Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Glassman prevailed in an uninsured motorist (UIM) arbitration against Safeco. The arbitration agreement was contained in a Safeco umbrella policy that provided excess UIM benefits, above those afforded by Glassman’s concurrent Safeco auto-liability policy. Glassman had sustained bystander emotional distress damages after witnessing her mother’s fatal injuries when an underinsured driver hit them both while they were in a crosswalk. The arbitrator’s award determined that Glassman’s compensable damages exceeded the required threshold to entitle her to the umbrella-policy excess UIM limits of $1 million.Before the arbitration, Glassman had issued to Safeco a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer of $999,999.99. Safeco did not accept the offer. Glassman sought prejudgment interest under section 3287(a) from the date of her section 998 offer. Under section 3287(a), a liquidated damage claim triggers entitlement to prejudgment interest as a form of additional compensatory damages if the defendant knew or was able to calculate from reasonably available information the amount of the plaintiff’s liquidated claim owed as of a particular day. The trial court denied Glassman’s request, concluding that the amount of her claim was not certain or capable of being made certain.The court of appeal affirmed. An insured’s prevailing section 998 offer in a UIM proceeding does not effectively liquidate the insured’s claim in the amount and as of the date of the offer under section 3287(a). The court noted the lack of evidence of Safeco’s knowledge that Glassman’s economic losses or special damages resulting from the accident already exceeded the umbrella-policy limits when her section 998 offer was made. View "Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Manuel Hernandez appealed the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Stockton (City) based on his failure to comply with the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff sued for damages arising out of an allegedly defective public sidewalk. Plaintiff filed a government claim with the City, alleging that it negligently maintained public property by failing to correct a dangerous condition along a sidewalk. Plaintiff claimed that he sustained severe injuries when he tripped and fell due to a “dangerous condition” on the City-owned “sidewalk surface” that he identified only as an “uplifted sidewalk.” After his government claim was rejected, plaintiff filed this personal injury action, complaining broadly that the “sidewalk surface” harbored a “dangerous condition” that created an unspecified hazard. He later disclosed during his deposition that he tripped and fell when he stepped into a hole, specifically a tree well with no tree in it. When specifically asked whether it was “fair to say that [his] fall was not caused by an uplifted sidewalk,” he responded: “Correct.” The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that this action was barred because the factual basis for recovery was not “fairly reflected” in plaintiff’s government claim. View "Hernandez v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-term employee of Defendant St. Cecilia Catholic School. In her final year of employment, Defendant worked part-time as an art teacher and office administrator. Following her discharge, Defendant filed this action against St. Cecilia for age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) The trial court granted St. Cecilia’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the ministerial exception, a constitutional doctrine that precludes certain employment claims brought against a religious institution by its ministers.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment in favor of St. Cecilia and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies in this case. Further, the court wrote that St. Cecilia did not waive the ministerial exception by failing to assert the defense in its answer. The evidence that Plaintiff promoted “Christ-like” behavior in her class does not establish, as a matter of law, that she performed vital religious duties for St. Cecilia or otherwise qualified as a minister. Because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies to Plaintiff’s former job position as an art teacher and an office administrator, St. Cecilia was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s age discrimination suit. View "Atkins v. St. Cecilia Catholic School" on Justia Law

Berry sued Frazier, a veterinarian, for nominal and punitive damages based on the circumstances surrounding the euthanasia of her cat. Her complaint alleged that Berry secured Frazier’s services to perform humane euthanasia on her cat. Instead, and without Berry’s informed consent, Frazier performed the euthanasia by means of an unnecessary and unjustified intracardiac injection, resulting in a horrific and painful death for her cat and great emotional distress to Berry. The trial court dismissed, without leave to amend, claims for fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation, conversion/trespass to chattels, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Civil Code section 3340, which allows for an award of exemplary damages for wrongful injuries to animals committed willfully or with gross negligence in disregard of humanity. Berry voluntarily dismissed the sole remaining claim.The court of appeal reversed; the complaint contained sufficient allegations to withstand demurrer to the causes of action for fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation, conversion/trespass to chattels, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Berru should be allowed to allege a request for section 3340 exemplary damages in connection with other pleaded causes of action. View "Berry v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Bocanegra and Vernon R. were very close friends for decades. However, one Christmas, defendant, who was married, slept with Vernon R.’s girlfriend. The next year, Vernon R., by his account, slept with defendant’s wife, or, by her account, forcefully tried to. By this point, the friendship between defendant and Vernon R. was “dead.” Rather than allowing this saga to end, on the night of January 12, 2020, defendant drove from his home in San Jose to Vernon R.’s home in Manteca armed with three firearms including an AR-15 style rifle. Defendant broke a front window and fired shots into the house as Vernon R. scrambled through the house and dove out a bedroom window to get away. A jury found defendant not guilty of attempted murder, but found him guilty of assault with a firearm, possession of an assault weapon, discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, and causing a concealed firearm to be carried in a vehicle while an occupant, and found true an allegation that, in committing assault with a firearm, defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the matter had to be remanded for resentencing based on changes to Penal Code section 6541 made by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021- 2022 Reg. Sess.); and (2) his conviction of possession of an assault weapon had to be reversed because Penal Code section 30605 was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, ___U.S.___ [213 L.Ed.2d 387] (2002). Agreeing with defendant on his first point, the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing. Otherwise, the Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. View "California v. Bocanegra" on Justia Law

