Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who, in late 2020, concealed his young daughter from her mother in violation of a custody order and threatened the mother with violence if she contacted authorities. He was also alleged to have previously injured the mother with a pocketknife. In 2018, a jury convicted him of felony child custody violation, dissuading a witness, and inflicting corporal injury on a child’s parent. At sentencing, the court imposed an aggregate prison term of 10 years and eight months, including a consecutive term for dissuading a witness calculated as one-third the middle term, doubled under the three strikes law.Several years after sentencing, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County received a letter from a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) case records manager, noting a possible error: the sentence for dissuading a witness should have been the full middle term, not one-third. The court held hearings, some without the defendant present, and ultimately increased the sentence to 13 years and four months by imposing the full consecutive term for that count. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed both the sentence modification and the denial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the matter. It held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence in response to the CDCR letter because the judgment was long final and no statutory basis for resentencing existed. The court clarified that such corrections can only occur under specific statutory authority or via habeas corpus. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but treated the appeal as a habeas petition, granted relief, and ordered reinstatement of the original sentence, without prejudice to future lawful efforts to correct the sentence. View "P. v. Singleton" on Justia Law

The defendant operated a dog breeding business from properties in Solano County, California. A nonprofit animal welfare organization brought suit against her, alleging violations of state and local animal welfare laws, including keeping more than the permitted number of dogs, failing to provide adequate care, and maintaining unsanitary conditions. The defendant was found to have violated several provisions of the Vallejo Municipal Code and the state’s Pet Breeder Warranty Act, including exceeding the four-dog limit, allowing dogs to run at large, and failing to provide proper nutrition, water, and veterinary care.The Superior Court of Solano County granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and issued a permanent injunction that, among other things, barred the defendant from owning any dogs and gave the plaintiff custody of all her dogs. On the defendant’s first appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, upheld the findings of violations but found the injunction overbroad, particularly the provisions dispossessing the defendant of all dogs and granting the plaintiff full custody. The case was remanded for the trial court to modify the injunction.After remand, the trial court issued a modified permanent injunction, which limited the defendant to four dogs but also authorized the plaintiff to enter the defendant’s properties and seize any excess dogs without prior notice or hearing. The defendant appealed again, arguing that these provisions were overbroad and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the four-dog limit was appropriate and necessary given the defendant’s history and the circumstances. However, the court found that the provision allowing the plaintiff to seize excess dogs without notice or a hearing violated due process. The court reversed that part of the injunction and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the remainder. View "Caru Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Anthony" on Justia Law

A prisoner incarcerated in a California state prison was found guilty of a serious institutional rule violation after a search of his shared cell uncovered a large quantity of inmate-manufactured alcohol. The reporting officer believed both cell occupants were aware of the alcohol due to its strong odor and issued a rules violation report (RVR) for each. The original RVR was classified as a serious offense by Captain Hopper, and after a disciplinary hearing, the senior hearing officer found the prisoner guilty. The chief disciplinary officer (CDO) at that time affirmed the result. The prisoner appealed administratively, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) office of grievances found merit in his due process claim, ordering the RVR to be reissued and reheard.After the RVR was reissued and classified by a different officer, a new hearing was held. The prisoner’s cellmate provided statements suggesting the prisoner had no knowledge of the alcohol, but the hearing officer again found the prisoner guilty. By this time, Hopper had become the acting CDO and conducted the final review, affirming the hearing results. The prisoner’s subsequent administrative appeal was unsuccessful, leading him to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, which was denied. He then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.The appellate court held that under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3320(h), an officer who classified the original RVR is disqualified from conducting the final review of the same RVR as CDO. Because Hopper performed both roles, the court found this violated the regulation’s requirement for impartiality. The court granted the petition, vacated the disciplinary finding, and ordered a new review by a non-disqualified CDO or restoration of lost credits and pay if such review is not feasible. View "In re Dixon" on Justia Law

