Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of San Diego (City) appealed a judgment entered in favor of Save Our Access on its petition for writ of mandate challenging the City’s approval of a 2020 ballot measure proposing amendments to the San Diego Municipal Code and a City ordinance to exclude the Midway-Pacific Highway Community Plan Area from the 30-foot height limit for construction of buildings within the City’s Coastal Zone. The superior court determined the City failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in approving the ballot measure because the administrative record did not support the City’s claim that a 2018 program environmental impact report for the Midway-Pacific Highway Community Plan Update considered the environmental impacts associated with excluding the area from the City’s Coastal Zone height limit. The court also concluded the administrative record supported a fair argument that the ballot measure may have significant environmental impacts that were not previously examined. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the City to set aside its approvals of the ordinance that submitted the ballot measure to the voters and enjoined the City “from taking any steps to further the Project until lawful approval is obtained from the City.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Save Our Access v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Privette doctrine limits a property owner’s potential liability for on-the-job injuries sustained by employees of an independent contractor. An exception to the Privette doctrine’s rule of nonliability in cases where: “(1) [the property owner] knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” Plaintiff-appellant Travis Blaylock argued the trial court erred by failing to recognize there was a triable issue of fact about whether DMP 250 Newport Center, LLC, the owner of the premises on which he was injured, and DMP Management, LLC, the owner’s property manager (collectively DMP) knew or should have known of the allegedly concealed hazardous condition — an access panel in the floor of the crawl space in which he was working—that he fell through. The Court of Appeal found no error: while the evidence submitted by Blaylock might be sufficient to demonstrate DMP should have known the access panel existed, there was no evidence it knew or should have known the panel was either concealed from a person in the crawl space above, or that it was hazardous. View "Blaylock v. DMP 250 Newport Center" on Justia Law

Nicholas Yedinak petitioned for mandamus relief, challenging the trial judge’s order denying him bail. Yedinak was charged with two counts of felony child abuse based on allegations he inflicted severe, nonaccidental injuries to his six-week-old son. For the two years and nine months after arraignment, Yedinak had been out on bail, making each court appearance and living in the community without incident. After his preliminary hearing, the judge issued a pretrial detention order based on a finding that other children in the community would probably not be safe if Yedinak were released pending trial, given the violent nature of the charged crimes. In support of his petition, Yedinak argued the order failed to satisfy the legal requirements for pretrial detention articulated in article I, section 12, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution, and In re Humphrey, 11 Cal.5th 135 (2021). The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court's order "fell short of the standard set forth in section 12(b)." The Court granted Yedinak's petition, ordering the trial court to vacate its pretrial detention order, and to reconsider the motion to set affordable bail. View "Yedinak v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Monte Vista Villas Project, on the site of the former Leona Quarry, has been in development since the early 2000s. The developers planned to close the 128-acre quarry site, reclaim it, and develop the land into a residential neighborhood with over 400 residential units, a community center, a park, pedestrian trails, and other recreational areas. In 2005, the developers entered into an agreement with Oakland to pay certain fees to cover the costs of its project oversight. The agreement provided that the fees set forth in the agreement satisfied “all of the Developer’s obligations for fees due to the City for the Project.” In 2016, Oakland adopted ordinances that imposed new impact fees on development projects, intended to address the effects of development on affordable housing, transportation, and capital improvements, and assessed the new impact fees on the Project, then more than a decade into development, when the developers sought new building permits.The trial court vacated the imposition of the fees and directed Oakland to refrain from assessing any fee not specified in the agreement. The court of appeal reversed, finding that any provision in, or construction of, the parties’ agreement that prevents Oakland from imposing the impact fees on the instant development project constitutes an impermissible infringement of the city’s police power and is therefore invalid. View "Discovery Builders, Inc. v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the Rosenthal Act or the Act), a debt collector may not “collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt by means of judicial proceedings when the debt collector knows that service of process, where essential to jurisdiction over the debtor or his property, has not been legally effected.” The trial court found that Defendant (Collect Access) violated this law in its efforts to collect a default judgment against Plaintiff. The court set aside the underlying judgment on equitable grounds, awarded Plaintiff statutory damages and attorney fees, and ordered Collect Access to repay the amount it had collected from Plaintiff as restitution. Collect Access appealed from both the trial court’s judgment (case No. B318325) and its order awarding attorney fees (case No. B321996).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Collect Access is a debt collector under the Act. Further, the litigation privilege does not apply to Collect Access’s conduct. Moreover, Section 1788.15 does not require actual knowledge of no effective service of process. it is irrelevant that no court had declared the judgment against Plaintiff void. Additionally, the trial court did not err by finding collect access liable under the unfair competition law. Finally, the court found that the attorney fees award was not an abuse of discretion. View "Minser v. Collect Access, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendent Ernest Tilley pled no contest to robbery and admitted a prior strike conviction, for which he was sentenced to the middle term, doubled pursuant to the strike. Tilley appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the middle term, because the court did not consider defendant’s mental health problems in accordance with Penal Code section 1170(b)(6); (2) if that claim was forfeited, he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the judgment had to be modified, as the trial court improperly advised defendant as to the parole consequences of his plea. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Tilley" on Justia Law

Bennett, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, purchased three disability income insurance policies from National in 1984, 1991, and 1995. Under the policies, monthly benefits were payable for life if he was totally disabled due to injury; if due to sickness, benefits would only be paid until the age of 65. National initially approved Bennett’s 2014 claim that he was totally disabled due to an injury sustained when thrown from his horse. In June 2015, National notified him of its determination that his disability was due to sickness, not an injury. National continued to pay disability benefits until September 2018, the policy year Bennett turned 65 years old.Bennett sued. The trial court granted National summary judgment, concluding his claims were barred by the statutes of limitation — four years for breach of contract and two years for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing–both of which accrued when National issued an unconditional denial of liability in June 2015. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing with Bennett that his causes of action did not accrue until all elements — including actual damages — were complete. Bennett suffered no harm as of June 2015, because National continued to pay disability benefits. Only in September 2018 — when National began withholding benefits, and Bennett thereby incurred damages — did his causes of action accrue. View "Bennett v. Ohio National Life Assurance Corp." on Justia Law

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

In 2018, voters in the City of South Lake Tahoe (City) enacted Measure T, an initiative that prohibited the use of dwellings in residential zones as short-term or vacation rentals. Measure T amended the City’s vacation home rental ordinances to bar the City from issuing any new permits for vacation home rentals in residential zones except for permanent residents’ dwellings, and to declare that all such existing and new permits would expire by the end of 2021. Measure T also imposed more strict occupancy limits on vacation rental homes which were to be effective immediately. Plaintiff South Lake Tahoe Property Owners Group brought this action against the City to have Measure T declared unconstitutional. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and denied plaintiff’s motion. On appeal, contended Measure T: (1) unconstitutionally interfered with vested property rights; (2) created an unconstitutional durational residency requirement to qualify for the exception to the ban; (3) exceeded the initiative power in violation of land use authority vested in the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA); and (4) violated rights of privacy and equal protection by restricting occupancy. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court to the extent that it found Measure T’s exception for resident owners did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "South Lake Tahoe Property etc. v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the juvenile court denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his petition filed under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 388 to reinstate reunification services with Minor, holding that, under the circumstances, it was error to deny Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition.A few days after Minor's birth, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition on his behalf under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300. The juvenile court terminated the reunification services of Father, who had been incarcerated since before Minor was born, and set a Cal. Well. & Inst. Code 366.26 hearing. The day before the hearing, Father filed his section 388 petition, stating that he had not been provided with services despite the court's orders. The court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition. View "In re Damari Y." on Justia Law