Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Raymundo Gomez was accused of committing lewd acts against three children at a public swimming pool. The key incidents involved Gomez allegedly bringing a 14-year-old boy’s hand into contact with his genitals and, separately, touching an eight-year-old girl, Katrina, on her buttocks and hip. The prosecution’s case against Gomez relied heavily on Katrina’s prior statements, including her preliminary hearing testimony and a forensic interview, as she did not testify at trial. Katrina’s mother objected to bringing her to court, citing concerns about the emotional impact on her daughter and her reluctance to have Katrina relive the experience in a courtroom setting.The Superior Court of San Diego County found Katrina unavailable to testify after hearing from her mother, who expressed that she did not want Katrina to participate further in the proceedings. The court allowed Katrina’s prior statements to be admitted at trial. The jury convicted Gomez of the offenses against Kane and Katrina but acquitted him of the offense against a third child. Gomez appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding Katrina unavailable and admitting her prior statements, thus violating his constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish Katrina’s unavailability as a witness because the record did not show that her mother’s refusal to bring her to court was unequivocal or that all reasonable efforts to secure her testimony had been exhausted. The court found this error prejudicial and concluded that the admission of Katrina’s prior statements violated Gomez’s confrontation rights. As a result, the court reversed the convictions on all three lewd act counts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "P. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Huntington Beach, a charter city in Orange County, amended its city charter through Measure A, which authorized the city to require voter identification for municipal elections beginning in 2026. This measure was passed by local voters. In response, the California Legislature enacted Elections Code section 10005, effective January 1, 2025, which prohibits any local government from requiring voter identification for voting unless mandated by state or federal law. The statute was specifically intended to address Huntington Beach’s Measure A.Following the passage of Measure A, the State of California, through the Attorney General and Secretary of State, filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Orange County, seeking to invalidate the voter identification provision in the city charter. The City of Huntington Beach demurred, arguing the issue was not ripe since the provision had not yet been implemented. The trial court sustained the demurrer, but after procedural developments and further hearings, ultimately denied the state’s petition, finding that the charter provision did not violate the right to vote or implicate the integrity of the electoral process. The state timely appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the four-part “home rule” test, the court held that Elections Code section 10005 addresses a matter of statewide concern—integrity of the electoral process—and is narrowly tailored to prevent discriminatory barriers to voting. The court concluded that section 10005 preempts the Huntington Beach charter provision. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate invalidating the charter provision, enter a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and declare it preempted by state law. View "P. ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

In 2010, police responded to an assault in which the victim reported being attacked and threatened due to his cooperation in a homicide investigation. The victim and a witness identified the defendant as one of the assailants. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating he confronted the victim over being called a “rat,” and that the victim emerged with a bat. The victim suffered significant injuries. In 2011, a jury convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, including assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, threatening a witness, and battery with serious bodily injury. The trial court found true several prior convictions, including two strikes, and imposed a sentence of 32 years to life, including enhancements for prior prison terms and great bodily injury.After the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Superior Court of Humboldt County recalled the sentence in 2022. The court appointed counsel and repeatedly continued the resentencing hearing to allow defense counsel to prepare a sentencing brief. Despite numerous continuances and the court’s admonitions, defense counsel failed to file any written argument or present substantial evidence in mitigation, ultimately making only a brief oral presentation at the hearing. The court struck the four one-year prison prior enhancements but otherwise reimposed the original sentence, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing. The court found that defense counsel’s failure to file a sentencing brief or adequately present mitigating evidence or argument fell below professional standards and prejudiced the defendant, as there was a reasonable probability the court could have imposed a lesser sentence. The judgment was reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Guevara" on Justia Law

Five gang members were present in an alley in 1999 when two were shot, resulting in one death and one injury. A witness observed three young Hispanic males fleeing the scene. Six years later, Jaime Cesar Perez-Tinoco was arrested and admitted to being present but denied knowledge of any plan to kill. He was 18 at the time. In 2005, Perez was charged with premeditated murder, attempted premeditated murder, and gang participation, with additional gang and firearm allegations. At his 2006 trial, the jury was instructed on both direct aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences theory. Perez was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 50 years to life.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. In 2022, Perez filed a petition under Penal Code section 1172.6, but later withdrew it. In 2024, he filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his convictions were invalid under People v. Chiu due to the jury instructions. The Superior Court of Orange County granted habeas relief, vacating the premeditated murder and attempted murder convictions, and later vacated the gang-related convictions and enhancements based on changes to Penal Code section 186.22. The court gave the prosecution the option to retry the vacated charges or accept reductions. The prosecution did not retry the case or request a stay, and after 60 days, the court dismissed the vacated charges and enhancements, leaving only second degree murder and attempted murder (without premeditation) convictions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that section 1172.6 did not preclude habeas relief for Chiu error, that the trial court properly vacated the gang-related findings due to retroactive statutory changes, and that dismissal of the vacated charges was proper because the prosecution failed to retry within the statutory period or seek a stay. The trial court’s orders were affirmed in full. View "People v. Perez-Tinoco" on Justia Law