Edelweiss brought a qui tam action against financial institutions (California False Claims Act (Gov. Code 12650) (CFCA)), alleging that the defendants contracted to serve as remarketing agents (RMAs) to manage California variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs): tax-exempt municipal bonds with interest rates periodically reset by RMAs. Edelweiss claims that the defendants submitted false claims for payment for these remarketing services, knowing they had failed their obligation to reset the interest rate at the lowest possible rate that would enable them to sell the series at par (face value), and “engaged in a coordinated ‘Robo-Resetting’ scheme where they mechanically set the rates en masse without any consideration of the individual characteristics of the bonds or the associated market conditions or investor demand” and “impose[d] artificially high interest rates on California VRDOs.” Edelweiss alleged that it performed a forensic analysis of rate resetting during a four-year period and that former employees of the defendants “stated and corroborated” this robo-resetting scheme.The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the allegations lacked particularized allegations about how the defendants set their VRDO rates and did not support a reasonable inference that the observed conditions were caused by fraud, rather than other factors.The court of appeal reversed. While allegations of a CFCA claim must be pleaded with particularity, the court required too much to satisfy this standard. The court rejected an alternative argument that Edelweiss’s claims are foreclosed by CFCA’s public disclosure bar. View "Edelweiss Fund LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

The Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation California (Chumash) appealed a judgment following the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington) in Chumash’s lawsuit against Lexington for denial of insurance coverage.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that, among other things, Chumash did not present sufficient evidence to show that the COVID-19 virus caused physical property damage to its casino and resort so as to fall within the property damage coverage provisions of the Lexington insurance policy. The court explained that had the Chumash Casino and Resort sustained property damage, it was required to specify what property was damaged and to submit a claim for the dollar amount of that loss. The absence of such information supports Lexington’s decision to deny coverage. View "Santa Ynez Band of Chumash etc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Krissy Werntz sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Werntz committed murder by failing to protect her daughter. Werntz contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings. She asked the Court of Appeal to review the denial of her petition de novo because there was no live testimony. In the alternative, she contended there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s factual conclusions. Furthermore, she contended the trial court’s order could not be affirmed based on a finding of aiding and abetting implied malice murder because such a theory was not valid under the current law. The Court of Appeal concluded the proper standard of review was substantial evidence, and found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Werntz failed to protect her child and was guilty of second degree murder. In addition, the Court rejected Werntz’s contention that aiding and abetting implied malice murder no longer exists under California law. View "California v. Werntz" on Justia Law

Wellsfry, playing golf on OCP's course, parked his golf cart, not noticing any trees or tree roots in the area. He left his cart, took a shot, and walked down a “gentle slope” toward his cart. He felt “searing pain” and fell into his golf cart. Wellsfry knew he had stepped on something but did not see what it was and could not say if his foot caught or twisted on anything. Another golfer pointed out a tree root; it is not clear whether she saw Wellsfry step on that root. Wellsfry continued playing golf and later that day reported the incident. Wellsfry filed suit, alleging that he had fallen “by tripping on a root that was concealed in the grass in reasonably close proximity to where a tree had been removed” and “the presence of a root as a hidden obstruction created a condition that was negligently maintained and dangerous with an unreasonable risk of harm."The court of appeal affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the negligence suit. The lawsuit was barred by the primary assumption of risk doctrine; playing outdoor golf includes the inherent risk of injury caused by stepping on a tree root in an area used to access tee boxes. OCP had not increased that inherent risk and had not failed to take reasonable steps to minimize the inherent risk of injury that would not have altered the fundamental nature of the sport. View "Wellsfry v. Ocean Colony Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment dismissing their lawsuit against Defendant following Defendant’s successful motion for judgment on the pleadings on the sole claim in the operative complaint, malicious prosecution. The operative complaint alleges that Defendant falsely reported to law enforcement that Plaintiffs had attacked her. It further alleges that Defendant’s false reports led to a law enforcement investigation, at the conclusion of which the district attorney declined to press charges. The trial court concluded that the operative complaint does not sufficiently allege a malicious prosecution claim because such a claim requires an adjudicative proceeding. The court further denied Plaintiffs’ leave to amend. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the court’s reliance on Van Audenhove v. Perry (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 915 (Van Audenhove).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiffs have standing to appeal. To the merits, the court agreed with Van Audenhove and agreed with the court below that, under Van Audenhove, the operative complaint is fatally defective. The proposed factual allegations Plaintiffs proffer they could allege if given leave to amend, would not address the deficiency in the only cause of action alleged in the complaint. Further, Plaintiffs are not entitled to amend their complaint to add causes of action they had voluntarily dismissed earlier in the litigation because Plaintiffs offered no explanation for their yearslong delay in seeking to do so. Nor are Plaintiffs entitled to add an abuse of process claim they had not previously alleged because this claim is time-barred and does not relate back to the sole cause of action in the operative complaint. View "Bidari v. Kelk" on Justia Law