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The Park and Malibu Bay petitioned the trial court to have Measure R, an initiative designed to limit large developments and chain establishments, declared invalid. The trial court granted the petition and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal held that Measure R exceeds the initiative power because it invalidly annuls or delays executive or administrative conduct. The court also held that Measure R's conditional use permit (CUP) is illegal because it conditions the CUP on the character of the permittee or applicant rather than on the use of the land. The court declined to sever the invalid portions of Measure R and affirmed the judgment. View "The Park at Cross Creek v. City of Malibu" on Justia Law

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The trial court held that the rate charged by Metropolitan Water District of Southern California for transporting water (“wheeling”) violated several laws and awarded the San Diego County Water Authority damages for breach of a water exchange agreement between the two agencies. The court held that the Authority lacked standing to challenge a provision in water conservation program contracts between the parties that penalizes the Authority for participating in litigation or supporting legislation to challenge or modify Metropolitan’s existing rate structure. The court of appeal remanded. The trial court erroneously held that although Metropolitan is required to pay its pro rata share of the costs of maintaining the California Aqueduct, these costs may not be considered in calculating Metropolitan’s wheeling charges, essentially because Metropolitan does not own the aqueduct. The inclusion of Metropolitan’s system-wide transportation costs, including transportation charges paid to the State Water Project, in the calculation of its wheeling rate does not violate the wheeling statutes, common law, or the parties’ agreement. The allocation of “water stewardship” charges to the wheeling rate was proper. The Authority has standing to challenge the unconstitutional anti-litigation condition. View "San Diego County Water Authority v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California" on Justia Law

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Jose S., a former ward of the juvenile court, moved under Welfare and Institutions Code section 781 to seal juvenile records related to an admitted charge of lewd and lascivious conduct that occurred in 2002. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding Jose was precluded from relief under section 781 because of an additional admitted and disqualifying charge of assault with a deadly weapon in 2005. On appeal, Jose argued each offense constituted a separate case for purposes of section 781 and that the records related to his 2002 offense should have been sealed. Jose argued in the alternative that the court's denial of his motion to seal was improper because the 2005 assault did not fall within the list of disqualifying offenses set forth in section 707, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal rejected both these contentions and found the juvenile court did not err in refusing to seal Jose’s records. View "In re Jose S." on Justia Law

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SJJC Aviation is a fixed base operator (FBO) that operates a full-service facility at the Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International Airport, which is owned by the city. In 2012 the city addressed a plan to add a second FBO on the west side of the airport and issued a request for proposals “for the development and operation of aeronautical services facilities to serve general aviation activities at the [airport].” The city awarded the lease and operating agreement to Signature and its prospective subtenant, BCH, rejecting SJJC's bid as nonresponsive. SJJC filed suit, contending that the “flawed” process of soliciting bids for the lease should be set aside. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal of the suit. SJJC lost its own opportunity to compete for the new airport FBO by submitting a manifestly nonresponsive bid. SJJC is in reality complaining of past acts by the city and is seeking a remedy that will allow it another opportunity to submit a responsive proposal. View "SJJC Aviation Services v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, an in-home caretaker for the Department of Social Services, was riding her bicycle from one private home where she worked to another home where she was scheduled to work when she was struck and injured by a car. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board concluded that the going and coming rule barred her claim for benefits. However, the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) found that the required vehicle exception to the going and coming rule applied because petitioner was impliedly required to provide her own transportation between patients' homes. The appeals board then concluded that petitioner's injury arose out of and in the course of employment. In this case, petitioner's transit was for the benefit of the Department and was impliedly requested by the Department. The Court of Appeal annulled the appeals board's earlier decision and remanded with directions to issue a new decision and opinion consistent with this opinion. View "Yu Qin Zhu v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Carmen Zubillaga was injured in an automobile accident. The other driver was at fault. Her insurer, defendant Allstate Indemnity Company (Allstate), rejected her demand for $35,000, the full amount of her remaining underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, although it made her a series of offers increasing to $15,584 instead. After an arbitrator awarded plaintiff $35,000, the amount of her demand, she sued Allstate for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. While an insurance company has no obligation under the implied covenant of good faith to pay every claim its insured makes, the insurer cannot deny the claim, without fully investigating the grounds for its denial. To protect its insured’s contractual interest in security and peace of mind, it is essential that an insurer fully inquire into possible bases that might support the insured’s claim before denying it. The Court of Appeal found the problem in this case was that the undisputed facts showed the insurer’s opinions were rendered in October and November 2012, but insurer continued to rely on them through the arbitration in September 2013, without ever consulting with its expert again or conducting any further investigation. Summary judgment in favor of the insurer was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Zubillaga v. Allstate Indemnity Company" on Justia Law

