Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of nurses directly employed by the City and County of San Francisco, represented by their union, brought a class action alleging that the City failed to comply with Labor Code section 512.1, which requires public sector healthcare employers to provide meal and rest breaks and pay premiums for missed breaks. The nurses claimed that since the law’s effective date, the City had not provided the required breaks or compensation. The City and the union had previously negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that set out meal and rest break provisions and remedies for missed breaks, but the nurses argued these did not satisfy the new statutory requirements.The Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, sustained the City’s demurrer, agreeing with the City’s argument that section 512.1 did not clearly apply to charter cities like San Francisco. The court did not address the City’s alternative constitutional argument regarding home rule authority. The nurses appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory language defining “employer” in section 512.1 was ambiguous as to whether it included charter cities and counties such as San Francisco. The court found that neither the statutory text, legislative history, nor legislative findings demonstrated a clear intent by the Legislature to override charter city home rule authority or to apply section 512.1 to charter cities. The court also noted that when the Legislature intends to regulate charter cities, it does so explicitly, which was not the case here. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that section 512.1 does not apply to the City and County of San Francisco. View "Levy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Berkeley violated the Ralph M. Brown Act during three city council meetings in late 2023 and early 2024. At each meeting, disruptions from attendees made it impossible for the council to conduct business. The mayor determined that order could not be restored by removing disruptive individuals but did not order the meeting room cleared. Instead, the meetings were recessed and reconvened in a different, smaller room, which could not accommodate all nondisruptive members of the public. The press was allowed to attend in person, and the public could participate by video, but the council did not return to the original meeting room or attempt to remove only the disruptive individuals.The Alameda County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding that section 54957.9 of the Brown Act did not require the city council to first attempt to remove disruptive individuals before determining that order could not be restored. The court also concluded that the city council complied with the statute by recessing and reconvening the meetings in a different room with the press present. The action was dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that section 54957.9 requires a legislative body to order the meeting room cleared and continue in session in the same room, not to recess and reconvene in a different location. The statute does not authorize relocating the meeting as a response to disruption. Because plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the city council did not clear the meeting room but instead moved the meeting, the court found that a claim for relief was properly stated. The judgment was reversed. View "Berkeley People's Alliance v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

A man was accused by his young daughter of repeated sexual abuse when she was five years old, including acts of oral copulation. The daughter delayed reporting the abuse due to emotional attachment to her father and fear of family disruption. After eventually disclosing the abuse to her mother, law enforcement was notified. The defendant denied the allegations, suggesting another individual may have been responsible during a trip abroad.The Superior Court of San Diego County conducted a jury trial. The prosecution presented expert testimony from a social worker to address common misconceptions about child sexual abuse, such as the prevalence of abuse by known individuals and the reasons for delayed disclosure by victims. The expert did not opine on the truthfulness of the specific allegations. The jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of oral copulation of a child 10 years old or younger and acquitted him of other charges. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 15 years to life.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the use of expert testimony, that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to certain expert statements, and that cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. The appellate court reviewed the instructional claim de novo and found the jury was properly instructed on the limited use of the expert’s testimony. The court also held that the expert’s statistical testimony was admissible to counter common misconceptions and did not constitute improper vouching. Finding no instructional error or ineffective assistance, the court rejected the cumulative error claim and affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Page" on Justia Law

A county public guardian filed a petition in February 2023 to establish a conservatorship over an individual, A.H., under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, alleging grave disability due to mental disorder. The trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship, which was extended as A.H. demanded a trial. However, the trial did not begin within the statutory 10-day period and was repeatedly continued, often due to court and counsel unavailability. While the first petition was still pending and as the initial temporary conservatorship was expiring, the public guardian filed a second petition and obtained a new temporary conservatorship, further extending A.H.’s involuntary confinement. A.H. opposed the continuances and requested dismissal of both petitions, but the court denied these requests. The first petition was eventually dismissed at the public guardian’s request, and trial on the second petition began about ten weeks after the statutory deadline. In January 2024, the court found A.H. gravely disabled and ordered a one-year conservatorship, which was not renewed after expiration.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County presided over the initial proceedings, including the imposition of temporary conservatorships, the granting of continuances, and the eventual trial and conservatorship order. A.H. appealed, arguing that statutory amendments required dismissal for untimely trial, that the court abused its discretion in granting continuances, and that the delays violated his due process rights.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the statutory amendment to section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), does not mandate dismissal for untimely trial but gives the court discretion. The court found no reversible error in the continuances or denial of dismissal under the statute. However, the appellate court concluded that the cumulative 10-month delay in adjudicating the conservatorship petitions, none of which was attributable to A.H., violated his due process rights. The order of conservatorship was therefore reversed. View "In re Conservatorship of A.H." on Justia Law

