Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man was convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving his long-term romantic partner’s daughters. The offenses included three counts against his biological daughter and six counts against his partner’s youngest daughter from a previous relationship. The abuse occurred over several years while the family lived in various residences in the Bay Area. The allegations came to light in 2018 after the mother observed suspicious behavior and questioned her daughters, who then disclosed the abuse. The police were notified, and the children underwent forensic interviews and examinations. The defendant was arrested and charged with several counts, including lewd acts, forcible lewd acts, sexual penetration, and oral copulation with minors under the age of 14 and 10.The case was tried before a jury in the Superior Court of Alameda County. The prosecution presented testimony from the victims, their mother, and expert witnesses on child sexual abuse. The prosecution also introduced evidence of uncharged acts of abuse involving other children in the defendant’s extended family. The defense called character witnesses and challenged the reliability of the victims’ accounts. The jury found the defendant guilty on all but two counts, for which the prosecutor later dismissed the charges after a deadlock. The defendant was sentenced to 54 years to life in prison.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed several claims, including alleged errors in jury selection, admission of evidence of uncharged acts, admission of prior statements, prosecutorial misconduct, jury instructions, and expert testimony. The court held that the trial court properly overruled the objection to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of a Black juror, finding no substantial likelihood that race was a factor. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged acts, prior statements, or expert testimony, and rejected claims of instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Two children, Claudia and Leila, were declared dependents of the court after an incident in which their parents, Wendy C. (Mother) and Michael M. (Father), engaged in a domestic altercation in the children’s presence, with Father under the influence of methamphetamine and in possession of a knife. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed petitions alleging parental substance abuse and failure to protect the children. The juvenile court sustained these allegations, removed the children from Father’s custody, and initially placed them with Mother. Later, after Mother failed to comply with court-ordered counseling and tested positive for drugs, the children were removed from her care as well. Reunification services were terminated, and the court ultimately found the children adoptable, terminating both parents’ rights and designating the current caretaker as the prospective adoptive parent.Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA). The Department had interviewed the parents, both grandmothers, and a paternal aunt, all of whom denied knowledge of Indian ancestry. However, the Department did not inquire of other extended family members, including the maternal grandfather, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, and paternal grandfather, despite having or being able to obtain their contact information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b), to interview all reasonably available extended family members regarding possible Indian ancestry. The court conditionally reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further ICWA and Cal-ICWA inquiry and compliance. If the children are found to be Indian children, a new hearing must be held; otherwise, the original orders will be reinstated. View "In re Claudia R." on Justia Law

The defendant was originally sentenced in 2005 to a 10-year prison term for assault with a deadly weapon, with additional time added for inflicting great bodily injury, personal use of a weapon, and three prior prison commitments. Nearly two decades later, the defendant sought recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which invalidates certain prior prison term enhancements. However, by this time, the defendant was no longer serving the original sentence that included the enhancements; instead, he was incarcerated for offenses committed while in prison, with those sentences running consecutively to the original term.After the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as potentially eligible for relief, the Superior Court of Riverside County examined whether he qualified under section 1172.75. The court found, based on the defendant’s record, that he had completed the sentence containing the prior prison term enhancements and was now serving time solely for in-prison offenses. Relying on People v. Escobedo, the court concluded that section 1172.75 only applies to individuals currently serving a sentence that includes the now-invalidated enhancements, and not to those serving subsequent, separate sentences for in-prison offenses. The court also rejected the defendant’s equal protection argument, finding a rational basis for the legislative distinction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.75 is limited to defendants currently serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement. Because the defendant was serving a sentence for in-prison offenses, not the original judgment with the enhancements, he was ineligible for relief. The court also found no equal protection violation in the statutory scheme. View "People v. McKean" on Justia Law

Three siblings, all under the age of 14, lived with their father across the street from the defendant between 2015 and 2017. During this period, the children frequently played with the defendant’s children. In 2021, after moving in with a legal guardian due to their father’s poor health and subsequent death, the siblings disclosed that the defendant had repeatedly sexually abused them over a prolonged period. The abuse included acts of sexual intercourse, sodomy, and oral copulation, often accompanied by threats involving firearms. The defendant was charged with multiple counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child, sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger, and oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger.A jury in the Lake County Superior Court found the defendant guilty on all nine counts and found true the multiple-victim allegation. The defendant was sentenced to 75 years to life in prison, with sentences on the remaining counts stayed. On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, the defendant argued that Penal Code section 288.5 was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement as interpreted in Ramos v. Louisiana, and also challenged the jury instructions regarding unanimity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that section 288.5 does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement. The court reasoned that the statute requires unanimity as to the continuous-course-of-conduct element, even if jurors may disagree on the specific acts constituting that conduct. The court also found the jury instruction claim forfeited, as the instructions given were accurate and did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Giovanni De Meo, a co-founder of ReTech Labs, Inc., was involved in two business transactions in 2017 and 2021 concerning Rebotics, LLC, a company in which he held a minority interest. Cooley LLP served as outside counsel for ReTech and later for Rebotics, but De Meo was never a direct client of Cooley. In both transactions, Cooley prepared documents at the direction of its client, but did not communicate or negotiate directly with De Meo regarding the terms. During the 2021 transaction, De Meo retained his own counsel and negotiated separately with the buyer, Symphony AI, ultimately securing more favorable terms for himself without Cooley’s involvement.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment in favor of Cooley LLP, finding no attorney-client relationship between De Meo and Cooley during either transaction. The court determined that Cooley had complied with its professional obligations, including those under California State Bar Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(f), and that De Meo’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment were unsupported by the facts. The court also excluded certain evidence submitted by De Meo, including portions of his declaration and an expert’s declaration, on evidentiary grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that no express or implied attorney-client relationship existed between De Meo and Cooley, and that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not create a fiduciary duty to nonclients actionable in tort. The court also found that De Meo’s fraudulent concealment theory was not properly pled and could not be considered. The judgment in favor of Cooley LLP was affirmed. View "De Meo v. Cooley LLP" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with the murder of German Carrillo while both were incarcerated in the Santa Cruz County jail in 2019. The prosecution alleged that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, specifically Nuestra Familia, and also charged the defendant with active participation in a criminal street gang. Evidence at trial included expert testimony about the gang’s structure and rules, testimony from former gang members about intra-gang discipline and removals, and details about the circumstances of Carrillo’s death, including surveillance footage and gang communications. The defendant testified about his own gang involvement, his actions during the incident, and his subsequent departure from the gang.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court conducted a jury trial, where the jury found the defendant guilty of murder with special circumstances and found the gang allegations true. The court sentenced the defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed a consecutive gang enhancement, and a concurrent sentence for the gang participation count. The court also imposed a parole revocation fine, suspended unless parole was revoked. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the gang evidence, the exclusion of certain mental health evidence, the constitutionality of his sentence, and the imposition of the parole revocation fine.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that the murder and predicate offenses provided a non-reputational benefit to the gang, as required by amended Penal Code section 186.22. The court found no reversible error in the exclusion of mental health evidence, determined the sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual, and upheld the imposition of the parole revocation fine based on statutory requirements. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Cortez" on Justia Law

