Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Christopher Skaggs was released on parole in 2019 after serving a prison sentence for felony violations of the Vehicle Code. In December 2020, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a petition to revoke his parole, alleging new criminal conduct, and also filed a related criminal complaint. Skaggs failed to appear for hearings, resulting in bench warrants. He was later arrested in Lake County on these warrants and new charges, convicted, and sentenced to additional prison time. While incarcerated, Skaggs repeatedly requested to resolve the Mendocino County parole revocation and criminal matters. The criminal complaint was dismissed under Penal Code section 1381, but the court declined to dismiss the parole revocation petition, finding section 1381 inapplicable.Skaggs subsequently filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the parole revocation petition on constitutional due process grounds, arguing that delays prejudiced him by preventing concurrent sentencing and prolonging his custody. The Mendocino County Superior Court construed his motion as a Penal Code section 1385 motion and denied it, reasoning that section 1385 does not apply to parole revocation proceedings. The court then held a contested revocation hearing, found Skaggs violated parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered his parole terminated upon release. Skaggs appealed the denial of his motion and the parole revocation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, determined that Skaggs’s appeal was moot because his parole had already been terminated and no effective relief could be granted. However, the court exercised its discretion to address the trial court’s error, holding that the trial court improperly construed Skaggs’s constitutional due process motion as a section 1385 motion and incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to consider the motion. The appellate court clarified that trial courts have jurisdiction to entertain nonstatutory motions to dismiss parole revocation petitions on constitutional due process grounds. The appeal was dismissed as moot. View "People v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

A mobilehome park owner challenged the constitutionality of Civil Code section 798.30.5, which limits annual rent increases for certain mobilehome parks located within the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities in California. The statute, effective from January 1, 2022, to January 1, 2030, restricts rent increases to the lower of 3 percent plus the percentage change in the cost of living, or 5 percent, and limits the number of rent increases within a 12-month period. The owner alleged that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a procedural mechanism for property owners to seek rent adjustments to ensure a fair return, arguing this omission violates due process and results in an uncompensated taking.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the absence of a process to seek exceptions to the rent ceiling violated due process and rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court rejected the owner’s takings argument but concluded that the statute’s plain language was undisputed and denied the State’s request for leave to amend its answer, determining that any amendment would be futile.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the owner failed to demonstrate that the statute is facially unconstitutional, clarifying that a fair return adjustment mechanism is not required for all rent control laws to be constitutional, but may be necessary only if the law is confiscatory in its application. The court also found that the State’s general denial in its answer placed the owner’s standing to sue at issue, precluding judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of the owner. View "Anaheim Mobile Estates v. State" on Justia Law

An 81-year-old man purchased a Maserati from a car dealership and its principal, claiming they orally promised him a $6,500 credit for his trade-in vehicle but only credited $2,000 in the written contract. He alleged that he would not have completed the transaction had he known the true trade-in value. Based on these events, he sued the sellers for financial elder abuse, violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and several related claims. During discovery, the sellers served requests for admission, which the plaintiff denied or withdrew. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found in favor of the sellers on all claims, concluding there was no misrepresentation.After prevailing at trial, the sellers sought approximately $490,000 in attorney fees, specifically cost-of-proof fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 and CLRA fees under Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (e). The Superior Court of Orange County denied the fee motion in its entirety, holding that the unilateral fee provision in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a) barred prevailing defendants from recovering attorney fees on financial elder abuse claims and any intertwined claims. The court found all claims were based on the same transaction and thus inextricably linked, relying on precedent that prohibits fee awards to prevailing defendants in such circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in categorically denying cost-of-proof fees, finding that such fees serve a distinct purpose—encouraging efficient litigation—and do not conflict with the unilateral fee provision, which is designed to protect plaintiffs from adverse fee awards for losing on elder abuse claims. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of CLRA fees, as the sellers failed to provide a separate, adequate argument for their entitlement. The order was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on cost-of-proof fees. View "Gamo v. Merrell" on Justia Law