A chemical company sought a declaratory judgment to establish its right to insurance coverage for environmental damage resulting from its operation of a DDT plant. The company’s insurers denied coverage based on “qualified pollution exclusions” (QPEs) in their comprehensive general liability policies, which excluded coverage for pollution unless the discharge was “sudden and accidental” or, in some policies, “sudden, unintended and unexpected.” The company argued that “sudden” could reasonably be interpreted to include gradual, unintended pollution events, and sought to introduce extrinsic evidence, including drafting history and industry statements, to support this interpretation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, at the parties’ suggestion, divided the case into phases and, in Phase II-A, addressed the interpretation of the QPEs. The parties stipulated to the use of exemplar QPEs for interpretation. The trial court excluded the company’s proffered extrinsic evidence, reasoning that California appellate courts had uniformly held that “sudden” in this context unambiguously does not mean gradual, and that it was bound by this precedent. The court certified a question of law for appellate review regarding whether prior judicial construction of an insurance policy term precludes consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine ambiguity.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, as a general rule, prior judicial construction of a policy term does not categorically preclude a trial court from considering extrinsic evidence to expose a latent ambiguity. However, in this case, the court found that California appellate decisions have uniformly and specifically rejected the interpretation that “sudden” can mean “gradual” in the context of these pollution exclusions. Therefore, the trial court correctly excluded the extrinsic evidence as irrelevant, and the petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

After the sudden death of an Alameda County Supervisor in 2021, the Board of Supervisors appointed David Kyle Brown, the former chief of staff to the late supervisor, to fill the vacancy for District 3. At the time of his appointment, Brown had been living in Contra Costa County but moved to Oakland, within District 3, shortly before his appointment. Plaintiffs, including the Alameda County Taxpayers’ Association and several individuals, challenged Brown’s eligibility to serve, arguing he failed to meet both a one-year prior residency requirement under the Alameda County Administrative Code and a 30-day prior residency requirement under state law. They also contended that Brown did not satisfy the continuous residency requirement during his term, asserting he never became a true resident of the district.The Superior Court of Alameda County first overruled Brown’s demurrer and held a hearing on the merits of the prior residency issue. The court found that neither the county nor state code imposed a prior residency requirement on appointees filling a board vacancy, ruling in Brown’s favor. After Brown’s term ended, the court determined that the continuous residency issue was moot, as Brown was no longer in office, and entered judgment for Brown. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the issues were of public importance and that the trial court erred in its rulings and case management.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the prior residency requirements cited by plaintiffs do not apply to appointments made to fill board vacancies. However, the court found that the continuous residency requirement does apply and that there are unresolved factual questions regarding whether Brown satisfied this requirement during his term. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the continuous residency issue. View "People ex rel. Alameda County Taxpayers' Assn. v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a theft occurred at a licensed marijuana-growing facility in Adelanto, California, the employer, Kavry Management, LLC, required several employees, including Steven McDoniel, to take a polygraph test. McDoniel, who was not advised of his right to refuse the test, took and “failed” two polygraph examinations. He was subsequently terminated from his position, with evidence indicating the termination was due to the polygraph results. McDoniel experienced significant emotional distress and concern for his reputation in the industry following his discharge.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed McDoniel’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defamation, and violations of Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5. The court granted summary adjudication for the employer on the defamation and PAGA claims, and on punitive damages, but allowed the wrongful termination and Labor Code claims to proceed. At trial, the jury found Kavry liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and for violating Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5, awarding McDoniel $100,000 in noneconomic damages. The court also imposed a penalty for the personnel records violation and awarded McDoniel attorney fees under section 432.6.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that an employer’s violation of Labor Code section 432.2—requiring or demanding an employee to submit to a polygraph test as a condition of continued employment—supports a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court affirmed the jury’s award of noneconomic damages. However, it reversed the attorney fee award, finding that section 432.6 did not apply retroactively to McDoniel’s employment, which ended before the statute’s effective date. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general statute and found McDoniel forfeited his claim for fees under PAGA. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "McDoniel v. Kavry Management" on Justia Law

