Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after evidence suggested that the deputy public defender currently assigned to Sanchez's case made racially charged remarks during plea negotiations, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate the deputy public defender's conflict of interest. The motion included a declaration from the prosecutor detailing the deputy public defender's remarks, which implied racial bias. During a closed hearing, the trial court read the prosecutor's declaration to Sanchez and asked if he wanted the current public defender to continue representing him. Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court later ordered the public defender's office to assign a new attorney, citing potential RJA issues and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the trial court's decision to prevent potential future RJA claims and ensure adequate representation was within its discretion. The petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Julian Rodriguez, an hourly machine operator for Lawrence Equipment, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit in December 2015 alleging various wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code. Rodriguez claimed that Lawrence failed to pay for all hours worked, provide adequate meal and rest breaks, issue accurate wage statements, and pay final wages timely. In July 2014, Rodriguez had signed an arbitration agreement with Lawrence, which led to the arbitration of his non-PAGA claims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Lawrence, finding that Rodriguez failed to prove any of the alleged Labor Code violations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment in favor of Lawrence. Rodriguez appealed the judgment, but it was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, Lawrence moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Rodriguez's remaining PAGA claim was barred by issue preclusion because the arbitrator had already determined that no Labor Code violations occurred. The trial court initially denied the motion but later granted it after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, which influenced the court's interpretation of PAGA standing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the arbitrator's findings precluded Rodriguez from establishing standing as an aggrieved employee under PAGA. The court concluded that issue preclusion applied because the arbitrator's decision was final, the issues were identical, actually litigated, and necessarily decided, and the parties were the same. Consequently, Rodriguez lacked standing to pursue the PAGA claim, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

A minor child, Baby Girl R., was abandoned by her mother, S.R., shortly after birth. S.R. gave birth in a homeless encampment and was using methamphetamines daily. Baby Girl R. tested positive for the drug and exhibited withdrawal symptoms. S.R. was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold due to paranoia, delusions, and aggression. After being discharged, S.R. left Baby Girl R. at the hospital and returned to the encampment. The Department of Family and Children’s Services initiated dependency proceedings, and Baby Girl R. was placed in protective custody. Despite diligent efforts, the Department could not locate S.R.The juvenile court placed Baby Girl R. in foster care and ordered reunification services for S.R., despite her unknown whereabouts. The court found that S.R.’s location was unknown despite reasonable efforts to locate her. Baby Girl R. appealed, arguing that the court should have bypassed reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for S.R. at the six-month review hearing and placed Baby Girl R. with her maternal grandparents.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the appeal was moot due to the termination of reunification services but exercised discretion to address the merits. The court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) does not mandate bypassing reunification services when a parent’s whereabouts are unknown despite a diligent search. The juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny reunification services in such cases. The appellate court found no error in the juvenile court’s decision to order reunification services for S.R. and affirmed the disposition order. View "In re Baby Girl R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the Carolyn Patricia Young Family Trust, alleged that the defendants, the trust protector and trustee, were conspiring to withhold trust funds improperly. The alleged conspiracy aimed to preserve assets for the trustee, who is also a residuary beneficiary. Plaintiff sought an ex parte application to suspend the defendants' powers and appoint an interim trustee.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the ex parte application, issuing a minute order that suspended the powers of the trustee and trust protector, appointed a private professional fiduciary as interim trustee, required the interim trustee to post a bond, set a review hearing, and prohibited the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization. Defendants appealed this order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that orders suspending trustees and appointing interim trustees in probate court are not directly appealable. The court emphasized that such orders are provisional remedies, not final orders, and thus do not fall under the categories of appealable orders listed in the Probate Code sections 1300 and 1304. The court also found that the defendants lacked standing to appeal the portions of the order imposing a bond requirement and prohibiting the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization, as these did not injuriously affect the defendants' rights or interests in an immediate and substantial way.The court dismissed the appeal and denied the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, although it expressed concern over the conduct of the defendants' counsel. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' first request for judicial notice, granted the plaintiff's request for judicial notice, and denied the defendants' second request for judicial notice. View "Young v. Hartford" on Justia Law

LVNV Funding, LLC (LVNV) filed a debt collection lawsuit against Yolanda Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Rodriguez cross-complained, alleging identity theft and violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act). Rodriguez discovered that LVNV had sued the wrong Yolanda Rodriguez, as the debt was incurred by someone with a different date of birth and Social Security number. LVNV dismissed its suit, but Rodriguez continued with her cross-claim, arguing that the FDCPA and Rosenthal Acts are strict liability statutes that penalize false or misleading debt collection actions unless a "bona fide error" defense applies.The Superior Court of Fresno County granted LVNV's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Rodriguez could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits because there was nothing false, deceptive, or misleading about the debt collection action. The court found that even the "least sophisticated debtor" would have recognized the address on the documentation was not hers, and there was "nothing inherently false" about the complaint being served on the wrong person.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the FDCPA creates a strict liability cause of action for attempts to collect a debt that misrepresent or falsely present the "character" or "amount" of a debt owed. The court noted that numerous federal courts have interpreted the FDCPA as allowing a cause of action for cases of mistaken identity. The court found that Rodriguez's claims had minimal merit and that the trial court erred in concluding she could not show a probability of succeeding on the merits. The order granting LVNV's anti-SLAPP motion was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "LVNV Funding v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Dr. Laura Dean Head passed away in 2013, leaving behind her sisters, Della Hamlin and Helaine Head. Shortly before her death, Dr. Head executed a trust naming her former student and friend, Zakiya Jendayi, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. In 2020, Hamlin and Head petitioned the probate court to invalidate the trust, alleging undue influence, lack of capacity, and forgery. After a 17-day bench trial, the court found that Jendayi had exerted undue influence over Dr. Head and invalidated the trust.The Alameda County Superior Court held a bench trial and found that the trust was presumptively the product of undue influence. The court shifted the burden to Jendayi to disprove undue influence, which she failed to do. The court found that Dr. Head was vulnerable and dependent on Jendayi, who used her position to unduly benefit from the trust. The court invalidated the trust and ordered the assets transferred to the special administrator of Dr. Head’s estate.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that Hamlin and Head, as potential intestate heirs, had standing to contest the trust. The court found substantial evidence supporting the probate court’s application of the presumption of undue influence and its finding that Jendayi unduly influenced Dr. Head. The court also rejected Jendayi’s claims of judicial bias and found no deficiencies in the probate court’s statement of decision that warranted reversal. The appellate court concluded that the probate court did not err in its findings and affirmed the judgment. View "Hamlin v. Jendayi" on Justia Law