A mobilehome park owner challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that limits annual rent increases for certain mobilehome parks located within the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities. The owner argued that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a procedural mechanism allowing property owners to seek rent increases above the statutory cap to ensure a fair return, which the owner claimed is required by the California and U.S. Constitutions. The owner asserted that the absence of such a mechanism results in a violation of due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against uncompensated takings.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the statute’s failure to provide a process for seeking exceptions to the rent cap violated due process and rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court rejected the owner’s takings argument but concluded that the legal issue was dispositive and denied the State’s request for leave to amend its answer. Judgment was entered in favor of the owner, and the State appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the owner failed to establish that the statute is facially unconstitutional, as the relevant legal precedents do not require a fair return adjustment mechanism in every rent control law. The court also found that the State’s general denial in its answer placed the owner’s standing at issue, precluding judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the absence of a fair return adjustment mechanism does not, by itself, render the statute facially unconstitutional, and that the State’s answer raised material issues that should have prevented judgment on the pleadings. View "Anaheim Mobile Estates v. State" on Justia Law

Two minor plaintiffs attended a four-day overnight science camp operated by a private entity and organized by their public school district. After returning home, they and their parents alleged that, during the camp, they were exposed to discussions and lessons about gender identity, including being introduced to counselors who used “they/them” pronouns and being asked to state their own preferred pronouns. The plaintiffs also claimed they were not allowed to contact their parents to discuss these matters due to a camp policy prohibiting calls home. They asserted that these experiences caused them severe emotional distress and initiated professional therapy.The plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of Orange County, asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against both the camp operator and the school district. The camp operator responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that the claims arose from protected speech on matters of public interest—specifically, gender identity discussions. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the claims were not based on protected activity but rather on the lack of disclosure to parents and the prohibition on contacting them. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees, finding the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The appellate court found that the IIED and NIED claims, to the extent they were based on exposure to gender identity discussions, arose from protected activity and lacked minimal merit, both factually and legally, under California public policy. However, claims based solely on the prohibition of calls home or sleeping arrangements did not arise from protected activity and could proceed. The order was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. View "Sandoval v. Pali Institute" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was accused of multiple sexual offenses involving two individuals: his sister-in-law, Nathaly, and a family friend, Evelin. The prosecution charged him with several counts related to alleged assaults on Nathaly when she was a minor, and one count of misdemeanor sexual battery involving Evelin. The jury convicted the defendant only on the misdemeanor count involving Evelin, finding that he groped her after a party. The jury could not reach a verdict on the counts involving Nathaly, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial on those charges, which the prosecution chose not to retry.Following the conviction, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sentenced the defendant to 364 days in county jail for the misdemeanor sexual battery, ordered him to register as a sex offender, and issued a protective order under Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), restraining him from contacting Nathaly. The defendant appealed, arguing that the protective order for Nathaly was unauthorized because she was not a victim of the crime for which he was convicted, and that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the current version of Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), a postconviction protective order may only be issued to protect a victim of the specific crime for which the defendant was convicted. Because Nathaly was not a victim of the misdemeanor sexual battery, the trial court lacked authority to issue a protective order for her. The court also found the 364-day sentence unauthorized, as the statutory maximum for the offense is six months. The conviction was affirmed, but the judgment was reversed with directions to vacate the protective order and resentence the defendant to six months. View "People v. Pena" on Justia Law

The defendant, a military veteran, was convicted in 2017 of multiple firearm-related offenses, including possession of assault weapons and ammunition as a felon, as well as possessing a forged driver’s license. The convictions stemmed from his involvement in acquiring and storing firearms and ammunition, despite being prohibited from doing so due to his criminal record. The defendant’s background included significant childhood trauma, military service, and subsequent mental health and substance abuse issues, which were not considered at his original sentencing. While incarcerated, he received mental health treatment and engaged in rehabilitation efforts.After his conviction and sentencing to 20 years in prison, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, which allows veterans to seek reduced sentences if their mental health conditions related to military service were not considered at sentencing. The Superior Court of Orange County found the defendant eligible for relief, acknowledging a connection between his mental health disorders and military service. However, the court denied resentencing, reasoning that there was no evidence linking his mental health issues to the commission of his offenses and refusing to consider his rehabilitative conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an irrelevant factor—requiring a nexus between the defendant’s mental health condition and his offenses—and by failing to consider relevant factors, such as the defendant’s rehabilitation while incarcerated and changes in the law favoring mitigation. The appellate court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Hayde" on Justia Law