Aniano Olea was convicted by a jury in 2009 of 25 counts involving violent acts against his spouse, Jane Doe 1, including torture, aggravated mayhem, inflicting corporal injury, assault with a deadly weapon, stalking, and dissuading a witness. The jury also found that Olea personally inflicted great bodily injury during one of the corporal injury offenses. The abuse spanned years and included physical violence, psychological control, and severe injuries to Jane Doe. Olea was sentenced to four consecutive indeterminate terms of seven years to life, plus a determinate term of 20 years, totaling 48 years to life in prison.After his conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, Olea filed a petition in 2024 in Monterey County Superior Court seeking recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1, citing changes in sentencing laws. He argued that his rehabilitation and changes in the law warranted reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court appointed counsel, reviewed Olea’s prison records, held a hearing, and ultimately declined to exercise its discretion to recall and resentence, finding the original sentence just given the severity of Olea’s conduct.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, first addressed whether the trial court’s denial of Olea’s petition was appealable. The court distinguished this case from others where no hearing was held, finding that the trial court’s actions affected Olea’s substantial rights and thus made the order appealable. On the merits, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recall and resentence Olea, as the decision was reasoned and based on permissible factors. The order denying Olea’s resentencing petition was affirmed. View "People v. Olea" on Justia Law

A young adult, H.T., was adjudicated a ward of the court after admitting to a crime and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility. Upon completion of his baseline term, the juvenile court prepared to discharge him to probation supervision in the community. However, finding suitable housing proved difficult due to probation conditions: H.T. could not live with his mother, was ineligible for community organization housing due to a registration requirement, and could not be placed in the probation department’s usual facility because of its proximity to a high school. H.T. requested that the court order the County of Sacramento to pay for his stay at a transitional housing facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially granted H.T.’s request for 30 days of housing but later declined to order further payments, concluding it lacked statutory authority to require the County to pay for H.T.’s housing. The court instead directed the probation department to provide hotel vouchers and other support. H.T. appealed the orders denying his requests for continued payment of rent at the transitional housing facility.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the juvenile court had discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 900, subdivision (b), to order the County to pay for the support and maintenance of a ward, including necessary housing expenses. The appellate court found that the lower court misinterpreted its authority and abused its discretion by failing to recognize the full scope of its statutory power. The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court’s order and remanded the matter for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion under the correct legal standard, specifically to determine whether payment for H.T.’s housing was necessary at the relevant time. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

A 25-year-old defendant was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon after allegedly attacking four individuals, all of whom were Black, with a metal pipe in Santa Monica. The attacks were accompanied by racial slurs and resulted in serious injuries to at least one victim. The defendant had a documented history of mental illness, substance abuse, and noncompliance with treatment, including leaving mental health facilities against medical advice and failing to take prescribed medication.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County considered the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, supported by a psychological evaluation indicating that his schizoaffective disorder was treatable and that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if his symptoms were controlled with treatment. The prosecution opposed the motion, citing the defendant’s history of noncompliance and violence when untreated. After a hearing, the trial court granted diversion, ordering residential, medically assisted treatment and compliance with program rules, but made no express findings on whether the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding that the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion. The court emphasized the lack of evidence that the defendant would comply with treatment in a community setting and noted his history of abandoning treatment. The appellate court granted the petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting diversion and to deny the motion. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Taylor)" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder, with additional firearm and gang enhancements, resulting in a sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, reducing the sentence to 32 years to life. In 2021, the defendant sought resentencing under a statute that, at the time, did not apply to attempted murder. Subsequent motions for reconsideration and rehearing were filed, during which the trial court recognized a sentencing error: the defendant, who was not the actual shooter, should not have received the firearm enhancement after the gang enhancement was stricken. The court found the sentence appeared unauthorized but believed it lacked authority to correct it absent a habeas petition or a request from the district attorney or corrections department.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the defendant’s resentencing requests, finding he had not established a prima facie case for relief under the applicable statute. At a later hearing, the court acknowledged the sentencing error but concluded it could not act without a formal habeas petition or other postconviction relief mechanism, despite the prosecutor’s agreement that the sentence was excessive.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that a trial court has inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of whether a habeas petition is filed or whether the request comes from the defendant, the prosecution, or the corrections department. The court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the case with instructions to hold a prompt resentencing hearing. If the trial court finds the sentence is unauthorized, it must correct it. The court clarified that statutory limitations on resentencing do not bar correction of an unauthorized sentence. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on groundwater management in the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin, a high-priority basin under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). Local groundwater agencies developed and submitted a sustainability plan for the subbasin, but the Department of Water Resources twice found the plan inadequate. Following these determinations, the State Water Resources Control Board designated the Tulare subbasin as probationary, triggering state intervention and new monitoring, reporting, and fee requirements. In response, Kings County Farm Bureau and other parties filed a writ of mandate and complaint, challenging the State Board’s authority and actions, including the probationary designation and associated fees.The Superior Court of Kings County reviewed the Farm Bureau’s claims. It granted a preliminary injunction halting the State Board’s implementation of the probationary designation and denied in part the State Board’s demurrer to the complaint. Specifically, the trial court dismissed the equal protection claim with leave to amend but allowed the Farm Bureau to proceed on claims alleging improper underground regulations, unconstitutional fees, and general declaratory relief. The State Board then sought appellate review of the trial court’s order overruling its demurrer.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. It held that the Act exempts the State Board’s actions under the relevant statutory sections from the Administrative Procedures Act, precluding claims based on alleged underground regulations. The court further found that challenges to the extraction fees as unlawful taxes are barred by the “pay first” rule, requiring payment before judicial review. Finally, the court determined that declaratory relief is unavailable where the Legislature has provided a writ of mandate as the exclusive remedy. The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to grant the demurrer without leave to amend as to the sixth, seventh, and ninth causes of action. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law