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

Curtis Diblin and Monee Gagliardo were housemates when Diblin attacked Gagliardo with a rubber mallet, causing significant injuries. Diblin was criminally prosecuted and pled guilty to assault with intent to commit a sexual crime. Gagliardo then filed a civil suit against Diblin, alleging several intentional torts and negligence, all based on the attack. The operative complaint at trial did not allege any facts suggesting accidental conduct or negligence unrelated to the assault. Diblin’s homeowners insurance policy with State Farm covered injuries arising from an “occurrence,” defined as an “accident,” and excluded coverage for intentional or willful acts.In the San Diego County Superior Court, a jury found Diblin liable for gender violence (an intentional tort) and negligence, awarding Gagliardo over $2.5 million in compensatory damages. The jury also found Diblin acted with malice and oppression, supporting punitive damages, though Gagliardo later waived her right to punitive damages. State Farm, having defended Diblin under a reservation of rights, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a determination that it owed no duty to indemnify Diblin for the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s judgment in favor of State Farm. The appellate court held that the jury’s findings in the underlying action established Diblin’s conduct was intentional, not accidental, and therefore not a covered “occurrence” under the policy. The court rejected arguments that the negligence finding mandated coverage or that the concurrent independent causes doctrine applied, finding the injury-producing conduct was not independent of the intentional act. The court also found no need for a new jury to determine intent for exclusion purposes. The judgment in favor of State Farm was affirmed. View "State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Diblin" on Justia Law

A defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder for crimes committed at age 17, alongside an adult codefendant. The jury found true allegations of gang involvement and personal use of a firearm, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 75 years to life, plus additional time for unrelated carjacking offenses. After serving 15 years, the defendant petitioned for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and that he met several statutory eligibility criteria, including having committed the offense with an adult codefendant.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the petition, held a hearing, and denied relief. The court found that none of the eligibility criteria were satisfied, reasoning that the adult codefendant’s conviction had been vacated under a separate statute and that the defendant had not shown sufficient rehabilitation. The court also considered the defendant’s juvenile record and prison disciplinary history, concluding that he lacked potential for rehabilitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and interpreted the statutory language de novo. The appellate court held that the defendant satisfied the criterion of having committed the offense with an adult codefendant, as the adult was charged and convicted for the same incident, even though her conviction was later vacated due to a change in law. The court reversed the trial court’s order denying the petition and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing in accordance with section 1170(d), without expressing an opinion on the appropriate sentence. View "People v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Wayne Gandy, a professional football player, spent 15 years in the NFL, beginning with the Los Angeles Rams in 1994, then the St. Louis Rams, followed by the Pittsburgh Steelers, New Orleans Saints, and finally the Atlanta Falcons until his retirement in 2009. Gandy signed his initial contract in California with the LA Rams, which also covered his time with the STL Rams. Throughout his career, he played a limited number of games and practiced occasionally in California, but the majority of his employment and games were outside the state.After retiring, Gandy filed a workers’ compensation claim in California in 2015, alleging cumulative injuries from his NFL career. The claim named several teams as employers. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found that the Falcons provided workers’ compensation coverage under Georgia law, which also covered Gandy’s work in California, and determined both Gandy and the Falcons were exempt from California workers’ compensation law under Labor Code section 3600.5. The WCJ did not address the liability of other teams. Gandy petitioned for reconsideration, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) rescinded the WCJ’s decision, asserting jurisdiction over Gandy’s claim based on his initial California contract and disregarding the choice of law and forum selection clauses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the Falcons are exempt from liability under California workers’ compensation law pursuant to Labor Code sections 3600.5(c) and (d), as Gandy did not meet the statutory requirements for coverage: he worked only one season for a California-based team and spent less than 20 percent of his career in California. The WCAB’s decision was annulled, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Atlanta Falcons v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law