Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Map, filed with the Alameda County Recorder’s Office in 1854, depicts lots 15-18. In 1877, those lots were conveyed with others and were separately identified. Lots 15-18 were transferred in a single conveyance in 1885, 1887, and 1913. Lot 18 remained as depicted on the 1854 Map. In 1944, lots 17 and 18 and part of lot 16 were transferred in a single deed. In 2015, Crescent acquired those lots by a single deed. Crescent applied for a certificate of compliance for lot 18. The city surveyor agreed lot 18 “was legally created" but concluded, that lots “18 and 17, and a portion of 15 and 16 were merged" by a 1933 probate judgment because “[t]he adjudicated lines of the original lots were removed" by metes and bounds description, and they were effectively re-subdivided by the 1944 conveyance. There had “been no effort to divide the parcel into the original 25-foot configurations,” no separately assessed parcel existed for lot 18 in 1972, and the lot had not been “separately” conveyed.The court of appeal ruled in favor of Crescent. Lot 18, conveyed in conjunction with three or fewer other lots before the enactment of any ordinance governing such subdivisions, is presumptively lawful (Government Code 66412.6(a) and 66499.30(d)). It is irrelevant whether the original Map created legal parcels or whether lot 18 was ever “merged” into the adjoining lots, as the city never attempted to justify its denial of a certificate of compliance on that basis. View "Crescent Trust v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

In 2015, after his co-defendant stole a camera from tourists, Fox shot at the tourists as the two fled. Fox was charged with eight felony counts, exposing him to a life sentence. He pleaded guilty to robbery, admitted to personally using a firearm during the offense, and agreed to a 15-year prison sentence--10 years for the firearm enhancement and the aggravated term of five years for the robbery. While his appeal was pending, Senate Bill 620 took effect, granting trial courts new discretion under Penal Code 1385 to strike firearm enhancements. The court of appeal rejected Fox’s request for a remand to ask the trial court to strike his firearm enhancement while he retained the other benefits of his plea. In 2020, the California Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of “Stamps.” On remand, Fox unsuccessfully moved for the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement.The court of appeal held that Fox is entitled to a remand for resentencing under Senate Bill 567, which amended Penal Code 1170(b)) to alter a trial court’s discretion to choose the lower, middle, or upper term for a crime with a sentencing triad, such as the robbery charge to which Fox pleaded guilty. Based on the logic of Stamps, a defendant who agreed to serve the upper term under a plea agreement is nonetheless entitled to a remand to ensure section 1170(b)’s requirements are met. View "People v. Fox" on Justia Law

Three community stakeholders moved to intervene in several lawsuits challenging the authority of the California Coastal Commission (Commission) to ban all off-highway vehicle (OHV) use at Oceano Dunes State Vehicular Recreation Area (Oceano Dunes). The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the stakeholders’ interests are adequately represented in the litigation. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it: (1) denied them leave to intervene as of right, (2) denied their request for permissive intervention, and (3) sustained Respondents’ evidentiary objections.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that where a nonparty has interests in the outcome of a civil action that are identical to those of a party to the action, the nonparty must make a compelling showing of inadequate representation to be permitted to intervene as of right. The court explained that the trial court’s decision to deny Appellants’ request for permissive intervention did not exceed the bounds of reason because “ ‘the rights of the original parties to conduct their lawsuit on their own terms’ ” outweighed the reasons for intervention. The court wrote that additionally, permitting Appellants to intervene would add to an already-expansive action, one with four consolidated writ petitions; multiple plaintiffs, defendants, and real parties in interest; and significant burdens on the trial court. View "Friends of Oceano Dunes v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

In 2008, as part of the defendants’ application for approval of Onglyza and Kombiglyze XR, two diabetes drugs with saxagliptin as the active ingredient, the FDA’s Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee required that defendant AstraZeneca perform a cardiovascular outcomes study. “SAVOR” was a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study that consisted of 16,492 patients with type 2 diabetes who were at high risk of cardiovascular disease. The study concluded that saxagliptin did not increase or decrease the risk of these occurrences but noted a higher risk of hospitalization. Following SAVOR, the FDA required warning labels for medications containing saxagliptin, referring to the potential increased risk of heart failure. Researchers conducted additional studies and did not find an association between saxagliptin and an increased risk of hospitalization for heart failure.Patients who took drugs with saxagliptin filed approximately 250 related cases. Most of these cases were filed in federal court and consolidated into federal multidistrict litigation. A Judicial Council coordination proceeding (JCCP) was established for the California state court cases. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court upheld the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ general causation expert, who opined that saxagliptin can cause heart failure. View "Onglyza Product Cases" on Justia Law

