Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former driver for Defendant Lyft, Inc., filed suit against Lyft under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). He alleged that Lyft misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Lyft moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the “Terms of Service” (TOS) that it required its drivers to accept. The trial court denied the motion, finding the PAGA waiver in the arbitration provision unenforceable under then-controlling California law. Lyft appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed the denial of Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration. Lyft petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted Lyft’s petition and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022).   The Second Appellate District reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s order. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to (1) enter an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate his individual PAGA claim and (2) conduct further proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s non-individual claims. The court explained that it is not bound by the analysis of PAGA standing set forth in Viking River. PAGA standing is a matter of state law that must be decided by California courts. The court explained that until it has guidance from the California Supreme Court, its review of PAGA and relevant state decisional authority leads the court to conclude that a plaintiff is not stripped of standing to pursue non-individual PAGA claims simply because their individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration. View "Seifu v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

At sentencing, counsel stated that her client, defendant Eric Cooks waived his right to appear at any future restitution hearing. The court noted the waiver orally and in its sentencing minute order. Cooks appealed, claiming he never validly waived his right to be present at a future restitution hearing. At the time of his appeal, a restitution hearing had not yet taken place. The Court of Appeal concluded that until a restitution hearing takes place in Cooks’s absence, any error from an invalid waiver was hypothetical and not concrete. Concluding the claim was not yet ripe for appellate review, his appeal was dismissed. View "California v. Cooks" on Justia Law

Santa Clara Valley Water District was insured by Century. In 2000, the District notified Century that it had been advised by the federal government of potential claims for natural resource damages resulting from mercury contamination in the Guadalupe River Watershed (NRD Claim). Century requested additional information, including the status of negotiations. Century made several similar requests to the District between 2000-2002. In 2001, Century indicated that it had no duties under the primary policies because there was no lawsuit pending, had no duty to indemnify the District under the excess policies until the underlying limits of the policies had been exhausted, and was reserving its rights under the policies. The District subsequently signed a tolling agreement, was sued in federal court, and entered a Consent Decree without notifying Century.In 2008, the District notified Century of the existence of the lawsuit and the Consent Decree and stated that it had incurred $4 million in costs to comply with the Consent Decree. Century cited a No Voluntary Payment (NVP) provision. The District did not contact Century until 2014, when it completed its required Consent Decree work. In 2015, the District sued Century.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment for Century. The NVP provisions barred the District from seeking indemnification for the expenses it incurred under the Consent Decree, without notifying Century or obtaining its consent. Those provisions apply to the settlement even though it was achieved through a consent decree rather than a traditional settlement agreement. Because the NRD Claim was disposed of by that settlement, there was no “adjudication” that gave rise to an “ultimate net loss” that gave the District the right to pay and seek indemnification. View "Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Century Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

In the 1970s-1980s, the County approved maps for two subdivisions bordered by a tributary of “Murderer’s Creek.” The creek is a natural watercourse that is the main receptacle for storm runoff emanating from the watershed above the properties and is the only reasonable means of collecting and conveying that runoff. Pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act, the County required the developers to make drainage improvements to collect and convey water from the subdivisions to the creek. Contributing to runoff were two private roads serving as ingress and egress to the subdivisions and one county-owned road. adjacent to one subdivision. As provided by the Map Act, the County required the developers to dedicate drainage easements to the County. When it approved the subdivision maps, however, the County did not accept the offers of dedication. The drainage improvements remained in the ownership of the developers and later the homeowners.The owners bought lots in those subdivisions in 2010 and 2016. They sued the County and a flood control district for inverse condemnation and tort claims after drainage improvements constructed more than 40 years earlier failed and serious erosion and subsidence damaged their properties. The superior court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. As a matter of law, a public entity must either own or exercise actual control over a waterway or drainage improvements to render them public works for which the public entity is responsible. View "Shenson v. County of Contra Costa" on Justia Law

