Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

M.C. (mother) appealed the termination of parental rights to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) responded that by failing to raise the issue, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; alternatively, the Department argued that substantial evidence supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Mother also contended the juvenile court and the Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California statutes.   The Second Appellate District concluded the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA, and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes on appeal. The court explained that here, the usual benefit from the application of the forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. Thus, although the Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent from the record. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Webb was an amputee with only one leg. He challenged his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, claiming he lacked the present ability to commit a violent injury when, balanced on his remaining leg and braced against a table in front of him, he lunged at a restaurant worker with a knife. The Court of Appeal accepted that a defendant’s own physical limitations or other circumstances might affect how far he could move to strike a victim, which in turn may affect whether that defendant had the present ability to commit a battery. "But this case lies nowhere near that line." One victim testified that the tip of Webb’s blade came within a foot of him and would have struck him had he not backed away. On this record, the Court concluded substantial evidence supported Webb’s assault conviction, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Webb" on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services detained infant boy S.S. at birth, based on exigency, alleging his parents abused drugs and S.S. was born testing positive for various drugs. The juvenile court detained S.S. from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt and uncle. The mother and father both denied Indian ancestry. The maternal aunt, however, said that the mother might have Yaqui heritage. The Department, in turn, notified the Pascua Yaqui tribe, which replied S.S. was not eligible for membership: the tribe would not intervene. The Department never asked paternal extended family members about the possibility of Indian ancestry. The court terminated parental rights in favor of a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle, who were the caretakers and prospective adoptive parents. The mother appealed. At issue is the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, sections 1901 and following title 25 of the United States Code (the Act, or ICWA) and its California counterpart.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to inquire of the three paternal extended family members previously identified whether S.S. may be an Indian child. The court explained that the Department’s failure prejudices tribes. The Department had contact information for three extended paternal family members but did nothing with it, thus denying tribes the benefit of the statutory promise. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny tribes the benefit of this legislation. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

After the San Francisco Planning Commission approved a final mitigated negative declaration for the owner’s proposed renovation of a residence, Kaufman, the owner of an adjacent property, appealed the matter to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, which reversed the approval. The owner filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City and County, the Board, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Department, naming Kaufman as a real party in interest. In response,Kaufman filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law (Code Civil Procedure 425.16), arguing that the petition arose from his protected petitioning activity and lacked minimal merit. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded Kaufman attorney fees as the prevailing party. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding the mandamus petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct, as the activities that form the basis for the petition’s causes of action are all acts or omissions of the Board. That Kaufman’s administrative appeal preceded or even triggered the events leading to the petition’s causes of action against the Board did not mean that the petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct within the contemplation of the anti-SLAPP law. View "Durkin v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

