Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.In 2024, Valdez petitioned for resentencing again, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection. The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court clarified that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, making it not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10). The court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting resentencing relief and to deny Valdez's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Superior Court (Valdez)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated a class action against National General Insurance Company and Integon National Insurance Company, alleging that the defendants improperly denied their car accident claims and rescinded their automobile insurance policies. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants retroactively denied insurance claims and rescinded policies based on the plaintiffs' failure to disclose household members. The plaintiffs sought class certification for 1,032 insureds who had their policies rescinded under similar circumstances.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, citing the lack of a palpable trial plan for resolving damages. The court noted that the plaintiffs admitted most of the available damages were inherently individualized and expressed concern that the plaintiffs wanted to make the case more manageable by forfeiting certain categories of damages. The court concluded that class treatment would not be a substantial benefit to the litigants.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court disagreed with the defendants' contention that common questions of law and fact did not predominate on the issue of liability. The court found that the trial court had relied on improper legal criteria by denying certification based on individualized damages and by not considering the potential benefits of class certification. The appellate court held that individualized proof of damages does not preclude class certification when common issues of liability predominate. The court reversed the order denying class certification and remanded the case, directing the trial court to certify, at minimum, a liability-only class and to consider whether any subclasses are necessary. View "Cobos v. National General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In January 2021, Gregory Steshenko was declared a vexatious litigant in a prior civil action and was subject to a prefiling order requiring him to obtain permission from the presiding judge before filing any new litigation. Despite this, in November 2021, while his appeal in the prior action was pending, Steshenko filed a new civil action against the Foothill-De Anza Community College District and others. The College District filed a notice regarding the prefiling order, and Steshenko objected, claiming the order was stayed pending his appeal. The College District and others moved to have Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant again and to require him to furnish security.The trial court determined that the prefiling order was not stayed on appeal and that Steshenko was required to request leave before filing the new action, which he failed to do. Consequently, the court dismissed the action. Alternatively, the court found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant again, issued a new prefiling order, required him to furnish security, and dismissed the action when he refused to provide the security.On appeal, Steshenko argued that the judgment of dismissal should be reversed. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the January 2021 prefiling order remained in effect while on appeal and that the trial court properly dismissed the action based on Steshenko’s failure to obtain permission before filing the action and the denial of permission after the action was filed. The appellate court struck the June 2024 orders that again found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant and required him to obtain leave before filing new litigation. However, Steshenko continues to be designated as a vexatious litigant and subject to the January 2021 prefiling order. View "Steshenko v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

X.K., a Chinese emigrant, and M.C., a U.S. citizen, married and had a child in California. After moving to China in 2018, M.C. returned to California in January 2022, and X.K. followed with their child in December 2022. They lived with M.C.'s parents until August 2023, when X.K. left for a domestic violence shelter. She filed for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against M.C., alleging a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, citing the lack of recent events and insufficient reasons to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. X.K. testified about M.C.'s abusive behavior, including physical assaults, sexual coercion, and emotional and financial control. M.C. did not testify but his counsel argued against the DVRO and sought increased visitation rights. The trial court denied the DVRO, stating that the issues were primarily about custody and visitation, which did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of "abuse" under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) and improperly denied the DVRO based on the context of custody and visitation disputes. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credible, could constitute abuse under the DVPA, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. The court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing abuse.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the California Insurance Company (CIC), which attempted to merge with a newly-formed New Mexico corporation, CIC II, without obtaining the required consent from the California Insurance Commissioner. As a result, the trial court appointed the commissioner as CIC’s conservator. The trial court later approved a rehabilitation plan proposed by the commissioner, which included terms for ending the conservatorship. CIC appealed, arguing that the conservatorship was unlawfully imposed and should be vacated, and that the rehabilitation plan was an abuse of discretion.The San Mateo County Superior Court initially granted the commissioner’s application to be appointed as CIC’s conservator due to the unauthorized merger attempt. CIC’s motion to vacate the conservatorship was denied, and their subsequent petition for writ of mandate was also denied by the California Court of Appeal. CIC II and an affiliate filed federal actions to vacate the conservatorship, but these were dismissed, and the dismissals were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the conservatorship was lawfully imposed under Insurance Code section 1011(c) due to CIC’s unauthorized merger attempt. The court also found that the rehabilitation plan, which included reinsurance and assumption of CIC’s California policies and settlement options for pending litigation, was not an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that the plan was reasonably related to the public interest and necessary to address the issues that led to the conservatorship. View "Lara v. California Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, Robert Wayne Cunningham was convicted by a jury of provocative act murder and other offenses following a 1995 shootout with police. Cunningham and his accomplice, Daniel Soly, were under police surveillance for a series of armed robberies. After robbing a liquor store, they were blocked by police, leading Cunningham to shoot at the officers. The police returned fire, killing Soly and wounding Cunningham and at least one officer.Cunningham was convicted of special-circumstance murder, attempted murder of peace officers, robbery, commercial burglary, and conspiracy to commit robbery, with a personal firearm use enhancement. He was sentenced to life without parole plus additional consecutive sentences. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 2021, Cunningham petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage, concluding he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reconsidered the case following the Supreme Court's directive in light of People v. Antonelli. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Cunningham's petition, holding that the jury instructions and the first-degree murder verdict established that Cunningham acted with personal malice. This finding rendered him ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, as the provocative act doctrine required proof of malice, which was not imputed solely based on his participation in the crime. The court concluded that Cunningham's conviction was based on his own actions and malice, not on a theory of imputed malice. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Juan Carlos Benitez-Torres, a lawful permanent resident, was stopped by police while driving a car with tinted windows. The car, not registered to him, was searched, and methamphetamine was found in hidden compartments. Benitez was charged with narcotics offenses. His family hired attorney Kenneth Reed for $15,000, but Reed appeared only four times and did not file a motion to suppress the evidence. In August 2015, Reed advised Benitez to accept a three-year plea deal without adequately explaining the immigration consequences. Benitez pleaded guilty and was deported after his release.Benitez filed a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 in January 2023 to vacate his guilty plea, arguing he did not understand the immigration consequences and was prejudiced by this lack of understanding. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence that Benitez did not understand the consequences of his plea.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Reed did not provide adequate advice regarding the immigration consequences of the plea, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky. The court determined that Benitez did not meaningfully understand the mandatory deportation consequences of his plea and that there was a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood these consequences. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with directions to allow Benitez to withdraw his 2015 guilty pleas. View "People v. Benitez-Torres" on Justia Law

