Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Vivera) was developing a medical test kit, but had received “negative publicity” from its litigation with a rival company. Vivera hired Sitrick Group, LLC (Sitrick) to manage a public relations campaign. Vivera did not make any payments and Sitrick filed demands for arbitration with Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). Judge Swart was selected to serve as an arbitrator in a separate matter between Sitrick and Legacy Development (the Legacy matter). In that matter, Sitrick was employing the same law firm (but a different lawyer) as was representing it in the arbitration with Vivera. Sitrick filed petitions to confirm the arbitration award. Vivera asked the trial court to vacate the arbitrator’s award due to Judge Swart’s inadequate disclosure of the Legacy matter. The trial court issued an order confirming the arbitrator’s award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the California Arbitration Act (the Act) requires arbitrators to disclose, among other things, matters that the Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration (Ethics Standards) dictate must be disclosed. At issue here is whether the Ethics Standards require a retained arbitrator in a noncommercial case to disclose in one matter that he has been subsequently hired in a second matter by the same party and the same law firm. The court held “no,” at least where the arbitrator has previously informed the parties—without any objection thereto—that no disclosure will be forthcoming in this scenario. Because the arbitrator’s disclosures were proper here, the trial court properly overruled an objection based on inadequate disclosure. View "Sitrick Group v. Vivera Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

Almost 15 months elapsed from the time the juvenile court found Petitioner K.R. incompetent to stand trial and referred him for remediation until the court determined that he had been restored to competency and reinstated the proceedings. K.R. remained in juvenile hall for that entire period. He filed a writ petition arguing that the court lost jurisdiction when it failed to make a final ruling on his competency by the one-year deadline for remediation services and was required to dismiss the case at that point. In the alternative, he argues the court erred by allowing the prosecution to employ its own expert to examine him and asks us to order the juvenile court to strike the expert’s testimony.   The Second Appellate District disagreed and denied the petition. The court held that although section 709 establishes a maximum period of one year of remediation, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues for a reasonable period afterward for the court to resolve any dispute still existing at the end of that period over whether the minor has attained competency. Even if this was not the case, section 709 permits a court to keep juveniles accused of certain serious offenses (including several with which K.R. was charged) in secure confinement past the one-year remediation period for conclusion of competency proceedings. The court also found that section 709 does not preclude the parties from seeking the appointment of their own expert(s) after the initial competency hearing. View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Over several months, Jackie Marquez stole about $100,000 from her brother-in-law Robert C., who was then about 80 years old. The prosecution elected to charge Marquez with eight felony counts of elder theft as a noncaretaker. A jury found Marquez guilty of all counts. The court imposed a five-year sentence. Marquez contended the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution needed to prove she was “not a caretaker.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: a defendant’s status as a noncaretaker was not an element of Penal Code section 368 (d); rather, the Court found it more properly characterized as a charging option for the prosecution. Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution needed to prove the required elements of the crime: (1) Marquez committed a theft; (2) the victim was an elder; (3) Marquez stole more than $950; and (4) Marquez knew, or reasonably should have known the victim was at least 65 years old. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Stephen Wilson was convicted by jury of the sexual abuse of a child age 10 or younger. Wilson told his adult son that the victim (C.F.) at age six “was a better kisser than every one of my wives except [one].” During a police interrogation, Wilson admitted that he “kissed [C.F.’s] vagina and her breast area” and “she kissed me in private areas too.” In her testimony, C.F. (now 17 years old) described nine years of sexual abuse. Wilson contended the judgment should be reversed because in closing argument the prosecutor told the jury it could “presume” from this evidence that he “committed the crimes here.” The Court of Appeal determined that in the context in which it was said, the jury could reasonably have understood “presume” only in the colloquial sense, and there was no prosecutorial error. And even if there were, the Court concluded it was not prejudicial. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

While their marriage dissolution proceeding was pending in Virginia, David and Joanna filed dueling requests for domestic violence restraining orders in Marin County Superior Court under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), Family Code section 6200. After a trial, the family court found both parties had committed domestic violence and issued mutual restraining orders. The court also found that Joanna had obtained orders temporarily excluding David from his residence under false pretenses, and then damaged and confiscated substantial amounts of David’s property, so it conducted a second hearing on restitution and issued a substantial award.The court of appeal affirmed. The court rejected Joanna’s arguments that the restraining order did not include findings, required by section 6305(a)(2), to support mutual restraining orders; that the court exceeded its authority under section 6342 in awarding restitution for confiscated items; that the court’s decisions were driven by bias (in violation of Joanna’s right to due process) and a lack of “informed discretion”; and that the court intruded on the jurisdiction of the Virginia court presiding over the parties’ dissolution case and failed to accord “full faith and credit” to its orders. She also, unsuccessfully, asserted that certain findings are not supported by substantial evidence, View "Rivera v. Hillard" on Justia Law

