Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute among co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust, specifically Allison Littlefield, her brothers David and Scott Littlefield, and her aunt Denise Sobel. Allison filed a petition alleging various grievances, including the removal of co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the Trust. She claimed that the co-trustees misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, and restricted her and her husband's use of the Ranch. Additionally, she alleged that the co-trustees failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who had been hostile towards her and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to prevent lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights. The court found that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, concluding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the petition was based on protected activity. However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees. The appellate court found that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because it was entirely without merit, as no reasonable attorney would conclude that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

In March 2011, a grand jury indicted Prentice Robinson on multiple felony charges, including attempted murder, for crimes committed between January and February 2011. Robinson pleaded no contest to several charges, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, which led to an evidentiary hearing. Robinson appealed the trial court's denial of his petition, arguing that the court erred by considering grand jury testimony, which he claimed was inadmissible hearsay.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially sentenced Robinson based on his no contest plea and the grand jury transcripts. In 2022, Robinson sought resentencing under new laws that amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court found that Robinson made a prima facie case for relief but ultimately denied his petition after considering the grand jury transcripts and other evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the grand jury testimony was admissible under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), which allows the consideration of evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial if it remains admissible under current law. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also determined that Robinson's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply in the context of a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing, as it is a postconviction collateral proceeding. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Robinson's petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

Marlon Quesada, a deputy sheriff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was not promoted to sergeant despite taking the sergeant's examination in 2017 and 2019, scoring in band two and band one respectively. Quesada had a mixed employment record, including two suspensions for misconduct and a 2015 investigation that was terminated due to the statute of limitations. Quesada claimed the Department improperly considered this time-barred investigation during the promotion process.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Quesada's petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department to promote him and provide back pay and other damages. The trial court rejected Quesada's argument for a burden-shifting approach and found that Quesada did not establish that the Department's decision was illegal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Quesada argued that the trial court should have applied a burden-shifting approach similar to that used in discrimination cases under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The appellate court declined to adopt this approach, noting that Quesada's case did not involve discrimination based on race or membership in a historically oppressed group. The court emphasized that the standard approach to civil litigation, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, was appropriate.The appellate court also found substantial evidence supporting the Department's decision not to promote Quesada, citing his mediocre performance evaluations and past misconduct. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Quesada's policy arguments did not justify a departure from the standard legal approach. View "Quesada v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2021, the San Diego City Council approved new franchise agreements granting San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) the exclusive right to provide gas and electric services in San Diego. Kathryn Burton, a San Diego resident, filed a lawsuit against the City and the Council members, alleging a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Burton claimed that the Council members had discussed and agreed on their votes in a "secret serial meeting" using the mayor as an intermediary before approving the agreements.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed SDG&E to intervene as a defendant. SDG&E, along with the City defendants, moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, concluding that Burton failed to comply with the Brown Act's requirement to make a prelitigation demand to the legislative body to cure or correct the alleged violation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. Burton argued that she had satisfied the demand requirement through letters sent by her later-hired attorney, Maria Severson. However, the court found that Severson's letters did not mention Burton and were not sent on her behalf. The court held that Burton did not comply with the statutory requirement to make a demand before filing the lawsuit, as required by section 54960.1 of the Government Code.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that Burton's appeal lacked merit due to her failure to comply with the demand requirement. The court also found that Burton's challenge to the order allowing SDG&E to intervene was moot, as the summary judgment was properly granted regardless of SDG&E's participation. View "Burton v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The case involves Eliseo Martinez, who restrained Nicasio Calixto Pascual while his cousin, Valente Martinez, stabbed Calixto 18 times. During an interview with detectives, Martinez admitted his participation in the stabbing. Martinez appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion and violated his rights by finding him voluntarily absent from the trial.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found Martinez guilty of attempted murder and determined several aggravating circumstances, including that the crime was a hate crime. Martinez was sentenced to 23 years in state prison, which included enhancements for a prior serious felony conviction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence that Martinez acted in the heat of passion. The court found that neither Calixto’s behavior nor Martinez’s version of events constituted sufficient provocation. Additionally, the court noted that Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) prohibits considering provocation based on the victim’s sexual orientation as objectively reasonable.Regarding Martinez’s absence from the trial, the appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that Martinez voluntarily absented himself. The court noted that Martinez was aware of the trial proceedings, had no sound reason for his absence, and had refused to attend court despite being given the opportunity. The appellate court concluded that any error in proceeding with the trial in Martinez’s absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Mark did not appear at trial, and the court entered judgment against him, awarding Jennifer $250,000 in damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Kovtun argued that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications. The judgment against Kovtun was affirmed. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Michael Riste applied for a bail bond for his son, Michael Peterson, and signed an Indemnity Agreement and a Premium Agreement with Bad Boys Bail Bonds (Bail Agent). The agreements required Riste to pay a $10,000 premium in installments. Peterson signed identical documents after his release. The Bail Agent executed a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of The North River Insurance Company (Surety), ensuring Peterson's appearance at future court proceedings. Peterson failed to appear, leading to the forfeiture of the bail bond and a summary judgment against the Surety in October 2015.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied appellants' previous motions to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. Two different panels of the Court of Appeal affirmed these denials. In October 2020, a class action cross-claim was filed against BBBB Bonding Corporation (doing business as the Bail Agent), arguing that their bail bond premium financing agreements were subject to Civil Code section 1799.91 and thus unenforceable. The trial court agreed, and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, affirming a preliminary injunction against BBBB.In September 2022, appellants filed a third motion to set aside the summary judgment, citing the Caldwell decision. They argued that the premium was part of the consideration for the bail bond, making the bond void and the summary judgment invalid. The trial court denied the motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that the bail bond was not void because the consideration for the bail bond was Peterson's release from custody, not the premium financing agreement. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction, and the summary judgment was valid. View "P. v. North River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.The trial court had previously found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, but on appeal, his first-degree murder conviction was reversed due to a change in the law, and his sentence was reduced to second-degree murder. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied, but his third petition led to the current proceedings. The trial court's decision to quash the subpoena was based on the belief that the evidentiary hearing should be limited to the facts presented at trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court held that denying Garcia the ability to obtain relevant evidence would thwart his right to present or respond to new or additional evidence at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing Garcia from obtaining contact information for the witnesses, which could be crucial for his defense against new theories of liability. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the LAPD's motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Robert Mann, a taxpayer, filed a lawsuit against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies. Mann argued that the impoundment of vehicles without a warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful, unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, and to revise its notice form to advise owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition and entered judgment in favor of defendant Warren A. Stanley, who had retired before the trial. The court found that Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper defendant. The trial court issued a permanent injunction requiring CHP to revise its vehicle impound procedures, including considering the ability to pay and revising notice forms.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the injunction improperly required CHP to contravene valid statutes, relied on inapplicable case law, conflicted with the existing statutory scheme, and mandated unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in requiring CHP to conduct ability-to-pay hearings and revise its notice forms, as these requirements were not mandated by due process and conflicted with statutory provisions. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellant. View "Mann v. State of Cal." on Justia Law