The Oakland Waterfront Ballpark District Project proposes the redevelopment of Howard Terminal, a 50-acre site within the Port of Oakland, and five contiguous acres. It includes a 35,000-seat ballpark for the city’s Major League Baseball team, construction of 3,000 residential units, 270,000 square feet of retail space, 1.5 million square feet for other commercial uses, a performance venue, and up to 400 hotel rooms. There will be parking for 8,900 vehicles; nearly 20 acres will be set aside as publicly accessible open space. Howard Terminal borders an estuary. Portions of the site are currently used for various commercial maritime activities, but most of the land is devoted to truck parking and container storage. A rail line serving passenger and freight traffic runs down the northern border of Howard Terminal.Oakland issued a draft environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000) in 2021 and certified the final EIR a year later. A statement of overriding considerations concluded that the project’s benefits outweighed several significant environmental impacts that could not be fully mitigated. Excepting one wind mitigation measure, the trial court rejected challenges. The court of appeal affirmed. The court noted that the soil at the project site is contaminated from long years of industrial use; the ballpark and development will generate substantial new pedestrian and vehicle traffic in the neighborhood; and the site’s existing uses must be relocated but found the EIR adequate. View "East Oakland Stadium Alliance, LLC v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Vivera) was developing a medical test kit, but had received “negative publicity” from its litigation with a rival company. Vivera hired Sitrick Group, LLC (Sitrick) to manage a public relations campaign. Vivera did not make any payments and Sitrick filed demands for arbitration with Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). Judge Swart was selected to serve as an arbitrator in a separate matter between Sitrick and Legacy Development (the Legacy matter). In that matter, Sitrick was employing the same law firm (but a different lawyer) as was representing it in the arbitration with Vivera. Sitrick filed petitions to confirm the arbitration award. Vivera asked the trial court to vacate the arbitrator’s award due to Judge Swart’s inadequate disclosure of the Legacy matter. The trial court issued an order confirming the arbitrator’s award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the California Arbitration Act (the Act) requires arbitrators to disclose, among other things, matters that the Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration (Ethics Standards) dictate must be disclosed. At issue here is whether the Ethics Standards require a retained arbitrator in a noncommercial case to disclose in one matter that he has been subsequently hired in a second matter by the same party and the same law firm. The court held “no,” at least where the arbitrator has previously informed the parties—without any objection thereto—that no disclosure will be forthcoming in this scenario. Because the arbitrator’s disclosures were proper here, the trial court properly overruled an objection based on inadequate disclosure. View "Sitrick Group v. Vivera Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

Almost 15 months elapsed from the time the juvenile court found Petitioner K.R. incompetent to stand trial and referred him for remediation until the court determined that he had been restored to competency and reinstated the proceedings. K.R. remained in juvenile hall for that entire period. He filed a writ petition arguing that the court lost jurisdiction when it failed to make a final ruling on his competency by the one-year deadline for remediation services and was required to dismiss the case at that point. In the alternative, he argues the court erred by allowing the prosecution to employ its own expert to examine him and asks us to order the juvenile court to strike the expert’s testimony.   The Second Appellate District disagreed and denied the petition. The court held that although section 709 establishes a maximum period of one year of remediation, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues for a reasonable period afterward for the court to resolve any dispute still existing at the end of that period over whether the minor has attained competency. Even if this was not the case, section 709 permits a court to keep juveniles accused of certain serious offenses (including several with which K.R. was charged) in secure confinement past the one-year remediation period for conclusion of competency proceedings. The court also found that section 709 does not preclude the parties from seeking the appointment of their own expert(s) after the initial competency hearing. View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Over several months, Jackie Marquez stole about $100,000 from her brother-in-law Robert C., who was then about 80 years old. The prosecution elected to charge Marquez with eight felony counts of elder theft as a noncaretaker. A jury found Marquez guilty of all counts. The court imposed a five-year sentence. Marquez contended the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution needed to prove she was “not a caretaker.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: a defendant’s status as a noncaretaker was not an element of Penal Code section 368 (d); rather, the Court found it more properly characterized as a charging option for the prosecution. Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution needed to prove the required elements of the crime: (1) Marquez committed a theft; (2) the victim was an elder; (3) Marquez stole more than $950; and (4) Marquez knew, or reasonably should have known the victim was at least 65 years old. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Stephen Wilson was convicted by jury of the sexual abuse of a child age 10 or younger. Wilson told his adult son that the victim (C.F.) at age six “was a better kisser than every one of my wives except [one].” During a police interrogation, Wilson admitted that he “kissed [C.F.’s] vagina and her breast area” and “she kissed me in private areas too.” In her testimony, C.F. (now 17 years old) described nine years of sexual abuse. Wilson contended the judgment should be reversed because in closing argument the prosecutor told the jury it could “presume” from this evidence that he “committed the crimes here.” The Court of Appeal determined that in the context in which it was said, the jury could reasonably have understood “presume” only in the colloquial sense, and there was no prosecutorial error. And even if there were, the Court concluded it was not prejudicial. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

While their marriage dissolution proceeding was pending in Virginia, David and Joanna filed dueling requests for domestic violence restraining orders in Marin County Superior Court under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), Family Code section 6200. After a trial, the family court found both parties had committed domestic violence and issued mutual restraining orders. The court also found that Joanna had obtained orders temporarily excluding David from his residence under false pretenses, and then damaged and confiscated substantial amounts of David’s property, so it conducted a second hearing on restitution and issued a substantial award.The court of appeal affirmed. The court rejected Joanna’s arguments that the restraining order did not include findings, required by section 6305(a)(2), to support mutual restraining orders; that the court exceeded its authority under section 6342 in awarding restitution for confiscated items; that the court’s decisions were driven by bias (in violation of Joanna’s right to due process) and a lack of “informed discretion”; and that the court intruded on the jurisdiction of the Virginia court presiding over the parties’ dissolution case and failed to accord “full faith and credit” to its orders. She also, unsuccessfully, asserted that certain findings are not supported by substantial evidence, View "Rivera v. Hillard" on Justia Law