Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were stockholders of Sempra when the Aliso Canyon Natural Gas Storage Facility (Aliso Canyon facility) experienced a natural gas leak (Aliso gas leak). Sempra was a California corporation “whose operating units invest[ed] in, develop[ed], and operate[d] energy infrastructure, and provide[d] gas and electricity services to [its] customers in North and South America.” One of Sempra’s wholly-owned subsidiaries, Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas), maintained the Aliso Canyon facility. Defendants were either officer of Sempra or members of the Board or officers or members of the board of directors of SoCalGas at the time of the Aliso gas leak. When Plaintiffs filed the operative amended complaint, eight of the Board members had also been Board members at the time of the leak.  The trial court issued the judgment of dismissal, which Plaintiffs timely appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that a director acts with “reckless disregard” of his duties, within the meaning of section 204, subdivision (a)(10)(iv), when the director (1) does an intentional act or intentionally fails to act in accordance with those duties, (2) with knowledge, or with reason to have knowledge, that (3) the director’s conduct creates a substantial risk of serious harm to the corporation or its shareholders. The court held that Plaintiffs have not alleged particularized facts supporting their Caremark theory of liability and thus have failed to plead to demand futility as required under section 800, subdivision (b)(2). View "Kanter v. Reed" on Justia Law

Robin J. appealed the denial of her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Michael M., the father of their two children. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court misapplied the law in denying Robin’s renewal request, and that Robin established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant the renewal request and decide whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Michael M. v. Robin J." on Justia Law

In May 2022, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the basis that the 230 years to life sentence was unauthorized because his three prior violent or serious felony convictions under the “Three Strikes” law all arose from the same underlying case. Consequently, appellant contended he should only be sentenced as a second strike offender. The court construed this as an application for writ of habeas corpus and denied relief.Subsequently, Defendant appealed the order denying post-conviction relief. Because courts have the discretion to initiate an independent review of the denial of a post-judgment motion, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's petition. View "P. v. Hodges" on Justia Law

The trial court entered judgment for Respondent in this breach of contract claim. The Second Appellate District affirmed and also imposed sanctions against Appellant's counsel for filing a frivolous appeal.The Second Appellate District explained "An appeal is frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive – to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment – or when it indisputably has no merit – when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." The court held that here, the appeal was frivolous because it "indisputably has no merit." The matter was entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and the fact that Appellant's counsel consulted with two other attorneys who believed the claim had merit did not change the court's opinion. View "Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery" on Justia Law

In 2006, Redland, acting as a trustee, obtained a reverse mortgage line of credit from FFSF. She owned two parcels. Redland died in 2015. Dupree, an attorney, became the successor trustee. A series of bank failures, corporate acquisitions, and assignments, had occurred in the intervening years. MTC sought to foreclose on both parcels. The Trust, represented by Dupree, filed a complaint, naming FFSF and MTC as defendants (they had been succeeded by other entities), and alleging that the loan was secured only by one parcel. The Trust later added CIT as a defendant. CIT filed a cross-complaint. More than three years after the case was filed, MAM, a successor to CIT and the entity servicing the loan, moved to intervene.The court agreed with MAM that the naming of the Trust as plaintiff meant the action was void and dismissed. MAM argued that Dupree’s subsequent amendment request was tardy and futile because the limitations period had passed. T The court of appeal reversed the denial of leave to amend. The complaint Dupree mistakenly filed in the name of the Trust was presumptively within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Such defects do not typically deprive courts of the power to act. An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint's filing and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations if recovery is sought on the same general facts. View "Dupree v. CIT Bank N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Travis Cody petitioned for postconviction relief under California Penal Code former section 1170.95. In 2012, a jury found Cody and codefendant Steven Banister guilty of murder during a home invasion burglary/robbery and found true a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. Under the prior felony-murder rule, if a death occurred during a listed felony, all the participants in the underlying crime could be convicted of murder. And under the felony-murder special-circumstance enhancement, if a participant was the actual killer, directly aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill or was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, then he or she could be sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). As to Cody, the trial court imposed an LWOP sentence plus two years. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by failing to give the accomplice felony-murder special-circumstance jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 703), but the Court determined the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The California Supreme Court later clarified the terms in the felony-murder special-circumstance statute. In 2016, a federal court disagreed with the California Court of Appeal and found the error in Cody’s trial was prejudicial. The district court ordered the state to either (a) grant Cody a new trial on the felony-murder special-circumstances allegation, or (b) vacate Cody’s special-circumstances enhancement and resentence him. n 2017, the prosecutor elected not to retry Cody on the felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. The court then resentenced Cody to 25 years to life based on the murder charge, plus two years for two prison priors. In 2019, the California Legislature limited the scope of the felony-murder rule, which now mirrored the felony-murder special circumstance. The Legislature also enacted section 1172.6, which allowed persons to challenge prior convictions under the former felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Cody then filed a 1172.6 petition. After reviewing the 2012 trial transcripts (neither side offered additional evidence at the evidentiary hearing), the trial court denied Cody's petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed the court's order denying Cody's section 1172.6 petition. View "California v. Cody" on Justia Law