In October 2016, the mother filed a request to reinstate joint legal and physical custody of her minor daughter, after a lengthy period in which the father exercised sole legal and physical custody based on a child welfare referral that, according to the mother, had recently been “overturned.” The parents had a long-running custody battle. In May 2019, she was ordered to share in the expense of a court-ordered child custody evaluator who was appointed under Evidence Code section 730. The payment order was entered over the mother’s continuing objection that she cannot afford to pay any of the evaluator’s fees. She argued that, given her financial condition, the court erred when it reallocated a portion of that expense to her after the fact.The court of appeal remanded, In allocating the costs of a court-appointed child custody evaluator, the court must consider the parties’ ability to pay, whether the child custody evaluator is appointed by the court under Evidence Code section 730 or the more specific provisions of the Family Code (sections 3111-3112). The record does not indicate that the trial court considered all of the mother’s expenses before ordering her to contribute to the costs. View "Peterson v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Bautista-Castanon digitally penetrated his four-year-old niece while babysitting. He was convicted of sexual penetration of a child who was 10 years of age or younger (Penal Code 288.7(b)) and commission of a lewd act on a child under 14 years of age (288(a)); the jury found true that Bautista-Castanon had substantial sexual conduct with the victim. The court sentenced Bautista-Castanon to 15 years to life in prison on count 1 and later issued an order sentencing Bautista-Castanon to the upper term of eight years on count 2 and staying that punishment. The court identified several aggravating factors: a high degree of cruelty and callousness; Bautista-Castanon’s position of trust; the vulnerable victim; planning, and Bautista-Castanon had expressed no remorse, and was a “significant danger to the community.” Bautista-Castanon had no prior criminal record.Noting a stipulation by the parties, the court of appeal remanded for resentencing in light of Assembly Bill 518, effective January 1, 2022. AB 518 amended section 654 to specify that, when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are established by the defendant’s stipulation, proven to a jury (or to a court, if a jury is waived) beyond a reasonable doubt, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction. View "People v. Bautista-Castanon" on Justia Law

Defendant Jony Pantaleon was convicted by jury on 15 counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a children. In March 2022, after amendments to California’s determinate sentencing law went into effect, the trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 111 years in prison plus an indeterminate term of 115 years to life. The trial court also awarded defendant a total of 932 days of custody credit. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court’s imposition of upper term sentences was unauthorized because the State did not plead any aggravating factors as required by current law. Additionally, defendant argued, and the State conceded, the abstract of judgment and minute order had to be corrected to reflect the custody credits awarded by the court at his sentencing. The Court of Appeal accepted this concession and ordered the abstract of judgment and minute order corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. Because the State was not required to plead aggravating factors relating to defendant’s prior convictions, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Pantaleon" on Justia Law

Defendant Yaroslav Viktorovic Shkrabak was convicted by jury of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and the trial court doubled his sentence based on a prior strike conviction. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to strike his prior strike conviction consistent with California v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) because the court failed to afford “great weight” to the influence his mental illness had on the current offense. In supplemental briefing, defendant also argued he was entitled to a recalculation of his custody credits to include time he spent in Napa State Hospital after the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the former argument, but agree with the latter, and will remand the case for a recalculation of defendant’s custody credits. View "California v. Shkrabak" on Justia Law

In November 2021, a jury convicted Rahsaan Butler of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter and other offenses, and found true related allegations that he personally used a firearm and caused great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to the upper term for the conviction and the firearm enhancement. On appeal, Butler contended he was entitled to resentencing because: (1) the trial court erred by impermissibly relying on the same facts that formed the basis of the enhancements to sentence him to the upper term; and (2) he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which became effective while his appeal was pending. The State conceded the legislation applied retroactively to Butler’s nonfinal judgment but argued that remand was not necessary because sentencing Butler under the applicable law at the time was harmless. The Court of Appeal found there was a split of authority concerning the applicable harmlessness standard. The Court adopted the approach in California v. Lopez, 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (2022) and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Butler" on Justia Law