A child, X.D., was born in May 2022 and immediately placed for adoption by his biological mother, Jessica, due to her history of physical and verbal abuse by the child’s biological father, Raymon. Jessica had left Raymon after a violent incident during her pregnancy and sought refuge in a domestic violence shelter, cutting off communication with him. Raymon, who had a significant criminal history and ongoing substance abuse issues, was unaware of X.D.’s birth and believed Jessica had miscarried. The prospective adoptive parents, Cliff and Rebecca, cared for X.D. from birth. Jessica identified Raymon as the possible father in adoption documents but did not provide his contact information.After being notified of the adoption proceedings in January 2023, Raymon opposed the adoption, claiming he qualified as a “Kelsey S. father”—a status that would require his consent for adoption if he had demonstrated a full commitment to parental responsibilities. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found in Raymon’s favor, ruling that he qualified as a Kelsey S. father based on his financial and emotional support and that Jessica’s actions had prevented him from asserting his parental rights. The court ordered supervised visits for Raymon with X.D. and required that Raymon be introduced as a family friend, not as X.D.’s father.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the exclusion of key evidence—screenshots of Raymon’s threatening text messages—and the sufficiency of evidence supporting Raymon’s status as a Kelsey S. father. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the text message evidence, which was relevant and sufficiently authenticated. Considering this evidence, the appellate court found insufficient support for Raymon’s claim to Kelsey S. status and determined that it was not in X.D.’s best interest for Raymon to retain parental rights. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order and directed that the adoption proceed. View "In re Adoption of X.D." on Justia Law

Doug Ridley and Sherry Shen owned a condominium unit in a Santa Clara complex managed by a homeowners’ association (HOA). In April 2018, flooding occurred in the crawlspace beneath their unit, which was a common area under the HOA’s control. Initial investigations suggested the water originated from an undestroyed well, but the HOA delayed meaningful repairs for over 19 months, during which the unit suffered extensive damage, including mold and termite infestation. The HOA repeatedly ignored expert recommendations and shifted its position, ultimately failing to properly investigate or remediate the source of the water and related damage.The homeowners filed suit in the Santa Clara County Superior Court against the HOA and its president, Steve Moritz, alleging breach of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs), negligence, nuisance, and other claims. After a lengthy bench trial, the court found in favor of the homeowners on all claims, awarded damages for restoration, lost rent, and emotional distress, and issued an injunction requiring the HOA to complete specified repairs and compensate the homeowners until the work was finished. The court also found the HOA’s conduct grossly negligent and awarded punitive damages.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s finding that the HOA breached its duties under the CCRs by failing to reasonably investigate and timely repair the common area damage. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, rejected the HOA’s defenses under the business judgment rule, rule of judicial deference, and the CCRs’ exculpatory clause, and concluded the HOA’s conduct constituted gross negligence. The injunction order was affirmed, and the homeowners were awarded costs on appeal. View "Ridley v. Rancho Palma Grande Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

After tripping and falling on a raised portion of sidewalk in front of a residence, the plaintiff sued the owners of the adjacent properties and the City for negligence and premises liability. The claim against one property owner, Goode, was based on the theory that a tree in the parkway in front of her house had roots extending under the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell, potentially causing the damage. The City maintained and inspected the tree and sidewalk, but the plaintiff alleged Goode’s ownership of the tree contributed to the dangerous condition.The Ventura County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goode, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding her liability. The plaintiff did not oppose Goode’s motion for summary judgment, but the City did file an opposition and attempted to file a cross-complaint against Goode. The trial court declined to consider the City’s opposition, ruling that the City lacked standing because it had not filed a cross-complaint, and rejected the cross-complaint on procedural grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that a codefendant with an adverse interest has standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment, regardless of whether a cross-complaint has been filed. The court further found that the City’s cross-complaint was properly filed and should not have been rejected. However, after reviewing the evidence de novo, the appellate court concluded that Goode could not be held liable as a matter of law because she did not own, control, or maintain the sidewalk or tree in a manner that created the dangerous condition. The judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Goode was affirmed. View "Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks" on Justia Law