Owners of timeshare estates in a resort sued the County of Riverside, challenging the legality of the annual fee charged for separate property tax assessments. The owners argued that the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of providing the assessment, constituting a tax requiring voter approval, which had not been obtained.The Superior Court of Riverside County rejected the owners' argument and entered judgment for the County. The court ruled that the fee did not exceed the reasonable cost of the assessment and was not a tax requiring voter approval. The court also considered additional costs not included in the original fee calculation, such as costs related to assessment appeals and a new computer system.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the County's methodology for setting the fee was flawed. The County had used the assessor's entire budget for a previous fiscal year to calculate the fee, which included costs unrelated to the separate timeshare assessments. The court also noted that the County had not provided evidence of the actual cost of the separate assessments and had improperly included costs for services provided to all property owners.The Court of Appeal concluded that the County did not meet its burden to prove that the fee was not a tax. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate refund amount and to address the owners' requests for declaratory, injunctive, and writ relief. The court emphasized that the fee must be limited to the reasonable cost of the separate assessments and must bear a fair relationship to the benefits received by the timeshare estate owners. View "Scott v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tidrick purchased a vehicle from FCA US LLC (FCA) and experienced transmission issues, leading her to request FCA repurchase the vehicle under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. FCA initially declined, prompting Tidrick to file a lawsuit in Orange County Superior Court. The parties eventually settled, with FCA agreeing to repurchase the vehicle, pay restitution, and cover attorney fees and costs. Tidrick sought $82,719.33 in attorney fees and costs, but the trial court awarded her only $15,000, a significant reduction.The Orange County Superior Court, where the case was initially filed, awarded Tidrick $15,000 in attorney fees and costs, applying hourly rates prevailing in Fresno County, where Tidrick resided and purchased the vehicle. The court justified this by referencing Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (b), which it interpreted as mandating venue in Fresno County. The court also criticized the number of hours billed and the lack of a settlement agreement copy, suggesting the litigation was unnecessarily prolonged.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in applying Fresno County rates instead of Orange County rates, as venue was proper in Orange County where FCA's principal place of business is located. The appellate court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not properly applying the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees and failing to specify the amount of costs awarded. The appellate court reversed the trial court's award and remanded the case with directions to recalculate the attorney fees using Orange County rates and to clarify the costs awarded. View "Tidrick v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

In this residential landlord-tenant dispute, the tenants, Michael Gogal and Hildy Baumgartner-Gogal, entered into a lease with landlords, Xinhui Deng and Jianhua Wu. The lease included a clause that capped recoverable litigation costs and attorney’s fees at $1,000. After successfully suing the landlords for retaliatory eviction, the tenants were awarded a monetary judgment and attorney’s fees exceeding the $1,000 cap. They then sought to recover additional litigation costs under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b). The landlords argued that the lease’s $1,000 cap barred any further cost recovery.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially ruled in favor of the landlords, enforcing the $1,000 cap. However, after further arguments from the tenants, the court reversed its decision, allowing the tenants to recover nearly $14,000 in costs. The court reasoned that enforcing the cap would contravene the public policy intent of California Civil Code section 1942.5, which aims to protect tenants from abusive landlord conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The main issue was whether parties to a contract could waive their statutory right to recover litigation costs under section 1032(b) through a pre-dispute agreement. The appellate court concluded that section 1032(b) establishes a default rule allowing prevailing parties to recover costs but does not prohibit parties from waiving this right by agreement. The court found that such waivers are consistent with Civil Code section 3513, which allows the waiver of rights intended for private benefit. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order, directing it to strike the tenants’ memorandum of costs, thereby enforcing the $1,000 cap stipulated in the lease. View "Gogal v. Deng" on Justia Law