Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, doing business as The Soni Law Firm (collectively Soni), appealed from a judgment awarding attorney fees under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (MFAA in favor of Defendants Timothy Tierney and Cartograph, Inc., formerly known as Simplelayers, Inc. (collectively Tierney). On appeal, Soni contends: he was the prevailing party for the purposes of an attorney fees award under sections 6203 and 6204; he was also the prevailing party under the parties’ contractual attorney fees provisions; he was entitled to an award of attorney fees because he was not a self-represented litigant; and even if Tierney were entitled to fees, the amount was excessive.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the statutory attorney fees provisions of sections 6203 and 6204 govern rather than the attorney fees provision of the parties’ contract. The trial court properly awarded attorney fees to Tierney as the prevailing party under sections 6203 and 6204. Further, Tierney’s attorneys worked half as many hours as Soni’s attorneys on the matters at issue, and Tierney’s attorneys billed substantially lower total fees than the charges that Soni incurred and sought to recover in his competing motion for attorney fees. The trial court examined the bills carefully and reduced the amount awarded to Tierney for duplicative work by one attorney. Accordingly, the court held that no abuse of discretion has been shown as to the amount of fees awarded. View "Soni v. Cartograph, Inc." on Justia Law

The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed claims against the Ford Motor Company (FMC) for alleged defects in vehicles the company manufactured. FMC filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims based on the arbitration provision in the sale contracts. Plaintiffs opposed FMC’s motion, including on the grounds that FMC had waived its right to compel arbitration through its litigation conduct. The trial court denied FMC’s motion on its merits.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the trial court that FMC could not compel arbitration based on Plaintiffs’ agreements with the dealers that sold them the vehicles. Equitable estoppel does not apply because, contrary to FMC’s arguments, Plaintiffs’ claims against it in no way rely on the agreements. FMC was not a third-party beneficiary of those agreements, as there is no basis to conclude Plaintiffs and their dealers entered into them with the intention of benefitting FMC. And FMC is not entitled to enforce the agreements as an undisclosed principal because there is no nexus between Plaintiffs’ claims, any alleged agency between FMC and the dealers, and the agreements. View "Ford Motor Warranty Cases" on Justia Law

In the first part of a bifurcated trial, a jury found Jones guilty of first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm, finding true the allegation that he had personally used a firearm causing death. In the second part, the same jurors found that he had been convicted of a prior serious felony.The court affirmed the murder conviction. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the jury instruction about the relationship between the juror’s reliance on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a way that violated Jones’s rights. There was no reversible error in the trial court’s purported failure to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The court reversed the prior serious felony finding. The jurors were discharged and freed of any admonition around 10:10 a.m. and did not return to the courtroom until 2:05 p.m. The record is silent as to whether they abided by the terms of the admonition from which they had already been released and does not account for the jurors’ conduct or specific whereabouts during their absence from the courtroom. It is not possible to conclude that the jury remained within the court’s control. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

The California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (Division) debarred the following from acting as public works contractors: (1) GRFCO, Inc. (GRFCO), a contractor; (2) George Rogers Frost, the principal in GRFCO; (3) Garcia Juarez Construction (GJC), a contractor and apparent alter ego of GRFCO; and (4) James Craig Jackson, the principal in GJC and an employee of GRFCO. The Division found that, in six instances, the contractors violated apprenticeship requirements, and in two instances, Frost and Jackson had made false certifications under penalty of perjury. The trial court denied the contractors’ petition for administrative mandate. On appeal, the contractors contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the apprenticeship violations were knowing; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the false certification findings; (3) the contractors were debarred because they refused to join a union, in violation of the First Amendment; (5) the Division, hearing officer, and/or the investigator were biased; and (5) the hearing officer erred by denying the contractors' request to reopen, which was based on new evidence of bias. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "GRFCO, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2016, with a negotiated agreement, Vaca entered a plea of no contest to two counts of violating Health & Safety Code section 11379(a). The court dismissed the remaining charges and placed Vaca on formal probation for three years with a 120-day jail sentence. After completing probation, Vaca moved to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea under Penal Code 1473.7. At an evidentiary hearing, defense counsel stated that Vaca met his burden under section 1473.7 and alluded to the dismissal of the case. The prosecution opposed, and, concerning dismissal, claimed lack of notice. Defense counsel “invite[d] the Court to dismiss under 1385 and move[d] to dismiss under 1473.7 and 1016.2.” The court responded, “I’m going to go ahead and deny both of those requests … Under [ ] 1473.7[,] I find the defense has met their burden, but I will not dismiss.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Vaca’s argument that, after the trial court granted his motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7, the statute required the dismissal of the underlying criminal complaint. View "People v. Vaca" on Justia Law