A police officer filed a workers’ compensation claim in December 2020, alleging cumulative injuries—including orthopedic conditions and hypertensive cardiac disease—arising from employment with a city through 2013. The city and its claims administrator denied the allegations, and the matter proceeded to trial before a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge (WCJ). The WCJ found the officer sustained several injuries, but determined the cardiac disease claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, awarding medical treatment only for the other conditions.The officer timely petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) for reconsideration, challenging the WCJ’s finding that the cardiac claim was untimely. The city and claims administrator responded, supporting the WCJ’s determination. The WCJ recommended denying reconsideration. Under former Labor Code section 5909, the Board had 60 days from the petition’s filing to act, or the petition would be deemed denied. However, due to administrative delay, the Board did not receive the petition until after the 60-day period had expired. The Board ultimately granted reconsideration, applying equitable tolling to the statutory deadline, and found the cardiac injury compensable.The City and its claims administrator sought writ review in the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction to act after the statutory deadline. The Court of Appeal held that the 60-day deadline in former section 5909 is mandatory, and the Board generally acts in excess of its jurisdiction if it grants reconsideration after that period. However, the court concluded that the deadline does not affect the Board’s fundamental jurisdiction, allowing for equitable tolling in narrow circumstances. Because the officer acted diligently and was misled by administrative delay outside his control, the court affirmed the Board’s order granting reconsideration. View "City of Salinas v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Greg Wright was recorded on video robbing a gas station convenience store at gunpoint. The cashier, who was present during the incident, testified that Wright showed no signs of intoxication—he did not smell of alcohol, slur his words, or appear confused. Surveillance footage showed Wright acting purposefully and competently throughout the robbery, from his entry and interaction with the cashier to his escape. Wright, representing himself at trial, argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to rob, but the evidence at trial did not support this claim.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County tried the case before a jury, which convicted Wright of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The jury also found true the firearm use allegation and 13 prior convictions. The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life, including an upper-term enhancement for firearm use based on the finding that his prior convictions were “numerous.” Wright appealed, arguing, among other things, that the jury was improperly instructed on the intoxication defense and that there were errors in sentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by using the term “specific intent” in the jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, as this term is ambiguous and not the correct mental state for robbery. However, the court found this error harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly showed Wright was not impaired. The court also found harmless error in the prosecutor’s closing argument and rejected the claim of cumulative error. On sentencing, the court agreed that Wright was improperly punished for both firearm and ammunition possession based on the same act and that he was denied his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factor for the upper-term sentence. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for resentencing. View "P. v. Wright" on Justia Law

Russell Johnson, a resident of a continuing care retirement community operated by Stoneridge Creek, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Stoneridge Creek unlawfully increased residents’ monthly care fees to cover its anticipated legal defense costs in ongoing litigation. Johnson claimed these increases violated several statutes, including the Health and Safety Code, the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Elder Abuse Act, and breached the Residence and Care Agreement (RCA) between residents and Stoneridge Creek. The RCA allowed Stoneridge Creek to adjust monthly fees based on projected costs, prior year per capita costs, and economic indicators. In recent years, Stoneridge Creek’s budgets for legal fees rose sharply, with $500,000 allocated for 2023 and 2024, compared to much lower amounts in prior years.The Alameda County Superior Court previously denied Stoneridge Creek’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the RCA’s arbitration provision unconscionable. Johnson then moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Stoneridge Creek from including its litigation defense costs in monthly fee increases. The trial court granted the injunction, finding a likelihood of success on Johnson’s claims under the CLRA and UCL, and determined that the fee increases were retaliatory and unlawfully shifted defense costs to residents. The court also ordered Johnson to post a $1,000 bond.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the fee increases did not violate the CLRA’s fee-recovery provision or other litigation fee-shifting statutes, as these statutes govern judicial awards of fees, not how a defendant funds its own legal expenses. The court further concluded that Health and Safety Code section 1788(a)(22)(B) permits Stoneridge Creek to include reasonable projections of litigation expenses in monthly fees. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider whether the fee increases were retaliatory or excessive, and to reassess the balance of harms and the appropriate bond amount. View "Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC" on Justia Law

