Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) challenging the County of Los Angeles and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) over the implementation of Penal Code sections 13670 and 13510.8. These sections, effective January 1, 2022, prohibit law enforcement gang participation and authorize revocation of peace officer certification for serious misconduct, including gang participation. On May 12, 2023, the OIG sent letters to 35 Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputies, directing them to participate in interviews about law enforcement gangs and to display and provide photographs of certain tattoos. ALADS filed an unfair labor practice claim and sought injunctive relief, arguing that the interviews violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the OIG from conducting the interviews until the County completed its meet-and-confer obligations under the MMBA or until the unfair labor practice claim was adjudicated. The court found that the interview directive had significant and adverse effects on the deputies' working conditions, thus triggering the duty to meet and confer.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the OIG’s interview directive, which required deputies to disclose their own and their colleagues' gang affiliations under threat of discipline, had significant and adverse effects on working conditions. The court held that these effects necessitated bargaining under the MMBA. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the interim harm, noting the lack of compelling need for immediate investigation and the potential irreparable harm to ALADS from the County’s failure to meet and confer. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Freddy Rivera Corbi was bullied by gang members in his community for years. In the summer of 2019, a gang member stabbed him in the wrist with a broken beer bottle, causing serious injuries. A month later, Corbi encountered another member of the same gang, Lazaro Orozco, and fatally shot him after an argument. The main issue at trial was whether the shooting was in self-defense or an act of revenge by Corbi, who was alleged to be a member of a rival gang. The jury convicted Corbi of second-degree murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County sentenced Corbi to 15 years to life for the murder, plus an additional 10 years for a firearm enhancement. Corbi appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing certain expert testimony, that the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) during closing arguments, and that the court improperly imposed the firearm enhancement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony, as it was based on the expert's experience and relevant to the case. The court also held that Corbi forfeited his RJA claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Finally, the court determined that the trial court had the discretion to impose the firearm enhancement, even though it resulted in a sentence exceeding 20 years, and that the court properly considered the mitigating factors and the nature of the offense.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding Corbi's conviction and sentence. View "P. v. Corbi" on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim, stating it was not presented within six months of accrual as required by section 911.2. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which the County also denied. He then filed a petition for relief from the notice requirement in the trial court, arguing his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misadvised by three attorneys about the claim period.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy failed to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and fell under the six-month claims period in section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also argued the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred in ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed the section 1170(d) resentencing provision despite amendments to related laws. The court also found that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and placing him outside juvenile court jurisdiction.The court declined to reverse the stay order, noting it would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. The court presumed the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation would calculate Bagsby's custody credits correctly. View "People v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

Francisco Carlos Ibarra was convicted by a jury of the attempted murders of A.U. and R.M., and two counts of attempted robbery. The incident occurred on a rural property used for illegal marijuana cultivation, where Ibarra and others, wearing black clothes and ski masks, fired multiple shots into a shed where A.U. and R.M. were hiding. A.U. was severely injured, and R.M. was shot in the back. Ibarra was sentenced to a total of six years plus an indeterminate sentence of 14 years to life.The Superior Court of Riverside County found Ibarra guilty on all counts and imposed consecutive sentences for the attempted murders and robberies. Ibarra appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory of attempted murder, failing to instruct on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, and imposing consecutive sentences.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court agreed that the evidence did not support the "kill zone" instruction for the attempted murder of R.M., as there was no evidence Ibarra knew R.M. was present in the shed. Consequently, the conviction for the attempted murder of R.M. was reversed, and the case was remanded for a potential retrial on that count. The court found no error in the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, as there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. Additionally, the court upheld the imposition of consecutive sentences, concluding that the attempted murders were not incidental to the robberies and involved gratuitous violence.The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions for potential retrial and resentencing. View "People v. Ibarra" on Justia Law

Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion. They then filed a lawsuit in New York to enforce this judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly. During post-judgment proceedings, Zion revealed that his friend, Chaim Cohen, was covering his expenses. The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen, which he initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to provide unredacted American Express statements. Cohen's non-compliance with this order led to contempt proceedings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Cohen guilty of contempt for failing to comply with the discovery order. The court imposed a $3,000 fine and ordered Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs. Cohen appealed, challenging the court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, arguing that he was not a party to the original litigation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the original lawsuit. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and the broader context of post-judgment enforcement mechanisms support this interpretation. The court concluded that Cohen, as a party to the post-judgment enforcement proceedings, was subject to the court's order and liable for attorney’s fees for his contempt. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Grace Gonzalez slipped and fell on oranges in the common walkway of the Ontario Mills Shopping Center, owned by Ontario Mills Limited Partnership (OMLP) and maintained by Interstate Cleaning Corporation (ICC). Gonzalez and her granddaughters did not see the oranges before the fall, nor did they know how long the oranges had been there. An employee from a nearby store helped Gonzalez after the fall, and a security guard escorted her to a family car.Gonzalez filed a premises liability lawsuit against OMLP and ICC. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled oranges and could not have remedied the condition in time. They provided evidence of their rigorous training and maintenance regimens, including the use of an electronic tracking system called "Lighthouse" to monitor janitorial inspections. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding the defendants' lack of knowledge of the spill.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the defendants conducted reasonable and frequent inspections of the floors, including the area where Gonzalez fell. The court found that the eight- to nine-minute interval between the last inspection and the fall was insufficient to establish constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Therefore, the defendants could not be held liable for Gonzalez's injuries. The court also noted that Gonzalez did not challenge the trial court's evidentiary rulings on appeal, and thus, the excluded evidence could not be considered. View "Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp." on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's orders were void due to lack of statutory authority and that they violated her constitutional and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it could order a vocational evaluation based on public policy and statutory provisions, including Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court emphasized that section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf failed to provide. The court also noted that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the vocational evaluation order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) regarding the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested disability accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, seeking extensions of time and other procedural relief. The trial court granted six of these requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG argued that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the incomplete response.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that further delays would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which it failed to do. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection" on Justia Law

In 2013, Dr. Johnathan Slone began working as a general surgeon at El Centro Regional Medical Center (Center) on a locum tenens basis. Despite not being board-certified, he was granted full staff privileges in January 2015. In April 2016, Slone became an employee of the Imperial Valley MultiSpecialty Medical Group (IVMSMG) and later entered into a contract with Community Care IPA (IPA) to provide healthcare administrative services. By July 2017, Slone had not been paid by IVMSMG for several months and subsequently resigned, citing financial reasons and the Center's requirement for future board certification. He then began working full-time for IPA and did not perform any surgeries thereafter. In September 2017, the Center suspended his privileges for failing to complete medical records, and by March 2018, his suspension was deemed a voluntary resignation.Slone filed a lawsuit against the Center in February 2021, alleging unlawful retaliation under Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 after he reported concerns about patient care. The case proceeded to a bench trial on this cause of action. The trial court found in favor of the Center, concluding that Slone did not suffer retaliation and had not proven any economic or noneconomic damages.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Slone did not meet his burden on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the Center did not retaliate against Slone for his complaints about patient care. The court also upheld the trial court's findings that Slone voluntarily resigned from his surgical practice to pursue a full-time administrative role with IPA and did not suffer any damages as a result of the alleged retaliation. View "Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law