Moss Gropen brought suit against, among other defendants, Cyrus Shabrang and Michael Noud (together, Real Parties in Interest) arising out of Gropen’s treatment at a hospital. Gropen appeared at the noticed deposition with his wife Laura Gropen. Defense counsel objected to Laura’s presence at the deposition because she was a percipient witness in the action and could be deposed in the future. Gropen’s deposition did not proceed beyond the parties stating their objections on the record. Real Parties in Interest subsequently filed a motion for protective order and sanctions, asking the court to exclude Laura from Gropen’s deposition. At the hearing on the motion, for the first time, Gropen’s counsel explicitly requested under California Rules of Court, rule 1.100, that accommodations be provided to Gropen because he was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a recognized disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The court acknowledged that PTSD fell under the ADA but found Gropen’s request for an accommodation untimely. It thus granted the protective order and sanctioned Gropen. Gropen petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in granting the protective order and erred by not considering the evidence that Gropen was diagnosed with PTSD. Gropen also maintained that his request that Laura attend his deposition was a reasonable accommodation. The Court of Appeal concluded Gropen’s request for accommodation was timely, the district court abused its discretion by failing to remand the matter to the superior court with instructions to deny the motion for a protective order and sanctions, and to properly consider Gropen’s request under Rule 1.100. View "Gropen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 1988, Kerins was convicted of sodomy with a person under 18, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) qualifying offense. In 1998, Kerins pleaded guilty to two counts of annoying or molesting a child under 18. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. Before Kerins’s scheduled release date in 2006, two psychologists concluded Kerins met the SVP criteria, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(a). After his probable cause hearing there were multiple continuances, reevaluations, and substitutions of attorney. In November 2020. Kerins filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the People did not bring him to trial in a timely manner and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.The trial court denied the petition in November 2021, describing the delay as “considerable,” but finding that the “overwhelming reason” for the delay was that Kerins’s counsel sought “continuance after continuance.” The court further observed that Kerins did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 2019 and that nothing indicated Kerins’s defense had been impaired. The court of appeal upheld the decision. The court’s findings about the reasons for the delays and concerning prejudice were supported by substantial evidence. Kerins offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that his attorneys provided reasonable assistance. View "In re Kerins" on Justia Law

Minor S.S. (minor) appealed an order transferring him from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1. Minor contended: (1) the juvenile court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) subsequent legislation applies retroactively and requires reversal because the juvenile court did not comply with new requirements for transfer hearings. The State conceded the second argument. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the new law applied retroactively and therefore reversal and remand was appropriate for an amenability hearing in compliance with the new law. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA, Civil Code, 1786) mandates certain disclosures for investigative consumer reports, which are often used by landlords to make decisions regarding consumers who apply for housing. ICRAA requires the adoption of “reasonable procedures” for providing consumer information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer," concerning the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of their information. Any investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with the requirements is liable to the affected consumer for any actual damages or $10,000, whichever sum is greater. Courts of appeal disagreed about the constitutionality and enforceability of ICRAA.In 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of ICRAA. Bernuy had filed one of 27 consolidated actions seeking damages against BPMC for its commission of ICRAA violations in 2017. Bernuy’s action was designated a “bellwether” case for adjudicating certain issues. The court of appeal held that the California Supreme Court’s 2018 decision did not constitute a subsequent change in the law that relieved BPMC of liability for its ICRAA violations. However, certain plaintiffs’ ICRAA claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period was not tolled by the pendency of a putative class action. View "Bernuy v. Bridge Property Management Co." on Justia Law