Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Andrew Christian Temple was found not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of second-degree murder. The jury determined that Temple used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Temple was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on considering his mental disorders in determining imperfect self-defense, erred in using CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224, and wrongly denied his motion for a trial continuance to locate a witness.The Superior Court of Riverside initially handled the case, where Temple was convicted. Temple's defense requested jury instructions on imperfect self-defense and consideration of mental disorders, which the court provided. However, Temple contended these instructions were insufficient as they did not explicitly allow the jury to consider his mental disorders in assessing imperfect self-defense. Additionally, Temple's request for a trial continuance to locate a witness was denied by the trial court, which found no good cause for the delay.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that any instructional error regarding imperfect self-defense was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence that Temple used excessive force. The court also found no error in using CALCRIM No. 225, as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence only for Temple's mental state. Lastly, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as there was no guarantee the witness could be located within a reasonable time. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Temple" on Justia Law

Stephen Hofer, a licensed attorney and founder of Aerlex Law Group, hired Vicky Boladian as a part-time contract attorney in 2008. In 2013, they formed Aerlex Tax Services, LLC (tax LLC) to provide tax-related services. Hofer held a 55% equity interest, and Boladian held 45%. Their relationship deteriorated in 2017-2018, leading to litigation. In 2020, they settled by executing three agreements, each containing arbitration clauses. In 2023, they dissolved the tax LLC and transferred its assets to Aerlex Tax Services, LLP (tax LLP). Boladian later withdrew, forming her own firm and taking clients and assets.The plaintiffs, including Hofer and the tax LLP, filed a lawsuit against Boladian and her new firm, alleging 13 causes of action and seeking various damages and relief. They did not mention arbitration in their complaint. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, both of which were denied. They also engaged in extensive discovery and demanded a jury trial. Boladian and her firm filed a cross-complaint, and three days later, the plaintiffs moved to compel arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiffs had waived their right to arbitration by substantially litigating the case in court for over six months. The court applied the waiver standard from St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California, which was later overruled by the California Supreme Court in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo under the new standard set by Quach. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had waived their right to compel arbitration by engaging in extensive litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Hofer v. Boladian" on Justia Law

In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services) for alleged childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.The trial court overruled Family Services' demurrer, which argued that Plaintiffs' claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal (Family Services) was "litigated to finality" under section 340.1, subdivision (q), where a previous suit against an agent (Dowell) for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to allege facts supporting liability based on conduct other than that of Dowell. View "Doe 3, Family Services Organization v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In December 2019, Andrew Christian Temple, Vanessa Marquez, David Deschepper, and others were part of the homeless community in Temecula, California. On December 21, 2019, Temple fatally stabbed Deschepper in a Motel 6 parking lot after an altercation. Temple claimed self-defense, stating that Deschepper had attacked him first. However, evidence showed that Temple used excessive force, including pursuing and repeatedly stabbing Deschepper even after he fell to the ground.The Superior Court of Riverside convicted Temple of second-degree murder, finding that he used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury. Temple was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. On appeal, Temple argued that the trial court erred in jury instructions regarding imperfect self-defense and mental disorders, in using CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224, and in denying a trial continuance to locate a material witness.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that any instructional error regarding imperfect self-defense was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Temple used excessive force. The court also found no error in using CALCRIM No. 225, as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence only for Temple’s mental state. Lastly, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as there was no indication the witness could be located within a reasonable time.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding Temple’s conviction and sentence. View "People v. Temple" on Justia Law