Seven residents of Ojai and its surrounding area brought suit against a city council member and her attorney, alleging that confidential information from closed session meetings of the Ojai city council was improperly disclosed. The disclosures related to litigation and development agreements discussed in closed sessions, and included both oral statements and written materials distributed to the public and posted online. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming these disclosures violated the confidentiality provisions of the Brown Act.The defendants responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the suit was politically motivated. The plaintiffs opposed, asserting their action qualified for the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP law. The Superior Court of Ventura County found the plaintiffs failed to establish the public interest exception applied, granted the motion to strike, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants, concluding the Brown Act’s fee-shifting exception did not apply because the plaintiffs sought relief only under section 54963, not section 54960.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs’ action fell within the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute, as the relief sought was solely for the benefit of the public and aimed to enforce important rights under the Brown Act. The court also determined that the attorney’s fees award was improper, as the action was brought pursuant to the Brown Act and thus subject to its fee-shifting exception. The judgment was reversed and remanded with instructions to deny both the special motion to strike and the motion for attorney’s fees. The appellate court expressed no opinion on the merits of the underlying complaint. View "Byrne v. Rule" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of eight sex crimes involving three juvenile girls, including his stepdaughter and two other children in the household. The most serious incident occurred in December 2016, when a six-year-old girl suffered a severe vaginal injury while in the defendant’s care, leading to hospitalization and subsequent disclosure of sexual abuse. Over the following years, two other girls reported that the defendant had also sexually abused them on multiple occasions, with one describing repeated acts of molestation occurring regularly over a period of time.The Sonoma County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, including multiple counts of sexual intercourse or lewd acts with a child under 14, and found true several sentencing enhancements. The defendant appealed, challenging two of the convictions related to one victim. He argued that the prosecution relied on the same testimony to support both charged and uncharged offenses, and that the jury instruction regarding uncharged sex offenses (CALCRIM No. 1191A) improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof and confused the jury. He also raised an alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the instruction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that, although the same testimony was used to support both charged and uncharged offenses and the instructions could have been clearer, any potential instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the jury was properly instructed that each charged offense had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the evidence supporting the convictions was substantial. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "People v. Dejesus-Galindo" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married in 2016 and have one child together. After their separation in 2019, the mother experienced mental health issues, and in December 2020, the parents signed a marital settlement agreement granting the father sole legal and physical custody of their daughter, with the mother receiving visitation rights. This arrangement was formalized in a dissolution judgment in July 2021. In October 2021, the mother requested a change in custody, citing improved circumstances and alleging that the father had relocated, was not complying with court orders, and was restricting her contact with their child.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a three-day evidentiary hearing in November 2022. The trial court made detailed factual findings, including that the father was uncooperative, had violated court orders, denied visitation and communication, and was not credible. The court found the mother to be more capable of facilitating contact and noted her sobriety and efforts to co-parent. Based on these findings, the court ordered that the mother have sole physical custody of the child, while both parents would share joint legal custody. The father did not object to the tentative decision before judgment was entered in January 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the father forfeited his due process arguments by failing to raise them in the trial court and found that he was not denied due process, as he had notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court also rejected the father's claim regarding the separation of siblings, noting that two were stepsiblings and one was a half-sibling, and found no legal error. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s custody order and awarded costs to the mother. View "In re Marriage of R.K. & G.K." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with second degree robbery after an incident in which the victim was attacked by multiple individuals, including the defendant, who was identified as the Hispanic female participant. The victim suffered significant injuries, including lacerations and a puncture wound, and reported that the defendant made threatening statements during the robbery. The defendant, who had a history of mental health and substance abuse issues, was unhoused at the time and later sought pretrial mental health diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.36, submitting evidence of her diagnoses and willingness to participate in treatment.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion on three grounds: it found the prosecution had rebutted the presumption that her mental health disorders were a significant factor in the offense; it determined she posed an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community; and it exercised its residual discretion to deny diversion based on the nature of the offense and the victim’s injuries. The defendant then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, seeking to overturn the denial.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mental health diversion. The appellate court found there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the prosecution had rebutted the statutory presumption regarding the significance of the defendant’s mental disorder or that she posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super-strike offense if treated in the community. The appellate court also concluded that the trial court’s exercise of residual discretion was inconsistent with the purposes of the mental health diversion statute. The court issued a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its denial and grant the application for mental health diversion. View "Gomez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law