Gary Birdsall was stopped in traffic on the Bay Bridge when his van was rear-ended by Barton Helfet, resulting in serious injuries to Gary and a loss of consortium claim by his wife, Pamela. The Birdsalls’ attorney sent Helfet’s insurer a settlement demand for the $100,000 policy limit, specifying acceptance required delivery of a standard bodily injury release to be executed by both Gary and Pamela, a settlement check, and proof of policy limits by a set deadline. The insurer responded before the deadline with a letter accepting the offer, a release (which mistakenly listed Pamela as a releasee rather than a releasor), the check, and proof of policy limits. A corrected release was sent after the deadline. The Birdsalls’ attorney rejected the settlement, citing the release’s error and the late correction, and returned the check.The Birdsalls filed suit in the San Francisco County Superior Court. Helfet’s answer included affirmative defenses of settlement and comparative fault for Gary’s failure to wear a seat belt. The Birdsalls moved for summary adjudication on the settlement defense, which the law and motion judge granted. At trial, the assigned judge excluded evidence and jury instructions regarding Gary’s seat belt use. The jury found Helfet negligent, awarded substantial damages to both plaintiffs, and judgment was entered. Helfet’s post-trial motions were denied, and he appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that summary adjudication of the settlement defense was improper because there was a triable issue of material fact regarding mutual consent to the settlement. The court also found error in excluding seat belt evidence and instructions, holding that such evidence is admissible and, under the circumstances, expert testimony was not required. The judgment and amended judgment were reversed, with instructions for a new trial and denial of summary adjudication. View "Birdsall v. Helfet" on Justia Law

Adriana Ramirez and her family were involved in litigation with third parties, including Harvey Miller and Stockdale Villa Mobile Home Park, where Ramirez was a property manager. After settling employment and unlawful detainer claims, Ramirez alleged that opposing counsel, attorney Sandra McCormack and her law firm, interfered with the settlement by, among other things, disputing the mailing address for settlement checks and failing to ensure the dismissal and sealing of the unlawful detainer action as required by the settlement. Ramirez claimed these actions caused her significant damages and brought several tort and contract-related claims against McCormack and other attorneys involved.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied McCormack’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court relied on precedents involving non-attorney defendants and found that the alleged conduct did not constitute protected petitioning activity under the statute. The court did not address the applicability of Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, which specifically addressed claims against attorneys for litigation-related conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that McCormack’s actions as opposing counsel—such as negotiating settlements, communicating with other attorneys, and advising clients—were protected petitioning activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that Ramirez’s claims arose from McCormack’s representation of her clients in litigation, fitting squarely within the statute’s protections as articulated in Thayer. Furthermore, Ramirez failed to present evidence of minimal merit for her claims on appeal, effectively forfeiting the issue. The appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to grant the anti-SLAPP motion and determine the fees and costs Ramirez must pay. View "Ramirez v. McCormack" on Justia Law

An elderly man with significant medical needs was admitted to a skilled nursing facility, where a physician provided in-facility care. The physician was responsible for evaluating the patient, making treatment orders, and recording medical information. The complaint alleged that the physician performed only cursory examinations, failed to follow up on necessary tests, did not adequately address serious medical issues, and maintained illegible records. The patient’s condition deteriorated, leading to hospitalization and eventual death.The patient’s brother, acting as successor in interest and on behalf of the heirs, filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the facility, its operators, and the physician. The complaint included claims for elder neglect and financial abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, as well as negligence and wrongful death. After settling with all defendants except the physician, the plaintiff proceeded against him alone. The physician demurred to the elder abuse claims, arguing that he did not have the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship with the patient and that the financial abuse claim was not viable. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the allegations amounted only to professional negligence, which is excluded from the Act’s heightened remedies.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a physician’s negligent provision of medical services to an elder in a skilled nursing facility, without more, does not constitute “neglect” under the Act because the physician lacks the necessary robust caretaking or custodial relationship. The court also held that a financial abuse claim based solely on alleged professional negligence is not actionable under the Act. The judgment in favor of the physician was affirmed. View "Frankland v. Etehad" on Justia Law