Mone Yvette Sanders filed a class and representative action against her former employer, Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., alleging wage and hour claims under the Labor Code and a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The trial court granted Edward Jones's motions to compel arbitration of Sanders's individual claims and stayed the representative PAGA cause of action. Sanders initiated arbitration, but Edward Jones failed to pay $54,000 in fees within 30 days as required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Sanders then moved to vacate the order compelling arbitration and proceed in court.The trial court denied Sanders's motion, finding section 1281.98 preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Sanders filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98 is not preempted by the FAA, as it furthers the goal of expeditious arbitration. The court also rejected Edward Jones's contention that the arbitration agreement required the arbitrator to decide whether Edward Jones was in default. The court found that section 1281.98 vests the employee with the unilateral right to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court upon the drafting party's failure to timely pay fees. The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Sanders's motion to vacate the order compelling arbitration and granted the petition for writ of mandate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of Sanders's request for monetary sanctions. View "Sanders v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Beal Hickman pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 21 years in prison for the 2014 killing of Chadwick Brice. Hickman later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law under Senate Bill No. 1437, which altered the law of imputed malice, should apply to his case. He claimed that he could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder under the new legal standards.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Hickman's petition, relying on the precedent set by People v. Reyes, which held that defendants who were convicted by plea after Senate Bill No. 1437 took effect are ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The court concluded that since Hickman entered his plea after the effective date of the legislation, he could not demonstrate that he could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder due to the changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the reasoning in Reyes and other similar cases, such as People v. Lezama and People v. Gallegos, which held that defendants who were convicted by plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437 are categorically ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The court rejected Hickman's arguments that the law was unsettled after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437 and concluded that he had already received the benefits of the legislative changes. Therefore, the order denying Hickman's petition for resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Ryan Anderson pled guilty to multiple charges, including second-degree robbery, grand theft, retail theft, and second-degree burglary. These charges stemmed from a scheme where he stole "Scratchers" lottery tickets from various retailers and redeemed the winning tickets for prize money. The trial court ordered Anderson to pay $179,231.65 in restitution to the California State Lottery, which included the value of the stolen tickets, the prize money he collected, and commissions paid to retailers.The trial court's restitution order was based on a detailed chart presented by the prosecution, which outlined the value of the stolen tickets, the amounts reimbursed to retailers by the Lottery, and the prize money Anderson collected. Anderson did not dispute the Lottery's entitlement to recoup the prize money and retailer commissions but argued that the prize money should have been deducted from the retail value of the stolen tickets. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that the stolen tickets represented lost sales revenue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. Anderson's appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende, identifying no specific issues for appeal. The appellate court conducted an independent review and invited supplemental briefs on whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the restitution award. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the restitution order was appropriate and that the Lottery did not receive a windfall. The court found that the Lottery's reimbursement to retailers shifted the loss from the retailers to the Lottery, and Anderson was responsible for the full amount of the stolen tickets' retail value, the prize money he collected, and the retailer commissions. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Maxwell Tillinghast, a 13-year-old student, collapsed from sudden cardiac arrest while jogging during a physical education class at Palms Middle School. Although the school had a defibrillator in the main office, the teachers were unaware of its presence. Despite being trained to use a defibrillator, the teachers could not utilize it, leading to Tillinghast's death. His father sued the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and several employees, alleging negligence for failing to inform the teachers about the defibrillator.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard the case, where the jury focused on whether Tillinghast's latent heart defect would have been fatal even if the teachers had known about the defibrillator. The jury found the school district negligent and awarded Tillinghast's father $15 million in damages. The jury exonerated the school principal, Dr. Derek Moriuchi, from negligence.The LAUSD appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a specific jury instruction (CACI No. 423) related to public entity liability for failure to perform a mandatory duty. The appellate court found that the school district had forfeited its objections to this instruction by not raising the issue during the trial. Additionally, the court noted that the school district had conceded mistakes were made regarding the defibrillator's availability and training.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that the school district's failure to inform the teachers about the defibrillator constituted negligence. The court awarded costs to the respondent, Tillinghast's father. View "Tillinghast v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles College Faculty Guild, AFT Local 1521, sought to reverse the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of three grievances against the Los Angeles Community College District. The grievances involved safety-related construction projects at Los Angeles City College, the termination of a faculty member at Pierce College, and the miscalculation of retirement benefits for a faculty member at Los Angeles Trade-Technical College.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County partially granted the motion to compel arbitration for the grievance related to backpay for the retirement benefits issue but denied the motion for the other grievances. The court found that the grievances were beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement and were preempted by the Education Code and other statutory requirements.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the grievances related to construction projects and employment termination were not arbitrable because they were preempted by the Education Code and the Construction Bonds Act. The court also found that the grievance related to retirement benefits was partially arbitrable only concerning the backpay issue, as the Public Employees’ Retirement Law governed the reporting of service credits to CalPERS, and the arbitrator could not order injunctive relief beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.The appellate court concluded that the Guild failed to demonstrate that the grievances were within the scope of representation as enumerated by the Educational Employment Relations Act and affirmed the trial court’s mixed ruling. View "L.A. College Faculty Guild v. L.A. Community College District" on Justia Law

In this case, the mother (K.G.) and father (J.G.) were involved in a custody dispute following their divorce. The mother was a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by the father, which triggered a rebuttable presumption under Family Code section 3044 that awarding custody to the father would be detrimental to the child's best interest. Despite this, the parents initially agreed to joint legal custody.The Superior Court of El Dorado County initially found that the father had committed domestic violence but awarded joint legal custody based on the parents' agreement. Later, the mother requested a modification to award her sole custody. A second judge reviewed the case and denied the mother's request, stating that the presumption had been rebutted, although no specific findings were made to support this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the lower court had erred by not making the required findings to rebut the presumption under section 3044. The appellate court noted that the lower court failed to address the statutory factors and did not provide reasons for its decision in writing or on the record. The appellate court emphasized that the presumption is mandatory and must be properly applied, with specific findings made to determine if it has been rebutted.The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing to reassess custody in light of the current circumstances and the presumption set forth in section 3044. The court directed the family court to enter a new custody order after applying the presumption and making the necessary findings. The mother was awarded her costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of J.G." on Justia Law