Silvia Villareal created a revocable living trust in 2005, which she amended in 2018 and again in 2019. The trust named her three children, Leticia Linzer, Arturo Villareal, and Sonia Godoy, as beneficiaries, each to receive a one-third interest in her home. The 2018 amendment suggested, but did not mandate, that the property be kept within the family. The 2019 amendment, however, imposed mandatory conditions that any sale of the property be limited to $100,000 and only to the siblings, with flexible payment terms.After Silvia's death in 2020, Arturo and Sonia petitioned the Los Angeles County Superior Court to determine whether the 2019 amendment's conditions were mandatory and, if so, to declare them void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation under California Civil Code section 711. The probate court found the conditions mandatory and void, ruling that they unreasonably restricted the siblings' ability to sell their interests at fair market value. The court declared the 2019 amendment void and upheld the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the probate court's decision, holding that section 711 applies to testamentary instruments and prohibits unreasonable restraints on alienation. The court found that the 2019 amendment's conditions were indeed an unreasonable restraint, as they significantly devalued the property and limited the market to only two potential buyers. The court also rejected Leticia's argument that the 2019 amendment created a new testamentary trust, finding no clear intent or adherence to the procedures for establishing a separate trust. Thus, the 2018 restatement remained the operative trust document. View "Godoy v. Linzner" on Justia Law

LCPFV, LLC owned a warehouse with a faulty sewer pipe. After experiencing toilet backups, LCPFV hired Rapid Plumbing to fix the issue for $47,883.40. Rapid's work was unsatisfactory, so LCPFV hired another plumber for $44,077 to redo the job. LCPFV sued Rapid Plumbing, which initially responded but later defaulted. LCPFV sought a default judgment of $1,081,263.80, including attorney fees and punitive damages. The trial court awarded a default judgment of $120,319.22, which included attorney fees and other costs, and also awarded $11,852.90 in sanctions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case. Rapid Plumbing initially participated but ceased involvement after their attorney withdrew. LCPFV then filed numerous motions and requests for sanctions, despite knowing Rapid would not respond. The trial court struck Rapid's answer and granted LCPFV's motion to have its requests for admission deemed admitted, but ultimately awarded a significantly lower judgment than LCPFV sought.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, emphasizing the trial court's role as a gatekeeper in default judgment cases. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in rejecting LCPFV's use of requests for admissions to establish fraud and punitive damages. The court also upheld the trial court's reduced award of attorney fees, noting the excessive nature of LCPFV's request given the simplicity of the case and the lack of opposition. Additionally, the appellate court supported the trial court's decision on sanctions and prejudgment interest, affirming that the trial court's awards were appropriate and justified. View "LCPFV v. Somatdary" on Justia Law

The Comedy Store, a stand-up comedy venue in Los Angeles, was forced to close for over a year due to COVID-19 restrictions. In July 2021, the Store hired Moss Adams LLP, an accounting firm, to help apply for a Shuttered Venue Operator Grant from the U.S. Small Business Administration. The parties signed an agreement that included a Washington choice of law provision and a forum selection clause mandating disputes be resolved in Washington state courts. The Store alleges Moss Adams failed to inform it of the grant program's impending expiration, causing the Store to miss the application deadline and lose an $8.5 million grant.The Store initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Los Angeles, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Store then refiled in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting claims including gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Moss Adams moved to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion, contingent on Moss Adams stipulating that the Store could exercise its right to a jury trial in Washington state. Moss Adams provided such a stipulation, and the trial court signed an order to that effect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in failing to properly allocate the burden of proof to Moss Adams to show that litigating in Washington would not diminish the Store’s unwaivable right to a jury trial. The appellate court concluded that Moss Adams did not meet this burden, as it did not demonstrate that Washington law would provide the same or greater rights to a jury trial or that a Washington court would apply California law. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with instructions to deny Moss Adams’s motion to dismiss or stay the action. View "The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP" on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney filed a complaint against Experian Data Corp. on March 6, 2018, alleging a violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) due to Experian's failure to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The complaint sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. Experian demurred, arguing the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the claim.The trial court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence of civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint. The parties then stipulated to dismiss the entire complaint, and the City Attorney appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The court also vacated the order denying the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "P. v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law