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Hilliard owned a controlling interest in companies that owned radio stations. In 2003, the companies entered into a loan agreement with Wells Fargo, borrowing $18.9 million, secured by assets that exceeded $50 million. The loan was continuously in default after March 31, 2004. Although the agreement was amended several times, Wells Fargo never foreclosed. Hilliard sold his ranch and was attempting to sell radio stations when, without notice to Hilliard, Wells Fargo sold the loan to Atalaya. Atalay filed suit and was awarded judgments that resulted in Atalaya’s purchase of Hilliard’s companies in bankruptcies. Hilliard, now 78 years old, alleged that Wells Fargo took or assisted in taking his property for wrongful use, with intent to defraud, or by undue influence, violating Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30(a)(1)(2), a provision of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. The court dismissed, finding that Hilliard lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed. Hilliard’s circular argument—that the duty breached by Wells Fargo was owed to him personally, and not just as a shareholder, because he is an elder and elder abuse is by definition a personal claim—ignores the fact that his claim does not originate in circumstances independent of his status as a shareholder in the companies. View "Hilliard v. Harbour" on Justia Law

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A.J. and R.G. were the parents of three children, then-aged ten, nine and seven years old. In November 2011, A.J. was arrested and deported to Mexico after he assaulted R.G. R.G. obtained an order prohibiting A.J. from having contact with her and the children. After A.J. was deported, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) investigated 13 child protective services referrals on behalf of the children. The referrals were largely related to R.G.'s alcohol use and failure to supervise the children. In February 2013, October 2013, and February 2014, the Agency substantiated allegations that R.G. was neglecting the children. In October 2015, the Agency detained the children in protective custody and initiated dependency proceedings after an "extremely intoxicated" R.G. was arrested and jailed on charges of grand theft. A.J. appealed after a 12-month review hearing at which the juvenile court returned his children to their mother's care. He contended the court erred when it found that he had been offered or provided reasonable services. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the reasonable services finding as to A.J. In all other respects, the findings and orders were affirmed. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

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Kao was employed by Joy Holiday, a travel tour company. Kao had come to the U.S., lived with the company’s owners, and had worked for a net “allowance” of $1,700 per month for 11 months while waiting for his work visa. After he obtained that visa, he continued to work for the company until his termination. He sued, alleging breach of contract and that his monthly salary of $2,000 to $2,500 was below statutory standards for work in excess of 40 hours a week. (29 U.S.C. 201.; Lab. Code, 1194.2.) The court ruled against Kao on his breach of contract and statutory claims but awarded damages for unpaid labor under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Kao is entitled to compensation under the wage statutes, making an equitable remedy unnecessary. The court noted the parties’ express agreement establishing Kao's work requirements and compensation and concluded that the trial court erred in finding that he was not entitled to itemized wage statements and that the delay in paying his final compensation was excusable. View "Kao v. Joy Holiday" on Justia Law

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In 2010, Walton sued Rossdale. Walton, a California attorney, maintained a “litigation factory” by placing dozens of email addresses on the Internet, collecting spam messages sent to those addresses, and then demanding compensation for supposed violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code 1750. Walton‘s lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice in 2012. The same day, Rossdale sued Walton, alleging malicious prosecution. Rossdale was a fictitious business name registered in Florida to a Florida limited liability company, Miami Legal. In 2016, Walton argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed because Rossdale was "a fictitious business name registered by a company that has now dissolved.” Miami Legal argued that all of its assets and liabilities had been transferred to Rossdale Delaware, which Miami Legal called its “successor in interest to the causes of action.” The trial court dismissed for lack of standing. The court of appeals reversed. Rossdale was only a fictitious business name; no legitimate standing or jurisdictional issue was raised. This case does not involve an individual seeking to sue under a fictitious name to protect his identity, does not invoke serious privacy concerns, and did not raise any supposed violation of any fictitious name statute. View "Rossdale Group, LLC v. Walton" on Justia Law