Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Employer, a temporary staffing company, hired Young as a temporary worker in 2013 and assigned Young to a temporary position at BOW. On Friday, August 16, Young had a telephone altercation with Employer’s representative, who claimed Young was verbally abusive. Young testified the representative “basically” told Young she was “fired” and “implied” the firing was from Employer, rather than the BOW assignment. A contemporaneous internal email characterized the representative's message to Young as being that she was not to return to BOW due to her threatening behavior. Young reported for work at BOW on Monday, August 19. Another Employer representative escorted her out. Young was paid on August 23, for work performed the week of August 12 and on August 30 for work performed on August 19, in accordance with Employer’s regular payroll schedule.Young sued. In 2021—after arbitration of Young’s individual claims and dismissal of her class claims, Young’s only remaining claim was for Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2699, PAGA) penalties based on Employer’s alleged failure to timely pay final wages to a discharged employee (Labor Code 201.3(b)(4)). The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment for Employer. Section 201.3(b)(4) applies when a temporary services employer discharges an employee from employment with the temporary services employer, not when that employer terminates an employee from a particular work assignment. Young failed to demonstrate a dispute of fact as to whether she was discharged from work with Employer. View "Young v. RemX Specialty Staffing" on Justia Law

Based on a 2021 shooting death, a jury convicted Hiller of second-degree murder, Penal Code 187(a), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, section 29800(a)(1). The court found true several enhancement allegations, including that Hiller had suffered convictions in the State of Washington for serious or violent felonies, specifically robbery, and imposed a total sentence of 116 years to life; his terms were tripled under the Three Strikes law and he received two consecutive five-year enhancements for prior serious felonies.The court of appeal vacated the sentence, noting that robbery under Washington law does not require, as California law does, that the defendant intends permanently to deprive another of personal property, and that the trial court cannot supply this missing element of permanency by construing facts recorded in a document supplying the factual basis for defendant’s plea. The one-year arming enhancement (Penal Code 12022(a)(1)) was also stricken. The trial court’s true findings regarding the prior felony allegations under sections 667(a) and the Three Strikes law were reversed. The court remanded for retrial of the prior conviction allegations and resentencing. View "People v. Hiller" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Angelo Sherman petitioned for resentencing nearly 20 years after multiple convictions and receiving a sentence of 123 years to life for raping and sexually assaulting five different women, with a prior serious felony conviction for rape of an unconscious woman. He contended the trial court improperly found him ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91(b), because he adequately alleged that he suffered from a substance abuse problem related to his military service. The State contended Sherman was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.91(c), which was added to the statute and made effective January 1, 2023, while this appeal was pending. Subdivision (c) stated that section 1170.91 did not apply to a person who has been convicted of a super-strike offense or an offense requiring registration as a sex offender. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1170.91(c) applied to cases already pending when it became effective and made Sherman categorically ineligible for relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Sherman" on Justia Law

In 2015, a conservatorship of the estate of Thomas Tedesco, a wealthy nonagenarian (Thomas), was created, and Thomas requested the appointment of respondent David Wilson, an independent professional fiduciary, as conservator of the estate. Thomas’s second wife, Gloria Tedesco (Gloria) was present at the hearing and stipulated on the record, through counsel, to Wilson’s appointment. Approximately six years later, on March 23, 2021, Gloria petitioned the probate court to vacate the order creating the conservatorship, along with all subsequent orders “emanating” from the conservatorship. The court denied the petition, and she appealed. Through a "myriad of disjointed arguments," Gloria challenged the probate court’s order striking her petition to vacate all the orders in this conservatorship, including the establishment of the conservatorship and appointment of Wilson as the conservator. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Conservatorship of Tedesco" on Justia Law

Delores Attig was murdered in 1986. She was with two male friends smoking and talking in their car when they were attacked by four male assailants, two of them armed with guns. The assailants bound her friends and robbed them. Delores was led a short distance away, where she was gang raped and then shot once in the head at close range. Her murder remained a cold case for more than 20 years, until DNA analysis of evidence collected from her body led to the arrest of four men in 2007: Eddie Montanez, his brother Steve Montanez, and two juveniles. In 2010, a jury convicted Eddie of the first degree felony murder of Delores, and found true a principal personally used a firearm. The jury rejected special circumstance allegations that Eddie aided and abetted the murder while engaged in the commission and attempted commission of robbery, rape, sodomy, and oral copulation. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison, plus an additional year for the firearm enhancement. In 2012, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. In 2018, Eddie petitioned to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code 1172.6, enacted to allow certain defendant to take advantage of legislative amendments to restrict the scope of California's felony murder law. Eddie's petition was denied; on appeal he argued there was insufficient evidence to support the superior court’s findings he was a major participant in the felonies underlying Delores’ murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Finding no reversible error in the denial of Eddie's petition, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order. View "California v. Montanez" on Justia Law

The Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of eight children, alleging sexual abuse. Mother initially indicated that her deceased mother “had some Native ancestry.” Father reported “no Native American ancestry.” Days later, Mother reported that “she is not Native American and she paid for genetic testing.” At the detention hearing, Mother’s counsel represented that Mother has no Indian ancestry that she knows. The juvenile court responded: "Maybe there was a misunderstanding. I’ll make a finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. 1901) does not apply.” Mother's ICWA-020 form indicated “no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Father's form indicated “None.” The maternal aunt and the paternal grandfather both reported no documented information about Native American ancestry.After the contested hearing, the juvenile court declared dependency. A maternal cousin, the grandfather, and an aunt attended. The court again asked about Native American ancestry. The parents responded no. The court's finding that ICWA did not apply was included in the order.The parents did not challenge the jurisdictional findings or the dispositional orders but alleged that the Agency failed to satisfy its initial duty of inquiry into the children’s possible Native American heritage. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting their contention that the Agency was required to interview five additional extended family members, acknowledging that the Agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing” duty of inquiry. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Kinney, an adjudicated vexatious litigant and disbarred former attorney, obtained leave to pursue an appeal from the final judgment in this probate proceeding. Leave was granted not because Kinney made the necessary threshold showing of merit and absence of intent to harass or delay under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, but because the vexatious litigant statute has no application to a party who files an appeal in a proceeding he did not initiate.Kinney appealed the Final Distribution and Allowance of Fees Order, apparently claiming that the probate court erred in approving the Special Administrator’s decision not to pay him his $1,000 statutory fee, cancellation of an agreement with a prior administrator of the estate to manage and perform various services relating to a house owned by the estate, and approval of a distribution of $329,684.82 out of the sales proceeds of that house to satisfy indebtedness pursuant to certain judgment liens against that property.The court of appeal affirmed, describing Kinney’s arguments as “incoherent” and a “hodgepodge.” On all but one of the issues presented, Kinney either has no standing to appeal or is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion; on the remaining claim of error, the probate court acted within its discretion. View "Estate of Kempton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff 65282 Two Bunch Palms Building LLC, (Two Bunch) orally leased an industrial building in Desert Hot Springs to Coastal Harvest II, LLC, (Coastal Harvest) for the indoor cultivation of cannabis. When, after two years of negotiations, the parties were unable to agree to a written lease and a master service agreement, Two Bunch served Coastal Harvest with a 30-day notice to quit. Coastal Harvest refused to vacate the property, so Two Bunch instituted this unlawful detainer action. After a one-day trial, the trial court entered a judgment of possession for Two Bunch and awarded it $180,000.13 in holdover damages. At trial court, Coastal Harvest unsuccessfully argued it operated a licensed cannabis operation on the property and, therefore, it could not be evicted because it was entitled to the presumption under California Civil Code section 1943 of a one-year tenancy for “agricultural . . . purposes” and the presumption of a one-year holdover tenancy for use of “agricultural lands” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2). Assuming without deciding that Coastal Harvest’s cannabis operation constituted agriculture, Two Bunch rebutted the presumption under Civil Code section 1943 with evidence that the parties agreed that, unless they signed a written lease, the term of the oral lease was month-to-month. And, because this unlawful detainer action was not filed for failure to pay rent, Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2) and its holdover presumption for “agricultural” tenants did not apply. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "65282 Two Bunch Palms Building LLC v. Coastal Harvest II, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants were the maternal grandparents of the dependent child C.P. At a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the juvenile court ordered a legal guardianship for the child and appointed grandparents as his guardians. Grandparents contended the court should have instead selected adoption as the child’s permanent plan and designated them as the child’s prospective adoptive parents. The Court of Appeal agreed with grandparents and therefore reversed the order of legal guardianship. The Court directed the juvenile court to reconsider the matter given this opinion and any changed circumstances. View "In re C.P." on Justia Law

In 2014 the Los Angeles City Council passed a resolution directing various City departments and officials to prepare and execute the necessary approvals and agreements to convey the property to Childhelp in exchange for Childhelp’s agreement to continue using the property to provide services for victims of child abuse. Ultimately, however, the City decided not to transfer the property to Childhelp. Childhelp filed this action against the City for, among other things, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, and promissory estoppel, and the City filed an unlawful detainer action against Childhelp. After the trial court consolidated the two actions, the court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s cause of action for promissory estoppel, sustained without leave to amend the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer complaint. Childhelp appealed the ensuing judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Childhelp had occupied the property for almost 30 years and had an expectation it would eventually own the property. The 2014 resolution certainly suggested the City was seriously considering selling the property to Childhelp. But it was undisputed the parties never completed the transaction in accordance with the City Charter. While Childhelp cites cases reciting general principles of promissory estoppel, it does not cite any cases where the plaintiff successfully invoked promissory estoppel against a municipality in these circumstances. The trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action. View "Childhelp, Inc. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law