Coulthard was convicted of abducting his eight-year-old daughter after he failed to return the child to her mother in the United Kingdom (Pen. Code 2781 ). For this offense, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Coulthard on probation for two years.The court of appeal affirmed. The prosecution was not required to prove that a foreign court order used to prove Coulthard’s guilt had previously been registered under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. There was no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws; the court rejected Coulthard’s argument that “no reasonable interpretation of [section] 278" would put him on notice that violating an order of a foreign court, never registered with any U.S. court, could subject him to criminal penalties in this country. The court also rejected a preemption argument and an argument that the trial court denied Coulthard’s constitutional right to present a defense by failing to give him “a Hague Convention hearing,” denying him an opportunity to show that the laws of the UK granted him a right to custody; and foreclosing arguments about the necessity to protect the child. The remote, two-way audio/video testimony of the child’s mother did not violate his confrontation rights. View "People v. Coulthard" on Justia Law

Air 7, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and its owner, the Peter J. Koral Trust, owned a Gulfstream G-550 jet aircraft. Air 7’s headquarters were located at the Camarillo Airport in Ventura County. The owner was a resident of California. The County of Ventura (the “County”) imposed a tax on the aircraft that was permanently removed from California before the tax lien date of January 1 for the tax year 2017. Air 7 sued the County for a refund of the taxes, statutory interest, and penalties the County had imposed. The trial court found the aircraft was not permanently removed from Ventura County on the tax lien date because it had not established situs elsewhere. The trial court entered judgment for the County.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the aircraft was removed from California with the intent that removal be permanent, and the aircraft never returned to California during the 2017 tax year. Accordingly, the court concluded the aircraft was not “situated” or “habitually situated” in California. The tax imposed on the aircraft violates California law irrespective of whether the aircraft was situated and taxed in another state. View "Air 7, LLC v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

M.C. (mother) appealed the termination of parental rights to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) responded that by failing to raise the issue, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; alternatively, the Department argued that substantial evidence supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Mother also contended the juvenile court and the Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California statutes.   The Second Appellate District concluded the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA, and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes on appeal. The court explained that here, the usual benefit from the application of the forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. Thus, although the Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent from the record. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Webb was an amputee with only one leg. He challenged his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, claiming he lacked the present ability to commit a violent injury when, balanced on his remaining leg and braced against a table in front of him, he lunged at a restaurant worker with a knife. The Court of Appeal accepted that a defendant’s own physical limitations or other circumstances might affect how far he could move to strike a victim, which in turn may affect whether that defendant had the present ability to commit a battery. "But this case lies nowhere near that line." One victim testified that the tip of Webb’s blade came within a foot of him and would have struck him had he not backed away. On this record, the Court concluded substantial evidence supported Webb’s assault conviction, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Webb" on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services detained infant boy S.S. at birth, based on exigency, alleging his parents abused drugs and S.S. was born testing positive for various drugs. The juvenile court detained S.S. from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt and uncle. The mother and father both denied Indian ancestry. The maternal aunt, however, said that the mother might have Yaqui heritage. The Department, in turn, notified the Pascua Yaqui tribe, which replied S.S. was not eligible for membership: the tribe would not intervene. The Department never asked paternal extended family members about the possibility of Indian ancestry. The court terminated parental rights in favor of a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle, who were the caretakers and prospective adoptive parents. The mother appealed. At issue is the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, sections 1901 and following title 25 of the United States Code (the Act, or ICWA) and its California counterpart.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to inquire of the three paternal extended family members previously identified whether S.S. may be an Indian child. The court explained that the Department’s failure prejudices tribes. The Department had contact information for three extended paternal family members but did nothing with it, thus denying tribes the benefit of the statutory promise. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny tribes the benefit of this legislation. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law