CalSTRS is a “unit of the Government Operations Agency” authorized to invest the assets of the Teachers’ Retirement Fund (Ed. Code, 22001, 22203). In 2016, CalSTRS formed two LLCs for the purpose of acquiring two properties in Oakland. Both LLC agreements state “The purpose of the Company is to implement the essential governmental function of the Member ([CalSTRS]) … No other person or entity may become a member of the Company.” “For Federal and relevant State income and/or franchise tax purposes and for no other purposes whatsoever, the Company shall be disregarded as an entity separate from [CalSTRS].” The LLCs paid documentary transfer taxes of $3,371,250 to Oakland, and $247,225 to Alameda County for the acquisition of one property and $161,250 to Oakland, and $11,825 to Alameda County in connection with the other property. The LLCs unsuccessfully sought refunds.The superior court ruled “[t]he LLCs are not governmental entities even if a governmental entity is the sole member of the LLC” and the ordinances do not “provide a textual basis for an exemption for transactions in which a business entity takes ownership of real property based on that entity’s ownership” by an exempt state agency. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the competing interests at stake are a matter for the legislature. View "CSHV 1999 Harrison, LLC v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

In 2016, petitioner Daniel Garcia was diagnosed as having porphyria, an extremely rare condition that is potentially fatal, especially if not properly treated. Garcia was in jail awaiting trial on charges including murder. Garcia made a series of requests for testing, evaluation, treatment, and preventive measures to deal with his porphyria. The trial court granted some of them (which may not even have been contested). However, when Garcia made an ex parte application for multiple measures — including being given protective clothing, being kept out of direct sunlight, and being transported only in air-conditioned vehicles with tinted windows — the court denied the application. About a month later, Garcia filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the jail’s failure to deal properly with his porphyria constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case was assigned to the same judge who denied his ex parte request. Garcia promptly filed a peremptory challenge to the judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The Court denied the section 170.6 challenge as untimely; he reasoned that the habeas proceeding was a continuation of the criminal action. Garcia thereafter filed a petition for writ of mandate to require the judge to grant his section 170.6 challenge. The Court of Appeal determined the trial judge correctly found the habeas proceeding was a continuation of the criminal action. Hence, the court correctly rejected the section 170.6 challenge as untimely. View "Garcia v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed from April 2018 to August 2019 by Defendant EmployBridge, LLC, which does business in California as Select Staffing. In March 2018, as part of her employment application, Plaintiff electronically signed an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement (1) states it “is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” and (2) contains a broad agreement to arbitrate claims. Plaintiff sued EmployBridge Holding Company, a Delaware corporation, solely to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations suffered by her or by other employees. The trial court determined that the agreement to arbitrate specifically excluded PAGA claims. This appeal challenges the denial of a motion to compel arbitration of claims to recover civil penalties.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the trial court correctly interpreted the agreement’s carve-out provision stating that “claims under PAGA … are not arbitrable under this Agreement.” This provision is not ambiguous. It is not objectively reasonable to interpret the phrase “claims under PAGA” to include some PAGA claims while excluding others. Thus, the carve-out provision excludes all the PAGA claims from the agreement to arbitrate. View "Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging Governor Gavin Newsom’s reversal of her 2020 grant of parole. Petitioner is serving concurrent sentences of seven years to life for the 1969 murders which she committed with other members of a cult led by Charles Manson. This is the fourth time a governor has reversed Petitioner’s parole.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court held that there is no evidence to support the Governor’s conclusions. The court explained that Petitioner provided an extensive explanation as to the causative factors leading to her involvement with Manson and the commission of the murders, and the record does not support a conclusion that there are hidden factors for which Petitioner has failed to account. The court wrote that the Governor’s finding of inconsistencies between Petitioner’s statements now and at the time of the murders fails to account for the decades of therapy, self-help programming, and reflection Petitioner has undergone in the past 50 years. The historical factors identified in the criminal risk assessment are the sort of immutable circumstances our Supreme Court has held cannot support a finding of current dangerousness when there is extensive evidence of rehabilitation and other strong indicators of parole suitability, all of which Petitioner has demonstrated. View "In re Van Houten" on Justia Law