When A.F. was 11 years old, she applied for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F., who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. Mother was the original guardian ad litem (GAL), and she retained attorney Edward Castro to represent A.F. Father successfully moved to disqualify Mother as the GAL and Castro as A.F.’s counsel. A.F. appealed the order disqualifying Castro. A new GAL was not appointed. Although A.F. brought the petition on her own behalf, the family court in her parents’ dissolution matter, appointed a “minor’s counsel” to represent her best interests there, in anticipation of changes to the custody and visitation arrangement that could result from the outcome in the DV matter. A.F. retained attorney Aaron Smith, to represent her in the DV matter. The court disqualified Smith for numerous reasons, including that there was a potential conflict of interest from having her maternal grandfather serve as a third-party guarantor. The court also interviewed A.F. and determined she was not competent to retain counsel independently, and it found Smith did not meet the requirements detailed by the California Rules of Court to serve as a “minor’s counsel.” The court appointed counsel in the DV matter, and prohibited Smith from replacing the attorney the court appointed as a “minor’s counsel.” A.F. appealed, contending that the issue of selecting her attorney should have been stayed pending the appeal of the court’s order disqualifying Castro. She also contended it was error to appoint counsel in the DV matter and to disqualify the attorney she chose to represent her there. The Court of Appeal: (1) concluded the court had subject matter jurisdiction to act in the DV matter while the first appeal was pending because her original attorney substituted out of the case; (2) reversed the appointment of a “minor’s counsel,” which was improper in a DV matter where a minor seeks a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA); (3) affirmed the order voiding the agreement between A.F. and Smith and removing Smith as her attorney on the basis that A.F. lacked competency to select her attorney independently; (4) reversed the order prohibiting Smith from serving as A.F.’s attorney in the matter because it was an abuse of discretion to completely disqualify him on the basis that the court rejected the fee agreement or that he failed to meet the requirements of Rule 5.242. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought dismissal of the third attempt by the Merced County District Attorney to prosecute him for felony escape by force or violence under Penal Code section 4532, subdivision (b)(2). The People argued the exception to the two-dismissal rule set forth in section 1387, subdivision (c), applies and allows the third prosecution to proceed.   The Fifth Appellate District (1) vacated its November 17, 2022, ruling denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the information, (2) issued a ruling granting the motion to dismiss, and (3) restrained the court from conducting further proceedings with respect to the felony escape charge under Penal Code section 4532. The court held that Petitioner is entitled to relief as a matter of law and further prosecution would be prejudicial. The court concluded that the exception to the two-dismissal rule does not apply to these factual circumstances and further prosecution of Petitioner for escape is barred by section 1387. View "Barron v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The University's adjunct faculty taught individual classes on a semester-by-semester basis. Their appointment letters referred to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, specified a per-course salary, and estimated the number of work hours. Although the letters specified a work appointment from the first day of classes to the end of the semester, adjuncts were required to work outside of these time periods to prepare a syllabus and submit final grades. Adjuncts’ wage statements did not show the number of hours worked or an hourly pay rate.Gola brought claims for unpaid wages and failure to pay compensation at the time of discharge, citing work done outside of the assignment period and after the adjuncts’ “termination,” and alleged that the University failed to issue wage statements in compliance with Labor Code 226(a). Gola asserted a derivative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) seeking civil penalties.The trial court held that two causes of action were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 141) because they could not be resolved without interpreting the CBA. On the wage statement claim, the court concluded that adjuncts were not exempt employees and that the University was liable for penalties because it knew that facts existed bringing its actions within the provisions of section 226. The court calculated statutory damages and PAGA penalties and awarded Gola attorneys’ fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that newly-enacted Labor Code 515.7—permitting employers to classify certain adjunct faculty as exempt from specified wage statement requirements—should be applied retroactively. View "Gola v. University of San Francisco" on Justia Law

On December 29, 2022, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging a November 7, 2022, order of the superior court granting Petitioner’s request for trial setting preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36,1 but declining to set trial within 120 days.The Fifth Appellate District held that Petitioner's "entitlement to relief is obvious“ and ordered the Merced County Superior Court to set a trial date not more than 120 days after November 7, 2022. The court explained that a consistent line of precedent exists and superior courts have “no discretion to avoid the command of section 36[] in the interest of efficient management of the court’s docket as a whole.” View "Pabla v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Saucedo was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of evading a police officer causing injury, after a stolen truck he was driving collided with another truck and killed two young girls. He was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life, consecutive to a term of seven years plus eight months for the evading and taking charges.The court of appeal affirmed in part, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the jury instructions, to the admission of autopsy photos, and to the exclusion of evidence about the victims or of Saucedo’s assertion that his foot slipped. The trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding numerous minor driving offenses committed by Saucedo to prove he acted with implied malice, but the error was nonprejudicial. The court reversed the conviction for evading. The deputy did not turn on the lights or siren until Saucedo turned off the highway down an embankment, the collision occurred only two to five seconds later, the deputy testified he was 15 car lengths behind at that moment, and there is no evidence Saucedo looked back or should have heard the sirens at that distance. View "People v. Saucedo" on Justia Law