liability for Dayvon’s off-campus death under Education Code section 44808, which limits school district liability for student injuries occurring off school property unless the district has specifically undertaken responsibility for the student. The court found that Dayvon’s death did not occur during any school-sponsored activity or under LAUSD’s supervision. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's order and judgment, directing the trial court to enter judgment in favor of LAUSD. View "Taylor v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The Oakland Education Association (OEA) represents certain employees of the Oakland Unified School District (District). Following a dispute over school closures approved by the District, OEA members conducted a one-day strike. OEA filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), claiming the District committed unfair practices under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). The District filed a competing charge, claiming OEA’s strike was an unfair practice under EERA.PERB issued separate complaints for the competing charges and bifurcated the hearings. In its first decision, PERB found the District violated EERA. In its second decision, PERB held that OEA’s strike was legal because it was provoked by the District’s unfair practices and OEA had negotiated in good faith. The District did not challenge the first decision but contested the second, arguing that OEA’s strike was illegal and violated constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that public school employees may engage in unfair practice strikes under EERA. It concluded that PERB did not clearly err in finding that such strikes are allowed and that OEA’s one-day strike did not violate the rights to education, due process, or equal protection. The court also found that neither EERA nor the due process clause prohibits pre-impasse unfair practice strikes conducted before PERB determines an unfair practice has occurred. However, the court noted that PERB erred by excluding evidence of educational harm but deemed this error harmless. The court affirmed PERB’s decision. View "Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves siblings E.G., I.G., and K.G., who were found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court due to allegations of sexual abuse by their stepfather, Erick C. E.G., aged 11, reported the abuse after a school assembly on safety and boundaries. She disclosed that Erick C. had sexually abused her multiple times since she was six years old. E.G. provided detailed accounts of the abuse to her school counselor, police, and social workers. Despite initially denying the abuse to her mother, E.G. later recanted her allegations, claiming they were dreams influenced by movies her parents watched.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition alleging the children came under the court's jurisdiction due to Erick C.'s sexual abuse of E.G. and the risk it posed to her siblings. The juvenile court ordered the children released to their mother, with Erick C. required to stay away from E.G. During the investigation, E.G. recanted her allegations, influenced by family members who did not believe her and pressured her to change her story.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings, noting E.G.'s consistent and detailed reports of abuse to multiple individuals over time. The court determined that E.G.'s recantation lacked credibility due to family pressure and inconsistent reasons for recanting. The court upheld the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and the decision to declare the children dependents of the court, removing them from Erick C. and releasing them to their mother. The appeal by Erick C. was affirmed, and the court terminated jurisdiction with an exit order granting joint physical and legal custody to the parents. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. (CAG) filed two lawsuits under Proposition 65 against Walmart Inc. and Wal-Mart.com USA, LLC (collectively, Walmart), alleging that Walmart failed to warn consumers about products containing chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity. Michael Marcus, CAG’s Secretary and Chief Financial Officer, purchased the products online as a corporate agent for CAG. During the purchase process, Marcus agreed to Walmart’s Terms of Use, which included an arbitration clause.In the Alameda County Superior Court, Walmart filed petitions to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement Marcus accepted. The trial court denied Walmart’s petitions, concluding that Walmart failed to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate Proposition 65 claims, as the arbitration agreement only addressed the rights of the individual consumer and did not preclude an action brought by the state.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate a Proposition 65 claim against a seller of consumer products simply because an agent of the plaintiff previously agreed to arbitrate disputes with the seller when purchasing the products online. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s agent was not acting on behalf of the state, the real party in interest, when purchasing the products, and thus could not bind the state to arbitration. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying Walmart’s petitions to compel arbitration, as no agreement to arbitrate the Proposition 65 claims was formed. View "Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law